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EDITORIAL 
 
 
xi 
This year's report comes at a time when doubts on continued steady output growth have emerged and the 
optimism of the Spring that the European economy is emerging into the post-crisis world has become 
more cautious.  This optimism is moreover further muted by the risks associated with the Member States 
with high spreads on their bond yields, as concerns about solvency and sustainability persist. 
The issue of sustainability has emerged as the key concern in the immediate post-crisis years. Soaring 
deficits and off-balance-sheet operations to support the financial sector have led to a large increase in debt 
for nearly all European Union countries. Despite the fact that a return of GDP growth, a gradual 
withdrawal of the temporary support measures and the start of consolidation is starting to reduce deficits, 
debt is still expected to continue increasing for the next year or so in most cases. Once it has reached its 
peak, the issue is not over. It will not be sufficient to stem the increase; rather, additional consolidation 
measures will be required to reduce it from its new level, not least because population ageing is due to 
have an increasingly negative effect on the public finances and put pressure on their sustainability in 
coming decades. 
These issues and the appropriate policy responses to deal with the challenge we have ahead of us are 
considered in detail in the 2011 Report on the Public Finances in EMU. The report provides an overview 
of the current developments, looking at recent outcomes and both the Commission services' and the 
Member States' own projections for the public finances. This provides the background to discuss the 
proposed reform to economic and budgetary surveillance which is currently nearing the end of the 
adoption process and which seeks to put into action the main lessons learnt from the crisis. The report 
discusses the various parts of the reform in details, looking at the changes to the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), as well as the other proposals which accompany it and are key to an integrated policy change. 
It shows how the reform package addresses the weaknesses identified by the crisis, both in terms of the 
setting of policy and the correction of deviations from the optimal path. 
One of the proposals that accompany the changes to the SGP is the inclusion of a directive prescribing 
minimum requirements for national fiscal frameworks. The first analytical section of the report considers 
the impact that fiscal frameworks have on bond spreads and finds that an improvement in the quality of 
national budgetary decision-making can make an important contribution to the magnitude of spreads. This 
is particularly the case for countries with the weakest processes – which incidentally also tend to be the 
countries with the largest spreads.  
The second analytical chapter discusses the measurement of sustainability and presents a number of 
extensions to the existing methodology that is used by the European Commission. Being able to 
accurately estimate the strengths and weaknesses faced by different countries and the challenges they face 
is key to taking appropriate action and addressing problems in a timely and apposite manner. 
Given the difficult times that euro area has faced in recent years, and the central role that debt 
sustainability has come to play for a number of particularly affected countries, I trust that this year's 
report will provide a much needed addition to the debate of how to emerge from this crisis economically 
wiser than we went in. 
Marco Buti 
Director-General 
Economic and Financial Affairs 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
1 
The economic and financial crisis affected all European Union (EU) 
countries between 2008 and 2010. After a contraction in 2009 in every EU 
country (except Poland), growth returned in 2010 in all but five peripheral 
countries. Despite growth continuing through the beginning of 2011, the 
depth of the recession was such that the overall output level is expected to 
only just approach its pre-crisis level by the end 2011. For some countries, 
however, the effects on output have been much more dramatic; by 2010 
Ireland's output was 10% below its 2007 level, Estonia's over 15% below and 
Latvia's around 20% below its 2007 level. While the recovery was back on 
aggregate at the beginning of 2011, the overall economic situation remains 
fragile as  is shown by somewhat weaker-than-expected growth in the second 
quarter of 2011, and in some countries the recovery is yet to be felt.   
Nevertheless, the tentative  turnaround that started over the course of 2009 
indicates that it is now time to shift the policy focus to the longer term 
challenges that have resulted from these difficult times, especially in certain 
EU countries. While in 2010 several countries continued to support their 
economies through discretionary measures, other countries had less room for 
manoeuvre given their underlying public finance situation, and were already 
withdrawing measures and consolidating their public finances. Overall, this 
resulted in an improvement in the structural balance in both the EU and euro 
area. In 2011, this consolidation is being stepped up, with all euro area 
Member States improving their underlying budget balance through fiscal 
tightenings and both the euro area and EU27 averages showing a stronger 
structural budgetary position.  
The need for consolidation should not be underestimated. The years of the 
crisis left behind a legacy, not just of support measures that need to be 
reversed, but of lasting weaknesses to the public finances. The higher public 
deficits and below-the-line operations in support of the financial sector 
combined to drive up public debt. In the EU27, unless additional policy 
measures are legislated for, debt is forecast to rise from 59.0 % of GDP in 
2007 to 83.3% in 2012; for the euro area the corresponding figures are an 
increase from 66.3% to 88.7%. The challenge is not just to stem the increase 
in debt – if countries follow through the plans that they set out in their 2011 
Stability and Convergence Programmes then overall, stabilisation is expected 
in 2012 – but also to reverse the increases. Higher debt is costly in terms of 
interest payments with the additional taxes needed to service it negatively 
affecting growth and such negative effects being multiplied by the risk 
premia. The demographic trends are also such that the medium-term future is 
set to be marked by higher costs of ageing and lower potential growth as 
fewer working age people shoulder the burden of relatively more older 
individuals. The issue of the sustainability of the public finances is set to 
intensify in the coming decades. 
These increases in the level of debt are the result of both the policies 
introduced during the crisis years and the underlying fiscal positions that 
developed during the previous period. Over the years 2007 to 2009, fiscal 
balances deteriorated overall from an average deficit of 0.7% of GDP to 6.3% 
in the euro area and from 0.9% of GDP to 6.8% in the EU, with the automatic 
stabilisers being responsible for about half the deterioration. In addition, 
temporary support measures also contributed to the increases in the deficits 
The recovery is here – 
but growth is still 
delicate. 
The consolidation has 
started and set to 
intensify in 2011… 
…which is crucial as 
the crisis had a strong 
impact on the public 
finances, with a lasting 
increase in the debt 
level. 
The increase in debt 
has been caused by 
both the direct 
impact of the crisis 
and by policy-making 
in previous years. 
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2 
and with the return of growth their fiscal cost will need to be addressed. 
Moreover, not only was policy after 2007 responsible for the deterioration in 
the fiscal positions, but so was policy in the run-up to the crisis. 
The onset of the crisis exposed underlying weaknesses in many Member 
States' public finances, which had been allowed to develop over the first 
decade or so of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Before the crisis, 
assets and particularly real estate booms in some Member States, the 
counterpart of which was an increase in private debt, temporarily masked an 
underlying fiscal weakness because tax receipts depended heavily on debt-
fuelled consumption and real estate transactions. There has been a large and 
irreversible impact on fiscal positions from the slump as these revenues 
plummeted. As these windfall revenues were typically used to fund 
expenditure programmes, a lasting deficit appeared when the revenues dried 
up. The consolidation needs for these countries are particularly strong, as the 
return of growth will not provide enough of a cyclical improvement in the 
public finances. 
EU Member States are required by the Treaty to ensure that their government 
deficits do not exceed 3% of GDP and that their debt levels should be 
declining to below 60%.  Moreover, even when within these limits, countries 
should aim at a medium-term fiscal position that insures them against shocks 
and promotes long-term sustainability. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
sets out the implementation provisions for looking at both the overall 
medium-term orientation of fiscal policy in its preventive arm and the way in 
which excesses over the Treaty values are treated as part of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP) in its corrective arm.  
In 2009 and 2010, the Council applied the corrective arm of the SGP to 
almost all EU Member States. Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Malta, 
Poland, Bulgaria, Denmark. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, 
France, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia Slovakia, 
Cyprus and Finland were placed under the EDP, while Hungary and the 
United Kingdom had their prior recommendations amended. Finland's EDP 
has since been abrogated. In 2010, the Council gave notice to Greece to take 
measures to correct its excessive deficit by 2012. The requirements of 
Member States placed under the EDP were set so as to take the particular 
needs and circumstances of the different countries in the wake of the Great 
recession into account as allowed by the SGP rules. The deadlines set for the 
correction of the excessive deficits have been set depending on the size of 
consolidation that is required, taking wider issues of sustainability and 
budgetary risks into account. 
The Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) set out Member States' 
budgetary strategies to meet the requirements in the EDPs and their progress 
towards meeting Medium Term Budgetary Objectives (MTOs) over the 
coming years. The latest round of SCPs covers the years up to 2014 and was 
presented in early 2011 as part of the newly introduced European Semester, 
which allows for policy advice to be received by Member States ahead of the 
approval of their 2012 budgets. 
The plans set out in this round of the SCPs are based on growth assumptions 
that are broadly in line – albeit marginally more optimistic – than those set 
EU countries are 
bound to keep their 
deficits and debt in 
check and to aim at 
long-term fiscal 
positions that insure 
them against shocks 
and promote long-
term sustainability. 
The latest SCP plans to 
meet medium term 
budgetary objectives 
show a stronger 
consolidation than the 
Commission Spring 
forecasts.... 
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out by the Commission in the 2011 Spring forecasts. They show a 
considerable reduction in the budget deficit over the years under 
consideration, with the euro area overall reaching the 3% deficit threshold in 
2012, somewhat lower than the Commission forecasts.  
 
The main differences between the SCP plans and those forecast by the 
Commission are due to the inclusion in the SCPs of policies that are not yet 
specified. While the Commission forecasts are based on a 'no-policy-change' 
assumption which only considers measures that have been specified and 
committed to by governments, the SCP figures also consider the policies that 
governments plan to introduce. The extra consolidation measures included in 
the SCPs mean, not only that the deficits shrink faster, but that debt is also 
forecast to reach its inflection point in 2012, and to begin falling as a share of 
GDP from then on.  
The fact that the governments' plans depend on these extra consolidation 
measures raises the question of whether or not they will actually be realised. 
There is always the risk that the extra measures will not be introduced, as it is 
clear that consolidation measures tend to have a political cost. That said, the 
details given in the SCPs are encouraging – the time profiles of the fiscal 
tightenings that are given are generally front-loaded, indicating that 
governments intend to introduce necessary changes in the near future rather 
than postponing them with uncertain results. Moreover, they tend to be 
expenditure based. While a consolidation can be the result of a mix of tax 
increases or spending cuts, evidence from the past indicates that expenditure 
based consolidations tend to have greater success, in terms of the effect that 
they have on the overall public finances. Whether a primarily revenue or 
expenditure based consolidation is appropriate for a particular country 
depends on its particular characteristics – in some cases it will be difficult to 
cut spending further, while in others starting high levels of revenue act as a 
real constraint. 
It is clear that while the recovery is under way, the fiscal repair process – and 
its attending costs – will last for years to come. This is not just because the 
recession was particularly severe but also because the imprudent policies of 
the years before the crisis have left their mark. The preventive and corrective 
arms of the SGP were meant to ensure that countries maintained an 
underlying fiscal position in terms of their MTO that was close to balance or 
surplus, thereby ensuring that the absolute deficit did not exceed 3% of GDP 
in recession and the debt was brought rapidly below 60%. The objectives 
were meant to include a potential 'pre-financing' of future age-related 
expenditure. In practice, even in 2007 – a year of which came after a period 
of sustained favourable economic conditions – few countries were at their 
MTO. In addition, although countries were consistently placed under the 
EDP when their deficits exceeded 3% of GDP, the debt criterion was never 
explicitly adhered to. In particular, the EU secondary legislation which 
implements the provisions of the EDP does not provide any specification 
about the implementation of this criterion. While this absence does not 
legally exclude the possibility that countries could be placed in EDP for high 
levels of debt, it does render it more analytically and politically difficult. 
…based on additional 
measures being 
taken. 
The coming years will 
be difficult – in part 
because the pre-crisis 
years were not 
prudent enough. The 
provisions of the SGP 
were not sufficient to 
ensure, that prudent 
policies were pursued. 
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As a result of the weakness identified in the pre-crisis EU-level budgetary 
surveillance, the Commission has proposed a reform package with the aim of 
updating the SGP to take on board the lessons learnt from the crisis and 
introducing further aspects of surveillance and budgetary policy to improve 
policy making and avoid mistakes that are now apparent. Specifically, the 
package seeks to reform both the preventive and the corrective arms of the 
SGP, strengthen and introduce further sanctions for non-compliance with the 
SGP, introduce a new European Imbalances Procedure to look at wider issues 
of economic governance and introduce a new directive on national fiscal 
frameworks to improve fiscal policy making at a national level. While the 
adoption of the package was awaiting final approval by the Council and the 
European Parliament when this publication went to print, all its principal 
characteristics can be considered to be in place. 
The reform of the preventive arm of the SGP introduces the concept of an 
expenditure benchmark in assessing whether fiscal policy is appropriate, in 
the sense of being consistent with maintaining or approaching a country's 
MTO. The expenditure benchmark will be used alongside the examination of 
the structural balance in assessing the orientation of fiscal policy both on an 
ex ante and an ex post basis. It will require that net expenditure growth (that 
is, expenditure growth, net of any discretionary increases in revenues) be 
below a reference medium term potential growth rate of the economy. 
Countries at the MTO will need to show that net expenditure growth is in line 
with this estimate of economic growth, while those that more than meet their 
MTO will face looser constraints. This condition aims to ensure that 
countries no longer finance expenditure growth out of cyclical increases in 
revenues. Evidence from the years in the run-up to the crisis shows that the 
positive revenue surprises that many countries experienced tended to be used 
to increase expenditure rather than to reduce borrowing in debt. This led to 
insufficient strengthening of the underlying budgetary position, high levels of 
expenditure that were difficult to reduce once the underlying economic 
fundamentals changed and higher than desirable levels of debt. By increasing 
the focus on how government expenditure  is financed, the quality of fiscal 
decision making can be improved.  
Meanwhile, the reform of the corrective arm of the SGP places debt at the 
centre of the SGP by providing the secondary legislation to operationalise the 
debt criterion. The requirement to ensure that debt is either at or below the 
60% threshold or sufficiently diminishing towards it is placed on an equal 
footing to the 3% deficit criterion. So far, despite the deficit and debt criteria 
being on an equal footing in the Treaty, no country has been placed in EDP 
as a result of its debt. In the future, a breach of either criterion will be 
sufficient to place a country in EDP. The proposed legislation introduces a 
numerical benchmark for judging whether debt is sufficiently diminishing 
and amends the implementation provisions that previously focussed only on 
the deficit to also take the debt into account. At the same time, reflecting the 
greater impact on the evolution of the debt ratio of factors beyond the control 
of the government, non-respect of the benchmark, even adjusted for the 
cycle, will not necessarily result in the concerned country being placed in 
EDP. This decision will have to take into account all factors that are relevant 
in the sense of entering or mitigating the fiscal risks associated with high 
debt. A special transitional period is foreseen to allow high-debt countries, 
which are currently all subject to the EDP, to adapt to the new setup, where 
Introducing a new 
reform package 
which includes… 
…changes to the 
preventive arm of the 
SGP and …. 
…changes to the 
corrective arm. This 
introduces provisions 
to operationalise the 
debt criterion… 
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deficits below 3% – sometimes significantly so – will be required for 
compliance with the debt benchmark. The reform also affords greater leeway 
in taking relevant factors into account before placing a country in EDP in the 
case of a breach of the deficit criterion, if the country concerned has a public 
debt of below 60% of GDP. The overall thrust of the reform is therefore on 
concentrating on gross fiscal policy errors. 
The changes to the preventive and corrective arms of the SGP should 
improve the Pact's ability to ensure strong public finances. But this will only 
happen if the Pact is effectively enforced. So far, it can be argued that the 
Pact was more binding in difficult than in good times. But even when 
breaches of the corrective arm were identified, no use was ever made of the 
more punitive financial sanctions that existed thus weakening the urgency 
with which corrective action was taken. Conversely, there were no sanctions 
in the preventive arm, beyond the possibility for the Council to address an 
"early warning" to Member States whose policy was found to be in breach of 
the requirements to be at or move towards the MTO. 
The reform changes this picture significantly, at least for the euro area 
countries, which become subject to two new enforcement mechanisms. With 
the reform, an interest-bearing deposit could be levied on euro area countries 
that are found not to have made sufficient progress towards their MTOs and 
fail to comply with a recommendation to take measures. And in the corrective 
arm, sanctions are enhanced and apply earlier in the process. At the time 
when an excessive deficit is identified by the Council, the euro area country 
in question may already become liable to a non-interest-bearing deposit, 
which is then upgraded to a fine if the country is later found not to have taken 
sufficient action in response to the initial recommendations to correct the 
excessive deficit. Both these penalties will apply earlier than the fine 
originally possible under the SGP, which can be applied only when a country 
has failed on two successive instances to comply with EDP 
recommendations. 
Beyond the introduction of new sanctions, positive pressure on countries to 
comply with the SGP may increase as a result of the new provision for 
economic dialogue introduced in the reform: the competent committee of the 
European Parliament is expected to hold regular discussions on surveillance 
involving the Council and the Commission and, in the case of country-
specific surveillance measures, the countries concerned. 
While the European rules set the framework within which fiscal policy is to 
be determined, it is at the national level that budgetary decisions are actually 
taken. The quality of the decisions taken and the process for taking them 
varies greatly from Member State to Member State. In order to ensure that 
the worst performing Member States learn from the best performing ones and 
take on board some valuable lessons in policy setting, a directive on national 
fiscal frameworks is also included in the reform package. It sets out minimum 
requirements for domestic fiscal frameworks, while allowing Member States 
to choose the means for complying with them. This is in recognition of the 
fact that the optimal procedural and institutional set-up for fiscal-policy 
making will depend on the different characteristics of Member States, 
meaning that there is no one model that can or should be applied in all cases. 
The directive covers the quality of accounting and statistics, the 
…and enhance the 
enforcement 
mechanism. Sanctions 
are also being 
introduced to the 
preventive arm of the 
Pact for the first time. 
But the EU rules 
cannot be effective 
without national 
decision-making 
supporting them, so a 
new directive on 
national fiscal 
frameworks is part of 
the reform process. 
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macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts that they use, the numerical fiscal 
rules that they have in place, the existence of medium-term budgetary 
frameworks and the transparency of the their finances. By adhering the 
requirements in the directive, the decision-making process in the worst 
performing Member States can be enhanced. Adequate processes within 
Member States are a sine qua non to strong European-wide public finances. 
The idea that processes have an impact on fiscal outcomes can be seen by 
analysing the impact of fiscal governance on sovereign spreads. Sovereign 
spreads are the differential between a country's sovereign bond yield and the 
yield of a risk-free bond and are determined by the perceived risk linked to 
the probability that a government will default on its debt and the associated 
loss given the default. As fiscal governance procedures are increasingly 
recognised as determining the quality of fiscal decision making, it would be 
expected that better procedures should be linked to lower perceived default 
probabilities and lower spreads. Results from an econometric analysis which 
looks at the impact of measures of fiscal governance, while controlling for 
other variables, on the yield spread, confirm this reasoning: holding other 
characteristics such as the level of the deficit and debt constant, a higher 
quality of rules based fiscal governance is linked with a lower yield spread. 
The results also indicate that those countries with the highest deficits and 
debt have the most to gain from an improvement in their fiscal governance in 
terms of a reduction in their spreads.  
The role played by sovereign spreads in the euro zone has increased 
dramatically with the onset of the crisis. Prior to the crisis, there was little 
difference in the bond prices of the various euro zone countries. Although the 
EU had a stated policy of not bailing out any country that might find itself 
facing sovereign default, the markets had not priced in the possibility that a 
euro area country might default on its debt. Whether this was due to the 
perceived credibility of the SGP to contain deficits and debt, or the perceived 
irrelevance of the so-called no bailout clause, spreads were low and only 
started to widen in 2009. As a number of countries found themselves facing 
the possibility of not being able to finance their debt due to the cost imposed 
by the markets and the financial stability of the euro area as a whole was 
considered under threat, the EU and its Member States put together assistance 
packages for Greece, Ireland and the Portugal. 
Alongside the assistance programmes and the temporary vehicles for delivery 
funds, the euro area Member States have put together the permanent 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Once the relevant Treaty is ratified by 
all participating Member States, the ESM will be able to offer financial 
assistance to countries facing difficulties financing their debt on the financial 
markets, subject to strict conditionality conditions. However, ESM will only 
provide funding after a fiscal sustainability assessment shows the country to 
be solvent – it is not a mechanism for taking on a country's debt, but for 
tiding it over until it is able to access the financial markets again. Such an 
assessment will typically require two types of analysis: first, an assessment of 
the short-term liquidity needs of the country, and, second, a medium to long 
term assessment of debt sustainability which analyses the public sector's 
ability to pay back its debt. The two aspects of the analysis are both 
necessary and interconnected.  
The importance of 
fiscal frameworks can 
be seen by estimating 
their impact on  
sovereign spreads. 
Spreads have 
increased 
dramatically since the 
onset of the crisis, 
leading to some 
countries facing the 
possibility of sovereign 
default…  
…which is turn has 
prompted action to 
create the European 
Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). 
Summary 
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In order to be able to assess debt sustainability in the future, the Commission 
services are looking to supplement their traditional sustainability analysis 
with a number of other methodologies. The first methodology being looked at 
measures the fiscal risk linked to the banking sector in order to estimate the 
possible impact that a banking crisis could have on the public finances. It 
provides a probability distribution of the impact of a banking crisis on the 
public finances. This is computed in a number of steps. First, an estimate of 
the probabilities of default of banks' obligors is obtained, to gain an 
assessment of the probability of default of individual banks. These are then 
aggregated – taking possible inter-linkages into account – to compute the 
distribution of the cost of a banking crisis on the public finances.   
A second methodology being looked at uses fiscal and macroeconomic 
variables to identify thresholds which have in the past been linked to the 
onset of crises. By using historical data to calibrate the thresholds, an 
indicator of fiscal crisis can be developed which signals the emergence of 
variable levels that have previously occurred before the onset of crises. By 
considering the underlying data, such a model can be used to alert policy 
makers to early signs of a possible impending crisis. 
Another methodology being looked at to reinforce the current sustainability 
gap methodology consists in using country-level fiscal reaction functions 
which assess how government deficits have in the past reacted to the debt 
level by controlling for a number of macroeconomic and institutional 
determinants. The country-level reaction functions can be combined with the 
EU intertemporal budget constraint to calculate sustainable debt levels under 
different assumptions for the interest rate-growth rate differential. Current 
debt levels can then be compared with these thresholds to draw an assessment 
of whether a Member State is fiscally sustainable.  
The aforementioned methodologies are useful tools to assess debt 
sustainability but require the assumption that the feedback effects between 
fiscal and economic variables are small. With large consolidations being 
required in a number of countries, the reaction of the economy to new 
measures is particularly important when choosing which policies to 
implement, both because the macroeconomic impact is important in itself and 
because it limits the revenue-raising potential of measures. To evaluate such 
limits, a model-based general equilibrium approach is also tested in this 
report based on the Commission's QUEST model. Revenue maximising tax 
rates are estimated based on the Laffer curve – which relates taxation 
revenues with taxation levels – to look at the feasibility of tax-based 
consolidations. The model provides a way to assess different consolidation 
composition and timing scenarios can be compared via a measure of their 
output costs. 
It is important to be 
able to assess 
sustainability and new 
methodologies are 
being developed for 
this purpose. 
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A slow and tentative recovery from the worst 
economic crisis since World War II is underway in 
the EU. Following a deep recession in 2009, GDP 
growth in the EU came in at 1.8% in 2010 and is 
expected to remain similar in 2011. Both the 
recession and subsequent upswing varied greatly 
across countries; in 2010, GDP growth ranged 
from over 3% in several Member States to 
negative growth in Ireland, Romania and Greece 
and to minor degree in Spain and Latvia.  
The economic crisis has also had visible effects on 
the labour market, with the EU unemployment rate 
stabilising at around 9.5% between 2009 and 2011. 
The consequences for the public finances have 
been and continue to be significant. The EU 
average budget balance deteriorated by 6.1 
percentage points of GDP between 2007 and 2009, 
to reach a deficit 6.8% of GDP. Half the 
deterioration was due to the functioning of the 
automatic stabilisers, while the effect of 
discretionary temporary support measures enacted 
by governments and the collapse of tax receipts 
from certain sectors such as the real estate market 
contributed to the remainder of the weakening. 
In 2010, many EU Member States continued to 
support their economies with discretionary 
measures. However, a partial withdrawal of the 
stimulus measures began in a number of countries 
and as a result, the structural balance improved 
overall in both the EU and the euro area. The 
improvement in the euro area was primarily the 
result of a lower expenditure-to-GDP ratio, with 
lower public investment being a key feature. The 
improvement in the structural balance equals the 
improvement in the headline deficit, indicating that 
the overall improvement was structural in nature. 
However, within the overall total there are large 
differences between countries. In 2010, Ireland 
experienced an unprecedented deterioration in its 
public finances with the deficit reaching 32.4% of 
GDP owing to extraordinarily large measures to 
support the banking system, while several other 
Member States, including Greece, posted 
significant improvements.  
2011 and 2012 should see further improvements in 
the budgetary positions. Nevertheless, budget 
deficits are forecast to remain higher than their 
2007 or 2008 levels. The aggregate general 
government deficit of the EU is expected to shrink 
by 1.7 percentage points to reach 4.7% of GDP in 
2011 and to further improve to 3.8% of GDP in 
2012, with more than half of this improvement 
coming from structural measures. A similar 
profile, albeit with slightly lower deficits, is 
expected for the euro area. Once again, there are 
large differences between the figures for different 
countries.  
The economic slowdown, increasing public 
deficits and below-the-line operations in the 
context of the support to the financial sector 
combined to drive up public debt. Debt in the EU 
is projected to rise from 59.0% of GDP in 2007 to 
83.3% in 2012 and from 66.3% to 88.7% in the 
euro area. The starting levels of debt ranged from 
3.7% of GDP in Estonia to 105.4% in Greece. 
Member States with higher starting levels of debt 
face both a snowball effect of debt and are more 
likely to face an increase in the interest rate. There 
were large differences in the increases seen so far, 
and those still projected to materialise, with part of 
the heterogeneity being due to sizeable differences 
across countries in public interventions to support 
the financial sector. These developments are 
examined in Chapter I.1. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) sets out the 
parameters within which EU countries should 
manage their public finances. It requires Member 
States to achieve and maintain medium-term 
budgetary objectives (MTO) for their budget 
balances, which are set in cyclically adjusted terms 
and are net of one-off and temporary measures. It 
also requires Member States to avoid excessive 
deficit positions, measured against reference 
values for deficits and debt of 3% and 60% of 
GDP, respectively. Chapter I.2 shows that the 
recent unprecedented economic downturn and the 
associated deterioration of the budgetary positions 
have been an important test for European fiscal 
surveillance. During 2009 and 2010, the 
Commission and the Council applied the 
enforcement mechanisms of the SGP against 
almost all EU Member States. Chapter I.2 reviews 
the implementation of the framework since 
January 2010 focussing, in particular, on the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP). According to 
the Commission services' 2011 Spring forecasts, 
twenty-two Member States had a deficit in excess 
of the 3% of GDP threshold in 2010; only 
Denmark, Estonia, Luxemburg, Finland and 
Sweden had budgetary positions that were within 
the Treaty limits. On the back of a robust, albeit 
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geographically dispersed, economic recovery, the 
fiscal outcomes for some Member States turned 
out to be better than expected even one year ago. 
The Commission services' 2011 Spring forecasts 
project that twenty EU Member States will record 
deficits in excess of the 3% of GDP threshold in 
2011. Bulgaria and Germany are expected to bring 
their deficit below 3% in 2011, while Hungary is 
projected to reach a 1.6% of GDP surplus. 
However, as this is mainly on account of 
temporary proceeds from a return to the public 
Pay-As-You-Go system of assets hitherto 
accumulated in the second private pension pillar, 
the Commission services expect Hungary to return 
to a deficit of 3.3% of GDP in 2012, in the absence 
of any further policy measures. 
Chapter I.3 provides an overview of the 2011 
updates of the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs) submitted by Member States 
in the context of the European Semester. The 
Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) set 
out Member States' fiscal strategies to return to 
their medium term budgetary objectives over the 
coming years. As the SCPs were examined in the 
context of the European semester for the first time, 
policy advice was received by Member States 
ahead of the approval of their 2012 budgets and 
covered both fiscal and other economic policies in 
a comprehensive manner. The economic growth 
assumptions for 2011 and 2012 contained in the 
SCPs are slightly more optimist (by 0.1 to 0.2pp) 
than those set out in the 2011 Commission Spring 
forecasts. The SCPs project euro area growth of 
1.7% and 1.9% for 2011 and 2012 respectively 
while for the EU they forecast growth of 1.8% and 
2.1%. Potential growth in the SCPs is not projected 
to differ much from the Commission's forecasts, as 
the additional growth in the SCPs is primarily 
cyclical. The largest differences in growth 
projections are for Spain, Bulgaria and Sweden on 
the positive side (so for higher SCP projections 
relative to the Commission's figures) and Estonia 
and the Czech Republic on the negative side. 
The SCPs projections show considerable reduction 
in the general government deficit, with the overall 
figure approaching 3% of GDP by 2012 – the first 
year fully influenced by the introduction of the 
European Semester. The Commission forecasts, 
which are based on unchanged policy assumptions, 
are however for a larger deficit than appears in the 
SCPs, 3.5% of GDP for the euro area and 3.8% for 
the EU. All countries except Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland are 
targeting lower deficits than the Commission for 
2012. By decomposing the differences in the 
projections, it is clear that the impact of the 2011 
consolidation measures which are included in the 
SCPs but have not yet been explicitly committed to 
and so are not included in the Commission figures, 
makes up nearly all the difference between the two 
forecasts for the euro area overall. This points to 
the fact that if countries are to realistically expect 
to meet the projections set out in the SCPs, they 
will have to introduce the measures that are 
outlined in the SCPs over the course of 2011. The 
policy gap is largest in the cases of Slovenia, 
Cyprus, Lithuania, Belgium and Latvia, where it 
exceeds 1 percentage point of GDP. 
With economic growth having returned in 2010 
and stabilizing in 2011 and 2012, the necessary 
consolidation is now underway in both the EU and 
euro area as a whole. Over the years 2010–2014 
the EU (the euro area) is projected to improve its 
fiscal positions every year to reach a deficit of 
1.4% (1.3%) of GDP in 2014. Overall, the time 
profile of the consolidation is front-loaded with the 
main exceptions being Belgium, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Estonia. In these countries the 
consolidation is back-loaded, although in some 
cases only to a limited extent. The consolidation is 
based on reductions to expenditure. According to 
the proposed reform of the preventive arm of the 
SGP which are discussed in more detail in Part II, 
countries should plan for expenditure growth to be 
in line or below their medium-term rate of 
potential GDP growth unless the excess is covered 
by discretionary revenue measures. Plans in the 
SCPs are broadly consistent with the proposed 
benchmark, albeit with some exceptions such as 
Lithuania and Estonia, which plan strong 
expenditure growth in 2012, only to reverse it 
between 2013 and 2014. 
Debt is expected continue increasing past the point 
where economic growth returned, until the 
consolidation has been underway for long enough 
and gained enough strength to halt and then start 
reversing the upward trend in debt. This means 
that the debt ratio in the EU should peak at 82.5% 
in 2012 before returning at 79.9% of GDP in 2014. 
This is near the 80% level seen in 2010, but is 
considerably higher than the pre-crisis starting 
point. However, for some countries such as 
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Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the UK and Spain the 
high increase in the level of debt since the 
beginning of the crisis means that the reduction by 
2014 will be small and reversing the increases seen 
since the time of the crisis is likely to take many 
further years. The main indicator (S2) for assessing 
long-term fiscal sustainability – calculated based 
on the projected changes in age-related 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expenditure up to 2060 from the 2009 Ageing 
Report – shows that nearly all countries are 
expected to have a lower sustainability gap under 
the assumption that the fiscal plans in the 
programmes are implemented with the exception 
of Luxembourg and Finland. Even assuming the 
full implementation of the fiscal plans in the SCPs, 
five countries are over 6%, which is considered to 
be risky. 
 
1. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 
 
15 
1.1. A SLOW AND UNCERTAIN RECOVERY 
Un uncertain recovery from the worst economic 
crisis since World War II is now underway in the 
EU. However, as the financial crisis compounded 
the imbalances accumulated earlier in the world 
economy, the adjustment process is leading to an 
extensive period of weakness in economic activity. 
The Commission services' Spring 2011 European 
Economic Forecast projects real GDP growth for 
the EU at 1.8% in 2011, (1) against a backdrop of 
1.8% in 2010 and a very steep recession in 2009 of 
–4.3%.  
The recession has been broad-based across 
countries, despite sizeable differences. Some EU 
Member States have been subject to a more 
pronounced and/or protracted recession, depending 
on their exposure to the financial crisis and the 
global manufacturing cycle on the one hand, and 
on domestic and external imbalances on the other, 
including competitiveness developments. In the 
same vein, the subsequent upswing is also 
occurring at a differing pace across countries. In 
2010, GDP growth ranged from high positive rates 
of over 3% of GDP in several Member States 
(Sweden, Slovakia, Poland, Malta, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland), and negative 
growth in Ireland, Romania and Greece and to 
minor degree in Spain and Latvia. In the large 
Member States, GDP is expected to change by 
between 4.0% (Poland) and 0.8% (Spain) this year. 
In Greece and Portugal the output change is 
forecast to be markedly in the negative.() 
The EU economy has returned to positive growth 
rates on a quarterly basis from the third quarter of 
2009, although overall, these have been relatively 
modest so far and in some countries they have 
been quite irregular. In 2012, GDP growth is 
expected to continue at a broadly unchanged rate 
of 1.9%. In the light of the overall situation of the 
world economy, the outlook still remains 
somewhat uncertain, with downside risks.  
The economic crisis has also had visible effects on 
the labour market. From the low of 7.1% in 2008, 
the EU unemployment rate has risen rapidly, 
                                                          
(1) The first estimate of GDP growth for the second quarter of 
2011, points to slightly smaller figures.  
although reacting with a lag to GDP growth. In 
2009 it stood at 9.6%. Unemployment is likely to 
remain at similar levels of around 9.5% this year, 
before decreasing in 2012. However, 
developments also differ strongly across countries, 
with Member States undergoing large-scale fiscal 
adjustments often experiencing a considerable 
deterioration in the labour market. On the other 
hand adverse labour market developments also 
affect the public finances, which further 
compounds the major policy challenge for the EU 
economy to reduce unemployment. 
1.2. THE BUDGETARY LEGACY OF THE CRISIS 
Three factors explain the marked deterioration in 
the public finances situation across the euro area 
and the EU which resulted from the crisis: the role 
of the automatic stabilisers, the introduction of 
discretionary measures and the fall in revenues due 
to the bursting of housing and/or credit bubbles in 
some countries.  
During the first phase of the crisis, between 2007 
and 2009, the budget balance deteriorated from an 
average deficit of 0.7% of GDP to 6.3% in the euro 
area and from 0.9% of GDP to 6.8% in the EU. 
Conventionally-measured automatic stabilisers (2) 
represented around half of this deterioration and, 
as the output gap is not forecast to be closed before 
2013, the automatic stabilisers should continue to 
weigh on headline deficits during the coming 
years.  
With the onset of the crisis, temporary supportive 
discretionary measures sought to increase demand 
and to act against the shrinking of the economies. 
Of course, these measures increased deficits and 
led to higher debt. Over the medium and long 
term, the effect of the supportive measures should 
be better outcomes for the economy and therefore 
a better outlook for the public finances overall, as 
the benefits of the extra stabilisation provided 
outweigh the fiscal costs. However, the balance 
                                                          
(2) The automatic stabilisers vary across countries in their size 
and composition. Overall, in bad times, governments 
receive less revenue from taxes while spending levels tend 
to rise due to an increased burden on the social security 
system. However, automatic stabilisation mainly works 
through the inertia of expenditure with respect to cyclical 
swings in output: their share in GDP increases 
‘automatically’ in downturns and declines in upturns.  
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between the benefits and costs over the short and 
long term will depend, in part, on the state of the 
public finances at the onset of the crisis. This was 
crucial for deciding whether EU Member States 
could shoulder the extra burden of the support 
measures and it was only those countries that had 
sufficiently strong public finances at the onset of 
the crisis that were able to provide their economies 
with this impetus. The country-specific pre-crisis 
situation was therefore of key importance when 
determining the level of support which was both 
possible and appropriate.  
In some EU Member States, the rise in public 
deficits is also due to the bursting of pre-crisis 
housing/credit bubbles. Although due to the effect 
of the economy and non-discretionary, such 
changes in revenues do not form part of 
conventionally measured automatic stabilisation as 
their cause is not directly linked to normally 
understood cyclical variation. Before the crisis, 
real estate bubbles temporarily masked an 
underlying fiscal weakness because tax receipts 
depended heavily on real estate transactions. There 
has been a large and irreversible impact on fiscal 
positions from the slump as these revenues 
plummeted. In parallel, many items of spending, 
such as the provision of public services, do not 
tend to fall as the economy weakens, also leading 
to an increase in the public deficit. Consolidation 
needs are therefore over and above the cost of the 
support measures of the crisis because taxes were 
used to fund expenditure programmes as if they 
were, effectively, permanent. 
In 2010, many EU Member States continued to 
support their economies with discretionary 
measures. However, a partial withdrawal of the 
stimulus measures began in a number of countries, 
particularly on the expenditure side. As a result, 
the structural balance improved slightly, despite 
the inertia which creates difficulties in adjusting 
the level of non-cyclical expenditure.  
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the average headline deficit has started 
to decrease along with the shrinking of the 
negative output gap. 
At the same time the unfolding of the crisis has put 
questions of debt sustainability at the centre of the 
debate. For the first time since the inception of the 
EMU a number of countries, both inside and 
outside the euro area, havefound themselves in a 
position where the markets could not address their 
debt financing needs. As a consequence they had 
to negotiate a financial assistance package with the 
European Union and/or the EU Member States and 
the IMF, to borrow money subject to strict 
conditionality conditions (see Box I.1.1 for country 
specific information). In parallel with the 
extension of the programmes the European 
Council has reached an agreement for the 
establishment of a European Stability Mechanism 
to provide on a permanent basis financial 
assistance to euro area Member States (see Box 
I.1.2.) 
Following increasing tensions in the markets, in 
particular in relation to the budgetary situation and 
prospects in Greece, where the need for a new 
assistance programme had become evident, but 
also to threats of contagion to otehr euro-area 
countries, the Heads of State and Government of 
the euro area, meeting in Brussels on 21 July 2011, 
decided on a set of measures to improve the 
sustainability of Greek public finances, including 
the involvement of private-sector creditors, and 
increasing the flexibility of the financial assistance 
mechanisms (see Box I.1.3.) 
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 Box I.1.1: Budgetary developments and policy responses in programme countries 
 
The EU and its Member States have provided financial support to a number of Member States facing 
problems in meeting their international payment obligations or financing their debt, on the condition that 
they implement a closely monitored programme of economic adjustment based on a Memorandum of 
Understanding. The main objective of the assistance programmes is restoring market confidence in debt 
sustainability of a country by correcting financial, external and fiscal imbalances in order to allow the 
government to return to the market at reasonable prices. The programmes have a medium-term policy 
orientation, as growth is unlikely to be buoyant when the initial corrective fiscal measures are implemented 
but should resume when the situation is improved. To achieve the programme objectives, all available 
budgetary, financial and structural policies are used, with a focus on correcting fiscal imbalances and 
placing debt on a sustainable path, maintaining banking sector stability, increasing potential growth and 
restoring competitiveness. This involves income and social security policies needed to buttress the budgetary 
adjustment effort and the restoration of competitiveness with social buffers, and the structural reforms that 
boost the economy's capacity to produce, save and export and hence are critical for the medium-term 
recovery. A key principle of the support is to pursue a fair distribution of the adjustment burden, protecting 
the most vulnerable in society. Fiscal policy is the cornerstone of the programmes and is the focus of this 
box. Interventions in favour of euro area members versus non-members have a difference legal basis and are 
thus treated separately. 
Non-euro area Member States 
The first Member States to benefit from EU support were Hungary, Latvia and Romania. According to 
Article 143 of the Treaty, the EU can provide assistance to non-euro area Member States when a Member 
State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments. The 
facility to provide medium-term financial assistance foreseen in the Treaty has been established by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 332/2002. In all three cases, the support consisted of balance-of-payments assistance 
designed to ease the country's external financing constraints. The assistance by the EU was provided jointly 
with the IMF in all cases. Both Romania's and Latvia's programmes also involved the World Bank and 
EBRD, while in Latvia's case contributions of bilateral loans by regional neighbours were also envisaged but 
never became necessary. 
Hungary received access to balance-of-payments assistance in November 2008 and in 2009, with EUR 5.5 
billions having been released in three instalments. However, in view of the improved access to market 
financing, Hungary has not drawn the remaining billion in the fund since the completion of the reviews in 
November 2009. The status of the Hungarian programme has been quasi-precautionary since the second half 
of 2009, when the period covered by the EU assistance ended. A post-programme surveillance framework 
was established to monitor the situation to ensure continued sound policies and the repayment of the EU 
funds. A first mission was carried out by Commission services in early April 2011, in close cooperation with 
the IMF staff. 
Latvia was granted support of EUR 7.5 billions (with the EU share being 3.1 billions) in December 2008 
subject to a three-year programme which was finalised in January 2009. The programme is very demanding 
and includes an extensive fiscal consolidation resting mainly on expenditure cuts. Its implementation has 
occurred alongside an improving external environment. With the economic recovery coming earlier than 
expected, the public finances have stabilised and fiscal targets have been consistently over-achieved. In 
2010, the deficit came in at 7.7% of GDP — well within the target of no more than 8.5%) of GDP — and 
would have equalled 5.5% in the absence of bank restructuring costs. For 2011 a deficit of 4.5% of GDP is 
expected, clearly below the target of no more than 6% of GDP. The Latvian authorities aim to reach a deficit 
of 2.5% of GDP in 2012 and to fulfil the conditions for adoption of the euro by 2014. Given the improved 
state of government finances and the economic recovery, the Latvian authorities do not intend to draw on the 
remaining financing available under the programme, in particular as Latvia successfully returned to 
international financial markets in June 2011.  
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 Romania has benefited from assistance since May 2009. The total amount of the loan provided under the 
first Balance of Payment programme amounts to € 5 billion (with the EU share being € 1.4 billion). The fifth 
and final tranche of € 150 million was disbursed in June 2011. Following the successful completion of the 
first Balance of Payments assistance programme in Romania (May 2009 – May 2011), a follow up joint 
EU/IMF precautionary program started in June 2011. The programme provides precautionary financial 
assistance of nearly € 5 billion  until the end of March 2013.On the fiscal side, significant progress has been 
recorded since the start of the programme: in 2010 the budget deficit was reduced to 6.4% of GDP from 
8.5% in 2009. The cash target for budgetary execution in the first quarter of 2011 was comfortably met, and 
developments indicate that the budget execution will remain on track to respect the agreed deficit target for 
2011 (4.4% of GDP on a cash basis; below 5% on ESA accrual basis). Public sector wage developments 
continue to respect the limits set out in the 2011 budget and in the medium-term fiscal strategy. For 2012 the 
Commission services expect a reduction of the budget deficit to 3.6% of GDP in their Spring 2011 forecast. 
Euro area Member States: Greece 
In May 2010 the euro-area Member States and the IMF provided financial support to Greece in the context 
of a sharp deterioration of its financing conditions. On 2 May 2010, the Eurogroup agreed to provide 
bilateral loans pooled by the European Commission for a total amount of EUR 80 billion to be disbursed 
over the period May 2010–June 2013. On 10 May 2010 the Council adopted a Decision according to articles 
126(9) and 136 of the Treaty including the main conditions to be respected by Greece in the context of the 
financial assistance programme. The financial assistance provided by euro area Member States is part of a 
joint package, with the IMF financing an additional EUR 30 billion under a stand-by arrangement. This 
financial assistance package fully covers the government’s financing needs related to its fiscal deficit and 
maturing medium- and long-term liabilities until the beginning of 2012, and progressively less thereafter.  
The programme of economic policies, whose implementation is a condition for the financial support, 
negotiated with the Commission on behalf of the Member States, ECB and IMF staff has been shown to be 
appropriate. Greece has made significant progress in reducing its macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances. 
Besides the direct fiscal steps for the budget, a series of important structural fiscal reforms have been 
initiated, including reforms of pensions, healthcare, taxation, and tax administration. For instance, the 
normal retirement age has been set to 65 years and early retirement restricted. However, after a strong 
start in the summer of 2010, reform implementation came almost to a standstill by the end of 2010/early 
2011. The insufficient political consensus on various reforms and administrative constraints, have weighed 
on programme implementation. In Spring 2011, the ESA-based 2010 general government deficit was found 
to equal 10.5 % of GDP, around 2.5% above the target and 1% of GDP above the estimates of the two 
previous reviews. This was because of a widening of general government to include a number of loss-
making public enterprises, a more severe than anticipated revenue shortfall – including in 2010 taxes which 
are collected in early 2011 – a worse than estimated balance of the social security sector and the 
accumulation of arrears in the other -than state sectors. Further to the revenue shortfall, several measures to 
fight tax evasion have not been fully effective, although part of this underperformance results from the 
severity of the recession and the liquidity constraints of taxpayers. Nonetheless, the quantitative fiscal 
performance criteria for the first quarter of 2011 have been met. 
Against this background, and in the light of prohibitively high spreads on Greek bonds, a reinvigorated 
economic adjustment programme with scaled up financing assistance became necessary to prevent the fiscal 
deficit from getting entrenched at unsustainable levels. (The maturity of the bilateral loans had already been 
extended and the interest payable lowered.) More imminently, it became necessary to cover the expected 
financial gap from 2012 onwards and to allow the next loan disbursement. The government has adopted a 
number of structural measures, also aimed at ensuring the durability of fiscal consolidation. They address 
various key weaknesses of public finances in Greece, including the overstaffing of the public sector and 
shortcomings in tax compliance. Important steps have also been agreed to strengthen and accelerate 
privatisation, while efforts to improve the collection and processing of general government data have 
been intensified further. If no action had been taken, the government deficit in 2011 would remain close to 
the 2010 level – above 10% of GDP rather than respecting the ESA-based fiscal deficit ceiling for 2011 of  
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 7% of GDP. A medium-term fiscal strategy (MTFS) has been prepared to ensure the durability of fiscal 
consolidation. The aim is to reduce the government deficit to 2.5% of GDP in 2014 and further in 2015, and 
place the debt ratio on a downward slope. To this end, the government identified fiscal consolidation 
measures of about 10% of GDP between 2011 and 2014.  
Euro area Member States: Ireland and Portugal 
At the time when the pooled bilateral loans were being made available to Greece, a new mechanism and 
facility were set up. The European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) essentially reproduces for the EU 
27 the basic mechanics of the existing balance-of payments-Regulation for non-euro area Member States. 
When the mechanism is activated, it allows the Commission to borrow on financial markets on behalf of the 
Union under an implicit EU budget guarantee. The Commission then lends the proceeds to the beneficiary 
Member State. This particular lending arrangement means that there is no debt-servicing cost for the Union. 
The interest and loan principal are repaid by the beneficiary Member State via the Commission. The EU 
budget guarantees the repayment of the bonds in case of default by the borrower. The EFSM has a budget of 
EUR 60 bn and is a part of a wider safety net available for euro area Member States, which aims to 
safeguard EU financial stability amid severe tensions in euro area sovereign debt markets. Alongside the 
EFSM, the European Financial Stability Facility provides up to EUR 440 billion in funds guaranteed by the 
euro area Member States, while funding from the International Monetary Fund of at least EUR 250 billion 
brings the total funds available to over EUR 750 billion. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has 
the possibility of purchasing sovereign debt. The legal basis for the EFSM is Council Regulation (EU) No 
407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism adopted on the basis of 
Article 122 TFEU. It is to be noted that the EFSM Regulation provides for the conclusion of a Memorandum 
of Understanding, which, in practice, is also used by the EFSF.  
 The first euro area Member State to use the new mechanism and facility was Ireland. Upon a request from 
the Irish government, understandings were reached in late November 2010 toward a comprehensive policy 
package including EUR 85 billion of financial assistance between the Irish government, the IMF and the 
European Union, in liaison with the ECB. Of this, EUR 17.5 billion comes from domestic and EUR 67.5 
billion from external sources. In addition to fiscal consolidation measures, the accompanying conditions 
provide for a reform of the Irish banking sector and a range of growth-enhancing structural reforms. Fiscal 
performance has so far been in line with programme targets. In 2010, central government tax revenue was 
slightly better than expected (by 0.1 percentage points of GDP), although partly offset by higher 
expenditure. This, together with a better than expected outturn of the local government balance, improved 
the general government balance in nominal terms by some EUR 0.3 billion, as compared to the programme. 
Despite weaker growth, the budget deficit is forecast to remain within the programme ceiling in 2011 
(10.5% of GDP). Revenue performance so far this year suggests stronger underlying revenue buoyancy than 
previously assumed and the government's cash-based revenue and expenditure targets to end-May have been 
met. The gross debt to GDP ratio is forecast to peak at just under 120% in 2013, and decline thereafter, 
broadly in line with original programme targets. The new government announced a jobs initiative aiming at 
boosting job creation on 10 May 2011 while respecting the agreed fiscal targets. The jobs initiative is 
designed to be fiscally neutral over the period 2011 to 2014. A comprehensive review of expenditure has 
also begun, which is expected to inform the budgetary process in the autumn. The authorities are putting in 
place a fiscal advisory council and there is a deadline to introduce legislation by the fourth quarter of 2010 
to underpin a medium-term expenditure framework with binding multi-annual ceilings. To reinforce long-
term fiscal sustainability, legislation was passed in June 2011 to progressively increase the pension age from 
65 to 68 between 2014 and 2028. 
Following a request by Portugal on 7 April 2011, Commission, ECB and IMF staff negotiated an Economic 
Adjustment Programme for the years 2011–14. The Programme was formally agreed by the European 
Council and the IMF Board in May 2011. Its financial package will cover up to EUR 78 billion for possible 
fiscal financing needs and support to the banking system. One third of this (up to EUR 26 billion) will be 
financed by the European Union under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), another 
third by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and the final third by the IMF under an Extended  
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 Fund Facility. The fiscal consolidation strategy, supported by structural fiscal measures and better fiscal 
control over public-private-partnerships and state-owned enterprises, aims at putting the gross public debt to 
GDP ratio on a firm downward path in the medium term. The authorities are committed to reducing the 
deficit to 5.9% of GDP in 2011, 4.5% of GDP in 2012 and 3.0% of GDP in 2013. Fiscal consolidation 
should be maintained in the medium term up to a balanced budgetary position, mainly by containing 
expenditure growth. Furthermore, the Programme envisages a possible budget-neutral adjustment of the tax 
structure so as to improve the competitiveness of the economy, once the scope for such a change has been 
assessed. 
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 Box I.1.2: The ESM, A Permanent Crisis Resolution Mechanism
In the face of one of the direst financial recessions in history, the European Union has taken robust action to 
limit contagion, reform its supervisory and regulatory framework in order to make the banking sector more 
resilient, strengthen economic governance, and stimulate growth. Furthermore, reforms of the economic 
governance package will significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the coordination of 
economic policies. These comprehensive efforts will not only help reduce the probability of another major 
financial crisis, but minimize the impact when one does occur. Overall, the EU has made the necessary 
efforts to ensure a path of sustainable recovery and greater financial and economic stability in the future.  
The financial crisis in Europe was exacerbated by the emergence of the euro area's sovereign debt crisis in 
early 2010. In response to this challenge, in May 2010, the EU and the euro area Member States established 
two temporary mechanisms – the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) – to provide funding for those euro area countries in need of financial 
assistance. The two mechanisms, one backed by the EU budget, the other an entity based on an 
intergovernmental agreement and able to issue directly on the financial markets, are temporary instruments, 
intended to act as a safeguard until 2013.  
Sustained market stress – but particularly the ongoing pressure on sovereign debt markets – increasingly 
highlighted the need for a more robust mechanism: one that would better appease market concerns and 
provide long-term reassurance. By the time the new multi-annual financial framework enters into force in 
2014, the EFSM would no longer exist and the EFSF would have lost the legal capacity to provide new 
financing. The only instrument left would be the Balance of Payments Regulation, which has limited 
financing power and geographical scope, as it does not cover euro area Member States. Without an adequate 
response mechanism at its disposal, the euro area could face sustained market uncertainty, jeopardizing 
longer-term stability.  
In that context, policy makers agreed that a permanent mechanism would be needed to handle sovereign 
debt crises and limit possible contagion effects in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. 
The European Council of November and December 2010 concluded that the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) would be established to assume the role of the EFSM and EFSF in providing external financial 
assistance to the euro area Member States as of June 2013. 
Towards a permanent European Stability Mechanism 
On 24 March 2011, the European Council endorsed major decisions regarding the structure of the ESM and 
the modalities under which financial assistance to Member States will be granted. The decision was a critical 
step in ensuring that the establishment of a permanent mechanism would come to fruition.  
The Term Sheet, the technical document in which structural and practical details of the ESM were laid out, 
was then developed into an ESM Treaty. The Treaty was signed by the 17 euro area Member States in July, 
at which point participating Member States began working through the national procedures for the necessary 
ratification by national Parliaments. The ESM will become effective in 2013. 
The possibility to establish such a mechanism will be explicitly referred to in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), subsequent to the March European Council's decision to amend Article 136 
of the TFEU by adding the following third paragraph: "The Member States whose currency is the euro may 
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a 
whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
conditionality". 
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ESM major structural features 
The function of the ESM will be to mobilise funding and provide financial assistance, during critical times, 
to euro area Member States. All access to ESM financial assistance will be provided on the basis of strict 
policy conditionality under a macroeconomic adjustment programme and a rigorous analysis of public debt 
sustainability, which will be conducted by the Commission together with the IMF and in liaison with the 
ECB. The beneficiary Member State will be required to put in place an appropriate form of private sector 
involvement, according to the specific circumstances and in a manner fully consistent with IMF practices. 
The highest decision-making body of the ESM will be its Board of Governors, which will consist of the 
Ministers of Finance of the euro area Member States (as voting members), with the European Commissioner 
for Economic and Financial Affairs and the President of the ECB as observers. The Board of Governors will 
take major decisions by mutual agreement, including the granting of financial assistance, the terms and 
conditions of that assistance, the lending capacity of the ESM, and changes to the menu of instruments/tools 
at its disposal. All other decisions will be taken by qualified majority, unless otherwise stated. Voting 
weights on the Board of Governors will be proportional to the Members' respective subscriptions to the 
capital of the ESM. 
The ESM will be set up as an International Financial Institution (IFI), under international public law, and 
will be located in Luxembourg. With an effective lending capacity of EUR 500bn, including outstanding 
loans of the EFSF, the ESM will be a robust mechanism and the largest IFI in the world.  
The ESM's lending capacity will be ensured by establishing the appropriate mix between paid-in and 
callable capital. The ESM's capital structure will comprise EUR 700bn of authorized capital, of which EUR 
80bn is in the form of paid-in capital (to be phased in over five years, in equal instalments) and EUR 620bn 
of callable capital. The lending capacity will be formally reviewed on a regular basis. Financial assistance 
from the ESM will take the form of loans; however, the ESM may also, in exceptional circumstances, 
intervene in the debt primary market in the context of a programme with strict conditionality. 
As it seems reasonable to link the functioning of the ESM to other fiscal changes that also include their own 
policy conditionality and, thus ensure consistency among the various reforms, a framework could be created 
under Article 136 for a reinforced economic and fiscal surveillance of Member States requesting financial 
support outside of the EU framework.  
The ESM will be able to lend at fixed or variable rates. Pricing will take into account the debt sustainability 
of a recipient country while remaining above funding costs, with an adequate mark-up for risk, and be in line 
with IMF pricing principles. ESM loan rates will have to cover the funding costs of the ESM, supplemented 
by a charge of 200 basis points applied on the entire loan, with an additional surcharge of 100 basis points 
for loan amounts outstanding after 3 years. For fixed rate loans with maturities above 3 years, the margin 
will be a weighted average of the charge of 200 basis points for the first 3 years and 200 basis points plus 
100 basis points for the succeeding years.  
An adequate and proportionate form of private sector involvement will be sought, in line with IMF practice, 
on a case-by-case basis where financial assistance is provided. The nature and extent of this involvement 
will depend on the outcome of a debt sustainability analysis and should take into account the risk of 
contagion and any potential spillover effects on other EU Member States or third countries. If, on the basis 
of this analysis, it is concluded that a macroeconomic adjustment programme can realistically restore public 
debt to a sustainable path, the beneficiary ESM Member shall take initiatives intended to encourage the main 
private investors to maintain their exposure. Where it is concluded that a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme cannot realistically restore the public debt to a sustainable path, the beneficiary ESM Member 
will be required to engage in active negotiations with non-official creditors to secure their direct 
involvement in restoring debt sustainability. In the latter case, the granting of financial assistance will be 
contingent on the ESM Member having a credible plan for restoring debt sustainability and demonstrating  
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1.3. SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR THE BUDGETARY 
POSITION 
In 2010, the budgetary positions in the euro area 
and the EU started their turnaround by recording a 
small improvement in comparison to 2009, after 
having deteriorated dramatically for two years in a 
row. The euro area average headline deficit came 
in at 6.0% of GDP, down from the 6.3% in 2009. 
As Table I.1.1 shows, this is still far above the 
historically low of 0.7% posted in 2007 before the 
outbreak of the crisis. As shown in Table I.1.2, a 
similar budgetary improvement took place in the 
EU as a whole, where the average general 
government deficit decreased by 0.4 percentage 
points reaching 6.4% of GDP in 2010. In both the 
euro area and the EU, the decrease in the headline 
deficit was matched by a very similar decrease in 
the structural deficit, i.e. the headline deficit net of 
cyclical factors and one-off and other temporary 
measures. This improved by 0.3 percentage points 
of GDP in both the euro area and the EU. This 
suggests that the improvement in the headline 
deficit was almost entirely of a structural nature.  
Within the euro area, Ireland experienced an 
unprecedented deterioration in the budget balance 
to 32.4% of GDP in 2010 which was 
overwhelmingly due to one-off measures in 
support of the banking sector. Conversely, several 
other Member States posted significant 
improvements. Greece, where the deficit 
deteriorated by about 5 percentage points (after 
further statistical revisions,) is a case in point. 
Improvements of between 1 and 2 percentage 
points of GDP were also posted in Spain, Belgium, 
Portugal and Estonia, the latter only being a euro 
area member since 2011. On the other hand 
Germany, which had been invited under the EERP 
(European Economic Recovery Plan) to run a 
sustained discretionary fiscal stimulus in both 2009 
and 2010, recorded a minor deterioration from 
3.0% of GDP to 3.3% of GDP. In all (current) euro 
area countries except Luxembourg, Finland and 
Estonia, the deficit in 2010 exceeded the 3% of 
GDP reference value of the Treaty. Estonia is the 
only (current) euro area Member State to post a 
(very small) surplus of 0.1% of GDP. 
2011 and 2012 should see further improvements in 
the budgetary positions, if economic growth 
continues at a stable rate as projected in the Spring, 
although budget deficits are forecast to remain 
higher than their 2008 or 2007 level. The 
Commission services’ Spring 2011 European 
Economic Forecasts project euro area (EU) real 
GDP to increase by a modest 1.6% (1.8%) in 2011. 
This is in line with the growth recorded in 2010 
and a marked improvement on the steep 
contraction seen in 2009. A slightly higher 
increase of 1.8% (1.9%) is forecast for 2012 with 
clear downside risks. Against this growth outlook, 
the aggregate general government deficit of the 
seventeen Member States which have adopted the 
single currency is expected to reach 4.3% of GDP 
in 2011, 1.7 percentage points lower than the year 
before. Based on the no policy change assumption, 
a further improvement to 3.5% of GDP is 
projected in 2012. Broadly the same profile is 
expected for the EU as a whole. The deficit is 
forecast to decline to 4.7% of GDP in 2011, from 
Box (continued) 
 
 sufficient commitment to ensure adequate and proportionate privatesector involvement. Progress in terms of 
implementation will be monitored and taken into account in decisions on disbursements.  
Collective action clauses (CACs) will be included, from June 2013 onwards, in all new euroarea government 
securities with maturities above one year. The objective of including CACs is to facilitate an agreement 
between the sovereign benefiting from financial assistance and its private sector creditors, in the context of a 
private sector involvement.  
Non-euro area Member States will be associated with ESM operations on a voluntary basis, from the 
outside, and will be allowed access to all relevant information and appropriately consulted on issues 
regarding the relevant financial assistance program. The ESM will enjoy preferred creditor status in a 
fashion similar to the IMF. 
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6.4% in 2010, and to continue to decrease to 3.8% 
of GDP in 2012. 
Outside the euro area, the general picture is also 
one of continued deficit reduction. However, only 
a handful of countries are expected to correct their 
excessive deficits by bringing the general 
government net borrowing below 3% of GDP in 
either 2011 or 2012. Bulgaria is expected to run 
deficits below the 3% threshold over the forecast 
horizon, while in Sweden surpluses are projected 
for both 2011 and 2012. The United Kingdom is 
forecast a further budgetary improvement with the 
deficit falling to 8.6% of GDP in 2011, and 7.0% 
of GDP in 2012. Due in part to the one-off 
accounting impact of pension reforms, without 
further action requested by the Council, the deficit 
in Hungary is forecast to revert to more than 3% of 
GDP in 2012, following a surplus in 2011. 
The structural balance is estimated to improve by 
1.0 percentage points of GDP in both the euro area 
and the EU as a whole. For 2012, further 
improvements of the order of 0.4 percentage points 
of GDP in the euro area and of 0.6 percentage 
points in the EU as a whole are projected. In 
Greece and Portugal, fiscal policy is forecast to be 
pro-cyclical in 2011, as growth is still forecast to 
be negative.  
While the number of euro area countries that have 
achieved their medium-term budgetary objective 
(MTO) since 2008 had fallen to zero in 2010, 
structural fiscal positions are forecast to remain 
weak over the projection horizon. Section I.1.3 
considers the MTOs in more detail. Out of the euro 
area, only Finland is expected to attain its MTO in 
2011, while in 2012 Luxembourg is projected to be 
the only country to join Finland.  
Outside the euro area, a similar picture emerges, 
with Sweden, already at its MTO in 2010, being 
the only country forecast to be at its MTO in 2011 
and 2012. However, it is clear that aiming to attain 
the MTOs will be a crucial element in any exit 
strategy from the current economic crisis as also 
reflected in the country specific recommendations 
that the Council issued in July 2011 as part of the 
European semester.  
 
Table I.1.1: Budget balances in EU Member States (% of GDP) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
BE -1.3 -5.9 -4.1 -3.7 -4.2 -1.9 -3.6 -2.9 -2.8 -3.7 1.9 0.0 0.5 0.6 -0.3
DE 0.1 -3.0 -3.3 -2.0 -1.2 -0.2 -0.8 -1.9 -1.4 -0.8 2.5 1.8 0.5 0.9 1.6
EE -2.8 -1.7 0.1 -0.6 -2.4 -4.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -1.1 -3.8 0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.8
IE -7.3 -14.3 -32.4 -10.5 -8.8 -7.4 -10.0 -10.5 -9.5 -8.5 -6.0 -7.9 -7.2 -5.7 -3.9
EL -9.8 -15.4 -10.5 -9.5 -9.3 -9.5 -14.0 -8.6 -7.4 -7.9 -4.6 -8.9 -3.0 -0.7 -0.4
ES -4.2 -11.1 -9.2 -6.3 -5.3 -3.8 -8.6 -7.0 -4.3 -3.9 -2.2 -6.8 -5.1 -2.1 -1.4
FR -3.3 -7.5 -7.0 -5.8 -5.3 -3.5 -5.6 -4.9 -3.9 -3.7 -0.7 -3.2 -2.5 -1.3 -0.8
IT -2.7 -5.4 -4.6 -4.0 -3.2 -3.4 -3.9 -3.1 -2.7 -2.3 1.8 0.8 1.4 2.1 2.8
LU 3.0 -0.9 -1.7 -1.0 -1.1 2.3 1.5 0.1 0.3 -0.4 2.6 1.9 0.5 0.8 0.1
NL 0.6 -5.5 -5.4 -3.7 -2.3 -0.5 -3.6 -3.7 -2.5 -1.3 1.7 -1.4 -1.7 -0.4 0.9
AT -0.9 -4.1 -4.6 -3.7 -3.3 -2.2 -2.9 -4.0 -3.2 -2.9 0.4 -0.1 -1.3 -0.4 0.0
PT -3.5 -10.1 -9.1 -5.9 -4.5 -3.5 -8.8 -9.2 -5.4 -3.1 -0.5 -5.9 -6.1 -1.2 1.7
SI -1.8 -6.0 -5.6 -5.8 -5.0 -4.6 -3.5 -3.0 -2.9 -3.3 -3.5 -2.2 -1.4 -1.1 -1.3
FI 4.2 -2.6 -2.5 -1.0 -0.7 2.5 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.7 3.9 1.9 1.4 2.0 2.1
MT -4.5 -3.7 -3.6 -3.0 -3.0 -5.6 -3.4 -4.3 -3.1 -3.1 -2.4 -0.2 -1.3 0.0 0.0
CY 0.9 -6.0 -5.3 -5.1 -4.9 -0.1 -5.8 -5.1 -4.6 -4.8 2.7 -3.3 -2.9 -2.1 -2.4
SK -2.1 -8.0 -7.9 -5.1 -4.6 -4.2 -7.5 -7.3 -4.8 -4.8 -3.0 -6.1 -5.9 -3.3 -3.1
EA-17 -2.0 -6.3 -6.0 -4.3 -3.5 -2.5 -4.3 -4.0 -3.0 -2.6 0.6 -1.4 -1.2 0.0 0.6
BG 1.7 -4.7 -3.2 -2.7 -1.6 -0.2 -3.4 -1.3 -1.2 -0.6 0.6 -2.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.3
CZ -2.7 -5.9 -4.7 -4.4 -4.1 -4.5 -5.5 -4.1 -3.5 -3.6 -3.4 -4.1 -2.7 -1.8 -1.8
DK 3.2 -2.7 -2.7 -4.1 -3.2 3.0 0.9 0.2 -2.2 -1.8 4.4 2.7 2.0 -0.3 0.2
LV -4.2 -9.7 -7.7 -4.5 -3.8 -6.3 -6.1 -3.7 -4.0 -4.5 -5.7 -4.6 -2.1 -2.1 -2.5
LT -3.3 -9.5 -7.1 -5.5 -4.8 -5.4 -7.5 -5.7 -5.3 -5.4 -4.7 -6.3 -3.9 -3.3 -3.4
HU -3.7 -4.5 -4.2 1.6 -3.3 -4.1 -2.0 -3.1 -5.2 -4.0 0.0 2.7 1.0 -1.4 -0.3
PL -3.7 -7.3 -7.9 -5.8 -3.6 -4.6 -7.4 -7.4 -5.3 -3.1 -2.4 -4.7 -4.7 -2.6 -0.3
RO -5.7 -8.5 -6.4 -4.7 -3.6 -8.2 -8.8 -5.5 -3.3 -2.8 -7.5 -7.2 -3.9 -1.5 -1.0
SE 2.2 -0.7 0.0 0.9 2.0 1.4 2.6 1.4 1.3 2.1 3.0 3.6 2.1 2.0 2.9
UK -5.0 -11.4 -10.4 -8.6 -7.0 -4.8 -8.9 -8.2 -6.5 -5.3 -2.5 -6.9 -5.2 -3.5 -1.9
EU-27 -2.4 -6.8 -6.4 -4.7 -3.8 -2.8 -4.7 -4.4 -3.4 -2.8 0.0 -2.1 -1.8 -0.6 0.2
Structural primary balanceBudget balance Structural balance
Source: Commission services' Spring 2011 European Economic Forecast. 
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1.4. SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR PUBLIC DEBT 
Turning to government debt, the economic 
slowdown and increasing public deficits combined 
to drive up public debt. This is shown in Table 
I.1.3. At the EU level, debt will not start to 
decrease before 2013.  
Member States with higher starting levels of debt 
face both a snowball effect (3) of debt and are more 
likely to face an increase in the interest rate as 
markets may doubt their ability to service their 
debt over the medium term. For this reason, high 
levels of debt can increase the urgency to 
consolidate, as there is no overall benefit from 
providing more support for the economy in the 
short-term, given the price that will be paid in 
terms of servicing the resulting debt. But high debt 
is not the only reason why markets may doubt a 
country's likelihood of repaying its debt. Other 
factors such as the outlook for growth in the 
medium term and the presence of macro-financial 
imbalances are also key determinants of the 
reaction of financial markets. 
Alongside increasing deficits, below-the-line 
operations in the context of the support to the 
financial sector have led to substantially higher 
government debt ratios over the crisis years and 
                                                          
(3) The snowball effect of debt stems from the interaction 
between the interest-growth rate differential and the debt 
level: if the difference between the interest paid on debt 
and the growth rate is positive – and it will in general 
increase with debt – the dynamic of debt is explosive and 
requires an increase in primary balances to escape from the 
resulting cycle. 
beyond. Graph I.1.1 shows the increases in debt 
projected between 2007 and 2012. It shows that 
debt in the EU is projected to rise from 59.0% of 
GDP in 2007 to 83.3% in 2012 and from 66.3% to 
88.7% in the euro area. Within these totals, there is 
considerable variation in both the starting levels of 
debt (which ranged from 3.7% of GDP in Estonia 
to 105.4% in Greece) and the overall increases. 
While Ireland is being forecast a 92.9 percentage 
point of GDP increase in its debt, Sweden is being 
forecast a decrease. 
Graph I.1.1: Short-term fiscal impact of the crisis – general 
government debt 
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Part of the heterogeneity in the rise in debt is also 
due to sizeable differences across countries in 
public interventions in the financial sector (10.0% 
of GDP of effective measures of which 2.2% 
capital injections for the EU as a whole). Countries 
with large public interventions in the financial 
sector such as Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Denmark, typically have large stock-flow 
adjustments in Table I.1.3. In Ireland for example, 
public debt is projected to increase from 25% of 
GDP to 118% of GDP in 2012. This development 
stems from the large primary deficit, rising interest 
 
Table I.1.2: Euro area - The General government budget balance (% of GDP) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total revenue (1) 45.3 44.9 44.5 44.5 44.9 44.9
Total expenditure (2) 46.0 47.0 50.8 50.5 49.2 48.5
Actual balance (3) = (1) - (2) -0.6 -0.6 -6.3 -6.0 -4.3 -3.5
Interest (4) 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.2
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4) 2.4 2.4 -3.5 -3.2 -1.3 -0.4
One-offs (6) 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.0
Cyclically adjusted  balance (7) -1.7 -2.5 -4.3 -4.4 -3.0 -2.5
Cyclically adj. prim. balance = (7) + (4)   1.3 0.5 -1.5 -1.6 0.0 0.6
Structural budget balance = (7) -(6) -1.7 -2.4 -4.3 -4.0 -3.0 -2.6
Change in actual balance: 0.7 0.7 -5.7 0.3 1.7 0.8
              - Cycle -0.4 -0.4 -1.4 -2.5 1.7 1.4
              - Interest 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2
              - Cycl.adj.prim.balance 0.1 0.1 -1.8 0.3 1.0 0.5
              - One-offs 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.4 0.0
              - Structural budget balance 0.9 1.2 0.6 -1.4 -1.2 0.0
Note: Differences between totals and sum of individual items are due to rounding.  
Source: Commission services. 
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expenditure and falling nominal GDP but also 
from the bank rescue measures which account for 
more than 20% of GDP in the form of promissory 
notes included in the government deficit and debt.  
On the whole, the total current effective support 
level is slowly declining (from the 13.0% end-
2009 peak to 10% in April 2011), signalling 
financial sector recovery and reducing the 
exposure of Member States to potential losses on 
support provided. 
In a historical perspective, the sharp rise in the 
debt ratio is consistent with developments 
observed in past financial crisis episodes. In fact, 
data on the deterioration of debt in previous 
financial crisis episodes show that the change in 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio between the year 
prior to the crisis and the end of the crisis is 18 
percentage points of GDP on average (estimates 
based on 49 crisis episodes). Moreover, financial 
crises have long-lasting implications: on average, 
countries did not manage to bring the debt-to-GDP 
ratio down to its pre-crisis level even eight years 
after.  
The rising debt-to-GDP ratios reflect the 
deteriorating public finances, ailing economies, 
and public interventions in the financial system. In 
the euro area, in 2010 the debt rose by 5.8 
percentage points relative to 2009 to 80.2% in the 
EU, and by 6.1 percentage points to 85.5% in the 
euro area. This can partly be explained by the steep 
increase in Germany which is significant part of 
the EU and euro area, while the EU average was 
also very much affected by the large increase in 
the debt of the United Kingdom. Debt increase in 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland were particularly 
notable, with Irish debt increasing by an 
unprecedented 30.6 percentage points. A further 
increase to 88.7% of GDP by 2012 is projected in 
the euro area and to 83.3% in the EU, as primary 
deficits are coupled with a weak contribution from 
economic growth and the additional effect of rising 
interest expenditure. Over the short-term, there 
remains the risk of further debt increases from any 
further public intervention in the financial sector. 
Aggregate figures tend to mask diverging 
developments at the country level. There are 
several Member States which before the current 
financial and economic crisis had low or very low 
 
Table I.1.3: Composition of changes in the government debt ratio in EU Member States (% of GDP) 
Change in 
debt ratio
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-12 Primary balance
Interest 
&growth 
contribution
Stock-flow 
adjustment
BE 84.2 89.6 96.2 96.8 97.0 97.5 13.3 1.5 5.0 6.8
DE 64.9 66.3 73.5 83.2 82.4 81.1 16.1 -3.1 4.8 14.4
EE 3.7 4.6 7.2 6.6 6.1 6.9 3.2 6.3 0.7 -3.8
IE 25.0 44.4 65.6 96.2 112.0 117.9 92.9 58.3 20.1 14.5
EL 105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 157.7 166.1 60.7 24.7 31.3 4.7
ES 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1 68.1 71.0 34.9 26.2 6.9 1.7
FR 63.9 67.7 78.3 81.7 84.7 86.8 22.9 15.6 5.3 2.0
IT 103.6 106.3 116.1 119.0 120.3 119.8 16.2 -4.4 17.3 3.2
LU 6.7 13.6 14.6 18.4 17.2 19.0 12.4 -0.3 -1.2 13.9
NL 45.3 58.2 60.8 62.7 63.9 64.0 18.7 5.6 4.6 8.4
AT 60.7 63.8 69.6 72.3 73.8 75.4 14.7 2.9 5.5 6.3
PT 68.3 71.6 83.0 93.0 101.7 107.4 39.1 15.3 18.0 5.9
SI 23.1 21.9 35.2 38.0 42.8 46.0 22.9 16.5 3.8 2.7
FI 35.2 34.1 43.8 48.4 50.6 52.2 17.0 -3.7 0.4 20.3
MT 62.0 61.5 67.6 68.0 68.0 67.9 5.9 2.4 1.1 2.4
CY 58.3 48.3 58.0 60.8 62.3 64.3 6.0 8.0 1.5 -3.5
SK 29.6 27.8 35.4 41.0 44.8 46.8 17.2 20.4 0.2 -3.3
EA-17 66.3 70.0 79.4 85.5 87.9 88.7 22.3 7.4 7.9 7.0
BG 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.2 18.0 18.6 1.4 6.6 -0.5 -4.7
CZ 29.0 30.0 35.3 38.5 41.3 42.9 14.0 14.3 3.6 -4.0
DK 27.5 34.5 41.8 43.6 45.3 47.1 19.6 0.6 4.7 14.2
LV 9.0 19.7 36.7 44.7 48.2 49.4 40.4 22.4 7.5 10.5
LT 16.9 15.6 29.5 38.2 40.7 43.6 26.6 22.5 2.4 1.8
HU 66.1 72.3 78.4 80.2 75.2 72.7 6.6 -6.3 7.9 5.1
PL 45.0 47.1 50.9 55.0 55.4 55.1 10.1 15.3 -2.7 -2.4
RO 12.6 13.4 23.6 30.8 33.7 34.8 22.2 21.6 0.5 0.2
SE 40.2 38.8 42.8 39.8 36.5 33.4 -6.9 -9.2 -0.7 3.0
UK 44.5 54.4 69.6 80.0 84.2 87.9 43.5 28.7 5.4 9.5
EU-27 59.0 62.3 74.4 80.2 82.3 83.3 24.3 10.1 8.6 5.6
Change in the debt ratio in 
2007-12 due to:Gross debt ratio
Notes: Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services' Spring 2011 European Economic Forecast. 
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debt levels, which however have been rising 
sharply. This group of countries includes Ireland, 
Spain and the United Kingdom, and, starting from 
lower levels, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. 
Moreover, four euro area countries are expected to 
have debt above 100% of GDP by 2011. Italy 
already had a public debt-to-GDP ratio above 
100% of GDP before the crisis. In Greece the 
already very high debt ratio of 142.8% of GDP, 
continually on the increase since 2007, is also 
expected to steeply increase further over the 
forecast horizon, up to 166.1% of GDP in 2012 
(under the usual no policy change assumption). In 
Ireland and marginally also in Portugal the debt-to-
GDP ratio exceeded the 100% of GDP in 2010 and 
is set to continue growing (again under the no 
policy change assumption). Belgium, Germany, 
France, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands 
and Austria also have debt ratios above the 60% 
threshold in 2010 and further increases of these 
ratios are projected in all of them except Germany 
and Hungary, while the Maltese debt ratio is 
expected to remain broadly constant. Aside from 
these three countries, the debt ratio is projected to 
start declining in Italy, Poland and Sweden in 
2012. 
1.5. GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND 
EXPENDITURE  
In 2010, the slight improvement in budgetary 
positions in the euro area was entirely the result of 
a lower expenditure-to-GDP ratio which was 
mainly due to lower public investment. This is 
shown in Table I.1.4, which also shows that the 
revenue ratio remained stable overall between 
2009 and 2010, while expenditure fell. Somewhat 
higher than expected growth alongside some 
consolidation measures contributed to this pattern. 
Table I.1.5 shows the expenditure and revenue 
ratios for all EU countries and shows, that 
according to the Commission services' Spring 
2011 Economic Forecast, the expenditure  ratio in 
the euro area will continue to decrease over the 
forecast horizon, while the revenue ratio will 
increase only very little. On the revenue side in 
particular, composition effects are expected to be 
small. 
The improvement on the expenditure side of the 
budget in 2010 explains the improvement of 
structural balances over the forecast horizon in 
most Member States. The improvement in the 
balance is only partly explained by the reduced 
operation of automatic stabilisers, and much of it 
consists of the withdrawal of discretionary 
measures.  
Overall Member States budgetary plans for 2011 
and 2012 have still been compiled against a 
background of uncertainty and continue to exhibit 
various risks, on both the revenue and expenditure 
sides. (4) 
 
                                                          
(4) See Part I.3 of this report. 
 
Table I.1.4: Euro Area – Government revenue and expenditures (% of GDP) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total revenue 45.3 44.9 44.5 44.5 44.9 44.9
Taxes on imports and production (indirect) 13.5 13.0 12.8 13.0 13.1 13.1
Current taxes on income and wealth 12.4 12.2 11.4 11.3 11.5 11.6
Social contributions 15.1 15.3 15.7 15.6 15.6 15.5
of which actual social contributions 14.0 14.2 14.5 14.4 14.4 14.4
Other revenue 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7
Total expenditure 46.0 47.0 50.8 50.5 49.2 48.5
Collective consumption 7.9 8.1 8.7 8.6 8.4 8.3
Social benefits in kind 12.1 12.4 13.4 13.3 13.0 12.8
Social transfers other than in kind 15.8 16.1 17.7 17.8 17.6 17.3
Interest 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.2
Subsidies 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
Gross fixed capital formation 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2
Other expenditures 3.4 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.5
Notes: Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table I.1.5: Government revenue and expenditure (% of GDP) 
           2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
DK 55.2 55.6 55.3 53.4 53.6 51.9 58.3 58.0 57.5 56.8
EE 37.0 43.4 40.1 39.2 38.0 39.9 45.1 40.0 39.8 40.4
IE 35.5 33.9 34.6 35.0 35.1 42.8 48.2 67.0 45.5 43.9
EL 39.9 37.3 39.1 40.2 40.2 49.6 52.7 49.6 49.7 49.5
ES 37.1 34.7 35.7 36.5 36.7 41.3 45.8 45.0 42.9 42.0
FR 49.5 48.7 49.2 50.1 50.1 52.8 56.2 56.2 55.8 55.4
LT 34.1 34.5 34.2 33.5 33.5 37.4 44.0 41.2 39.0 38.3
MT 39.0 39.5 38.7 39.7 39.4 43.5 43.2 42.3 42.7 42.4
NL 46.6 45.9 45.9 46.5 47.1 46.0 51.4 51.3 50.2 49.4
PL 39.5 37.2 37.8 40.0 40.1 43.2 44.5 45.7 45.8 43.7
RO 32.6 32.1 34.3 34.1 34.5 38.3 40.6 40.8 38.8 38.1
SK 32.9 33.6 33.1 33.6 32.9 35.0 41.5 41.0 38.8 37.4
HU 45.2 46.1 44.6 52.0 42.0 48.9 50.6 48.8 50.4 45.3
IT 46.1 46.5 46.0 45.9 46.1 48.9 51.9 50.6 49.9 49.2
SI 42.3 43.1 43.4 43.3 43.1 44.1 49.0 49.0 49.1 48.1
UK 42.5 40.2 40.6 41.2 41.6 46.3 47.3 48.3 49.3 50.3
BE 48.8 48.1 48.9 49.3 49.4 50.1 54.0 53.0 53.1 53.6
BG 39.3 36.0 34.5 34.7 35.0 37.6 40.7 37.7 37.4 36.6
CZ 40.2 40.1 40.5 41.2 41.2 42.9 46.0 45.2 45.6 45.2
DE 43.9 44.5 43.3 43.3 43.2 43.8 47.5 46.6 45.3 44.3
CY 42.6 39.8 41.3 41.0 41.0 41.7 45.8 46.6 46.1 45.9
LV 34.6 34.6 35.2 36.9 36.5 38.8 44.2 42.9 41.4 40.4
LU 39.8 41.3 39.5 39.3 39.0 36.9 42.2 41.2 40.3 40.1
AT 48.3 48.8 48.3 48.7 48.7 49.2 52.9 53.0 52.4 52.0
PT 41.1 39.7 41.5 41.8 42.4 44.6 49.8 50.7 47.7 46.9
FI 53.5 53.4 52.3 52.8 52.9 49.3 56.0 54.8 53.7 53.5
SE 53.9 54.2 52.7 52.4 52.7 51.7 54.9 52.7 51.5 50.6
EA-17 44.9 44.5 44.5 44.9 44.9 47.0 50.8 50.5 49.2 48.5
EU-27 44.6 44.0 44.0 44.5 44.5 46.9 50.8 50.3 49.1 48.3
Revenue Expenditure
Source: Commission services' Spring 2011 Economic Forecast 
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 Box I.1.3: The meeting of the Euro Area Heads of State or Government of 21 July 2011: main 
decisions
The summit of the euro area Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the commitment to the euro and to do 
whatever is needed to ensure the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States.  
As to Greece, a new programme was endorsed which, including the contribution of the IMF and the 
voluntary contribution of the private sector, would fully cover the financing gap until 2014 included. The 
total official financing would amount to an estimated 109 billion euro. This programme would decisively 
improve the debt sustainability and refinancing profile of Greece, notably through extended maturities and 
lower interest rates. Specifically, the maturity of future EFSF loans to Greece would be lengthened to the 
maximum possible, to a range between 15 and 30 years, while the maturities of the existing Greek facility 
would be extended substantially. The loans will be provided at lending rates equivalent to those of the 
Balance of Payments facility (currently around 3.5%), close to the EFSF funding cost. The summit took note 
of the willingness of the financial sector to support Greece on a voluntary basis through a menu of options, 
its net contribution being estimated at 37 billion euro. In addition, a debt buy-back programme would 
contribute up to 12.6 billion euro, bringing the total private sector contribution to 50 billion euro Credit 
enhancement would also be provided to underpin the quality of collateral, so as to allow its continued use 
for access to Eurosystem liquidity operations by Greek banks. Adequate resources will be provided to 
recapitalise Greek banks if needed. A comprehensive strategy for growth and investment in Greece was also 
called for, involving the mobilisation of EU funds and institutions such as the EIB. In this connection the 
Commission announced the creation of a Task Force working with the Greek authorities to target the 
structural funds on competitiveness and growth, job creation and training. Exceptional technical assistance 
would be provided by the Commission and Member States to help Greece implement its reforms. .  
Regarding private sector involvement more generally, at the same time the summit made clear that the 
approach taken in the case of Greece was exceptional and all other euro countries solemnly reaffirmed their 
inflexible determination to honour fully their own individual sovereign signature and all their commitments 
to sustainable fiscal conditions and structural reforms.  
As to the stabilisation tools, in order to improve the effectiveness of the EFSF and of the ESM and to 
address contagion, it was agreed to increase their flexibility linked to appropriate conditionality, allowing 
them to: 
- act on the basis of a precautionary programme; 
- finance recapitalisation of financial institutions through loans to governments including in non-programme 
countries; 
- intervene in the secondary markets on the basis of an ECB analysis recognising the existence of 
exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability and on the basis of a decision by 
mutual agreement of the EFSF/ESM Member States, to avoid contagion. 
Where appropriate, a collateral arrangement will be put in place so as to cover the risk arising to euro area 
Member States from their guarantees to the EFSF. 
Regarding fiscal consolidation and growth more broadly, Ireland's and Portugal's resolve to implement 
their programmes was welcomed and it was decided to apply the EFSF lending rates and maturities agreed 
upon for Greece also to these two countries. Heads of State and Government re-iterated earlier commitments 
to fiscal targets and to growth-enhancing reforms. Finally, the Commission and the EIB were invited to 
enhance the synergies between loan programmes and EU funds in all countries under EU/IMF assistance, 
including through a temporary increase in co-financing rates, in order to stimulate growth and employment. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The EU fiscal framework aims at ensuring 
budgetary discipline through two main 
requirements set out in the Treaty.(5) Firstly, 
Member States are required to achieve and 
maintain medium-term budgetary objectives 
(MTO) which are given as cyclically adjusted 
targets for the budget balance, net of one-off and 
temporary measures. Secondly, they must avoid 
excessive deficit positions, measured against 
reference values for deficits and debt of 3% and 
60% of GDP, respectively. The rules-based 
framework of the Treaty and the provisions for 
implementation in the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) include both preventive and dissuasive 
elements, both of which are backed by 
enforcement procedures. The recent unprecedented 
economic downturn and the associated 
deterioration of the budgetary positions have been 
an important test for European fiscal surveillance. 
During 2009 and 2010, the Commission and the 
Council applied the enforcement mechanisms of 
the SGP against almost all EU Member States. 
This chapter reviews the implementation of the 
framework since January 2010 focussing on the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) and 
distinguishing between euro and non-euro area 
Member States. 
According to the Commission services' 2011 
Spring forecasts, the government deficit exceeded 
3% of GDP in twenty-two Member States in 2010. 
These breaches of the 3% threshold have been 
taken into account in the EDPs. Only Denmark, 
Estonia, Luxemburg, Finland and Sweden had 
deficits within the 3% reference level. In the case 
of Denmark, unexpected and temporary revenue 
                                                          
(5) Article 126 of the Treaty lays down an excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) which is further specified in Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 'on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure'. The Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 'on 
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions 
and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies' 
lays down and specifies the obligation for the Member 
States to achieve and maintain their MTO. These two 
regulations are a part of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), representing its dissuasive and preventive arm, 
respectively. Relevant legal texts and guidelines can be 
found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/legal_texts/index
_en.htm  
windfalls related to volatile revenue components 
(in particular the pension yield tax) (6) brought the 
deficit temporarily below 3% of GDP in 2010. It is 
expected to rise to 4.1% in 2011. (7) On the back 
of a robust, albeit geographically dispersed, 
economic recovery, the fiscal outcomes for some 
Member States turned out to be better than 
expected even one year ago. The Commission 
services' 2011 Spring forecasts projects that twenty 
EU Member States will record deficits above 3% 
of GDP in 2011. Bulgaria and Germany are 
expected to bring their deficits down below the 3% 
threshold, while Hungary is projected to reach a 
1.6% of GDP surplus, mainly on account of 
temporary proceeds from a return to the public 
Pay-As-You-Go system of assets hitherto 
accumulated in the second private pension pillar. 
However, unless further policy measures are taken 
by the Hungarian government (as requested by the 
Council in July 2011,) the Commission services' 
2011 Spring forecasts see the budget balance 
returning to 3.3% of GDP deficit in 2012. 
In order to visualise to what extent the weakness of 
public finances is related to the crisis, Graph 
I.2.1 (8) shows the relation between the output gap 
Graph I.2.1: Deficit and cycle in the EU 
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and the government deficit since 2003 in the EU as 
an aggregate. Between 2007 and 2009 the public 
finances across the euro area were hit by a set of 
factors including the working of automatic 
                                                          
(6) The pension yield tax is a flat-rate tax levied on the annual 
gains of pension portfolios.  
(7) This is still in line with the Danish excessive deficit 
procedure that is to end in 2013. 
(8) It should be noted that while figures for years up to 2010 
are observed or estimated data, figures for 2011 and 2012 
are forecast. This holds throughout the Report. 
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stabilisers, discretionary measures and a fall in 
revenues due to the burst of housing/credit bubbles 
in some countries. This was followed by a second 
phase in 2010 during which the fiscal stance was 
broadly neutral as many Member States continued 
to support their economies with discretionary 
measures while others began a partial withdrawal 
of the stimulus. A phase of consolidation has 
begun in 2011 with the EU general government 
deficit projected to shrink from 6.4% of GDP in 
2010 to 3.8% of GDP in 2012 according to latest 
Commission forecast, alongside the closure of the 
output gap. 
2.2. THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
This section focuses on the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) since January 
2010. The historical country-specific 
developments are summarised in Tables II.2.1.-
II.2.3.(9) 
Euro-area Member States  
Table I.2.1 shows the EDP steps taken for all euro 
area countries except Greece, which is shown in 
Table I.2.2. Proceeding in a chronological order, in 
February 2010, the Council considered that Malta 
had taken effective action in compliance with the 
Council recommendations issued in July 2009, but 
following unexpected adverse economic events 
with major unfavourable consequences for 
government finances and on a recommendation 
from the Commission, adopted new 
recommendations under Article 126(7), extending 
the deadline for correcting the excessive deficit by 
one year. 
In the Spring 2010 EDP notification validated by 
Eurostat on 22 April 2010,(10) the government of 
Cyprus reported a breach of the 3% threshold in 
2009, while the Finnish authorities notified a 
planned breach of this threshold for 2010. As a 
result, the Commission adopted reports under 
                                                          
(9) All the country-specific developments regarding the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) can be followed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/deficit/countries/i
ndex_en.htm 
(10) Eurostat Press Release 55/2010 - 22 April 2010,  Provision 
of deficit and debt data for 2009 - first notification, to be 
found at: 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-
22042010-BP/EN/2-22042010-BP-EN.PDF     
Article 126(3) for both countries in May 2010.(11) 
In July 2010, following an opinion of the 
Commission and on the basis of proposal from the 
Commission, the Council decided that an 
excessive deficit existed in both countries in 
accordance with Article 126(6). On the basis of the 
Commission’s recommendation, the Council 
issued recommendations under Article 126(7) and 
set deadlines for correction of the excessive 
deficits.  
In June 2010, the Commission assessed the actions 
taken in compliance with the December 2009 
Council recommendations by Ireland, France, 
Spain, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. It 
concluded in all cases that no further steps in the 
excessive deficit procedure were needed at that 
time.  
In December 2010, on the basis of a 
recommendation from the Commission and 
following unexpected adverse economic events 
with major unfavourable consequences for 
government finances, the Council adopted new 
recommendations under Article 126(7) to end the 
excessive deficit situation in Ireland, extending the 
deadline for correction by one year. Ireland has 
received a deadline for taking effective action by 7 
June 2011. An assessment of the action taken will 
follow in the Summer of 2011.  
In January 2011, the Commission concluded that 
effective action had been taken in compliance with 
the July 2010 Council recommendations by Cyprus 
and Finland. The Commission also considered that 
Malta had taken effective action in compliance 
with the February 2010 Council recommendations. 
Developments in the budget balance were judged 
to be on course for a timely correction of the 
excessive deficits. 
In the Spring 2011 EDP notification, Finland 
reported that its general government deficit 
remained below 3% in 2010. Therefore the 
Commission adopted a recommendation in June 
                                                          
(11) Also the government of Luxemburg notified the planned 
breach of 3% for 2010, however following the Commission 
report under Article 126(3), it was concluded that both the 
deficit and debt criteria in the second paragraph of Article 
126 would be respected and next steps under the excessive 
deficit procedure should not be considered.  
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2011 for the abrogation of the EDP. The Council 
adopted a decision in this sense on 12 July 2011.  
In the case of Greece, the excessive deficit 
procedure was stepped up in February 2010 when 
the Council adopted (on a recommendation from 
the Commission) a decision to give notice under 
Article 126(9). Also on a recommendation from 
the Commission, the Council adopted further 
amendments to the Council decisions in September 
and December 2010 and in March and July 2011, 
in parallel to the program of economic adjustment 
agreed between Greece and the Commission on 
behalf of the lenders, in liaison with the ECB and 
the IMF.(12) The Greek fiscal consolidation is 
combined with more fundamental structural and 
institutional reforms, to the point that the excessive 
deficit procedure is superseded by the 
aforementioned macroeconomic adjustment 
programme. As can be seen in Table I.2.2, the 
Greek authorities report on fiscal plans and 
developments on a quarterly basis. In line with the 
timetable, reviews took place in Summer and 
Autumn 2010 as well as in Spring 2011.  
Non euro-area Member States 
Table I.2.1 shows the EDP steps taken for the non 
euro area countries. Proceeding in a chronological 
order, in January 2010, the Commission assessed 
the action taken in compliance with the July 2009 
Council recommendations by Hungary and Latvia. 
It concluded that no further steps in the excessive 
deficit procedure were needed at that stage. In 
February 2010, the Commission reached the 
conclusion that effective action had also been 
taken in compliance with the July 2009 Council 
recommendation by Poland. 
In February 2010, the Council considered that 
Lithuania and Romania had taken effective action 
in compliance with the Council recommendations 
issued in July 2009, but following unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances, on a 
recommendation from the Commission adopted 
                                                          
(12) See Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies and 
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic 
Policy Conditionality (both 3 May 2010). All the 
documents related to the implementation of the EDP in the 
case of Greece can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/deficit/countries/
greece_en.htm  
new recommendations under Article 126(7), 
extending the deadline for correcting the excessive 
deficit by one year.  
In the Spring 2010 EDP notification, the Bulgarian 
authorities reported a breach of the 3% of GDP 
threshold in 2009, while the government of 
Denmark notified a planned breach of the 3% of 
GDP threshold for 2010, validated by Eurostat on 
22 April 2010. (13) As a result, the Commission 
adopted reports under Article 126(3) for both 
countries in May 2010. In July 2010, following an 
opinion of the Commission and on the basis of 
proposal from the Commission, the Council 
decided that an excessive deficit existed in both 
countries in accordance with Article 126(6). On 
the basis of the Commission’s recommendation, 
the Council issued recommendations under Article 
126(7) and set deadlines for correction of the 
excessive deficit.  
In June 2010, the Commission assessed the action 
taken in compliance with the December 2009 
Council recommendations by the Czech Republic. 
It concluded that no further steps in the excessive 
deficit procedure were needed at that point in time. 
In July 2010, the Commission reached the 
conclusion that effective action had been also 
taken in compliance with the December 2009 
Council recommendation by the UK. In September 
2010, the Commission considered that effective 
action had been taken in compliance with the 
February 2010 Council recommendations by 
Lithuania and Romania. In January 2011, the 
Commission concluded that effective action had 
been taken in compliance with the July 2010 
Council recommendations by Bulgaria and 
Denmark. In all cases, developments in the budget 
balance were judged to be on course for a timely 
correction of the excessive deficits. 
 
 
                                                          
(13) Eurostat Press Release 55/2010 - 22 April 2010,  
 Provision of deficit and debt data for 2009 - first notification, 
to be found at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-
22042010-BP/EN/2-22042010-BP-EN.PDF 
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Table I.2.1: Overview of EDP procedure: euro area Member States 
Treaty 
Art.
IE FR ES MT BE DE IT NL AT PT SI SK CY FI LU
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 126(3) 18.02.2009 18.02.2009 18.02.2009 13.05.2009 07.10.2009 07.10.2009 07.10.2009 07.10.2009 07.10.2009 07.10.2009 07.10.2009 07.10.2009 12.5.2010 12.5.2010 12.5.2010
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 126(4) 27.02.2009 27.02.2009 27.02.2009 29.05.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.5.2010 27.5.2010 27.5.2010
Commission adopts:
    opinion on existence of excessive deficit 126(5) 24.03.2009 24.03.2009 24.03.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 15.6.2010 15.6.2010 15.6.2010
    recommendation for Council decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 24.03.2009 24.03.2009 24.03.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 15.6.2010 15.6.2010 15.6.2010
    recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 24.03.2009 24.03.2009 24.03.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 15.6.2010 15.6.2010 15.6.2010
Council adopts:
    decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 27.04.2009 27.04.2009 27.04.2009 07.07.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 13.7.2010 13.7.2010
    recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 27.04.2009 27.04.2009 27.04.2009 07.07.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 13.7.2010 13.7.2010
         deadline for taking effective action 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 07.01.2010 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 13.01.2011 13.01.2011
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council*
at least 
1.5% of 
GDP in 
2010-2013
at least 1% 
of GDP in 
2010-2012
at least 
1¼% of 
GDP in 
2010-2012
-
¾% of GDP 
in 2010-
2012
at least 
0.5% of 
GDP in 
2010-2013
at least 
0.5% of 
GDP in 
2010-2012
¾% of GDP 
in 2011-
2013
¾% of GDP 
in 2011-
2013
1¼% of 
GDP in 
2010-2013
¾% of GDP 
in 2010-
2013
1% of GDP 
in 2010-
2013
at least 
1½% of 
GDP in 
2011-2012
at least 
0.5% of 
GDP on 
2011
         deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2013 2012 2012 2010 2012 2013 2012 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2012 2011
Commission adopts communication on action taken - - - - 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 27.01.2011 27.01.2011
Council adopts conclusions thereon - - - - 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 15.02.2011 15.02.2011
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 
end situation of excessive deficit
126(7) 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 11.11.2009 27.01.2010
Council adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to end 
situation of excessive deficit
126(7) 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 02.12.2009 16.02.2010
         deadline for taking effective action 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 02.06.2010 16.08.2010
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council*
2% of GDP 
in 2010-
2014
above 1% 
of GDP in 
2010-2013
above 1.5% 
of GDP in 
2010-2013
¾% of GDP 
in 2011
         revised deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2014 2013 2013 2011
Commission adopts communication on action taken 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 15.06.2010 06.01.2011
Council adopts conclusions thereon 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 13.07.2010 18.01.2011
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action
126(8) -
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) -
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 
end situation of excessive deficit
126(7) 03.12.2010
Council adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to end 
situation of excessive deficit
126(7) 07.12.2010
         deadline for taking effective action 07.06.2011
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council*
9½% of 
GDP over 
2011-2015
new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2015
Abrogation of excessive deficit procedure
Commission adopts recommandation for EDP abrogation 126(12) 29.06.2011
Council abrogates EDP 126(12) 12.07.2011
Follow-up of the NEW Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Country
Starting phase
Steps in EDP procedure
Follow-up of the Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Source: Commission services. 
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Table I.2.2: Overview of EDP procedure: Greece 
Treaty 
Art.
EL
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 126(3) 18.02.2009
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 126(4) 27.02.2009
Commission adopts:
    opinion on existence of excessive deficit 126(5) 24.03.2009
    recommendation for Council decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 24.03.2009
    recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 24.03.2009
Council adopts:
    decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 27.04.2009
    recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 27.04.2009
         deadline for taking effective action 27.10.2009
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council -
         deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2010
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing inadequate 
action
126(8) 11.11.2009
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) 02.12.2009
Commission adopts Council recommendation for decision to give notice 126(9) 03.02.2010
Council decision to give notice 126(9) 16.02.2010
         deadline for taking effective action 15.05.2010
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council
at least 3½% of GDP 
annualy in 2010 and 2011, 
at least 2½% of GDP in 
2012
         new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2012
Commission adopts communication on action taken 09.03.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 16.03.2010
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council decision to give notice 126(9) 04.05.2010
Council decision to give notice 126(9) 10.05.2011
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council at least 10% in cumulative 
terms over 2009-2014
         new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit
2014
Commission adopts communication on action taken 19.08.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 07.09.2010
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision amending the Council 
deicision to give notice
126(9)
19.08.2010
Council decision amending the Council decision to give notice 126(9) 07.09.2010
         new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit
2014
Commission adopts communication on action taken 09.12.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 20.12.2010
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision amending the Council 
deicision to give notice
126(9)
09.12.2010
Council decision amending the Council decision to give notice 126(9) 20.12.2010
         new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit
2014
Commission adopts communication on action taken 24.02.2011
Council adopts conclusions thereon 07.03.2011
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision amending the Council 
deicision to give notice
126(9)
24.02.2011
Council decision amending the Council decision to give notice 126(9) 07.03.2011
         new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2014
Follow-up - 2nd review
Follow-up - 3rd review
Follow-up of the Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Steps in EDP procedure
Starting phase
Follow-up of the Council decision
Follow-up - 1st review
Source:  Commission services. 
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Table I.2.3: Overview of EDP procedure: non-euro area Member States 
Treaty 
Art.
HU UK LV PL LT RO CZ BG DK
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 126(3) 12.05.2004 11.6.2008 18.02.2009 13.05.2009 13.05.2009 13.05.2009 07.10.2009 12.05.2010 12.05.2010
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 126(4) 24.05.2004 25.6.2008 27.02.2009 29.05.2009 29.05.2009 29.05.2009 27.10.2009 27.05.2010 27.05.2010
Commission adopts:
     opinion on existence of excessive deficit 126(5) 24.06.2004 02.07.2008 02.07.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 06.07.2010 15.06.2010
     recommendation for Council decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 24.06.2004 02.07.2008 02.07.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 06.07.2010 15.06.2010
recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 24.06.2004 02.07.2008 02.07.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 06.07.2010 15.06.2010
Council adopts:
     decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 05.07.2004 08.07.2008 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 02.12.2009 13.07.2010 13.07.2010
     recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 05.07.2004 08.07.2008 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 02.12.2009 13.07.2010 13.07.2010
          deadline for taking effective action 05.11.2004 08.01.2009 07.01.2010 07.01.2010 07.01.2010 07.01.2010 02.06.2010 13.01.2011 13.01.2011
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council* - at least 0.5% of GDP in 2009/10
at least 2¾% of 
GDP in 2010-
2012
at least 1¼% of 
GDP in 2010-
2012
at least 1½% of 
GDP in 2009-
2011
at least 1½% of 
GDP in 2010-
2011
1% of GDP in 
2010-2013
at least ¾% of 
GDP in 2011
at least 0.5% of 
GDP in 2011-
2013
          deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2008 fin. year
 2009/10
2012 2012 2011 2011 2013 2011 2013
Commission adopts communication on action taken - - 27.01.2010 03.02.2010 - - 15.06.2010 27.01.2011 27.01.2011
Council adopts conclusions thereon - - 16.02.2010 16.02.2010 - - 13.07.2010 15.02.2011 15.02.2011
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action
126(8) 22.12.2004 24.03.2009 - -
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) 18.01.2005 27.04.2009 - -
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 
end excessive deficit situation
126(7) 16.02.2005 24.03.2009 27.01.2010 08.02.2010
Council adopts NEW recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 126(7) 08.03.2005 27.04.2009 16.02.2010 16.02.2010
          deadline for taking effective action 08.07.2005 27.10.2009 16.08.2010 16.08.2010
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council* -
beyond 1% of 
GDP in 2010/11-
2013/14
at least 2¼% of 
GDP in 2010-
2012
1¾% of GDP in 
2010-2012
          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2008 fin. year
 2013/14
2012 2012
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.07.2005 - 21.09.2010 21.09.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon - - 19.10.2010 19.10.2010
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action
126(8) 20.10.2005 -
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) 08.11.2005 -
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 
end excessive deficit situation
126(7) 26.09.2006 11.11.2009
Council adopts NEW recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 126(7) 10.10.2006 02.12.2009
          deadline for taking effective action 10.04.2007 02.06.2010
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council* -
1¾% of GDP in 
2010/11-
2014/15
          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2009 fin. year 
2014/15
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.06.2007 06.07.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 10.07.2007 13.07.2010
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action
126(8) -
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) -
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 
end excessive deficit situation
126(7) 24.06.2009
Council adopts NEW recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 126(7) 07.07.2009
          deadline for taking effective action 07.01.2010
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council*
at least 0.5% of 
GDP in 
cumulative 
terms in 2010-
2011
          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2011
Commission adopts communication on action taken 27.01.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 16.02.2010
Country
Follow-up of the NEW Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Follow-up of the NEW Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Follow-up of the NEW Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Steps in EDP procedure
Starting phase
Follow-up of the Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
 
Source:  Commission services. 
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This chapter provides an overview of the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) that 
Member States submitted in Spring 2011 (it has to 
be noted that some countries have since then 
announced measures corresponding to updated 
strategies.) For the first time, SCPs were examined 
in the context of the European semester, aimed at 
giving comprehensive economic policy advice to 
Member States ahead of the approval of their 
budgets for next year. Recommendations based on 
the SCPs were issued by the Council in July 2011 
on the basis of a Commission recommendation. 
This chapter gives special attention to 2012, 
examining the deficit targets set out in the SCPs 
against the background of the Commission 
services' Spring 2011 forecasts. It then presents the 
adjustment paths, the time profile and the 
composition of the consolidation over the whole 
horizon of the programmes. The chapter finally 
outlines the implications of the fiscal plans for the 
debt path. 
3.1. MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS 
The economic growth assumptions for 2011 and 
2012 contained in the SCPs are, on average, 
broadly in line with the 2011 Commission Spring 
forecasts, as shown by the Graphs I.3.1 and I.3.2. 
For the euro area, the SCPs project growth of 1.7% 
and 1.9% for 2011 and 2012 respectively while for 
the EU they project growth of 1.8% and 2.1%. 
These SCP projections are broadly equal to the 
Commission ones for 2011, while for 2012 they 
are 0.1pp of GDP higher for the euro area and 
0.2pp higher for the EU. Potential growth in the 
SCPs is not projected to differ much from the 
Commission's forecasts, so the additional growth 
that the SCPs project is primarily cyclical. 
While the overall growth averages projected in the 
SCPs are close to the Commission's figures, there 
is a significant gap for some individual countries. 
With higher growth pencilled in their SCPs for 
both 2011 and 2012, Spain, Bulgaria and Sweden 
show the greatest differences in their growth 
projections relative to the Commission for the next 
two years. Spain has growth higher by 0.5pp in 
2011 and 0.8pp in 2012, Bulgaria's by 0.8pp and 
0.4pp and Sweden's by 0.4pp and 1.3pp. 
Cumulatively, these countries are therefore basing 
their public finance projections on over 1pp more 
growth over the two years 2011 and 2012. 
Conversely, a number of countries are projecting 
weaker growth than the Commission, the most 
significantly for Estonia (-0.9pp in 2011) and the 
Czech Republic (-0.6pp in 2012.) 
Graph I.3.1: Growth assumptions (EU) 
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Source: SCPs, Commission Services. 
 
Graph I.3.2: Growth assumptions (euro area) 
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Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
The sectoral breakdown of growth is also worth 
considering. In order to generate growth during a 
time of expenditure-driven fiscal consolidation, the 
private and/or the external sector must fill the 
shortfall arising from the restraint in the public 
sector. Internal demand (consumption, investment) 
from the private sector can serve to close the 
demand gap arising from a reduction in general 
government spending, while an increase in net 
exports can also serve the same function.  
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Graph I.3.3 shows that, from 2010 to 2014, all 
countries except Malta and Portugal are showing a 
combination of a tightening in general government 
alongside an expansion in the private sector. In 
most cases, the expansion in the private sector is 
smaller than the retraction in the public sector, 
meaning that an increase in the current account is 
expected. An improvement in the external sector is 
set to play a significant role in Portugal, Greece, 
Malta, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Slovakia. 
For Finland, Denmark, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Sweden, France, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Latvia, the increase in demand from the private 
sector is projected to more than make up for the 
decrease expected in the public sector. As a result, 
these countries are projecting a current account 
deterioration to absorb the excess internal demand. 
3.2. DEFICIT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2012 
This section looks at the differences in the general 
government deficit for 2012 as this is the year into 
whose budgets the European Semester is expected 
to contribute. In line with this timetable, the 
recommendations were issued to Member States in 
July 2011, on the basis of the plans that they set 
out in their SCPs. Overall, both the SCP 
projections and the Commission forecasts show 
considerable reductions in the general government 
deficits, which should approach the 3% of GDP 
threshold, on average. This can be seen in Graph 
I.3.4, which sets out the deficit projections for 
2012.  
The Commission forecasts, which are based on 
unchanged policy assumptions, are however for a 
larger deficit than appears in the SCPs. For the 
euro area, the Commission is forecasting a 3.5% of 
GDP deficit, while the SCPs show an expected 
deficit of 3.1% of GDP. For the EU, the deficits 
are greater, with the Commission forecasting a 
3.8% of GDP deficit and the SCPs showing one of 
3.4% of GDP. All countries except Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and 
Finland are targeting lower deficits than the 
Commission for 2012, within at most 0.4pp of the 
Graph I.3.3: Sectoral net lending and relative unit labour cost changes (2010-2014) 
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(1) The change in the private sector balance stems from the following accounting identity: change in the net lending of the general government + 
change in the net lending of the private sector + change in the net lending vis-à-vis the rest of the world = 0. There is an implicit assumption of no 
change in statistical discrepancy. 
(2)The position of the country with respect to the -45° line allows an assessment of the contribution of the external sector. 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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Commission figures, with the exception of 
Denmark whose target is 1.3 pp of GDP higher 
than the Commission's. The remaining Member 
States are projecting lower deficits than the 
Commission for 2012. In the case of Slovenia, 
Belgium and Latvia, the SCPs project deficits that 
are over 1pp lower the Commission's, while 
Lithuania and Cyprus's SCPs forecast deficits over 
2pp lower .(14)  
Graph I.3.4 also breaks down the differences in the 
projections in terms of three components. The first 
is the difference in the starting deficit conditions in 
2011 (labelled the '2011 base effect') and stems 
from differences in the growth assumptions for 
2011 and/or from differences in assessing the 
impact of the 2011 consolidation measures. The 
second component is the difference in the growth 
                                                          
(14) The figures for Greece also show a deficit that is almost 
5pp of GDP stronger than forecast by the Commission. 
However as Greece figures come from the latest 
programme for the assistance for Greece, they are not SCP 
figures and are therefore not of primary concern in this 
analysis. 
assumptions for 2012 (labelled '2012 growth gap') 
and is calculated using the standard semi-
elasticities to estimate the impact that the real 
growth assumptions have on the public deficit. The 
residual difference is labelled the '2012 policy gap' 
as it is assumed to stem from the quantification of 
the consolidation measures to be taken for 2012 to 
achieve the targets set out in the SCPs. Indeed, the 
SCPs contain estimates of all the planned – 
although not necessarily legislated for –- 
consolidation measures, while the Commission 
forecasts are undertaken on an unchanged policy 
basis, meaning that only measures already 
specified and legislated for are taken into account. 
Overall, it is the '2012 policy gap' that makes up 
nearly all the difference between the two forecasts 
for the euro area overall: as Graph I.3.4 shows, it 
accounts for 0.3pp of the 0.4pp gap between the 
forecasts, with the remaining difference stemming 
from the slightly higher growth forecast in the 
SCPs for 2012. For the EU, the '2012 policy gap' is 
half of the whole gap, and corresponds to 0.2pp of 
Graph I.3.4: General government deficit for 2012: decomposition of the gap between the SCP projections and the COM forecasts 
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(1) One-off measures for Ireland (2010) and Hungary (2011) have been replaced for the sake of clarity. This has been done along this chapter anywhere 
it is relevant. 
(2) The case of Denmark is unusual, as the policy gap is in the opposite direction. Denmark is in the process of undertaking a retirement reform which 
should be adopted by the parliament shortly, and will involve reimbursements to people no longer eligible to the pension scheme. Denmark is 
projecting a higher deficit than the Commission, and a policy gap of 1.8pp of GDP leads to a deficit which is higher by 1.3pp of GDP. 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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the 0.4pp difference. The '2011 base effect' and the 
'2012 growth gap' each account for 0.1pp.  
The fact that the difference is mainly driven by the 
policy effect, points to the fact that if countries are 
to realistically expect to meet the projections set 
out in the SCPs, they will have to introduce the 
measures that are outlined in the SCPs. (15) The 
policy gap is near or above 1pp of GDP in the case 
of Slovenia, Cyprus, Lithuania Belgium and 
Latvia. 
3.3. FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 
3.3.1. Size and time profile consolidation 
With economic growth having returned in 2010 
and stabilizing in 2011 and 2012, the necessary 
consolidation is now underway in both the EU and 
euro area as a whole. Graphs I.3.5 and I.3.6 show 
the planned changes in government deficits and in 
the structural deficits over the 2010–2014 horizon, 
as set out in the SCPs. It shows that, on aggregate, 
both the EU and the euro area are projected to 
improve their fiscal positions every year between 
2010 and 2014. In the EU, the general government 
deficit is planned to fall from 6.3% of GDP in 
2010, to 4.6% in 2011, 3.4% in 2012, 2.3% in 
2013 and 1.4% in 2014. Meanwhile, the 
corresponding figures for the euro area are 6.0%, 
4.3%, 3.1%, 2.1% and 1.3%. In structural terms 
also, deficits are projected to decrease faster during 
2011–2012 than during 2013–2014. The time 
profile of the consolidation is therefore one that is 
front-loaded – an aspect which points to a 
commitment by Member States to ensure that 
consolidation is indeed undertaken.  
Of course, there are variations in the time profile. 
For some countries such as Belgium, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Estonia, the adjustment is back-
loaded, although in some cases only to a limited 
extent, in the sense that the decrease in both the 
general government deficit and the structural 
deficit is projected to be higher during the second 
half of the timeframe of the programmes (2013–
2014) than during the first half (2011–2012). 
                                                          
(15) This is also stressed by the Council in its country-specific 
recommendations of July 2011. 
Graph I.3.5: Planned changes in government deficits over 2010–
2014 in the SCPs 
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Graph I.3.6: Planned changes in structural government deficits 
over 2010–2014 in the SCPs and the MTOs 
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Within the first half of the programmes' timeframe, 
countries such as Lithuania, Poland, Italy, Estonia, 
Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Bulgaria are 
projecting that their consolidation effort will be 
higher in 2012 than in 2011. A back-loaded 
adjustment in 2012 – compared to 2011 – is also 
projected in the more extreme case of Slovenia, 
where the deficit is projected to stabilize in 2011, 
and Hungary, where, net of one-offs, the general 
government deficit is projected to increase in 2011.  
In countries for which a high '2012 policy gap' has 
also been revealed, the back-loading of the 
adjustment can be seen as posing a particular extra 
risk in terms of whether projections will be 
realised. This especially refers to Belgium, 
Lithuania and Slovenia. 
Part I 
Current developments and prospects 
 
41 
3.3.2. Composition of the consolidation 
Graph I.3.7 looks at the split between revenue and 
expenditure measures. Overall, in the euro area, 
the consolidation is due to be primarily 
expenditure based. While the revenue ratio is due 
to increase by 0.5pp of GDP between 2010 and 
2014, the expenditure ratio is set to shrink by 
3.6pp of GDP. A similar pattern exists in the EU, 
with revenue ratio due to increase by 0.5pp of 
GDP and expenditure ratio due to shrink by 3.9pp 
of GDP.  
The country specific information contained in 
Graph I.3.7 shows that the overall picture of an 
expenditure-based consolidation holds true for the 
vast majority of countries. However, a number of 
countries are cutting revenues alongside 
expenditure. For these countries, greater cuts in 
expenditure will be necessary in order to ensure 
that deficits return to within the 3% ceiling 
specified by the SGP. 
Graph I.3.7: Planned changes in revenue and expenditure over 
2010–2014 
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Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
In the cases of France and to some extent Belgium, 
it should be noted that the consolidation effort is in 
part relying on increases in revenue ratio, despite 
the fact that these countries have amongst the 
highest starting tax burdens in the EU. Conversely, 
despite a low starting level, the tax ratio is 
projected to decrease significantly through 2014 in 
Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia and to some 
extent Slovenia and Lithuania, (16) adding to the 
cuts to expenditure that will be required to close 
the deficit. As many of these countries have low 
starting levels of expenditure, there is an added 
risk that it may prove difficult to realise the 
projected expenditure – and by extension deficit – 
cuts. 
Graphs I.3.8 and I.3.9 provide further analysis on 
the components of the consolidation. They show 
that while there is a weak, if any, relationship 
between the level of the deficit and the magnitude 
of the revenue-based consolidation being planned, 
the relationship between the deficit and the 
expenditure-based consolidation is stronger. It is 
countries with the largest deficits that are planning 
the biggest decreases in expenditures. As there is 
considerable evidence that expenditure-based 
consolidations are more likely to succeed than 
revenue based ones, it is a positive sign that the 
countries that are most in need to consolidate are 
turning to expenditure to reduce their deficits. 
Graph I.3.8: Average annual change in the revenue ratio planned 
over the 2010–2014 period versus the general 
government deficit in 2010 
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(16) For some of these countries however, the reduction of the 
tax ratio is mainly driven by the deceleration of the 
absorption of EU funds. Since EU structural funds are 
neutral on the deficit, this is mirrored by a decrease of the 
expenditure ratio. 
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Graph I.3.9: Average annual change in the expenditure ratio 
planned over the 2010–2014 period versus the 
general government deficit in 2010 
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Empirical evidence on consolidation episodes 
suggests (17) that expenditure cuts do not 
materialize to the extent initially envisaged and 
that, by contrast, revenues often turned out above 
expectation, because of favourable cyclical 
developments in macroeconomic or asset price 
conditions and/or the introduction of (temporary) 
revenue measures to offset difficulties in 
implementing expenditure cuts. 
Table I.3.1 presents the differences between 
planned and actual data on expenditures and 
revenues as observed in the past and as projected 
in the SCPs. The table computes averages between 
1999 and 2007, (18) highlights the 2010 outcome 
and then presents the projections for 2011–2014. 
Given the years shown in the table, it should be 
stressed that the past outcomes do not relate to 
consolidation episodes, but to the years before the 
onset of the crisis. The averages presented are 
unweighted, so they represent the average 
programme, but are not informative about the 
plans versus outcomes of the EU on average. 
                                                          
(17) See for example  IMF (2011). 
(18) The years 2008 and 2009 are not included as they were 
years when most countries ran discretionary fiscal stimuli. 
 
Table I.3.1: Actual versus planned fiscal adjustment for EU 27 
(unweighted average) 
1999–2007 
average
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Planned ∆ Actual ∆ Planned ∆ Actual ∆ Planned ∆ Planned ∆ Planned ∆ Planned ∆
Revenues 6.3% 7.7% 3.0% 3.2% 6.5% 4.5% 3.9% 3.9%
Expenditure 5.5% 7.1% 2.4% 1.3% 2.6% 2.3% 1.9% 2.1%
Government 
balance
0.3pp 0.2pp 0.2pp 0.9pp 2.3pp 0.7pp 0.8pp 0.7pp
(1) These figures represent the percentage increase in nominal values. 
The change in the public balance is given in % of GDP 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
 
As can be seen from the 1999–2007 data, while 
revenues typically came in stronger than had been 
planned, the higher outcomes are particularly true 
for expenditure. While the programmes had a 
planned expenditure increase of 5.5%, the actual 
increase in expenditure averaged at 7.1%. Taken 
together, this meant that the public balance 
improved by slightly less than was planned for.  In 
the last year, 2010, expenditure restraint was 
successful however. While expenditure was 
planned to increase by 2.4%, it actually went up by 
a significantly lower 1.3% as, due to the stress in 
sovereign their debt market, some countries 
implemented new consolidation measures along 
the way. With revenues being slightly stronger 
than planned, this meant that the improvement in 
the public balance was stronger than planned for. 
The table also shows the SCP plans for 2011 to 
2014. Overall, it can be seen that the SCPs are 
forecasting much stronger increases in revenues 
than in spending, resulting in improvement in the 
public balance. The Commission forecasts for 
2011 and 2012 are broadly in line on the 
expenditure side while they are lower on the 
revenue side. As a result, the unweighted planned 
government balance increase is slightly lower than 
in the SCPs in 2011 and 2012. 
This section also assesses the expenditure plans for 
2012 and for 2013–2014 against an illustrative 
benchmark. According to the reform to the 
preventive arm of the SGP currently under 
discussion, the reference benchmark against which 
expenditure plans should be assessed is the 
medium-term rate of potential GDP growth 
determined on the basis of forward-looking 
projections and backward-looking estimates. For 
the sake of this illustrative assessment, the 
reference benchmark used is based on three years 
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of backward-looking data and seven years worth of 
projections. (19) 
According to the proposed reform of the 
preventive arm, countries that have achieved the 
MTO should plan for expenditure growth to be in 
line with their medium-term rate of potential GDP 
growth unless the excess is covered by 
discretionary revenue measures. This is meant to 
ensure that increases in expenditure are accounted 
for by revenue measures and ensures that spending 
cannot be increased using cyclical or one-off 
revenues, which experience shows are likely to 
disappear leading to lasting deficits. In countries 
that have not yet achieved their MTO, planned 
expenditure growth should be below the medium-
term rate of GDP growth so as to achieve an 
improvement in the structural balance to the order 
of at least 0.5% of GDP, unless the excess is 
matched by discretionary revenue measures. 
Graph I.3.10 indicates whether the SCP plans are 
consistent with the above described expenditure 
benchmark, for 2012 and 2013–14. Each figure 
shows the reference medium term growth rate of 
GDP for the period in question on the horizontal 
axis and the planned expenditure growth (in 
nominal terms) on the vertical axis. Countries at 
                                                          
(19) Since 2010 is the last year for which actual data are 
available, the benchmark requires potential GDP growth 
forecasts until 2017. We have thus taken actual real growth 
outcome from 2008 to 2010, the COM Spring forecast for 
2011 and 2012. The remaining potential growth estimates 
until 2017 consist of the agreed Output Gap Working 
Group methodology up to 2015 (based on the COM Spring 
2011 forecast and allowing for the output gap to be closed 
by 2015) and converging to the Ageing Working Group 
potential GDP projections by 2020. 
their MTO should have a planned expenditure 
growth in line with the medium term growth rate: 
in the figures this corresponds to their point lying 
on the solid grey line that represents the 45° line. 
According to the SCP plans, the two countries to 
which this applies are Sweden and Finland. 
Countries not at their MTO, should have points 
lying below the dashed line, which represents 
expenditure growth being 1pp lower than the 
medium term growth rate of GDP. (20) Plans in the 
SCPs are broadly consistent with the proposed 
benchmark; in the context of the majority of 
Member States being subject to the EDP, it could 
be expected that planned expenditure growth be 
well below the benchmark. Graphs I.3.10 show 
that this is the case. Nevertheless, within the 
overall pattern, there are countries whose plans 
stand out, such as Lithuania and Estonia, which 
plan strong expenditure growth in 2012, only to 
reverse it between 2013 and 2014. 
3.4. DEBT IMPLICATIONS 
This section assesses debt implications of the 
macroeconomic scenario and of the consolidation 
plans. Overall, it should be expected that debt will 
continue to increase past the point where economic 
growth returned (around 2010) until the 
consolidation has been underway for long enough 
                                                          
(20) The dashed line is plotted under the hypothesis of an 
expenditure ratio around 50% of GDP, so that a Member 
State that has not yet achieved its MTO should implement 
a growth rate of expenditure 1pp below the reference 
medium-term growth rate of GDP in order to improve the 
structural balance of 0.5% of GDP (provided that the tax 
elasticity to GDP growth is equal to 1 and there is no 
change to tax policy). 
Graph I.3.10: Expenditure growth in 2012 and in 2013/2014 versus a reference medium-term growth rate of GDP 
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to halt and then start reversing the upward trend in 
debt. Graph I.3.11 shows that in both in the euro 
area and EU overall there is expected to be little 
change in debt between 2010 and 2014. This 
effectively means that within this period debt 
continued to increase before the increase reversed, 
in time to come down to broadly the 2010 level by 
2014. 
The underlying figures tell the story in a bit more 
detail. For the euro area, debt starts at 85.4% of 
GDP in 2010, before reaching a peak of 87.0% and 
then returning to 85.1% by 2014. For EU 27, debt 
starts at 80.0% of GDP before reaching a peak of 
82.5% and returning to 79.9% of GDP. In both 
cases, the peak is reached in 2012. The implication 
for the medium term is that as long as the 
consolidation measures are not reversed beyond 
2014, debt should be on a declining path for the 
years after the SCP programme horizon. All 
countries except Finland, Latvia and Luxembourg 
are projecting that they will reach their peak debt 
before 2014 and that the debt reduction will have 
started by then. However, for some countries such 
as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the UK and Spain the 
high increase in the level of debt during the crisis 
means that the reduction by 2014 will be small and 
reversing the increases seen since the time of the 
crisis is likely to take many further years. 
Graph I.3.11: 2010-2014 planned changes in public debt 
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While consolidation is a necessary prerequisite to 
debt going down, debt dynamics also depend 
crucially on the interest rate-growth 
differential. (21) The larger the differential (r-g), 
the larger the increase in the primary balance 
required to stabilise a given debt ratio. Thus, r-g 
plays a key role in determining an appropriate 
strategy to achieve a given debt target. Conversely, 
the debt ratio that can be sustained by the 
(perceived) largest feasible primary balance is 
inversely related to the differential. 
Graph I.3.12: Interest-growth differential and debt 
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Empirical evidence suggests that the differential is 
positively correlated with the level of public debt: 
the larger the public debt ratio, the higher the 
differential tends to be. (22) This is shown in Graph 
I.3.12. The causality can be expected to work in 
both directions leading to a snowball effect of 
debt, whereby high debt causes high interest 
payments which in turn increase debt further. 
There is evidence that once debt exceeds a given 
level, the interest rate starts to rise, reflecting the 
additional risk involved in holding debt from a 
highly indebted country.  
                                                          
(21) The change in the gross debt ratio can be decomposed as 
follows: 
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where t is a time subscript; D, PD, Y and SF are the stock of 
government debt, the primary deficit, nominal GDP and the 
stock-flow adjustment respectively, and r and g represent 
the average real interest rate and real rate of GDP growth. 
The term in parentheses represents the “snow-ball” effect, 
measuring the combined effect of interest expenditure and 
economic growth on the debt ratio. 
  
(22) See Baldacci and Kumar (2010) 
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Graph I.3.13 looks at the relationship between the 
interest-growth rate differential and the debt from 
a slightly different angle, using the SCP data. They 
plot the interest growth rate differential for an 
earlier time period on the horizontal axis and for a 
later one on the vertical axis. Specifically, the first 
figure compares 1991–2000 on the horizontal axis 
with 2000–2007 on the vertical, while the second 
figure compare 2000–2007 on the horizontal axis 
with 2011–2014 on the vertical. On the graph on 
the left, we observe that most points lie below the 
45° line: the differential was slightly lower for 
nearly all countries in 2001–2007 compared with 
1991–2000. Indeed the differences in both periods 
were mainly driven by the rates of growth, in a 
context of risk premia convergence during the 
early 90's. Since there was little risk differentiation 
between EU countries during the 2000–2007 
period, countries with the highest growth rates 
were those facing the lowest interest-growth 
differential, which in a number of cases was 
negative. Between 2000–2007 and 2011–2014 
however, bigger changes are evident. While some 
countries continue to reduce their differential, 
fiscal risk has re-entered the pricing of debt and 
countries displaying this risk see marked increases 
in their differential. This can be seen in 
Graph I.3.13 where 14 more countries have moved 
north-west, indicating an increase in their 
differentials. 
The consolidation underway is expected to reverse 
the trend in debt over the current SCP time-period. 
Graph I.3.14 looks at whether and to what extent 
debt will be on a declining path for individual 
countries under EDP, once the deadline for 
correcting their excessive deficit according to their 
current EDP recommendations has been reached. 
As the proposed amendments to the corrective arm 
of the Pact include the operationalisation of the 
debt criterion, in the future a sufficiently declining 
debt ratio will be a requirement to keep countries 
out of EDP (if their debt exceeds the 60% 
reference value).  Although the interpretation of 
"sufficient progress towards compliance" during 
the transition period to the new corrective arm has 
not yet been defined, there are no doubts that an 
increase in debt would clearly not represent 
"sufficient progress". 
Graph I.3.14 therefore shows the debt levels 
foreseen in the SCPs in the year of the correction 
of the excessive deficit and the years after the 
correction. Where the points lie below the black 
line, debt is forecast to be decreasing; and by 
looking at the points for a number of years it can 
be seen whether debt is expected to continue to 
decrease. The illustration is only partial for some 
countries, as the SCP horizon does not extend 
beyond their deadline for the correction of the 
excessive deficit. By contrast, for Member States 
expected to correct early (for example Italy, whose 
deadline is 2012), the graph presents the projected 
path. It is clear that all the countries illustrated are 
expecting debt to be on a declining path in the 
years after the correction of the excessive deficit. 
While this may not always be sufficient to be 
consistent with the provisions of the transition to 
the debt criterion, it is at the very least a necessary 
condition and should be seen as an encouraging 
sign. 
Comparing the projections for 2012 and using a 
similar methodology as for Graph I.3.4, which 
compared the deficit projections, Graph I.3.15 
shows the level of debt projected by both the SCPs 
Graph I.3.13: Comparing changes in the interest-growth rate differential (2001-2007 versus 1991-2000 and 2011-2014 versus 2001-2007) 
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and the Commission and decomposes it into the 
'2011 base effect', the '2012 growth gap' and the 
residual '2012 policy gap'. 
Graph I.3.14: The level of debt in EDP closing year and the years 
after 
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The graph shows that for both the euro area and 
EU, the Commission forecasts slightly higher debt 
in 2012. For the euro area, the Commission 
expects debt to come in at 88.5% of GDP, while 
the SCPs forecast 87.4%. For EU the difference 
between the two is smaller; while the Commission 
forecasts debt of 83.3% the SCPs forecast 82.2%. 
The '2012 policy gap' accounts for 0.4pp of the 
difference in the euro area debt, and 0.2pp in the 
EU. A significant contributor to the difference is 
also the '2011 base effect' which accounts for 
0.3pp in the euro area and 0.5pp in the EU. 
Graph I.3.15: General government debt for 2012: decomposition 
of the gap between the SCP projections and the 
COM forecasts 
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(1) It is assumed differences in the stock-flow adjustment between the 
Commission forecast and SCP projections enter the '2012 policy gap'. 
That's why this '2012 policy gap' is different between Graph I.3.4 and 
I.3.14. 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
These large effects of the '2011 base effect' are 
driven by a number of countries that show very 
significant differences in their SCPs, to the 
Commission figures. Greece has a starting 
difference of over 5% of GDP, while Denmark and 
Lithuania's differences are over 2.5% of their 
GDPs. Bulgaria and Ireland also have sizeable 
differences. As with the differences in the deficit 
projections, the fact that many countries have 
significant policy changes pencilled in is both a 
risk and a challenge, as it is necessary to ensure 
that consolidation measures are effectively 
implemented, to ensure that the outcomes are not 
weaker than the plans. (23) 
3.5. LONG-TERM FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 
This section assesses the longer term implications 
for fiscal sustainability taking account of the 
projected changes in age-related expenditure, the 
macroeconomic scenario and the consolidation 
plans. Three scenarios are compared:  
• the "2010" scenario (structural primary 
balance/GDP ratio kept constant at 2010 actual 
level;)  
• the "2012 COM" scenario, with structural 
primary balance/GDP ratio kept constant at 
2012 estimated level as in Spring 2011 
Commission forecasts (reflecting the 
"unchanged policy" assumption;)  
• the "programme" scenario (structural primary 
balance/GDP ratio kept constant at end of 
programme levels in the SCPs), reflecting 
planned changes in fiscal policies as reported in 
the SCPs. (24) 
Graph I.3.16 shows the projected evolution for the 
government gross debt ratio (including the 
projected increase in age-related expenditure) up to 
2020. The gross debt-to-GDP ratio would rise 
steadily over the projection period in the "2010" 
scenario while in the "programme" scenario the 
debt-to-GDP ratio would start to decrease after 
2013; however it would remain above the 60% of 
                                                          
(23) The European semester and where applicable the ongoing 
excessive deficit procedures are designed to ensure that. 
(24) In the "programme" scenario, the macroeconomic 
assumptions up to 2014 (or last year of programme) are 
those reported in the SCPs . 
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GDP Treaty threshold in 2020. The "2012 COM" 
scenario shows that debt would increase slightly 
on the basis of the Spring 2011 Commission 
forecast. (25)   
Graph I.3.16: Medium-term projections for the EU 
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
110.0
120.0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
2010 scenario 2012 COM scenario Programme scenario
Debt as % of GDP - European Union(% of GDP)
(1) Portugal is not included in the calculation and for Greece and Ireland, 
the adjustment programmes are incorporated in the 2012 COM scenario. 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
Even without taking into account ageing costs, 
debt would only stabilise at its 2012 level by 2020 
in the "2012 COM" scenario for the EU and euro 
area. Nonetheless, there is considerable diversity 
among Member States. An increase in the period 
up to 2020 in more than half of the countries in the 
COM 2012 scenario would materialize. In fact, in 
7 countries (Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and the UK), the debt-to-GDP 
ratio would increase by 10 p.p. of GDP or more, 
pointing to the importance of a determined 
implementation of a consolidation strategy in the 
medium-term and beyond, notably for those 
countries where debt would still be above the 
Treaty threshold. 
Graph I.3.17 shows the adjustment in the structural 
primary balance required up to 2020 in order to 
reach the 60% Treaty threshold for government 
debt by 2030, according to three scenarios 
described above. 
As shown in Graph I.3.17, substantial fiscal 
adjustment will be required over the medium term 
in many countries to push the debt ratio down 
further (to 60% of GDP). On the basis of the 2010 
budgetary position, the improvement required in 
the structural primary balance to achieve a debt-to-
                                                          
(25) The macroeconomic scenarios in the SCPs may be on the 
optimistic side (a phenomenon repeatedly observed). By 
using the latest independent COM forecast, this potential 
effect would be reduced. 
GDP ratio of 60% of GDP by 2030 amounts in the 
EU to 5.3 percentage points of GDP over the 
period 2011–2020, i.e., an average budgetary 
consolidation effort of just above ½ percentage 
points of GDP per year.  In other words, the 
average structural primary balance would have to 
improve from a deficit of 1.7% in 2010 to a 
surplus of 3.6% in 2020. The required 
consolidation effort varies significantly across 
countries depending on the initial structural 
primary balances, starting debt ratios and the 
growth prospects over the next 20 years. The 
required adjustment of the structural primary 
balance would be particularly demanding (a 
budgetary consolidation effort of at least 6 
percentage points of GDP) in Ireland, Greece, the 
United Kingdom, Malta, Slovenia, Spain and 
France. Furthermore, a significant consolidation 
effort of above 5 percentage points of GDP is 
estimated in Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary, 
Austria and Belgium. 
When the "2012" COM scenario is considered, the 
cumulated consolidation effort for the EU as a 
whole amounts to 3.3 percentage points of GDP, 
i.e., by just under ½ of a percentage point per 
annum for the remaining period until 2020.  
Finally, adherence to the fiscal plans in the SCPs 
throughout the programme period would give rise 
to a lower outstanding adjustment requirement in 
the EU, amounting to 1.0 percentage point of GDP  
(i.e. 0.15  percentage points of GDP per annum) 
given the ambitious consolidation plans in the later 
years. Nevertheless in many countries the 
remaining annual consolidation effort until 2020 
after the programme horizon, is still ½ a 
percentage point or more of GDP (in Ireland, 
Austria, Slovenia and Finland). 
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Graph I.3.18 shows the main indicator (S2) for 
assessing long-term fiscal sustainability. The 
indicator is calculated based on the projected 
changes in age-related expenditure up to 2060 
(from the 2009 Ageing Report) with two different 
starting points: (i) the "2010" scenario (the 2010 
actual budgetary position) and (ii) the 
"programme" scenario (SCP plans until 2014/the 
end of the programme period). The latter scenario 
thus shows the extent to which the implementation 
of the fiscal consolidation plans would contribute 
to ensuring fiscal sustainability. Nearly all 
countries are expected to have a lower 
sustainability gap under the assumption that the 
fiscal plans in the programmes are implemented 
(as shown a position below the 45° degrees line in 
the figure.) However, two countries would have a 
higher sustainability gap in the programme 
scenario (Luxembourg and Finland). Even 
assuming the full implementation of the fiscal 
plans in the SCPs, more than two thirds of the 
Member States would still have sustainability gaps 
in excess of 2 percent and 5 countries over 6 
Graph I.3.17: Fiscal adjustment required until 2020 to reach a 60% public debt/GDP ratio by 2030 (as a percentage of GDP) 
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percent. (26) The recommendations issued to 
countries as part of the European semester take this 
into account and stress the importance of attaining 
the MTO in order to achieve medium-term 
sustainability. 
Graph I.3.18: Assessing sustainability on the basis of current and 
prospect S2 indicators (S2 based on 2010 and end of 
SCP fiscal position) 
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(26) The calculations do not take into account the recent 
pension reforms in Greece and Romania, which would 
significantly reduce the ageing component of the 
sustainability indicators and thus significantly improve the 
long term sustainability of public finances in the two 
countries. 
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Table I.3.2: Overview  of the most fiscal-policy relevant Council recommendations of 12 July 2011 – summary and policy invitations 
AT Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
plausible, and too favourable towards the end of the Stability Programme period. The main goal of the
medium-term budgetary strategy, presented in the latest update of the Stability Programme, is to gradually
reduce the general government deficit from 4,6 % of GDP in 2010 to 2,4 % of GDP in 2014, chiefly by
expenditure restraint. There are mainly downside risks to these targets due to the fact that the measures to
underpin the consolidation path at the sub-national level are unspecified and the fact that savings from some
of the measures adopted at the federal level will not materialise, e.g. gains from the anti-tax-fraud campaign
the predicted impact of which seems to be highly speculative. 
On the other hand, a positive risk factor is the multi-annual expenditure framework introduced for the federal
government in 2009, which seems to have contributed to enhancing predictability of the budgetary process in
the medium term, albeit only at the federal level. The Stability Programme stipulates that the debt-to-GDP
ratio will grow from 72,3 % in 2010 to 75,5 % in 2013 before declining to 75,1 % in 2014. However, there are
some risks attached to this projection, which relate to the growing debt of state-owned companies classified
outside the government sector and potential further burden stemming from support measures to the banking
sector. At the same time, however, the debt ratio might turn out lower as it is probable that the banks which
received the public support during the crisis will pay it back ahead of the schedule that is assumed in the
Stability Programme. 
According to the Stability Programme, the general government deficit is expected to fall below the 3 %
reference value in 2013, which is in line with the deadline set by the Council. However, the annual average
fiscal effort of 0,2 % of GDP envisaged by the Stability Programme in the period 2011-2013 is well below the
0,75 % of GDP effort that the Council invited Austria to provide. According to the Commission's latest
assessment, the risks with regards to long-term sustainability of public finances appear to be medium.
Recommendation:
Accelerate the correction of the excessive deficit, which is planned mainly on the expenditure side, thus
bringing the high public debt ratio on a downward path, taking advantage of the ongoing economic recovery,
in order to ensure an average annual fiscal effort of 0,75 % of GDP over the period 2011-2013 in line with the
Council recommendations under the EDP. To this end, adopt and implement the necessary measures,
including at the sub-national level. Specify measures as needed to ensure adequate progress towards the
medium-term objective in line with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) after correction of the excessive
deficit. 
Take steps to further strengthen the national budgetary framework by aligning legislative, administrative,
revenue-raising and spending responsibilities across the different levels of government, in particular in the
area of health care. 
In consultation with the social partners and according to national practices, take steps to further limit access
to the current early retirement scheme for people with long insurance periods and take steps to reduce the
transition period for harmonisation of the statutory retirement age between men and women to ensure the
sustainability and adequacy of the pension system. Apply strictly the conditions for access to the invalidity
pension scheme. 
Reduce, in a budgetary neutral way, the effective tax and social security burden on labour, especially for low
and medium-income earners.
BE Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the
Stability Programme is plausible. Although it is based on slightly less favourable growth assumptions for 2011,
it is broadly in line with the latest Commission services' spring 2011 forecast. After a better-than-expected
deficit of 4,1 % in 2010, the objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the Stability Programme is to further
reduce the deficit to 3,6 % in 2011 and below the 3 % reference value by 2012, the deadline set by the
Council for correcting the excessive deficit. The reduction in the deficit planned for 2011 seems feasible in
view of the rather cautious economic projections. 
However, the fiscal effort is likely to be below the 0,75 % of GDP average annual effort recommended by the
Council, in particular in 2011 and 2012 when it would only amount to 0,4 and 0,3 % of GDP in structural terms
respectively. Moreover, the deficit targets for 2012 and subsequent years are not supported by specific
adjustment measures. Lastly, the medium-term objective (MTO), which is a structural surplus of 0,5 % of
GDP, is not expected to be achieved within the 2011-2014 Stability Programme period. 
In view of the better-than-expected outcome recorded in 2010, a more ambitious reduction in the deficit in
2011, and faster-than-projected progress towards the 3 % of GDP threshold, would be appropriate. Moreover,
it will not be possible to bring the excessive deficit to an end by 2012 and to continue to make progress
towards the MTO without further consolidation measures. Since the tax burden, especially that on labour
income, is already very high in Belgium, these consolidation measures should be essentially expenditure-
based. 
Recommendation:
Take advantage of the ongoing economic recovery to accelerate the correction of the excessive deficit. To
this end, take the necessary specified measures — mainly on the expenditure side — by the time of the 2012
budget to achieve an average annual fiscal effort in line with the recommendations under the EDP, thus
bringing the high public debt ratio on a declining path. This should bring the government deficit well below the
3 % of the GDP reference value by 2012 at the latest. Ensure progress towards the medium-term objective
by at least 0,5 % of GDP annually.  
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Take steps to improve the long-term sustainability of public finances. In line with the framework of the three-
pronged EU strategy, the focus should be put on curbing age-related expenditure, notably by preventing early
exit from the labour market in order to markedly increase the effective retirement age. Measures such as
linking the statutory retirement age to life expectancy could be considered.
Improve participation in the labour market by reducing the high tax and social security burden for the low-paid
in a budgetary neutral way and by introducing a system in which the level of unemployment benefits
decreases gradually with the duration of unemployment. Take steps to shift the tax burden from labour to
consumption and to make the tax system more environmentally friendly.
BG Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the fiscal projections is based on
more favourable growth projections than those of the Commission services forecast. The updated
Convergence Programme foresees a correction of the excessive general government deficit in 2011 in
compliance with the Council Recommendation of 13 July 2010, and further reductions afterwards. After a
considerable and frontloaded budgetary adjustment of more than 2 percentage points in structural terms in
2010, the fiscal effort in 2011 is well below the recommended adjustment of at least 0,75 % of GDP but on
average, for the whole EDP period, the fiscal effort remains above 1 % of GDP. For the period 2012-2014 the
update does not provide sufficient details of the planned budgetary measures to achieve the fiscal targets in
these years. 
The downward revised medium-term objective (MTO) of a structural deficit of 0,6 % of GDP, scheduled for
2014, is still more ambitious than the minimum required level. It reflects the objectives of the Stability and
Growth Pact and it is foreseen to be achieved by the end of the Convergence Programme period (2014).
However, the envisaged annual average structural fiscal effort in 2012-2014, after the planned correction of
the excessive deficit in 2011, is well below the recommended minimum annual structural improvement of 0,5
% of GDP. In view of the gradually improving economic outlook, the Convergence Programme should aim for
a faster progress towards the achievement of the MTO. When assessed against a prudent estimate of
medium-term potential output growth, the projected budgetary expenditure growth in 2012-2013 seems to be
on the optimistic side, posing a risk to the structural fiscal position in the medium term.
Correcting the excessive deficit as envisaged by the end of 2011 will help regain confidence and strengthen
the credibility of government policies. Over the medium term, achieving the objective of a small structural
deficit of 0,6 % of GDP is important to ensure that fiscal policy is supportive to the monetary regime in place.
However, fiscal consolidation is hindered by inefficiencies in the public sector which may lead to considerable
expenditure pressures while budget revenues are likely to be structurally lower than in the pre-crisis boom
years. Ambitious public finance reforms are thus needed in order to carry out the necessary fiscal adjustment
and help secure funding for the implementation of necessary structural reforms, including the co-financing
needed for EU-supported projects. 
Recommendation:
Proceed with effective budget implementation so as to correct the excessive deficit in 2011, in line with the
Council Recommendation of 13 July 2010 under the EDP. Specify the measures underpinning the budgetary
strategy for 2012-2014. Take advantage of the economic recovery to ensure adequate progress towards the
medium-term objective, primarily by keeping tight control over expenditure growth, while prioritizing
growthenhancing expenditure. 
Take further steps to improve the predictability of budgetary planning and the implementation control,
including on an accruals basis, in particular by strengthening fiscal governance. To this end, design and put in
place binding fiscal rules and a well-defined medium-term budgetary framework that ensures transparency at
all government levels. 
Implement the agreed steps with social partners under the current pension reform, advance some of its key
measures that would help to increase the effective retirement age and reduce early exit, such as through the
gradual increase of the social insurance length of service, and strengthen policies to help older workers to
stay longer in employment. 
CY Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
plausible until 2012, but rather favourable thereafter, as assessed against the Commission services' spring
2011 forecast. The Stability Programme aims to reduce the budgetary deficit to 4 % of GDP in 2011 and 2,6
% in 2012, in line with the Council Recommendation of 13 July 2010, and to continue consolidation
afterwards. The programme projects the debt ratio to peak in 2012 and to decline thereafter. The annual
average improvement in the structural balance for the period 2011-2012 is 1,5 % of GDP, in line with the
Council Recommendation of 13 July 2010. However, the structural improvement is set to be below the
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact in both 2013 and 2014. The medium-term objective (MTO),
which is reaffirmed as a balanced budget in structural terms, will not be reached within the programme period. 
Overall, there are downside risks to the consolidation path mapped out in the programme, associated with the
continued rebalancing towards a less tax-rich growth pattern, the practice of adopting supplementary budgets
during the course of the year and the timely implementation of measures which are still to be agreed with the
social partners and others still to be specified (e.g. containment of current expenditure). In view of these risks,
additional measures may need to be adopted if macroeconomic or budgetary developments turn out to be
worse than expected. 
Recommendation:  
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Adopt the necessary measures of a permanent nature to achieve the budgetary target in 2011 and the
correction of the excessive deficit by 2012, in line with the Council recommendations under the EDP. Take
measures to keep tight control over expenditure and make use of any better-than-expected budgetary
developments for faster deficit and debt reduction. Ensure progress towards the medium-term objective by at
least 0,5 % of GDP annually and bring the public debt ratio on a downward path. Accelerate the phasingin of
an enforceable multiannual budgetary framework with a binding statutory basis and corrective mechanisms,
as from the preparation of the 2012 Budget. The Programme and Performance Budgeting should be
implemented as soon as possible. 
Improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by implementing reform measures to control pension
and healthcare expenditure in order to curb the projected increase in age-related expenditure. For pensions,
extend years of contribution, link retirement age with life expectancy or adopt other measures with an
equivalent budgetary effect, while taking care to address the high at-risk-of-poverty rate for the elderly. For
healthcare, take further steps to accelerate implementation of the national health insurance system.
CZ Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the Convergence
Programme are plausible in the first two years of the Programme and favourable thereafter, when assessed
against the Commission's medium-term projections of potential output according to the commonly agreed
methodology. The Convergence Programme is based on a lower growth projection for 2012 compared with
the Commission services 2011 Spring forecast, mainly on account of a further sustained reduction in real
government consumption expenditure, which is not taken up in the Commission services' no-policy-change
forecast for 2012. The Convergence Programme foresees a reduction of the general government deficit
below 3 % of GDP in 2013 and further to 1,9 % of GDP in 2014. The planned consolidation is mainly based
on expenditure restraint. 
The proposed measures are broadly sufficient to reach the target by 2013, as recommended by the Council,
but there are risks to the actual budgetary outcome of measures as presented in the Convergence
Programme. Moreover, the attainment of the targets for the outer years of the Convergence Programme
seems to rely on favourable cyclical conditions and further efficiency gains in public administration, which may
become increasingly difficult to materialise. The achievement of the medium-term budgetary objective is
foreseen beyond the horizon of the Convergence Programme. The average annual fiscal effort over the
period 2010-2013 is slightly below 1 % of GDP recommended by the Council under the EDP procedure of 2
December 2009. 
The Convergence Programme set out a clear objective to bring the deficit in public finances below 3 % of
GDP by 2013. The challenge will be to ensure that measures underlying the path for the deficit reduction in
2011-2013, as well as in subsequent years, do not compromise long-term growth, especially by safeguarding
expenditure on education and public R&D, and that they provide an adequate buffer for increases in
expenditure entailed by demographic developments. 
Recommendation:
Implement the planned consolidation in 2011 and take countervailing measures of a permanent nature as
needed in case of any revenue shortfalls or expenditure slippages. Adopt fiscal measures as planned in the
Convergence Programme for 2012 and underpin the target for 2013 by more specific measures; subject to
this, avoid cutting expenditure on growth-enhancing items. Improve the efficiency of public investments, and
continue efforts to exploit the available space for increases in indirect tax revenue to shift taxes away from
labour, improve tax compliance, and reduce tax evasion. Ensure an average fiscal effort over the period 2010-
2013 of 1 % of GDP, in line with the Council recommendations on correcting the excessive deficit, which will
allow meeting the EDP deadline with a sufficient margin in 2013.
Implement the planned pension reform in order to improve the long-term sustainability of public finances and
to ensure the future adequacy of pensions. Additional efforts should focus on further changes to the public
pillar to ensure that the system is not a source of fiscal imbalances in the future, and on the development of
private savings. With a view to raising the effective retirement age, measures such as a link between the
statutory retirement age and life expectancy could be considered. Ensure that the envisaged funded scheme
attracts broad participation, and is designed to keep administrative costs transparent and low.
DK Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underlying the Convergence Programme is
plausible. While based on slightly more favourable growth assumptions for 2012 and beyond, it is broadly in
line with the Commission services' spring 2010 forecast. The budgetary strategy set out in the Convergence
Programme aims at bringing the deficit below the 3 % reference value by 2013, in line with the Council
Recommendation of 13 July 2010, and reaching the revised medium-term objective (MTO) of firstly structural
budget balance not below -0,5 % of GDP by 2015 and secondly budget balance by 2020. The adjustment
path towards this objective is appropriate. Measures included in the Convergence Programme and adopted
by Parliament in spring 2010 are considered adequate to underpin the budgetary targets and would represent
an annual fiscal effort of around 1 % of GDP over the period 2011-2013. Denmark will reach its revised MTO
within the Convergence Programme horizon. Risks to the budgetary targets are broadly balanced.
Recommendation:
Implement fiscal consolidation measures in 2011, 2012 and 2013 and ensure an average annual fiscal effort
of 0,5 % of GDP over the period 2011-2013 as planned and correct the excessive deficit by 2013 in line with
the Council recommendation under the EDP. Thereafter ensure, as planned, an appropriate adjustment path
towards the medium-term objective. Accelerate the reduction of the general government deficit if economic
conditions turn out better than currently expected. Strengthen expenditure control by adopting binding
multiannual spending ceilings for local, regional and central government which are consistent with the overall
medium-term general budget targets.  
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In order to strengthen employment and the sustainability of public finances, take further steps to increase long-
term labour supply, by implementing the recently concluded reform on the voluntary early retirement pension
(VERP) scheme, reforming the disability pension and better targeting subsidised employment schemes (the
"flex-job" system) towards the most vulnerable groups.
Consider preventive action to strengthen the medium-term stability of the housing market and the financial
system including reviewing the functioning of the mortgage and property tax systems.
EE Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
plausible. The medium-term budgetary strategy of the Stability Programme is to achieve the medium-term
objective, defined as structural balance, by 2013, and to maintain it throughout the rest of the Stability
Programme period, by aiming at structural surpluses in 2013 and beyond. The headline general government
budgetary position is projected to reach surplus by 2013, while in the short term the headline deficit is
expected to deteriorate somewhat due to the one-off impact of environmental investments on carbon credits. 
The budgetary adjustment of the Stability Programme relies on holding back growth in government
consumption expenditure. The Stability Programme provides some information regarding measures to reach
the targeted position and the previous track record of meeting the fiscal targets mitigates the risk of missing
them in the coming years. In particular, the envisaged reforms seek efficiency gains in several areas, such as
education and active labour market policies. Risks to the budgetary targets thus appear to be broadly
balanced. Nevertheless, it will be important for the upcoming budgets to provide the key details of measures
to further enhance the efficiency of public spending, thus underpinning the implementation of the Stability
Programme. 
Recommendation:
Achieve structural surplus by 2013 at the latest, while limiting deficit in 2012 to at most 2,1 % of GDP, keeping
tight control over expenditure and enhancing the efficiency of public spending.
Take steps to support labour demand and to reduce the risk of poverty, by reducing the tax and social security
burden in a budgetary neutral way.
FI Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underlying the Stability Programme is
plausible for 2011-2012, but slightly too favourable thereafter. For 2011-2012, the macroeconomic scenario is
in line with the Commission services spring forecast. For 2013-2015, the Stability Programme projects growth
of about 2 % of GDP, which is slightly above the potential growth estimate of 1,5 % and could therefore be
subject to some downside risks. The objective of the budgetary strategy is to bring the deficit down to 0,9 % of
GDP in 2011 and 0,7 % in 2012, reflecting the cyclical improvement in the economy and some consolidation
measures already decided by the previous government. However, the Stability Programme update does not
plan any further fiscal consolidation over 2013-2015. Risks to the budgetary targets appear to be balanced.
The most notable risk factor stems from the global macroeconomic environment, which has traditionally had a
strong impact on the export-reliant Finnish economy. 
Recommendation:
Continue the fiscal consolidation using any windfall revenue to reduce the deficit, while taking additional
measures to maintain the fiscal position above the medium-term objective, in particular through compliance
with the medium-term expenditure benchmark.
Take further measures to achieve productivity gains and cost savings in public service provision, including
structural changes, in order to respond to the challenges arising from population ageing.
In view of the already existing system of linking pension benefits to life expectancy, consider a link between
the statutory retirement age and life expectancy.
FR Summary Assessment:
the Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
favourable, especially as expected growth levels remain well above the potential growth in later years. After a
better-than-expected deficit of 7 % of GDP in 2010, the Stability Programme plans to bring it down to 3 % of
GDP in 2013, which is the deadline set by the Council for correcting the situation of excessive deficit, and to
continue consolidation thereafter. Starting from a debt of 82 % of GDP in 2010, the debt ratio is set to
increase until 2012 (86 %), after which it will decline slightly. The deficit and debt adjustment paths are subject
to risks, which include the possibility of a macroeconomic scenario that could turn out to be less favourable,
the fact that the measures are not sufficiently specified to reach the targets from 2012 onwards, and the fact
that targets have often been missed in the past, notwithstanding the better-than-expected outcome in 2010. 
Therefore, it cannot be ensured that the excessive deficit will be corrected by 2013 unless further measures
will be taken as needed. The medium-term objective of a balanced budget in structural terms will not be
reached within the Stability Programme period. The average annual fiscal effort over the 2010-2013 period as
recalculated by the Commission services according to the commonly agreed ethodology is slightly below
what was included in the Council Recommendation of 2 December 2009 ('above 1 % of GDP').
Implementation of fiscal consolidation remains a major challenge. Avoiding expenditure slippages by means
of a strengthened fiscal effort based on fully specified measures is vital to re-establishing a sustainable fiscal
position, especially since the 2013 target does not provide any safety margin below the 3 % of GDP threshold.
Moreover, as specified in the 2011-2014 Multiyear Public Finance Planning Act voted in December 2010 it
would be appropriate to use all windfall revenues to accelerate the deficit and debt reduction. According to the
Commission's latest assessment, the risks with regards to long term sustainability of public finances appear to 
be medium.  
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To improve the long-term sustainability of public finances, France adopted a new pension reform in 2010. The
planned measures, including the gradual increase in the minimum retirement age from 60 to 62 and in the
statutory retirement age from 65 to 67, as well as the phasing out of early retirement schemes, should have
an impact on the low employment rate of older workers. Moreover, the pension system is expected to be in
balance by 2018. A deficit is likely to appear thereafter unless further measures are taken. The latest pension
reform has also created a new public body, the "Comité de pilotage des régimes de retraite", which is in
charge of presenting annual assessments of the budgetary situation of pension accounts and, if there is any
likelihood of a deterioration, of proposing corrective measures.
Recommendation:
Ensure the recommended average annual fiscal effort of more than 1 % of GDP over the period 2010-2013
and implement the correction of the excessive deficit by 2013, in line with the Council recommendations
under the EDP, thus bringing the high public debt ratio on a downward path, and ensure adequate progress to
the medium-term objective thereafter; specify the necessary corresponding measures for 2012 onwards, take
additional measures if needed and use any windfall revenues to accelerate the deficit and debt reduction as
planned; continue to review the sustainability of the pension system and take additional measures if needed.
Increase the efficiency of the tax system, including for example through a move away from labour towards
environmental and consumption taxes, and implementation of the planned reduction in the number and cost
of tax and social security exemptions (including 'niches fiscales').
DE Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underlying the Stability Programme is cautious
for 2011 and plausible thereafter, also as assessed against the Commission services spring 2011 forecast.
The Stability Programme projects real GDP to grow by 2,3 % in 2011, before slowing to 1,8 % in 2012 and to
an average of 1,5 % in 2013-2015. The Stability Programme plans to bring the deficit below the 3 % GDP
reference value already in 2011, two years ahead of the deadline established by the Council, and to make
further progress towards achieving the medium-term objective (MTO) – a deficit of 0,5 % of GDP in structural
terms – in 2014. Following the expected correction of the excessive deficit, the pace of adjustment towards
the MTO under the Stability Programme falls below the 0,5 % of GDP benchmark in 2013 and 2014. While
the debt-to-GDP ratio rose by almost 10 percentage points in 20101, it is projected to start falling as of 2011 
The risks to the budgetary projection appear broadly balanced for 2011, but the outcomes thereafter could be
weaker than expected, since some savings might not materialise as envisaged. Certain measures are still
subject to debate (e.g. energy and financial transaction tax) and others remain to be specified (e.g. efficiency
improvements in public administration). Moreover, further financial market support measures cannot be
excluded. According to the Commission's latest assessment, the risks with regards to long term sustainability
of public finances appear to be medium.
Recommendation:
Implement the budgetary strategy for the year 2012 and beyond as envisaged, thus bringing the high public
debt ratio on a downward path, in line with the Council recommendations under the EDP. Ensure an adequate
structural adjustment effort towards the medium-term objective thereafter. Complete the implementation of
the budgetary rule at the Länder level and further strengthen the corresponding monitoring and sanctioning
mechanism. Maintain a growth-friendly consolidation course, in particular by safeguarding adequate
expenditure on education and by further enhancing the efficiency of public spending on health-care and long-
term care. 
Enhance participation in the labour market by improving equitable access to education and training systems
and by taking further steps to reduce the high tax wedge in a budgetary neutral way and improve work
incentives for persons with low income perspectives.
EL Summary Assessment:
Greece did not submit any SCP.
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding.
HU Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that, based on the Commission services 2011 spring forecast, the
macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is slightly favourable, in particular regarding
the development of domestic demand. The update aims to correct the excessive deficit by the 2011 deadline
set by the Council, to be achieved with a surplus of 2 % of GDP thanks to the significant one-off revenues
from the pension assets. The budget would turn into a deficit of 2,5 % of GDP in 2012 and thereafter gradually 
decline to 1,5 % of GDP in 2015, mainly based on expenditure restraint. The update confirms the country's
medium-term objective (MTO) for the budgetary position in structural terms, a deficit of 1,5 % of GDP. The
consolidation strategy is expected to reduce the budgetary deficit in a structural way and put the debt on a
downward path to reach 64 % of GDP by 2015. 
However, it appears to be rather back-loaded with structural improvement starting only from 2012, whereas
the cumulative structural deterioration of over 3 % of GDP over 2010 and 2011 is not in line with the Council
recommendation of July 2009 asking Hungary to achieve a structural adjustment of at least 0,5 % of GDP.
The spring forecast shows a deficit of 3,3 % of GDP in 2012, which assumes some implementation risks of
0,5 % of GDP; on this basis it cannot be excluded that the threshold may be breached again in that year
unless further measures are taken. In addition, the projected structural deficit path, as re-calculated by the
Commission, does not provide for the necessary adjustments that would ensure achievement of the MTO by
the end of the Convergence Programme period; in particular, there is no further structural adjustment beyond
2013, though the margin to the MTO is small.  
 
(Continued on the next page)
Part I 
Current developments and prospects 
 
55 
Table (continued) 
 
Finally, the abolishment of the mandatory private pension pillar results in additional one-off and permanent
revenues but also increases the long-term liabilities. The ensuing likely deterioration of the long-term fiscal
sustainability taking into account that part of the pension funds' assets are used to finance current
expenditure, is partly offset by several announced steps related to the pension system in the context of the
structural reform programme (e.g. the partly already implemented parametric changes in the public pillar).
According to the Commission's latest assessment, the risks with regards to the long-term sustainability of
public finances appear to be medium. 
Fiscal consolidation remains a major challenge. Without rigorous implementation of the measures announced
and additional measures of a structural nature as needed, it cannot be ensured that the excessive deficit is
corrected on a sustainable basis and appropriate progress is made towards the MTO. Moreover, fiscal
consolidation will also help to put debt reduction on an appropriately declining path and improve long-term
sustainability which appears to be at medium risk. Making full use of windfall revenues could help accelerate
the fiscal consolidation. Against this background, the authorities' bi-annual Excessive Deficit Procedure
progress reports will serve as a useful tool for closely monitoring progress of fiscal consolidation.
Recommendation:
Strengthen the fiscal effort in order to comply with the Council recommendation to correct the excessive
deficit in a sustainable manner, inter alia by avoiding the structural deterioration in 2011 implicit in the planned
2 % of GDP budget surplus and ensure that the budget deficit is kept safely below the 3 % of GDP threshold
in 2012 and beyond, contributing to the reduction of the high public debt ratio. Fully implement the announced
fiscal measures and adopt additional measures of a permanent nature if needed at the latest in the 2012
budget to secure the budgetary target for that year. The 2012 budget should also identify the additional
measures in order to attain the 2013 target in the Convergence Programme. Ensure progress towards the
medium-term objective (MTO) by at least 0,5 % of GDP annually until the MTO is reached and use possible
windfall revenues to accelerate the fiscal consolidation. 
Adopt and implement regulations specifying the operational aspects of the new constitutional fiscal
governance framework, including, inter alia, the numerical rules that will be implemented at the central and
local level until the debt ratio has declined to below 50 % of GDP. Regarding the fiscal framework, implement
and strengthen multiannual fiscal planning, improve the transparency of public finances and broaden the remit
of the Fiscal Council. 
Enhance participation in the labour market by alleviating the impact of the tax reform on low earners in a
budget-neutral manner.
IE Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the
Stability Programme is plausible. The medium-term budgetary strategy of the Stability Programme is to bring
the headline general government deficit below the 3 % of GDP reference value by the deadline foreseen in
the Council Recommendation of 3 December 2010. The Stability Programme targets deficits of 10,0 % of
GDP in 2011, 8,6 % in 2012, 7,2 % in 2013, 4,7 % in 2014 and 2,8 % by the end of the Stability Programme
period in 2015. This path is underpinned by consolidation measures of 3,8 % of GDP implemented in the
budget for 2011, and broad consolidation measures of 5,9 % of GDP in 2012-14 and a further unspecified
consolidation effort of more than 1 % of GDP in 2015. 
The Stability Programme restates the medium-term objective (MTO) for the budgetary position of -0,5 % of
GDP, which is not reached within the Stability Programme period. According to the Commission's latest
assessment, the risks with regards to long term sustainability of public finances appear to be high. Achieving
sufficient primary surpluses over the medium-term and further reforming the Irish social security system are
necessary to improve the sustainability of public finances. 
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding.
IT Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme is plausible. The
programme plans to bring the general government deficit below 3 % of the GDP reference value by 2012,
based on further expenditure restraint and additional revenues from improved tax compliance. Following the
correction of the excessive deficit, the programme plans to achieve the medium-term objective (MTO) of a
balanced budgetary position in structural terms by the end of the programme period (2014), backed by a
commitment to further restrain primary expenditure. The programme projects the government debt ratio to
peak in 2011 and to decline at an increasing pace thereafter, as the primary surplus increases.
The planned average annual fiscal effort over the period 2010-2012 is above the 0,5 % of GDP recommended
by the Council under the EDP, and the envisaged pace of adjustment after 2012 is well above the provisions
in the Stability and Growth Pact. Reaching the above deficit and debt outcomes will require a strict budgetary
implementation, while more information on the planned consolidation measures for 2013 and 2014 is needed
to increase the credibility of the programme.
Given the very high government debt, which stands at around 120 % of GDP in 2011, the pursuit of a durable
and credible consolidation and the adoption of structural measures to enhance growth are key priorities for
Italy. According to the Commission's latest assessment, the risks with regards to long term sustainability of
public finances appear to be medium. For the period until 2012, the achievement of the targets for the general
government deficit set in the stability programme, and thus the correction of the excessive deficit by 2012,
relies on the full implementation of the measures already adopted.
Additional action would be required if, for instance, revenues from improved tax compliance are lower than
budgeted or if difficulties arise in achieving the planned restraint in capital expenditure. For 2013-2014, the
new three-year budgetary framework prescribes that the concrete measures underpinning the consolidation
Although the budgetary framework has been strengthened considerably in recent years, the introduction of
enforceable expenditure ceilings and further improvements to budgetary monitoring across all government
sub-sectors would foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of the medium-term budgetary strategy. 
Recommendation:  
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Implement the planned fiscal consolidation in 2011 and 2012 to ensure correction of the excessive deficit in
line with the Council recommendations under the EDP, thus bringing the high public debt ratio on a downward
path. Building on recently approved legislation, fully exploit any better-than-expected economic or budgetary
developments for faster deficit and debt reduction and stand ready to prevent slippages in budgetary
implementation. Back up the targets for 2013-2014 and the planned achievement of the medium-term
objective by 2014 with concrete measures by October 2011 as provided for in the new multi-annual budgetary
framework. Further strengthen the framework by introducing enforceable ceilings on expenditure and
improving monitoring across all government sub-sectors. 
Take steps to promote greater participation of women in the labour market, by increasing the availability of
care facilities throughout the country and providing financial incentives to second earners to take up work in a
budgetary neutral way. 
LV Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the
Convergence Programme is plausible although the inflation projection may be on the low side for 2011. The
mediumterm budgetary strategy of the Convergence Programme is to bring the headline general government
deficit below the 3 % reference value by the deadline foreseen in the Council Recommendation of 7 July
2009. Taking into account the measures implemented since the issuance of the recommendation to correct
the excessive deficit situation and additional consolidation implied in the updated Convergence Programme,
the planned fiscal effort for 2011-2012 is in line with the required adjustment. In view of the starting point, the
Convergence Programme does not foresee the achievement of the medium-term objective (MTO) by the end
of the programme period, while the planned fiscal effort to reach the MTO after the correction of the excessive
deficit situation could be accelerated in particular in 2013. 
The fiscal consolidation path envisaged in the Convergence Programme is mostly expenditure based. The
budgetary targets are subject to downside risks, as the Convergence Programme does not provide full
information on measures to underpin the achievement of the set targets. These measures are expected to be
provided in the forthcoming budgets. Reducing the primary deficit over the medium term, as foreseen in the
Convergence Programme, would help reduce the risks to the sustainability of public finances.
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding.
LT Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underlying the 2011 Convergence Programme
is plausible although economic growth and inflation may turn out higher than currently projected. While based
on somewhat more favourable growth assumptions for 2011, it is broadly in line with the latest Commission
forecast for 2012. The Convergence Programme plans to bring the deficit below the 3 % reference value by
2012, the deadline set by the Council, but is not sufficiently underpinned by measures for 2012. The
accelerating economic momentum may lead to better 2011 budgetary outcomes than expected in the
Convergence Programme. However, if temporary consolidation measures that will expire at the end of 2011
are not renewed and complemented by sizable permanent measures, the Convergence Programme's
budgetary targets for 2012 risk not being met despite the improving macro-economic outlook. 
The average annual fiscal effort over the period of 2010-2012 is well below the 2,25 % of GDP recommended
by the Council under the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) adopted on 16 February 2010. As economic
growth and tax revenues are substantially stronger than expected at the time of the Council EDP
Recommendation of 16 February 2010, implementation of the required fiscal effort should allow for faster
deficit reduction and progress towards the medium-term objective (MTO). The MTO of a structural surplus of
0,5 % of GDP is not foreseen to be achieved within the Convergence Programme period. 
In view of the sizable adjustment required to meet the 2012 EDP target and make progress towards the MTO,
and the need to secure the necessary co-financing in order to frontload the absorption of EU structural funds
and increase productive investment in the economy, identifying further consolidation measures will be a
challenge. Improvements in public sector efficiency could create additional room for expenditure adjustments
without compromising the quality of public services. In the absence of further reform, age-related expenditure
will increase at a rate above the EU average over the next few decades. In June 2010, the government
approved the broad outline of a comprehensive social security and pension system reform. The proposal
included significant increases in the pensionable age, changes to the way pensions are calculated and the
integration of state pensions into the general scheme of social insurance. 
The approval and successful implementation of all aspects of these proposals will be critical for long term
fiscal sustainability and could help increase the labour supply by providing stronger incentives to work for
older workers while ensuring the adequacy of pensions. Moreover, long-term fiscal sustainability would also
require a stronger fiscal framework. In particular, in the run-up to the crisis, the fiscal framework did not
prevent recurrent sizeable revisions of expenditure targets and pro-cyclical expenditure growth financed by
revenue windfalls. Excessive expenditure growth financed by boom-related revenues was at the origin of the
large fiscal imbalances that emerged during the crisis. They also contributed to overheating the economy.
According to the Commission's latest assessment, the risks with regard to long term sustainability of public
finances appear to be high. 
Recommendation:
Adopt additional fiscal measures of a permanent nature by the time of the 2012 budget to correct the
excessive deficit in line with the Council recommendations under the EDP. Reinforce tax compliance and take
full advantage of the economic recovery to further accelerate deficit reduction and ensure progress towards
the medium-term objective by at least 0,5 % of GDP annually. Strengthen the fiscal framework, in particular
by introducing enforceable and binding expenditure ceilings in the medium-term budgetary framework.
Adopt the proposed implementing legislation on Pension System Reform. In order to enhance participation in
the labour market, remove fiscal disincentives to work, especially for people at pensionable age.
LU Summary Assessment:  
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The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
slightly cautious when compared with the Commission services 2011 spring forecast. According to the
Stability Programme, the target for 2011 is a deficit of 1,0 %, which is in line with the Commission services
spring forecast. The Stability Programme, under an unchanged policy scenario, projects a deterioration of the
headline deficit in 2012 to 1,5 % of GDP before it improves gradually again to 0,8 % of GDP by 2014. The
Commission services' forecast is slightly more optimistic projecting a deficit of 1,1 % of GDP in 2012, based
on a more favourable macro-economic scenario and a slower increase in expenditure. 
The Stability Programme does not foresee the achievement of the medium-term objective (MTO), which is
defined as a structural surplus of 0,5 % of GDP, within the 2011-2014 programming period. On the contrary,
the structural balance (recalculated by Commission services based on the information in the Stability
Programme, following the commonly agreed methodology) is expected to deteriorate gradually from a 0,3 %
surplus in 2011 to a 0,8 % deficit in 2014. 
Recommendation:
Take advantage of the improving cyclical conditions, strengthen the fiscal effort and use unexpected
additional revenue in order to further reduce the headline deficit and reach the medium-term objective in
2012. 
Propose and implement a broad pension reform to ensure the long-term sustainability of the pension system,
starting with measures that will increase the participation rate of older workers, in particular by discouraging
early retirement. With a view to raising the effective retirement age, measures such as a link between the
statutory retirement age and life expectancy, could be considered.
MT Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
slightly favourable, especially in the later years of the Stability Programme period. From 3,6 % of GDP in
2010, the Stability Programme plans to bring the general government deficit below the Treaty reference value
by 2011. Thereafter, gradual progress towards the medium-term objective (MTO) of a balanced position in
structural terms is to be backed up by a commitment to ensure a sustainable, largely expenditure-based
consolidation. However, the Stability Programme does not envisage the achievement of the MTO within the
Stability Programme horizon. The debt ratio is projected to decline from its 2010 peak of 68 % of GDP to 63,7
% in 2014, due to a positive and strengthening primary balance. 
The average annual structural adjustment effort in the period 2012-2014, as calculated by the Commission, is
broadly in line with the Stability and Growth Pact. However, budgetary outcomes could be worse than targeted
because of possible expenditure overruns and the lack of information on the measures underpinning the
consolidation effort after 2011.
Pursuing fiscal consolidation to achieve the MTO is a key challenge for Malta. While the budget for 2011 put
in place measures to correct the excessive deficit in 2011, additional action would be required in case of
slippages. The credibility of the medium-term consolidation strategy, which is not yet underpinned by concrete
measures, would be enhanced by a stronger multi-annual budgetary framework. A key weakness is the non-
binding nature of the multi-annual targets, which implies a relatively short fiscal planning horizon. The Stability
Programme states that the introduction of an expenditure rule is being considered.
Recommendation:
Ensure correction of the excessive deficit in 2011, in line with the EDP recommendations, standing ready to
take additional measures so as to prevent possible slippages, and adopt concrete measures to back up the
2012 deficit target. Bring the high public debt ratio on a downward path and ensure adequate progress
towards the MTO. With a view to strengthening the credibility of the medium-term consolidation strategy,
define the required broad measures from 2013 onwards, embed the fiscal targets in a binding, rule-based
multi-annual fiscal framework and improve the monitoring of budgetary execution.
Take action to ensure the sustainability of the pension system such as by accelerating the progressive
increase in the retirement age and by linking it to life expectancy. Accompany the higher statutory retirement
age with a comprehensive active ageing strategy, discourage the use of early retirement schemes and
encourage private pension savings.
NL Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections
presented in the Stability Programme is plausible. The Stability Programme is based on slightly more prudent
growth projections for 2011 and 2012 than the Commission services' spring 2011 forecast. The Stability
Programme plans to reduce the general government deficit below the 3 % reference value in 2012, which
would be one year ahead of the deadline set by the excessive deficit procedure. Based on the figures in the
Stability Programme, the medium-term objective (MTO), namely, a structural deficit of 0,5 % of GDP, will be
almost achieved by the end of the Stability Programme period, as the structural balance calculated by the
Commission comes out at -0,8 % of GDP in 2015. 
The budgetary strategy is fully underpinned by sufficiently specified measures up to 2015, though their
implementation is subject to some risks, mainly with respect to the ability to offset health care overruns and to
monitor local government expenditure. The average annual fiscal effort is 0,75 % of GDP over the period
2011-2013, in compliance with the Council Recommendation of 2 December 2009 under the EDP procedure.
For the years following the deadline for correcting the excessive deficit (2014 and 2015), the recalculated
structural balance is to improve by 0,25 % in 2014 and 0,5 % in 2015, thereby slightly falling short of the
required 0,5 % improvement in the structural balance until the MTO is reached. 
Recommendation:
Implement the budgetary strategy for the year 2012, in line with the Council recommendations on correcting
the excessive deficit, setting the high public debt ratio on a downward path. Thereafter, progress towards the
medium-term objective in line with the Stability and Growth Pact requirements, respecting the overall
spending ceilings and consolidation requirements, thereby ensuring that consolidation is sustainable and
growthfriendly, by protecting expenditure in areas directly relevant for growth such as research and
innovation, education and training.  
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Take measures to increase the statutory retirement age by linking it to life expectancy, and underpin these
measures with others to raise the effective retirement age and to improve the long-term sustainability of public
finances. Prepare a blueprint for reforming long-term care in view of an ageing population.
Enhance participation in the labour market by reducing fiscal disincentives for second-income earners to work
and draw up measures to support the most vulnerable groups and help them to re-integrate within the labour
market. 
PL Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
plausible, while based on slightly too favourable growth assumptions for 2012. The Convergence Programme
plans to bring the deficit below the 3 % of GDP reference value by 2012, the deadline set by the Council. The
average annual fiscal effort over the period 2010-2012 is fully in line with the 1,25 % of GDP recommended by
the Council under the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) on 7 July 2009. Achievement of the medium-term
objective (MTO) is not envisaged during the Convergence Programme period. The amendment to the pension
reform reducing the structural budget deficit by 0,7 % in 2011 and by a further 0,5 % of GDP in 2012 does not
substantially improve the underlying budgetary situation as an improvement in the initial budgetary position is
accompanied by an increase in long-term liabilities. Risks to budgetary targets are tilted to the downside. 
In particular direct tax revenues might turn out lower than projected because of optimistic assumptions on
elasticities with respect to the tax base, programme projections on social contributions rely on favourable
scenarios for employment and wage growth; and potential implementation delays and changes to the deficit-
reducing measures, also beyond the direct control of the government, could result in a slippage in the
consolidation path. 
Recommendation:
Implement the measures announced in the draft 2012 Budget Law and take additional measures of a
permanent nature if needed to reduce the general government deficit to below 3 % of GDP in 2012, in line
with the Council recommendations under the EDP. While ensuring adequate progress towards the medium-
term objective, minimise cuts in growth-enhancing expenditure in the future.
Enact legislation with a view to introducing a permanent expenditure rule by 2013. This rule should be based
on sufficiently broad budgetary aggregates and should be consistent with the European system of accounts.
Moreover, take measures to strengthen the mechanisms of coordination among the different levels of
government in the medium-term and annual budgetary processes.
Raise as planned the statutory retirement age for uniformed services, continue steps to increase the effective
retirement age, such as linking it to life expectancy. Establish a timetable to further improve the rules for
farmers' contributions to the social security fund (KRUS) to better reflect individual incomes.
PT Summary Assessment:
On 23 March 2011, the Portuguese government submitted a Stability Programme for 2011-2014 to the
national parliament, which rejected it.
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding.
RO Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the projections in the
programme are plausible. The Convergence Programme aims to correct the excessive deficit by the 2012
deadline set by the Council in its recommendation of 16 February 2010. The programme targets headline
deficits of 2,6 % of GDP in 2013 and of 2,1 % of GDP in 2014, with the envisaged consolidation being mostly
expenditure-based. According to the structural balance recalculated by Commission services, the medium-
term objective (MTO) will not be achieved within the programme period. The consolidation strategy appears to
be frontloaded with the structural improvement being concentrated in 2011 and 2012. By contrast, there is no
improvement in the structural balance in 2013 and 2014. The deficit path foreseen is appropriate in 2011 and
2012, but not in 2013 and 2014.  
The main risks to the budgetary targets are implementation risks, the arrears of state-owned enterprises
which represent a serious contingent liability for the budget, and the reservations expressed by the
Commission (Eurostat) about Romania's excessive deficit procedure notification. In view of the latter,
Romania has committed to give priority to improving the compilation of government finance statistics in ESA
95 within the National Statistical Institute. 
Recommendation:Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding.
SK Summary Assessment:
the Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underlying the Stability Programme is plausible
for the initial two years but favourable towards the end of the Stability Programme period. The Stability
Programme plans to bring the deficit below the 3 % of GDP in 2013, in line with the deadline set by the
Council and further to 2,8 % of GDP in 2014. Beyond 2011, the adjustment is broadly expenditure-based.
There are downside risks to budgetary targets mainly due to the implementation of proposed measures. The
Stability Programme does not foresee the achievement of the medium-term objective. Meeting the budgetary
targets would imply for the period 2011-2013 an average annual fiscal effort of around 1,4 % of GDP.
Recommendation:
Rigorously implement both the 2011 budget as envisaged and the planned specific
measures of a permanent nature in 2012 and 2013, to reduce the deficit below 3 % of GDP by 2013 in line
with Council recommendations on correcting the excessive deficit and ensure adequate progress towards the
medium-term objective. Subject to this, safeguard growth-enhancing expenditure, and use available room to
increase revenue through environmental and property taxes and by increasing the efficiency of VAT
collection. 
Strengthen fiscal governance by adopting in 2011 and implementing from 2012 binding multi-annual
expenditure ceilings, covering the central government and the social security system. In addition, introduce an
independent Fiscal Council and ensure timely publication of budgetary data at all levels of the government.  
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Enhance the long-term sustainability of public finances by further adjusting the pay-as-you-go pillar of the
pension system also by changing the indexation mechanism and implement further measures with a view to
raising the effective retirement age, in particular by linking the pensionable age to life expectancy. Introduce
incentives to ensure the viability of the fully-funded pension pillar so as to progress towards fiscal
sustainability while assuring adequate pensions. 
Take steps to increase employment and to support labour demand for the low-skilled unemployed by reducing
the tax wedge for low-paid workers.
SI Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections of the
programme is plausible in the near term, and favourable towards the end of the programme period. Starting
from 5,6 % of GDP in 2010, the programme plans to bring the general government deficit below the 3 % of
GDP reference value by 2013, through a broad-based containment of primary expenditure. After correcting
the excessive deficit, the programme envisages some progress towards, but not achievement of, the medium-
term objective (MTO) of a balanced budgetary position in structural terms within the programme period.
Although the MTO is set at a more ambitious level than in the previous programme, it does not appear to
ensure sufficiently rapid progress towards long-term sustainability of public finances. 
The average annual change in structural balance over the period 2010-2013, as calculated by the
Commission services based on the information in the programme following the commonly agreed
methodology, is planned to be around 0,5 percentage points of GDP, below the level recommended by the
Council. Moreover, deficit and debt outcomes could fall short of the targets. Additional measures are expected
to be adopted as part of a supplementary budget to achieve the 2011 deficit target. After 2011, the
programme does not specify measures to contain expenditure and the possibility of additional financial rescue
operations affecting deficit and debt cannot be excluded. 
While the general government deficit has narrowed since its peak in 2009, further
consolidation to correct the excessive deficit by 2013 and achieve the MTO thereafter is a key challenge for
Slovenia. In line with the consolidation strategy pursued in recent years, the further expenditure savings
envisaged in the Stability Programme for the period 2011-2014 mainly affect the public sector wage bill, social
transfers (including pensions) and public investment. However, the Stability Programme offers no detailed
information on the planned measures beyond 2011. Further corrective action is being taken in the context of a
supplementary budget to achieve the 2011 deficit. The credibility of the medium-term consolidation strategy
would be enhanced by adopting more structural expenditure-containing measures — as opposed to the
temporary interventions that have characterised recent consolidation efforts — and by a more binding
medium-term budgetary framework. 
The Stability Programme confirms the introduction of an expenditure rule but key provisions, for instance on
the definition of non-compliance, remain to be worked out. Finally, comparatively low spending efficiency, for
example in healthcare and education, implies that Slovenia may have additional scope for expenditure-based
consolidation without compromising the quality of public services. The Stability Programme announces
initiatives to rationalise public services and transfers and introduce a unified public procurement system, but
the detail of some of these is lacking. 
Recommendation:
Achieve the 2011 deficit target, underpin the 2012 deficit target with concrete measures and implement the
necessary consolidation rigorously, standing ready to adopt additional measures to prevent possible
slippages. Underpin this required adjustment process over the programme period with additional measures to
ensure the average annual fiscal effort in line with the Council recommendations under the EDP and
adequate progress towards an appropriate medium-term objective. To this purpose, use structural measures
to contain expenditure and address identified inefficiencies and implement a more binding medium-term
budgetary framework. Accelerate the reduction of the deficit if economic or budgetary conditions turn out
better than currently expected. 
Take the required steps to ensure the long-term sustainability of the pension system, while preserving the
adequacy of pensions.
ES Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the
Stability Programme is favourable in 2011 and 2012. The Stability Programme plans to bring the budget
deficit below the 3 % reference value by 2013, in line with the Council recommendations of April 2009, and
reduce the deficit further to 2,1 % of GDP in 2014. The Stability Programme does not foresee the
achievement of the medium-term objective, which remains a balanced budget, in the Stability Programme
horizon. This adjustment path is appropriate. The annual average improvement of the structural balance is 1,5
% of GDP on average for 2010-2013, in line with the Council recommendation, and an additional 0,3 % of
GDP in 2014. The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise from 60,1 % of GDP in 2010 to 69,3 % in 2013 and
decline slightly in 2014. 
There are downside risks to the consolidation path related to the underlying macroeconomic assumptions and
to the respect of budgetary targets at the regional level. Regions account for a large share of total public
expenditure and 9 out of 17 exceeded their fiscal objectives in 2010. However, deficit and debt control
mechanisms for regional governments have already been strengthened and the Spanish government has
committed to take additional measures, if needed to meet the budgetary targets.
Achieving the foreseen fiscal consolidation in 2011 and 2012 requires strict application of the deficit and debt
control mechanisms that have been put in place for regional governments. Achieving the budgetary targets in
the event that macroeconomic and budgetary developments turn out worse than expected in 2011 and 2012,
will require additional measures that the Spanish government has committed itself to taking. For 2013 the
Expenditure Revision Plan identifies a few measures to underpin the budgetary targets. According to the
Commission's latest assessment, the risks with regards to long term sustainability of public finances appear to 
be high. 
Recommendation:  
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Implement the budgetary strategy in 2011 and 2012 and correct the excessive deficit in the year 2013 in line
with the Council recommendation under the EDP, ensuring the achievement of deficit targets at all levels of
government, including by strictly applying the existing deficit and debt control mechanisms for regional
governments; adopt further measures in case budgetary and economic developments do not turn out as
expected; take any opportunity including from better economic conditions to accelerate the deficit reduction;
set out concrete measures to fully underpin the targets for 2013 and 2014 which should bring the high public
debt ratio on a downward path and ensure adequate progress towards the medium-term objective. Keep
public expenditure growth below the rate of medium-term GDP growth, by introducing a binding expenditure
rule at all levels of government, as envisaged. Further improve the provision of information in relation to
regional and local government budgets and their execution. 
Adopt the proposed pension reform to extend the statutory retirement age and increase the number of
working years for the calculation of pensions as planned; regularly review pension parameters in line with
changes to life expectancy, as planned.
Explore the scope for improving the efficiency of the tax system, for example through a move away from
labour towards consumption and environmental taxes while ensuring fiscal consolidation plans.
SE Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
plausible, except for 2012 when it appears favourable compared with the Commission services' spring
forecast. The budgetary strategy, as outlined in the updated Convergence Programme, is appropriate, as it
would contribute to meeting Sweden's medium-term objective (MTO) of 1 % GDP surplus over a cycle. This
would provide some margin against breaches of the 3 % of GDP reference value in any future downturn. The
programme projects the general government surplus to widen from 0,6 % of GDP in 2011 to 3,7 % of GDP in
2014, the last year of the programme. This improvement would result from assumed strong economic growth,
as the programme does not envisage any consolidation efforts in these years. Risks to the budgetary targets
are broadly balanced. 
As the revenue forecast presented in the programme is somewhat cautious for 2011, budgetary outcomes
could turn out slightly better this year, whereas downside risks to budgetary projections from 2012 onwards
are linked to favourable macroeconomic assumptions. As the government has indicated that further
expansionary fiscal measures envisaged in the 2011 Budget Bill (including a fifth step in the in-work tax credit
for wage-earners, a further rise in the threshold for paying state income tax, lower VAT on restaurant
services, and lower taxes on pensions) could be implemented as from 2012, if there is sufficient fiscal space,
here is a risk of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy stance. Considering also the demographic outlook, it is important
that fiscal policy is kept on a path that ensures that the MTO continue to be met. According to the
Commission's assessment, the risks with regard to long-term sustainability of public finances appear to be
low.  
Recommendation:
Keep fiscal policy on a path that ensures that the medium-term objective continues to be met.
UK Summary Assessment:
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is
plausible except for 2012 when it may be slightly too favourable. The Convergence Programme does not
include a medium-term objective (MTO) as foreseen by the code of conduct although it can be derived from
targets therein. The objective of the budgetary strategy is to bring down the deficit from 9,9 % in 2010-2011 to
1,7 % in 2015-2016, mainly based on expenditure restraint, a strategy consistent with evidence on fiscal
consolidations that have supported growth. The Convergence Programme plans to bring the deficit below the
3 % reference value by 2014-2015, the deadline set by the Council. Starting from a debt ratio of 78,7 % in
2010-2011, the budgetary projections in the Convergence Programme foresee the debt ratio increasing to
87,2 % by 2013-2014 before beginning to fall slowly. 
The average annual fiscal effort over the period of 2010-2011 to 2014-2015 is 1,6 %. This is slightly below
that recommended by the Council in December 2009 (1,75 % of GDP) but is nevertheless appropriate given
that the effort is being pursued from a significantly lower-than-expected budget deficit in 2009-2010 and is
therefore consistent with reducing the headline deficit to below the reference value by 2014-2015. According
to the Commission's latest assessment, the risks with regard to the long term sustainability of public finances
appear to be high. 
The long-term cost of ageing is above the EU average and the current budgetary position compounds the
cost of ageing. Based on the current fiscal position, debt would increase to 128 % of GDP by 2020. However,
the full implementation of the Convergence Programme would be enough to put debt on a downward path but
would still be above 80 % by 2020. Beyond its consolidation plans, the UK Government has announced
measures to support long-run sustainability; these include bringing forward the date of the planned rise in the
State Pension Age from 65 to 66 and changes to the method of up-rating certain benefits and tax thresholds. 
Implementing the proposed fiscal consolidation remains a major challenge. Ensuring no slippage from
published spending plans will be vital to re-establishing a sustainable fiscal position. Subject to this, the
historically low rates of public infrastructure investments, particularly as regards transport, mean that growth-
enhancing expenditure should be prioritised. Ensuring sufficient primary surpluses over the medium term, as
already envisaged in the Convergence Programme, will improve the sustainability of public finances.
Recommendation:
Implement the planned fiscal consolidation aiming at a deficit of 6,2 % of GDP in 2012-2013, in line with
Council recommendations on correcting the excessive deficit, and setting the high public debt ratio on a
downward path when the excessive deficit is corrected by the end of the programme period. Ensure no
slippage from the ambitious spending reduction targets, thereby strengthening long-term sustainability; and,
subject to this, prioritise growth-enhancing expenditure.  
Source: Commission services 
 
Part II 
Evolving budgetary surveillance 
 
 

SUMMARY 
 
63 
The economic and financial crisis had widespread 
effects on the public finances of the Member 
States. In addition to the increases in government 
deficits and debt levels once the crisis hit and 
countries bore both the consequences of the 
downturn in macroeconomic conditions and the 
cost of the support measures that they introduced, 
the crisis also exposed underlying weaknesses in 
the public finances.  
In the EU, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
sets out the provisions according to which the 
Treaty requirements to ensure fiscal discipline are 
implemented. The SGP contains two parts; the 
preventive and corrective part. Both apply to both 
euro area and non euro area countries, although the 
sanctions that are part of the corrective arm are 
only applicable to euro area countries. 
The preventive arm seeks to ensure that fiscal 
policy making is undertaken in a prudent and 
forward-looking manner, while the corrective arm 
sets out the procedure to be followed when it is 
clear that deficits have exceeded the reference 
values set in the Treaty. In particular, the 
preventive arm looks at whether Member States' 
plans for their public finances, as given in the 
Stability and Convergence Plans they submit, are 
consistent with countries' deficits approaching or 
staying at or above their Medium Term Objectives 
(MTOs) over the near term. All countries have an 
individual MTO for their budgetary position, set in 
structural terms, which takes into account the 
specificities of their economic and budgetary 
situation, which they should aim to be at. Being at 
this structural MTO is consistent with a prudent 
and sustainable underlying fiscal position and 
should ensure that the deficit stays within the 
requirements of the corrective arm over the ups 
and downs of typical economic cycle. While 
countries that are deemed to be planning 
imprudent fiscal policy can be issued a warning 
and a recommendation by the Council to take 
corrective action, there is no stronger enforcement 
mechanism. The preventive arm of the Pact is 
therefore an exercise that seeks to pre-empt the 
consequences of fiscal plans, but does not have 
any hard legal instruments to ensure that countries 
adjust their plans accordingly. It functions on the 
basis of peer pressure. 
The corrective arm of the Pact implements the 
obligations in the Treaty under the Excessive 
Deficits Procedure (EDP) for Member States to 
keep their deficits below 3% of GDP and 
government debt at, below or sufficiently declining 
towards 60% of GDP. So far, the EDP has 
focussed on the deficit criterion; the debt criterion 
has not been operationalised. A necessary and 
sufficient condition for the launch of an EDP is 
that the deficit is considered to be in breach of the 
3% benchmark. A deficit slightly above 3% may in 
some cases not lead to an EDP being launch if the 
breach is shown to be "small and temporary" and if 
"other factors" such as pension liabilities and 
economic conditions are deemed to play an 
important role in this breach. Once an EDP is 
launched, a series of steps are followed whereby a 
country is called upon to correct the deficit within 
a given timeframe and assessments are made to 
ensure that adequate measures are taken. If the 
progress made is not deemed to be sufficient, euro 
area countries can be subject to sanctions; first a 
non-interest bearing deposit is payable, and this 
can then be converted into a fine if a lack of 
progress continues to be observed. 
Taken together, the two parts of the SGP should 
ensure that the public finances of the euro area 
countries are healthy and sustainable. As Chapter 
II.1 illustrates, between 2007 and 2009, all 
countries but one saw an increase in their 
borrowing and widespread breaches of the 3% 
borrowing reference value emerged. While in 
2007, three countries were in breach of this value, 
by 2009 twenty-two countries had borrowing that 
was higher. Meanwhile, average debt in EU27 
climbed from 59.0% of GDP in 2007 to 74.4% in 
2009 and has continued to increase since. These 
deteriorations in the public finances clearly have 
difficult political and economic consequences and 
for some countries these are particularly acute. 
While the SGP allowed countries to provide 
support for their economies during the crisis years 
by containing enough flexibility to adjust to these 
difficult times, and is proving a valuable anchor 
for fiscal consolidation that is now underway, it is 
clear that fiscal policy in the run-up to the crisis 
did not leave many Member States' public finances 
in a strong enough position to weather the storm. 
For countries that faced insolvency/illiquidity and 
required financial assistance, the problems that 
emerged are particularly acute. 
An obvious lesson learnt from the crisis is thus that 
the SGP was not able to ensure sound public 
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finances throughout the EU. Beside weakness in its 
implementation that were evident already before 
the crisis, e.g. limited use of the instrument of 
early warnings by the Commission and even more 
limited follow up of these early warning by the 
Council, flaws in design have also emerged. 
By focusing on purely fiscal indicators the SGP 
was not equipped to prevent the accumulation of 
macroeconomic imbalances. These resulted in 
deferred but massive impacts on the public 
finances of some Member States that showed 
apparently sound fiscal position before the 
recession (see Chapter IV.3.) Even delivery on 
fiscal positions was less than satisfactory. 
Excessive reliance on the change in the structural 
balance as a way of assessing the adjustment 
towards the MTO masked a widespread use of 
windfall revenues to offset expenditure 
developments. Accordingly, the European 
Commission has proposed changes to the 
economic and budgetary surveillance framework. 
These are currently undergoing the legislative 
process which is expected to be completed in the 
coming months. The changes consist of 
amendments to the two regulations that implement 
the preventive and the corrective arms of the SGP, 
a new directive on minimum provisions for 
national fiscal frameworks and a new regulation 
that introduces sanctions to the preventive arm of 
the Pact and strengthens those applicable under the 
corrective arm. The reforms are part of a package 
that also includes two new regulations to introduce 
a new economic imbalances procedure. 
Chapter II.2 presents the proposed changes to the 
preventive arm of the Pact. The amended 
regulation introduces the concept of an expenditure 
benchmark in judging whether fiscal policy is 
considered prudent, in the sense of being 
consistent with staying at or reaching a country's 
MTO. The expenditure benchmark will be used 
alongside the examination of the structural balance 
in assessing fiscal policy both on an ex ante and an 
ex post basis. It will require that net expenditure 
growth (that is, expenditure growth, net of any 
legislated discretionary increases in revenues) be 
below a medium term potential growth rate of the 
economy. Countries at the MTO will need to show 
that net expenditure growth is in line with this 
estimate of economic growth, while those that 
more than meet their MTO will face looser 
constraints. This condition aims to ensure that 
countries are no longer financing expenditure 
growth out of cyclical increases in revenues – 
evidence from the years in the run-up to the crisis 
shows that the positive revenue surprises than 
many countries experienced tended to be used to 
increase expenditure rather than to reduce 
borrowing in debt. This led to insufficient 
strengthening of the underlying budgetary position, 
high levels of expenditure that were difficult to 
reduce once the underlying economic 
fundamentals changed and higher than desirable 
levels of debt. By increasing the focus on the 
relationship between how government expenditure 
(which tends to be permanent) is financed, the 
quality of fiscal decision making can be improved.  
Chapter II.2 describes the changes to the 
preventive arm in detail, discusses issues relating 
to their implementation and presents simulations 
that look at how fiscal policy outcomes might look 
given certain stylised conditions. In addition, it 
discusses the part of the sanctions regulation that 
will apply to the preventive arm; for the first time, 
financial sanctions will be part of the preventive 
arm, as countries can be required to make an 
interest bearing deposit if their policy setting is not 
in line with the assessments made under the 
preventive arm. 
Chapter II.3 presents and discusses the changes to 
the corrective arm of the Pact. The new regulation 
places debt at the centre of the SGP by providing 
the legislation to operationalise the debt criterion. 
The requirement to ensure that debt is either at or 
below the 60% threshold or sufficiently 
diminishing towards it is placed on an equal 
footing to the 3% deficit criterion. So far, despite 
the deficit and debt criterion being on an equal 
footing in the Treaty, no country has been placed 
in EDP as a result of its debt and no provision had 
been made for actually implementing the debt 
criterion. In the future, a breach of either criterion 
will be sufficient to place a country in EDP, 
although whether or not a breach exists will be 
judged taking into account a number of features 
that are described in the legislation. 
Although monetary sanctions exist under the 
unreformed corrective arm, the sanctions 
regulation strengthens and accelerates the 
application of sanctions for euro area countries, 
thereby implicitly increasing the penalties to be 
faced for imprudent fiscal policy. Sanctions will 
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apply earlier in the EDP process, with a non-
interest bearing deposit being payable as soon as a 
Council decision confirming the existence of an 
excessive deficit is taken, while fines will also be 
due earlier. 
Finally, Chapter II.4 presents the new directive on 
national budgetary frameworks. This requires that 
Member States adhere to certain minimum 
standards for domestic fiscal frameworks. The use 
of a directive rather than a regulation is important 
– it is in recognition of the fact that the optimal 
procedural and institutional set-up for fiscal 
policy- making will depend on the different 
characteristics of Member States, meaning that 
there is no one model that can or should be applied 
in all cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instead, the directive allows countries to choose 
the manner in which they will comply with 
requirements on the quality of accounting and 
statistics, the macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts that they use, the numerical fiscal rules 
that they have in place, the existence of medium-
term budgetary frameworks and the transparency 
of the their finances. Research has shown that the 
best performing countries meet certain minimum 
standards. By requiring that all Member States 
adhere to them in their own way, the quality of 
national decision-making can be enhanced for the 
worst performers. After all, while fiscal policy is 
supervised at European level, it is set at national 
level. Adequate processes within Member States 
are a sine qua non, to effective European-wide 
results.  
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As Chapter I illustrates, the economic and financial 
crisis had widespread effects on the public 
finances of the Member States. Between 2007 and 
2009, all countries but one saw an increase in their 
borrowing and widespread breaches of the 3% 
borrowing reference value emerged. While in 
2007, three countries were in breach of this value, 
by 2009 twenty-two countries had borrowing that 
was above. Meanwhile, average debt in EU 
climbed from 59.0% of GDP in 2007 to 74.4% in 
2009 and has continued to increase since. These 
deteriorations in the public finances clearly have 
difficult political and economic consequences and 
for some countries these are particularly acute. As 
the possibility of the illiquidity or insolvency of 
both EU and euro area Member States arose for the 
first time since the launch of the euro, questions 
were asked about both the quality of the fiscal 
policy making before the crisis and the adequacy 
of the overall budgetary surveillance at European 
level.  
The economic crisis came after a period of strong 
macroeconomic conditions that characterised the 
first decade of the EMU. During that period, 
growth was sustained, inflation low and the 
conditions were such that the public finances had 
every opportunity to be on a strong path. 
Nevertheless, once the crisis hit, the impact on  
most countries' public finances revealed 
widespread underlying weaknesses. Cyclically 
adjusted borrowing was slightly higher in 2007 
than it had been in 2000. While debt did decline 
over the period from 2000 to 2007, the reduction 
was small with overall debt going from 61.8% of 
GDP in 2000 to 59.0% in 2007 for the EU. The 
spread of debt levels within this average is 
significant, with 3 countries having debt over 80% 
in 2007, and of these two had levels of debt in 
excess of 100% of their GDP.   
Overall, the crisis therefore brought attention to the 
way fiscal policy had been conducted in the years 
before it hit and thus to the lack of implementation 
of the common fiscal framework and/or possible 
faults in its design. Specifically, Member States 
are required by the Treaty to avoid excessive 
deficits(27) and to ensure coordination of their 
economic policies and sustained convergence of 
                                                          
(27) Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European 
Union (TFEU). 
their economic performance. (28) The Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) provides the secondary 
legislation that defines these obligations in greater 
detail and thus sets out the framework within 
which fiscal policy making is to be set and 
monitored at European level. 
The SGP was introduced as a continuation of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, which set out the 
conditions that countries' economies and public 
finances have to fulfil, in order to join EMU. The 
Maastricht criteria were set up to ensure that 
countries becoming part of the single currency had 
economies that were healthy enough to not 
jeopardise the functioning of the monetary union. 
After the run up to euro, the importance of 
ensuring public finances remained strong, both for 
Member States that had not yet completed the 
convergence process and for those joining the euro 
area. The SGP was set up to ensure that all 
countries had sufficient incentive to pursue prudent 
fiscal policies. Countries outside currency unions 
typically bear a high share of the cost of imprudent 
fiscal policy, and the credit markets price their 
debt according to the perceived risk of holding 
their bonds. Within a currency union however, 
there are significant spillovers, as more integrated 
economic and financial systems mean that other 
countries bear a higher share of the cost of one 
country's profligacy than would otherwise be the 
case. Moreover, the market reaction tends to be 
more muted; the effects of high debt on the interest 
rate are watered down by the presence of other 
countries which also affect the interest rate, while 
bond prices are expected to be more tempered. The 
absence, or dampening, of market mechanisms to 
act as an incentive for fiscal prudence led to the 
introduction of a common framework, which 
monitors and constrains the public finances of 
European Union countries. 
The SGP contains two arms; the preventive and 
corrective arm. Both apply to both euro area and 
non euro area countries, although some of the 
provisions, in particular concerning sanctions, of 
the corrective arm are only applicable to euro area 
countries. The preventive arm seeks to ensure that 
fiscal policy-making is undertaken in a prudent 
and forward-looking manner, while the corrective 
arm sets out the procedure to be followed when it 
                                                          
(28) Article 121 TFEU. 
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is clear that gross errors have been made. Taken 
together, the two parts of the SGP should ensure 
that the public finances of the euro area countries 
are healthy and sustainable. The SGP was already 
subject to a first revision in 2005, which added 
some flexibility to the assessment of whether a 
deficit was excessive and the process of judging 
whether adequate action was then taken, in 
particular in relation to the possibility to take into 
account unexpected economic developments.  
It is impossible to know what would have 
happened to countries' public finances had the SGP 
not existed at all. In any case, it was not able to 
ensure that all countries' public finances were able 
to withstand the shock of the crisis without either 
seriously weakening their fiscal situation or being 
subject to punitive market conditions on their debt.  
The experience of the crisis pointed to a need to 
overhaul the SGP and its functioning, to address 
the weaknesses that have been identified and to 
ensure that it is able to provide the required 
framework to guide the Member States towards 
strong public finances in the future, thus anchoring 
expectations for exit from the current fiscal 
situation. 
In order to update the Pact in the light of the 
lessons learned, it is important to look at how the 
SGP works as a whole, and how it interacts with 
other aspects of both European and national 
economic policy-making. In its communications of 
12 May and 30 June 2010, the Commission 
outlined a comprehensive set of measures that 
were considered urgent to reinforce economic 
governance in the EU and announced the 
preparation of related legislative proposals. A 
package comprising six proposals was presented 
by the Commission on 29 September 2010. This 
package included revisions to the two existing 
regulations that make up the SGP as well as a new 
regulation which will strengthen the enforcement 
mechanism for euro area Member States on its 
corrective arm and introduce them on the 
preventive arm. As experience showed that 
effective enforcement of the EMU budgetary 
coordination framework cannot be expected to 
derive only from provisions established at EU 
level, a new directive on national budgetary 
frameworks was also proposed to complement the 
reform of the SGP.  
 
The different parts of the package have been 
prepared together, taking into account the overall 
functioning of budgetary and economic 
surveillance, and are being complemented with a 
new regulation on an Economic Imbalances 
Procedure (EIP), which will introduce the concept 
of monitoring wider imbalances in Member States' 
economies as well as a Regulation outlining the 
enforcement procedure under the new EIP. This 
will provide a more holistic view of the strengths 
and weaknesses of Member States economies and 
allow a timely assessment of where risks are 
emerging. 
On 15 March 2011 the economic and financial 
affairs ministers of the Member States agreed on 
the Council's general approach related to the six 
proposals, which enabled the Council's presidency 
to start negotiations with the European Parliament. 
The Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of 
the European Parliament held their first public 
discussion on the legislative package on 22 March. 
On 20 April 2011, the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee agreed on a negotiating 
position for the Parliament. 
Subsequent negotiations between the two co-
legislators have allowed an agreement on nearly all 
the relevant issues to be achieved. The only 
currently outstanding issue of disagreement – as 
recognised by the conclusions of the 21 July 2011 
euro area heads of State and Government meeting, 
which called for its quick resolution – concerns the 
voting procedure in the decision establishing non-
compliance with a recommendation to correct a 
significant deviation in the preventive arm of the 
SGP. Accordingly, the following chapter analyses 
the reform of the SGP and the directive on national 
budgetary frameworks as they emerge from the 
current state of negotiations between the European 
Parliament and the Council. While this implies a 
number of differences with respect to the proposals 
presented by the Commission on 29 September 
2010, the thrust of the Commission's proposals has 
been broadly retained.  
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2.1. THE PREVENTIVE ARM OF THE PACT 
The preventive arm of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) is based on Article 121 of the Treaty 
and implements the provisions on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of 
economic policies.(29) It aims to ensure that 
Member States pursue prudent and coordinated 
budgetary and economic policies and details the 
rules against which national policies are judged 
within a structure of multilateral surveillance. 
The preventive arm of the SGP requires that 
Member States aim for, achieve and maintain 
medium term budgetary objectives (MTOs) which 
are determined according to the specifics of each 
country's economic and budgetary circumstances. 
The MTOs are set in structural terms – that is, they 
are cyclically adjusted to be net of the estimated 
effects of the economic cycle and of one-off and 
temporary measures. This is so that the targeted 
measures reflect the underlying health of the 
budgetary position as much as possible and 
provide incentives for Member States to pursue the 
kind of budgetary and economic policies that will 
lead to strong public finances over the medium-
term. The MTOs currently range from a deficit of 
1½% of GDP to a surplus of 1% of GDP, with 
most countries having the MTO of balance. 
According to the preventive arm of the Pact, the 
norm should be an MTO of balance or surplus 
although deviations are possible and euro area and 
ERM II countries may not have an MTO which 
has a deficit greater than 1% of GDP. All 
countries' MTOs must provide a safety margin 
with respect to the 3% of GDP government deficit 
ratio and ensure rapid progress towards 
sustainability while allowing room for budgetary 
manoeuvre. In particular, ensuring sustainability 
includes differentiating MTOs in relation to debt 
ratios and the projected budgetary cost of 
ageing.(30)  
                                                          
(29) The secondary legislation that implements the preventive 
arm of the SGP is Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 
7 July 1997. On 27 June 2005, the original Regulation (OJ 
L 209, 2.8.1997) was amended by Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1055/2005 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005). 
(30) European Commission (2010). 
As part of the preventive arm, Member States 
submit annual Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs) which, amongst other 
information, set out their MTOs and their 
adjustment paths towards the MTO if they have 
not already attained it. The economic assumptions 
underlying their budgetary projections and the 
budgetary measures that are included in those 
projections are also specified. The preventive arm 
specifies that countries that are on the adjustment 
path to their MTOs should plan for and pursue an 
annual improvement of at least 0.5 percentage 
points of GDP in structural terms, with greater 
adjustments being required in economic good 
times. Conversely, in economic bad times, a more 
limited effort may be appropriate. In specifying the 
appropriate adjustment path to the MTO the effect 
of long-term structural reforms and pension 
reforms in particular can be taken into account. 
The SCPs are submitted to the Commission and 
the Council, and are examined, based on an 
assessment by the Commission, by first the 
Economic and Financial Committee and then the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN.) The ECOFIN Council delivers an 
opinion on the SCPs based on the Commission's 
recommendation. Where the Council considers that 
the objectives and contents of a SCP should be 
strengthened, the Council invites the Member State 
concerned to adjust its programme. The Council 
also monitors the implementation of the 
programmes, in particular with a view to 
identifying an actual or expected significant 
divergence from the MTO or the adjustment path 
towards it. If such a significant divergence is 
identified, in order to prevent the occurrence of an 
excessive deficit, the Council addresses to the 
Member State concerned an 'early warning' to take 
the necessary adjustment measures, in order to 
prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit. If 
the Council then judges that the divergence is 
persisting or worsening, in accordance to Article 
121(4) of the Treaty, it makes a recommendation 
to the Member State in question to take prompt 
corrective measures. In both cases, the Council 
acts on the basis of a Commission 
recommendation. 
In principle, the preventive arm of the SGP should 
ensure that sustainable and credible public finance 
plans are set out and implemented. In practice, 
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while the plans in the SCPs typically showed 
structural positions moving towards the MTOs, the 
implementation often diverged from the plans. 
Graph II.2.1 shows the structural deficits and the 
MTOs in 2007. It shows that few countries were at 
their MTOs in 2007; this occurred despite the 
helpful economic conditions. The nearly 10 years 
of strong growth before the crisis, were marked by 
more limited progress to the MTOs than was 
typically set out in the plans. As a result, the 
underlying public finances were not as strong as 
they should have been, had the requirements of the 
preventive arm been strictly adhered to. 
Instead of being marked by consistent 
improvements in the structural balance, the first 
decade of the euro showed persistently lax fiscal 
policy. European Commission (2007) discusses 
this in detail, and shows that the overall lack of 
planned improvement in the government balance 
occurred as a result of persistent spending 
overruns. Graph II.2.2 shows the planned and final 
outcomes for nominal expenditures, over the years 
1998-2006. It shows that higher than anticipated 
expenditure was a recurrent feature of fiscal 
policy-making over that period – as a result the 
underlying structural positions typically came out 
weaker than planned for. Conversely, as European 
Commission (2007) shows, revenue projections 
tended to be more realistic, pointing to expenditure 
being the weak link in fiscal policy. 
In addition to slippages in the implementation of 
plans, once the crisis arrived, there was emerging 
evidence that the assessment of the structural 
balance was imperfect and masked weaknesses 
that became apparent. In particular, the estimate of 
the structural balance depends on correctly 
estimating both the output gap and the relationship 
between the output and key fiscal aggregates such 
as revenues. Assessing the output gap is an 
imperfect art, and assessing it in real time is 
particularly likely to result in errors. Meanwhile, 
the relationship between the output gap, the change 
in individual tax bases and resulting revenues is 
imperfectly estimated. Over the years preceding 
the crisis insufficient account was taken of revenue 
windfalls and shortfalls that were not directly 
related to the economic cycle, particularly where 
these were related to housing and financial market 
assets cycles. Recurrent positive revenue surprises 
were in many cases ascribed to an improved 
underlying relationship between the output gap and 
revenues, without adequate attention being paid to 
the effect of asset cycles. With the onset of the 
crisis, these revenues disappeared, giving way to a 
larger deficit than the estimated underlying fiscal 
position indicated. 
The experience of the years before the crisis also 
indicated that peer pressure was underused. The 
Commission has recommended the issuance of an 
early warning to four countries: Germany and 
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Portugal in 2002, France in 2003 and Italy in 2004. 
However, the Council only acted on these 
recommendations in the case of France, when in 
fact the breach of the 3% of GDP deficit threshold 
had already occurred. The lack of willingness to 
use the early warnings and the lack of possible 
punitive measures to be taken in the case where 
persistent breaches of policy are observed have 
been identified as a particular weakness of the 
preventive arm. 
2.2. THE REFORM OF THE PREVENTIVE ARM 
The reform of the preventive arm of the SGP 
consists of an amendment to Regulation 1466/97 
and is complemented by a new Regulation which 
introduces new enforcement mechanisms for 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area, including 
in the preventive arm of the SGP. The idea behind 
the reform is to set out more detailed parameters 
for how the SCP public finance plans are 
formulated in order to increase the likelihood that 
sustainable policies will actually be pursued and 
stronger underlying public finances will ensue; to 
strengthen the assessment of whether MTO or its 
adjustment path have been adhered to; and to back 
the new rules with sanctions that can be imposed 
where insufficient progress has been identified.  
2.2.1. The expenditure benchmark and the 
MTOs 
The reformed SGP maintains the MTOs as a 
reference for the conduct of fiscal policy, but 
progress towards it and hence compliance with the 
provisions of the preventive arm is assessed based 
on a 'two-pillar approach'. The first pillar remains 
the change in the structural balance, with reference 
to a 0.5 of a percent of GDP improvement as a 
benchmark. The second pillar introduces an 
expenditure benchmark, which countries must 
meet when adjusting towards the MTO.  
The expenditure benchmark is not aimed at 
constraining the size of the government, as it 
explicitly allows for a discretionary revenue offset: 
its ultimate goal remains a strong underlying fiscal 
position. Overall, the MTO and expenditure 
approach should be broadly equivalent. 
Specifically, to be consistent with the MTO or the 
adjustment towards it, expenditure growth needs 
Graph II.2.2: Planned versus final expenditure levels, 1998-2006 
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not to exceed – and if the MTO has not been 
achieved, remain clearly below – a reference 
medium-term rate of potential growth unless 
(i) the excess of expenditure growth over the rate 
is matched by discretionary expenditure measures; 
(ii) the MTO has been more than attained.  
Expenditure is defined as primary expenditure, i.e. 
excluding interest payments. Additionally, 
unemployment benefits and expenditure offset by 
revenue increases mandated by law are also 
excluded from the aggregate. Finally, some 
smoothing is envisaged to reduce the volatility of 
capital expenditure, which can be particularly high 
in small countries. 
The idea behind the expenditure benchmark is to 
ensure that any plans for increases in expenditure 
are properly financed without leading to a 
weakening of the underlying fiscal position. For 
this reason, expenditure that is not under the 
control of the government or is automatically 
matched by revenue is not included. Its application 
retrospectively means that any revenue windfalls 
(that is, increases in revenues that are not the result 
of discretionary changes and of the standard – unit 
– elasticity of revenue to output growth) are not 
absorbed by increasing spending, but must instead 
contribute to reducing the deficit and, by 
implication, the debt. 
From an analytical point of view the structural (or 
cyclically adjusted) approach and the expenditure 
threshold analysis share a common basis. This is 
explained in more detail in Box II.2.1. In both the 
cyclically adjusted and the expenditure benchmark 
approaches, fiscal policy is assessed with respect 
to a benchmark of medium-term economic growth, 
which is a rate of growth that does not reflect the 
ups and downs of the cycle. The main assumption 
behind interpreting a positive (negative) change of 
the cyclically adjusted budget as expansionary 
(contractionary) is that expenditure growth 
exceeds (falls short of) potential GDP growth, 
while revenues, under unchanged policy, are taken 
to have a unit elasticity with respect to GDP. The 
same principles apply to the expenditure threshold 
approach: expenditure growth is assessed with 
respect to a reference rate of economic growth, 
while revenues are allowed to fluctuate in line with 
economic activity. If expenditure grows faster than 
the prudent rate of economic growth there is an 
expansion, if they grow less there is adjustment. 
The substantial difference between assessing 
changes of the cyclically adjusted budget and the 
expenditure threshold approach is that with the 
latter the focus moves towards budgetary 
aggregates that are observable and under the 
control of government, that is, primary expenditure 
and discretionary revenue measure; while revenues 
at unchanged policies can follow their "natural 
course". By focussing on these observable 
budgetary aggregates, the relationship between the 
estimate of whether policy is appropriate or not, 
and the measures that a government would have to 
take at any one point to ensure that it is, is more 
direct and more transparent. 
In line with the broad equivalence between the 
cyclically adjusted budget and the expenditure 
benchmark, countries that are not at their MTOs 
would need to keep expenditure growth net of 
discretionary measures on the revenue side 1 
percentage point below GDP growth. Assuming a 
government size of around 50% of GDP, and 
taking into account that over the medium term 
government revenues generally have unit elasticity 
with respect to GDP, this should result in a 
structural improvement in line with the 0.5 of a 
percentage point of GDP requirement. 
The new expenditure benchmark is therefore not a 
completely additional requirement, but a means of 
making the surveillance mechanism of the 
preventive am of the pact more transparent and, by 
extension, more effective. By explicitly judging 
the conduct of fiscal policy on concrete existing 
figures rather than on estimates of underlying 
positions, it becomes easier for Member States' 
plans and outcomes to be judged against the 
requirements set out by the preventive arm, while 
the simple requirements of the expenditure 
benchmark provide more explicit guidance to 
Member States in terms how to determine their 
policy in any given year to ensure compliance with 
the preventive arm. (31) One of the main downsides 
of using only the adjustment path towards the 
MTO to judge the appropriateness of fiscal policy 
is that inherent statistical difficulties and 
subsequence re-estimations of the cyclical position 
render any estimation of how a country is 
                                                          
(31) The reference growth rate is adjusted at a frequency lower 
than one year to reduce its variance. 
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progressing towards its MTO subject to much 
uncertainty and this takes away from the 
tractability of this measure as an effective guide to 
policy. Instead, using also the expenditure 
benchmark approach circumvents this issue by 
providing fixed policy guidance and a firmer 
ground for assessing outcomes.  
Moreover, the use of an expenditure threshold 
approach goes some way to automating the 
consideration of the cyclical conditions that is 
included in regulation 1466/97 in the requirement 
to make a greater adjustment on the structural 
balance during good times, while allowing smaller 
improvements in economic bad times. The 
expenditure threshold approach allows the free 
operation of the automatic stabilisers, as long as 
expenditure is on a sustainable path over the cycle. 
If the MTO is achieved, by making reference to the 
medium-term rate of growth of the economy, the 
expenditure benchmark automatically 
accommodates increases in the expenditure ratio 
owing to the rate of growth of the economy falling 
below its medium term average. Needless to say, 
the policy that results from the application of the 
expenditure benchmark will depend in part on the 
rate of economic growth that is chosen to judge 
compliance with the benchmark. The choice of the 
rate of growth is crucial, as it serves as an anchor 
to the system and acts to cancel out the 
denominator effect that exists in the nominal 
expenditure ratio over the economic cycle.  
As such, it should represent the average growth 
rate of the economy over a cycle. Choosing a 
growth rate that is too high will result in 
expenditure rising faster than actual growth and 
will lead to a deterioration in the underlying public 
finances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conversely, choosing one that is too low will lead 
to the expenditure rule requiring tight fiscal policy, 
which while prudent, may not be appropriate for 
growth and to enable the funding of government 
services and transfers for which tax receipts are 
raised. Choosing the appropriate growth rate is a 
forecasting exercise and may prove especially 
difficult in the current economic climate, where 
past growth rates may be a particularly imperfect 
guide to future growth of the European economies. 
Adjusting the growth rate as more information 
becomes available should not be undertaken often, 
as the stability of the growth rate is key to the 
transparency and efficacy of the expenditure 
approach. 
The reform foresees that the reference medium-
term rate of potential GDP growth will be 
determined on the basis of forward-looking 
projections and backward-looking estimates. It 
also envisages that projections should be updated 
at regular intervals and that the Commission will 
be in charge of publishing the methodology and 
the results. The balance between backward-looking 
and forward-looking elements will need to take 
into account, on the one hand, the degree of 
stability of estimates of the past relative to 
projections of the future, on the other hand the 
need for an appropriate gauge for trends on future 
expenditure, not least in the light of the structural 
break introduced by the recession.  
Simulations are presented in Box II.2.2 to show the 
potential benefits of an expenditure benchmark-
based fiscal surveillance and the potential 
beneficial effects from adopting a counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy in all economic times.   
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 Box II.2.1: The relationship between the cyclically adjusted budget (CAB) and the 
expenditure threshold benchmark approach
This box examines the analytical basis the CAB and its link with the expenditure benchmark approach. 
Starting with the CAB, the budget can be described as the sum of two components a structural and cyclical. 
Expressing all budgetary variables in percent of GDP we have: 
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Subtracting the cyclical component from the change in the headline balance yields the change in the CAB 
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Turning to the expenditure benchmark-based approach we know that  
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where capital letters indicate levels of the respective variable and a dot a change with respect to time. This 
expression tells us how the underlying budget, i.e. the CAB, evolves depending on how fast revenues and 
expenditures grow relative to potential GDP. 
Keeping in mind that in the EU government revenues R have an elasticity with respect to GDP equal or 
close to 1, the first term on the right hand side of equation (4) is equal to zero. In that case, the change of the 
CAB can only be zero if expenditure G grows in line with potential GDP. In terms of equation (3) it means 
that the increase in expenditure equals the increase in revenues implied by an increase in potential GDP. 
Similarly, assuming a government size (G/Y) of around 0.5 an improvement of the CAB in the order of 
0.5% of GDP requires that expenditure growth is one percentage point lower than potential GDP growth, 
unless higher expenditure growth is compensated by discretionary revenue measures, which would go on top 
of the 'natural' increase of R. 
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2.2.2. Using the expenditure benchmark as 
part of multilateral surveillance 
Both the change in the structural balance and the 
expenditure benchmark will be assessed on an ex 
ante and on an ex post basis. 
The ex ante assessment of will take place when 
examining countries' plans as set out in their SCPs, 
where there is a possibility for the Member State to 
be ordered to strengthen its programme in case of 
the planned adjustment towards the MTO being 
insufficient. In particular, sufficient progress 
towards the medium-term budgetary objective will 
be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment 
with the structural balance as the reference, 
including an analysis of expenditure net of 
discretionary revenue measures. 
The ex post assessment will take place when 
assessing whether there has been a significant 
observed deviation on the basis of actual data. For 
a Member State that has not reached the MTO, the 
assessment of whether the deviation is significant 
will take into account both the change in the 
structural balance and the expenditure 
developments. When assessing of the change in the 
structural balance, the deviation will be considered 
significant if the structural balance has not 
improved at all in one single year or if, for two 
consecutive years, it has not improved by at least 
¼ of a percent of GDP on average per year. When 
assessing compliance with the expenditure 
benchmark, the deviation will be considered 
significant if, net of discretionary revenue 
measures, its impact on the government balance 
amounts to at least ½% of GDP in one single year, 
or cumulatively over two consecutive years. For a 
Member State that has overachieved the MTO, a 
worsening in the structural balance does not 
represent a source of particular concern and even a 
deviation from the expenditure benchmark is not 
considered, barring the existence of significant 
revenue windfall and budgetary plans that 
jeopardise the MTO over the programme period.  
The deviation is also not considered in the case of 
severe economic down-turn for the euro area or the 
EU or when resulting from an unusual event 
outside of the control of the Member State 
concerned.  
Where the assessment establishes that a significant 
observed deviation has occurred, a warning is to be 
issued by the Commission in accordance with 
article 121(4) of the Treaty, where 'early warnings' 
in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive 
deficit were previously issued by the Council.  
On the basis of a Commission recommendation, 
the Council examines the situation and issues 
recommendations for the necessary policy 
measures in accordance with Article 121(4), within 
one month from the adoption of the warning by the 
Commission. The Council recommendation should 
set a deadline of no more than five months for the 
Member States to adopt the measures necessary to 
address the deviation. A Council decision 
establishing that the Member State concerned has 
taken no effective action within the deadline 
established by the recommendation under Article 
121(4) would be backed, for euro area countries 
only, by an interest bearing deposit of 0.2% of 
GDP. (32)  
Specifically, the Council decision establishing that 
no effective action has been taken is followed by a 
recommendation by the Commission to the 
Council to impose such deposit. The deposit would 
be payable unless the Council decides to the 
contrary by qualified majority within 10 days. In 
this way, the voting procedure is reversed, with a 
qualified majority being required to reject rather 
than to accept the Commission's recommendation. 
Once the Council is satisfied, on the basis of a 
Commission recommendation, that adequate 
measures have been taken and the situation giving 
rise to the imprudent fiscal policy has ended, the 
deposit is returned along with the interest it has 
accrued. 
 
 
                                                          
(32) The possibility to introduce, for the first time, financial 
sanctions in the preventive arm of the SGP has been made 
available by a legal basis specific to Member States whose 
currency is the euro (Article 136 of the Treaty), including 
with a view to strengthen their coordination and 
surveillance of budgetary discipline. It is on this Article, as 
well as on Article 121 that the new regulation on effective 
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area 
envisaging, inter alia, the interest-bearing deposit in case of 
a significant observed deviation is based. 
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The idea behind this sanction mechanism is to 
address the weakness in the preventive arm. With 
absence of financial penalties associated with 
deviations from the adjustment towards the MTO, 
peer pressure alone proved insufficient to 
encourage countries to adhere to its requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A further potential source of pressures comes in 
the form of the economic dialogue provisions in 
the reform, whereby the competent committee of 
the European Parliament may hold hearings on the 
conduct of surveillance by the Commission and the 
Council, with Member State concerned by the 
above-mentioned measures also invited to appear. 
Graph II.2.3: Fiscal surveillance – preventive arm : stylised course of events 
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 Box II.2.2: The potential benefits of an expenditure benchmark approach for fiscal 
performance
This box presents a simple mechanical exercise in which the actual course of public finances as measured by
the budget balance in a selection of EU countries (BE, DE, EL, ES, EI, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI) in 1997-2009 is 
compared with a counterfactual path where the growth rate of government primary expenditure follows an
expenditure threshold approach as set out in the Commission's proposal. The principles of the expenditure 
threshold approach are simulated as follows: 
• If in year t-1 the fiscal balance, i.e. the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB), falls short of the MTO,
government primary expenditure growth in year t is capped at one percentage point below the medium-
term rate of GDP growth so as to have a progressive adjustment towards the MTO over the cycle. (1) 
• If in year t-1 the fiscal balance, i.e. the CAB, is at or above the MTO, government primary expenditure
growth in year t is set equal to the medium-term rate of GDP growth. 
• For the sake of the simulation, the medium-term rate of GDP growth used in year t is defined as the ten-
year forward-looking average of the long-term projections of the AWG. (2) 
The message from the simulations is fairly clear. In most, but not all of the countries considered, expenditure 
paths consistent with an expenditure benchmark would have generated sounder fiscal positions especially in
the years preceding the economic and financial crisis.  
For each country, two graphs are shown below. The first graph compares the actual budget balance in % of 
GDP with the counterfactual balance (also in % of GDP) obtained by applying the principles of an 
expenditure benchmark approach. The second graph sets out the actual rate of real primary expenditure 
growth against the rate implied by an expenditure benchmark approach. 
Three groups of countries can be distinguished:  
The first group includes Greece, Portugal, France, Italy and Belgium which in 2007 (the last year before the 
crisis) recorded more or less sizeable deficits, i.e. their room for manoeuvre during the downturn was already
limited or exhausted at the onset of the crisis. Had they applied an expenditure benchmark throughout the
sample period, these countries would have entered the crisis with sizeable budgetary surpluses.  
The second group of countries comprises Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands, which in 2007 posted a more or
less sizeable surplus. Adhering to an expenditure benchmark approach throughout the sample period would
have resulted in significantly higher buffers.  
The third group of countries is composed of Germany and Finland, where the fiscal performance implied by
a prudent expenditure path over the sample period is worse or broadly in line with the actual course of fiscal-
policy making. 
                                                          
(1) With a government size (expenditure-to-GDP ratio) of around 0.5 and assuming that over the medium term revenue
growth keeps broadly pace with GDP growth, an excess of expenditure growth over GDP growth of 1 percentage
points results into a deterioration of the budget balance of 0.5% of GDP. 
(2) In the years prior to 2006, not covered by the long-term projections of the Ageing Working Group, the 10-year 
averages of potential output growth from the 2006 vintage of the Commission autumn forecast are used. 
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Box (continued) 
 
 The fact that the expenditure threshold approach yields a stronger underlying fiscal stance when compared 
with actual outcomes does not mean that its implementation in real time would necessarily lead to those 
outcomes. Using retrospective data to compare outcomes against a stylised rule, does not take into account 
whether the rule would indeed lead to the correct decisions being made in actual fact. In particular, an 
effective surveillance framework must give the right signals and policy guidance at the right time.  
The EU fiscal surveillance framework consists of both ex ante assessments based on official projections 
presented in the SCPs and on the Commission forecasts, and ex post assessments based on outcome data. The 
ex ante assessments are therefore based on forecast data, which are usually subject to revisions in retrospect, 
both in terms of the starting magnitudes for revenues and spending, the costs of measures introduced and the 
macroeconomic situation. The quality of the ex post assessments are also subject to uncertainties; the sooner 
they are undertaken the lower the reliability of the data they are based on, but the greater their policy 
relevance. 
Evidence from detailed analysis undertaken on a small number of countries using the data available at the 
time of actual assessments over the 2000–07 period suggests that the expenditure threshold approach is 
subject to similar uncertainty as the structural balance approach on an ex ante basis, but that the magnitude 
of the uncertainty makes it somewhat more robust a policy guide. In terms of the ex post assessments, 
qualitative assessments are broadly similar in both approaches, but in particularly sensitive years the 
expenditure approach provides clearer signals. This appears to be the case in years with significant revenue 
windfalls and a large uncertainty concerning the size of the output gap, such as during (extended) boom 
periods or in periods when economic fortunes are about to change. 
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Box (continued) 
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Box (continued) 
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Box (continued) 
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Box (continued) 
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Box (continued) 
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Box (continued) 
 
 Second group of countries: Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands 
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Box (continued) 
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Box (continued) 
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Box (continued) 
 
 Third group of countries: Germany, Finland 
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Box (continued) 
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3.1. THE CORRECTIVE ARM OF THE PACT  
The corrective arm of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) is concerned with the procedure to be 
followed if a country's public finances fall outside 
the requirements of the Treaty. It is based on 
Article 126 of the Treaty and implemented through 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 
1997(33) on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.  
Article 126 specifies that Member States shall 
avoid excessive government deficits and defines 
the criteria according to which compliance with 
budgetary discipline should be examined in terms 
of whether the ratio of the planned or actual deficit 
to gross domestic product or the ratio of 
government debt to gross domestic product exceed 
respective reference values. Both these conditions 
are subject to further specification. In the case of 
the deficit, a ratio that has declined substantially 
and continuously and reached a level close to the 
reference value, or one where the excess over the 
reference value is only exceptional and temporary 
and results in a ratio still close to the reference 
value, need not be classified as a breach. In the 
case of the debt, a sufficiently diminishing debt 
ratio which approaches the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace, could also be in line with the 
requirements of the Treaty. The references values 
are given in Protocol 12 on the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) as 3% of GDP for the deficit and 
60% of GDP of the debt. 
According to the Treaty, the Commission prepares 
a report if a Member State does not fulfil the 
requirements specified under either the deficit or 
debt criteria. The Commission report should take 
into account the other relevant factors. Following 
an opinion by the Economic and Financial 
Committee, the Commission can address an 
opinion to the country in question if it considers 
that an excessive deficit exists. On the 
Commission's proposal, the Council decides 
whether an excessive deficit exists and where it 
finds that one does, it adopts recommendations 
under Article 126(7) addressed to the Member 
State in question to take action and put an end to 
                                                          
(33) In 2005, Council Regulation 1467/97 (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997) 
was amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 
of 27 June 2005. 
the excessive deficit in a given time period, on the 
basis of a Commission recommendation.  
In case of failure to put the recommendations into 
practice, the following steps of the procedure differ 
between euro area and non euro area Member 
States. Specifically, a new recommendation under 
Article 126(7) can be issued to non euro area 
Member States, whereas euro area Member States 
are, based on a Commission recommendation, 
given notice by the Council to take measures for 
the deficit reduction, in accordance with Article 
126(9). Only if the Member State does not comply 
even with this notice does the Council impose 
sanctions, again on the basis of a Commission 
recommendation. (34) To date, sanctions have 
never been applied, as this step has never been 
reached, i.e., the Council has not adopted any 
decision establishing that inadequate action has 
been taken to comply with an notice under Article 
126(9).  
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 specifies the 
implementing provisions for the excessive deficit 
procedure. In particular, it specifies the factors to 
be taken into account and the mechanism for doing 
so in the various stages of the EDP, the timetable 
to be followed in the different steps, the minimum 
correction to be required of countries where an 
excessive deficit has been found, the conditions for 
abeyance and abrogation and the specifications for 
how the sanctions are to be applied. However, only 
the deficit criterion is specifically referred to and 
no explicit provisions are made for the application 
of the debt criterion. In this way, while the caveats 
on the deficit criterion are clarified, there is no 
definition in the legislation of how a "sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching reference value at 
satisfactory pace" debt level is to be judged. In the 
same way, while the level of sanctions to be 
imposed in the case of deficit overrun are set out in 
                                                          
(34) In particular, the Council should immediately take a 
decision to require a non-interest-bearing deposit, but can 
decide to supplement the deposit by other sanctions 
envisaged in Article 126(11) of the Treaty. If the Member 
State continues to fail to take effective action the deposit is 
increased. The deposit is transformed into a fine if two 
years after its imposition the situation of excessive deficit 
is not yet corrected. Specifically, the Council can require 
the Member State concerned to publish additional 
information before issuing bonds and securities and invite 
the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending 
policy towards it. 
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detail in the secondary legislation, no analogous 
clarification is made in the cases of debt overruns. 
Although the lack of specification about the 
interpretation of the debt criterion is not a legal 
barrier to its application, it has nonetheless been 
the case that in absence of an agreed interpretation 
no EDPs have been opened on the basis of the debt 
criterion since the introduction of the SGP. As 
illustrated in Chapter I.1, average government debt 
in EU has hovered around the 60% of GDP 
threshold since the introduction of the euro. Graph 
II.3.1 shows the evolution of government debt 
ratios from 2000 to 2007 for all EU countries 
which had debt above 60% at some point during 
that period. As can be seen ten Member States 
were in this position, of which seven were 
members of the euro area at the time. (35) Despite 
the fact that a number of countries had instances of 
either increasing and/or very slowly declining high 
debt, no EDPs were opened either exclusively on 
the debt criterion. 
At the time of the Maastricht Treaty, when it was 
thought the deficit and debt thresholds were 
established, in principle, adherence to the deficit 
criterion should have been sufficient to ensure that 
the debt-to-GDP ratio was on a declining path for 
                                                          
(35) Malta and Cyprus joined the single currency in 2008 and 
Hungary is not a member. 
countries with a ratio above 60%. A nominal GDP 
growth rate of 5% means that a 3% of GDP deficit 
is consistent with debt converging to 60% of GDP, 
in the absence of other operations that affect the 
debt but not the deficit – so called "below-the-line" 
operations. As the 3% threshold is a limit and not 
an average, even a lower nominal growth rate 
should be consistent with debt falling if the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty is adhered to. Overall, until 
2008, the EDP has functioned relatively well in 
keeping headline deficits below 3% of GDP and 
fostering, in most cases, a rapid correction when 
breaches of the 3% level have occurred. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this has not been 
sufficient to push debt ratios on a steadily 
declining path. Besides an unsatisfactory reduction 
of deficits in goods times, in turn increasing the 
frequency of breaches of the 3% threshold in bad 
times, two factors help explain the lack of progress 
in reducing debt ratios:  below-the-line operations, 
instead of averaging zero over time as one could 
have a priori expected, have had a consistently 
debt-increasing effect; the growth rate of the EU 
economies has been trending down, making the 
assumption of a nominal GDP growth rate of 5% 
look increasingly optimistic. 
Graph II.3.1: General government debt as % of GDP, 2000-2007, countries over the 60% threshold 
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3.2. THE REFORM OF THE CORRECTIVE ARM 
The reform of the corrective arm of the SGP 
consists of an amendment to Regulation 1467/97 
and is complemented by new Regulation on the 
effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in 
the euro area, which supplements the sanctions 
provisions in 1467/97. The idea behind these 
changes is to strengthen the link between 
sustainability and the EDP and attach heavier 
consequences to gross errors in fiscal policy.   
The most significant of the changes to the 
corrective arm of the SGP is the operationalisation 
of the debt criterion. The amended Regulation 
1467/97 places the debt criterion on an equal 
footing to the deficit criterion and contains the 
operating provisions required to ensure its 
implementation. In this way, it defines the concept 
of debt being judged as "sufficiently diminishing 
and approaching reference value at a satisfactory 
pace" through the introduction of a numerical 
benchmark and sets out the factors to be taken into 
account when the Commission and Council 
consider whether a country is to be placed in 
excessive deficit as a result of the level and 
dynamics of its debt. These factors are of 
particular importance when assessing a debt 
benchmark, because the evolution of government 
debt-to-GDP ratio is not as readily in the direct 
control of government policy as the deficit. Above 
all, the dynamic of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
strongly affected by the cyclical conditions (see 
Box II.3.2.) For this reason, the influence of the 
cycle on the pace of debt reduction is treated 
differently from the other relevant factors to be 
taken into account. Namely, while all the other 
relevant factors are examined in the report that the 
Commission will have to prepare in case the debt 
benchmark is not complied with, the impact of the 
cycle on the debt ratio is considered part of the 
assessment of compliance with the debt benchmark 
and can thus make the preparation of the report 
unnecessary.  
The new Regulation on the effective enforcement 
of budgetary surveillance in the euro area 
introduces a new set of financial sanctions for the 
euro area countries, which apply much earlier in 
the process as compared to those envisaged by 
Article 126(11) of the Treaty and specified in the 
Graph II.3.2: Fiscal surveillance – corrective arm: stylised course of events (i) 
Deficit > 3% of GDP
Debt > 60% of GDP, not sufficiently diminishing
COM opinion Art 126.5 TFEU
EFC opinion Art 126.4 TFEU
Council decision on existence of EDP (Art 126.6 TFEU) + recom. (Art 126.7 TFEU) 
+ (in case of ‘particularly serious non-compliance’ or pre-existing interest-bearing deposit) Commission 
recommendation for a Council decision on sanctions for euro area MS (0.2% of GDP)
COM assessment of effective actionDeadline for effective action 
EDP in abeyance: monitoring continuesEffective action taken
+ Commission recommendation for Council decision on sanctions for euro area MS (0.2% 
of GDP fine)
Council decision (Art 126.8 TFEU) + notice to take action (Art. 126.9 TFEU)
Possible extended deadline (Art 126.7 TFEU)
Decision on sanctions automatically adopted unless, within ten days, the Council rejects the Commission 
recommendation by QMV
Decision on sanctions automatically adopted unless, within ten days, the Council rejects the 
Commission recommendation by QMV
COM report Art 126.3 TFEU assessing ‘relevant factors’
No effective action taken
Effective action
but adv. econ. events
Source: Commission services 
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regulation specific to the EDP. If a Member State 
was already called to lodge an interest-bearing 
deposit due to lack of effective action to correct a 
significant deviation from the adjustment path 
towards the MTO, this deposit is transformed in a 
non-interest bearing deposit upon the decision to 
place a country in excessive deficit. Even in 
absence of an interest-bearing deposit, a 0.2% of 
GDP non-interest bearing deposit can be invoked 
at the time of the launch of the EDP, always only 
for euro area Member States, if the Commission 
identifies particularly serious non compliance with 
the SGP. In case of lack of compliance with a 
Council recommendation to correct the excessive 
deficit issued under Article 126(7), following the 
Council decision establishing such non-compliance 
(Art. 126(9),) a 0.2% of GDP fine is imposed on 
the euro area Member State concerned (if the 
Member State had already lodged a deposit, the 
deposit is converted into a fine.)  
As for the lodging of the interest bearing deposit in 
the preventive arm, the new sanctions for the 
corrective arm described above are also applied 
through a system of reverse voting. They are 
recommended by the Commission and euro area 
Member States will therefore have to vote to 
against rather than for the imposition of sanctions.  
The provisions on sanctions already envisaged by 
the regulation on the EDP have been adjusted to 
take account that the new financial penalties 
introduced already envisage a fine in case of lack 
of compliance with a recommendation under 
Article 126(7). Accordingly, a fine, instead of the 
currently envisaged non-interest-bearing deposit, 
will be applied as a rule in case of inadequate 
action in response to a notice under Article 126(9). 
The sanctions in the EDP regulation also take 
explicitly account of the imposition of sanctions on 
the basis of a breach of the debt criterion, by 
determining the level of the fine to be paid in this 
eventuality. Unlike the new fine at step 126(8) 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, this fine will 
contain both the fixed 0.2% of GDP component, 
and a variable component. The amount of the 
variable component has not been changed for the 
cases where the government deficit has caused an 
EDP to be launched; it will equal one tenth of the 
difference between the deficit and the 3% limit of 
the EDP. In the event of an EDP launched on the 
basis of a breach of the debt criterion, a new 
provision has been added, setting the variable 
component of the fine at one tenth of the 
difference between the deficit and the level of the 
deficit that was required under the notice given in 
step 126(9) of the EDP.  
By requiring a deposit and fine earlier in the 
process, financial penalties should begin to apply 
at time when they seem more relevant and should 
be used more widely. This should move away from 
a situation where financial penalties come late in 
the process and are therefore only levied on 
countries that are in a very difficult fiscal situation. 
Moreover, the introduction of reverse voting 
should not only make it more likely that financial 
penalties are applied, but also increase the political 
cost of choosing not to apply them, increasing the 
Graph II.3.3: Fiscal surveillance – corrective arm: stylised course of events (ii) 
Fines + interests earned channelled to EFSF / 
Council  imposes sanctions on euro-area MS under Art. 121.11 of TFEU 
in case of repeated non compliance with Council recom. + notices:
- Enhanced reporting obligations for MS before issuing new bonds
- EIB invited to reconsider lending policy to MS concerned
Additional fine of max. 0.5% of GDP:
- Fixed component 0.2% of GDP;
- Variable component: 1/10 of ∆ between headline deficit and
         - 3% (EDP deficit criterion)
         - deficit target notice Art 126.9 TFEU (EDP debt criterion)
Source: Commission services 
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chances that this will only happen in duly justified 
circumstances. 
3.3. THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE DEBT 
CRITERION 
Debt as a share of GDP is considered to be 
sufficiently diminishing and approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace if the 
differential with respect to the reference value has 
reduced over the previous three years at an average 
rate of the order of one-twentieth per year as a 
benchmark, based on the changes over the last 
three years for which the data are available. The 
requirement is also considered fulfilled if the 
budgetary forecasts as provided by the 
Commission indicate that the required reduction in 
the differential will occur over the three-year 
period encompassing the two years following the 
final year for which the data is available.  
The formulation of the debt criterion implies 
asymptotic convergence towards the 60% of GDP 
threshold: for very high levels of debt a significant 
debt reduction, as a percentage of GDP is required, 
while for levels of debt close to the 60% reference 
value the required reduction is small. As debt 
approaches 60% of GDP from above, the fiscal 
effort required diminishes. The 1/20th yearly rate of 
reduction is the one that ensures consistency 
between the 3% of GDP and the 60% of GDP 
deficit and debt limits. Specifically, if growth were 
5% in nominal terms every year, sticking with the 
3% deficit limit would lead to the debt falling at a 
rate of 5% of the difference between its level and 
60% of GDP in the absence of other operations. 
However, as growth over the medium term is 
likely to be below 5% in many cases and as it is 
clear that the "absence of other operations" has not 
held in the past, introducing an independent rule, 
even if equivalent to the deficit rule in equilibrium, 
brings debt into the heart of the fiscal surveillance 
process in a way that is consistent with the spirit of 
the Treaty. 
The regulation also specifies the other necessary 
provisions for the operationalisation of the debt 
criterion. In preparing its report for the Council as 
the first step of launching an EDP, the 
Commission will include an analysis of the 
developments in the medium-term debt position, 
which will include risk factors such as the maturity 
structure and currency denomination of debt, 
stock-flow operations, accumulated reserves and 
other financial assets, guarantees, notably linked to 
the financial sector, implicit and explicit liabilities 
related to ageing and the existence of private debt 
to the extent that it may represent a contingent 
liability for the government. 
The operationalisation of the debt criterion should 
increase the demands made on countries with high 
levels of debt. On the other hand, the amended 
regulation makes new provisions that allow lower 
debt countries to have looser conditions when 
assessing a breach of the 3% deficit target. In 
recognition of the fact that such countries present 
less of a sustainability risk and that deficits in 
excess of 3% are therefore less problematic, the 
regulation specifies that other relevant factors may 
be taken into account in determining whether there 
has been compliance with the deficit criterion even 
where the excess over the 3% threshold is not 
necessarily small and temporary, for countries with 
debt below 60%. For countries with debt above 
60%, there has been no change to the condition 
that such factors may only be used to assess 
compliance, when the excess of the deficit over 
3% is first judged to small and temporary. 
3.3.1. The numerical benchmark 
In line with the requirements of Article 126(2) of 
the Treaty and the EDP Protocol, the new 
Regulation defines a "sufficiently diminishing" 
debt in numerical terms as follows:  
"a debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% of GDP is 
considered to be sufficiently diminishing if its 
distance with respect to the 60% of GDP reference 
value has reduced over the previous 3 years at a 
rate of the order of 1/20th per year".  
This definition does not itself provide an 
unambiguous rule that can be used in all cases to 
judge whether a debt trajectory is or is not in 
compliance with the debt requirement. In 
particular, it is clear that a debt that decreases 
every year for three years by more than 1/20th of 
the distance is in compliance, while a debt that 
increases is in breach. However a number of 
interpretations are possible for situations where 
some of the decreases are greater and some are 
smaller than the 1/20th requirement. 
An interpretation consistent with the formulation 
of the reform, which results in a benchmark debt 
level for each year t, based on the outcome of the 
previous three years, is presented in Box II.3.1.  
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 Box II.3.1: A formula for the debt reduction benchmark
A debt in year t  that is below benchmark is judged as being in compliance with the SGP, while a debt above 
it is judged as breaching the SGP requirement. The proposed benchmark debt level is given as:  
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It is a weighted average that considers the outcomes in the debt-to-GDP ratio in each of the three years 
preceding the year t under consideration, and requires a 5% decrease per annum from each of these three 
outcomes.  
In year t, the one-year decrease by 5% of the distance between the debt in year t-1 and the Treaty threshold 
60% is: 
( ) 05.0%6011 ⋅−−=− −− ttt bbb  
By rearranging the previous formula, the one-year benchmark ytbb
1 , i.e. the debt ratio at t that respects the 
one-year 5% decrease for a given debt ratio at t-1, is: 
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The two-year benchmark ytbb
2  for an annual reduction of 0.05 of the distance between the debt ratio and 
60% for two years would be:(1)  
( ) 222 95.0%60%60 ⋅−+= −tyt bbb  
By further iteration, the three-year period benchmark ytbb
3 for an annual reduction of 0.05 of the distance 
between the debt ratio and 60% for three years would be: 
( ) 333 95.0%60%60 ⋅−+= −tyt bbb  
The Commission has chosen the average of the three benchmarks: 
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Graph 1 shows an illustrative path for debt implied by the debt benchmark that is proposed. The thick line 
represents the illustrative actual debt level, with the thin lines showing the debt benchmark. Compared with 
the simple 1 or 3 year rules, this rule contains an element of smoothing, which means that the benchmark 
debt is not so volatile as when only a single benchmark year enters the calculation. It allows increases in 
debt without an automatic breach provided this comes after falls in debt. This is shown in Graph 1 below, 
                                                          
(1) It is obtained by iteration from the previous formula. Assuming that the one-year benchmark was met in the first year 
t-1 relative to the debt in t-2, then by definition ( ) 95.0%60%60 21 11 ⋅−+== −−− tytt bbbb  and this can be 
substituted into ( ) 95.0%60%60 12 ⋅−+= −tyt bbb to obtain the formula in the text.  
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3.3.2. How the benchmark will be used to 
judge compliance with the SGP 
The decision to place a country in excessive deficit 
on the basis of the debt criterion will not be an 
automatic one, based on a crude application of the 
rule using four years of data. Instead, the 
procedure leading to such a decision will contain 
two stages: (i) the assessment of whether the debt 
benchmark is breached; and, if this is the case (ii) a 
report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty, taking 
into account all the relevant factors. 
The first stage will be to implement the debt 
benchmark. In turn, this requires checking both 
whether (i) the benchmark has been breached 
based on notified data and (ii)  to consider whether 
current policy should lead to debt diminishing 
sufficiently over the following two years. This 
recognises the fact that it takes a number of years 
Box (continued) 
 
 where the debt benchmark is not breached even with the debt spike observed in time 12 of the simulation 
(t=12). 
The choice of a three-year horizon is meant to avoid the pitfalls of a simple one-year rule, specifically the 
volatility of the benchmark and its vulnerability to manipulation. An average of a one-year, a two-year and 
three-year uniform benchmarks has advantages with respect to choosing the straight reduction over three 
years. The main difference between the two choices is that the average of the benchmarks puts slightly more 
weight on more recent outcomes and that there is a smoothing of what previous years' outcomes imply for 
the present. This is an attractive feature especially in those cases where the decline in debt ratio is due to 
exceptionally high inflation or a large positive output gap. Moreover, by including an element of smoothing 
in the rule, there is less year-on-year volatility in the debt target due to the events of the previous years. 
Although the benchmark is more complicated, it displays better dynamics than the simpler alternatives 
already discussed. 
Graph 1: Illustration of the proposed three-year average debt reduction benchmark 
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for actual debt to meet the requirements of the 
benchmark, once policy responses have been 
introduced. In this way, a backward and then a 
forward-looking approach will be applied. Finally, 
the influence of the cycle on the pace of debt 
reduction should be considered.  
Specifically, a breach of the benchmark level of 
debt in any year t, i.e. an unsatisfactory pace of 
development of the debt-to-GDP ratios based on 
the data notified in year t+1 for the previous four 
years (t-3, t-2, t-1 and t) . The next step will be to 
see what the current budgetary situation implies in 
terms of whether the benchmark is likely to be 
breached in the near future on unchanged policy. 
This will be done by looking, in year t+1, at 
whether the benchmark in year t+2 is forecast to be 
met or breached on unchanged policy. The 
Commission Services' forecast, which is based on 
unchanged policies, will be used as a reference. If 
it appears that fiscal policy is consistent with the 
debt ratio diminishing sufficiently by t+2 so that 
the benchmark is forecast to be fulfilled in that 
year, the debt criterion does not need to be 
considered breached. This might be the case, for 
example, if a country has already taken the 
measures necessary to adjust its fiscal stance.  
If it appears that also the debt-to-GDP ratio 
forecast for t+2 is above the t+2 benchmark, the 
breach observed for year t on the basis of historical 
data, it will also be necessary to take into account 
the impact of the cycle.  
Taking into account the effect of the cycle on the 
debt presents challenges that are additional to 
those of adjusting the deficit. Box II.3.2 describes 
a possible approach for estimating the effects of 
the cycle. The results of this estimation will be 
complemented by a broader analysis of factors that 
might have compounded or offset these effects, 
e.g. revenue elasticity. Only if the assessment 
concludes that the non-respect of the benchmark 
was not due to cyclical factors, the Commission 
will prepare a report under Article 126(3).  
The analysis of the economic and budgetary 
situation in the Commission's report will take 
account of all factors considered relevant to 
assessing past developments in the debt ratio and 
prospects for future developments. This will allow 
the Commission and the Council to make a 
balanced overall assessment of all the relevant 
factors specifically, the extent to which they affect 
the assessment of compliance with the deficit 
and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or 
mitigating factors. In particular increases in gross 
debt due to the accumulation of financial assets, 
which can easily be disposed of on the markets and 
therefore do not add to the risks associated with 
debt, should be taken into account in assessing 
whether non-respect of the benchmark amounts to 
a "gross error" in fiscal policy. The proposed 
criteria for assessing the risks associated with the 
stock flow adjustment are described in Box II.3.3. 
The budget balance is the variable which is 
typically at the centre of the budgetary process. 
When the Council decides that an excessive deficit 
exists, the recommendations for correction will 
thus still require the achievement of annual 
budgetary targets, irrespective of whether the 
procedure was opened due to a breach of the 
deficit or the debt criterion or both. The general 
government balance should be required to be 
gradually improved, in line with a minimal annual 
improvement in the structural balance of at least 
0.5 pp of GDP per year. (36) 
                                                          
(36) The annual structural adjustment needs to be higher in 
countries with particularly high government debt and low 
potential growth, too avoid the path of debt-to-GDP 
reduction remaining insufficiently diminishing over a too 
long period.  
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 Box II.3.2: Accounting for the effects of the cycle 
The respect of the debt reduction benchmark will be checked effectively over six years (from t-3 to t+2) 
although in two steps. Such a relatively long horizon will tend to mitigate the impact of the cycle; if, for 
example, debt increased in the past due to cyclical weakness, the expected developments would in general 
include a cyclical rebound. The inclusion of this rebound will facilitate meeting the benchmark at the end of 
the period considered. (1) As Commission forecasts are made on the basis of unchanged policy, if the 
underlying budgetary position of the Member State in question is prudent enough, the effect of the higher 
expected growth should be sufficient to keep the country out of the EDP. 
In practice however, the length and depth of economic cycles are asymmetric and unknown and cannot, of 
course, be guaranteed to fit into a six year time period. This means that meeting the debt reference 
benchmark on either the backward or forward looking measures might at time require large fiscal efforts in 
bad times. As this is undesirable in itself, it is the pro-cyclical nature of the debt benchmark will be 
addressed as part of the assessment that will be undertaken when a breach of the benchmark is identified.  
It should be noted that the pro-cyclicality inherent in the debt reduction benchmark is more pronounced than 
the pro-cyclicality of budget balance rules. In order to keep the debt in line with the pace of reduction 
prescribed by the benchmark in a year of slow growth, an additional fiscal effort is needed not only to offset 
the cyclical deterioration in the budget outcome, but also to compensate for the denominator effect on the 
debt ratio. (2) Taking account of the effect of the cycle on the ability of a country to meet the debt 
requirement is therefore necessary.  
To undertake such an exercise, both the denominator and the numerator of the debt ratio need adjusting. 
Specifically the numerator can be adjusted by subtracting from the debt the cyclical component of the 
balance. The denominator can be adjusted by using an estimate of real GDP obtained by using potential 
GDP growth in the place of actual over the time period under consideration. The adjusted denominator is 
therefore the product of potential growth times inflation. The adjustment of the debt-to-GDP ratio thus 
depends on both the output gap and the difference between actual and potential growth.  
To this end, the following estimate of the debt ratio can be used: 
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where tB  stands for debt, tY  for GDP, 
pot
t
y  for potential growth at constant prices, 
t
p for inflation, tC  
for the cyclical part of the budget balance. (3) All the variables are already used in the fiscal surveillance 
process and are publicly available. 
                                                          
(1) It should be noted that an increase in debt in t-1 would usually lead to the debt benchmark not being respected in year 
t. 
(2) Consider the basic approximated formula ( ) ttttt dybbb −−=− −− 11 , where tb is debt-to-GDP ratio, ty  
GDP growth and td  ratio of government balance to GDP. A back-of-the envelope calculation shows that for a 
country with a debt-to-GDP ratio at 90% and a cyclical semi-elasticity of government balance to GDP of 0.5, a 
difference of 1 percentage point in growth implies a 1.4 GDP points shortfall in debt reduction due to i) a difference 
of 0.5 GDP points in the cyclical deficit; and ii) a difference of 0.9 GDP points in the debt dynamics. 
(3) tC  is actually computed in terms of publicly available series. The series of cyclical components is multiplied by 
GDP as it is expressed as a percentage of GDP in the publicly available series.  
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Whenever an EDP is opened for a country with a 
debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% of GDP, the 
recommended targets should be such as to allow, 
on the basis of the forecasts underpinning the 
recommendations, the debt ratio to be gradually 
brought on a sufficiently diminishing path, i.e. to 
respect the debt reduction benchmark, or the 
deficit to be brought below 3% of GDP in a 
credible manner, whatever condition is more 
stringent.(37)  
The recognition that the process from making the 
right policy adjustments to meeting the debt 
benchmark is a long one also affects the abrogation 
of the EDP. To avoid extending the time countries 
are kept in EDP to collect enough backward 
looking data to measure compliance with the 
                                                          
(37) Although not likely, as a deficit above 3% of GDP would 
normally entail lack of compliance with the debt 
benchmark, a high debt country could in principle be 
subject to an EDP opened on the basis of deficit criterion 
only, due to a sizeable reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
in the previous years or to below-the-line operations that 
offset the negative impact on the debt-ratio effect. In any 
event, to ensure that the debt criterion is complied with, the 
EDP recommendations for high debt countries will always 
have to entail targets for the general government balance 
consistent with the numerical benchmark for the debt to be 
respected going forward. Only in case of unlikely high 
nominal growth, a correction of the deficit below 3% of 
GDP would be sufficient to ensure compliance with the 
debt benchmark.    
benchmark once they have adhered to the 
recommendations, abrogation will be possible on 
the basis of the debt benchmark being expected to 
be met at t+2 based on unchanged policy. In other 
words, the recommendations should require the 
general government balance to be gradually 
improved until it reaches a level that, if kept in 
structural terms, would allow the numerical 
benchmark to be respected from the second year 
after the deadline for correction. In this way, when 
Member States have taken the measures to ensure 
their debt is on the right trajectory for the future, 
they can be released from the EDP. 
If the deficit data notified in t+1 for the year t 
recommended for the correction are in line with 
those foreseen in the recommendation and yet the 
debt-to-GDP ratio forecast for t+2 does not respect 
the benchmark, an extension of the deadline might 
be granted, via a new Council recommendation. 
Whether or not it is granted will depend on the 
reason of the foreseen breach of the benchmark; a 
possible reason for revising the recommendations 
without stepping up the procedures would be a 
macroeconomic scenario significantly worse than 
that envisaged at the time of the initial 
recommendation. Overall, at the time of 
assessment of effective action and throughout the 
excessive deficit procedure, events beyond the 
Box (continued) 
 
 The purpose of the adjustment is to assess whether cyclical developments over the period t-3 to t were 
responsible for the breach of the debt reduction benchmark. The formula takes the debt ratio in year t-3 as 
given. It then adjusts both the numerator and the denominator for cyclical developments. The numerator is 
adjusted by adding the cyclical components of the deficit in years t-2, t-1 and t. Those are the first order 
cyclical components embedded in the debt levels of years t-2, t-1 and t, for a given debt level in t-3. With a 
positive output gap the adjusted debt will be larger than the observed debt and vice versa. The denominator 
is computed as the product of the actual GDP in year t-3 and the rate of potential growth in the following 
three years. The rate of inflation is used to convert real growth into nominal growth. (1) This gives the level 
that that GDP would have reached if it had evolved according to its potential. Note that it is not actually 
possible to directly use the series of potential output for this exercise, as the adjusted debt series and the 
benchmark would not be directly comparable if this were done.  
The estimated series for the adjusted debt ratio is best be understood as a counterfactual figure, describing 
the path the debt ratio would have taken, had GDP been growing at potential. It should not be understood as 
a measure of "structural debt" in the sense that it is normally attached to this concept, such as when 
considering the structural balance. As debt is a stock variable, current debt is not affected by future cyclical 
developments, in contrast to the government balance. 
                                                          
(1) Even if it is true that inflation is positively correlated with output it was decided to use actual inflation for two 
reasons: i) there is no well defined alternative benchmark for "potential" inflation; ii) there was no major difference in 
the results using as potential inflation the ECB benchmark, 2% or a rolling 6-years average of the actual inflation.  
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government control with a substantial impact on 
public finances may allow an extension of the 
deadline for correction without the Council 
deciding that the country has not taken effective 
action. In view of the experience gained with the 
crisis, it is now also envisaged that the 
recommendation can be revised in case of a severe 
economic downturn affecting the euro area or the 
EU of the whole, on condition that this does not 
endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. 
3.3.3. The transition arrangements 
The introduction of the debt rule requires some 
account to be taken of how it will operate when it 
is first made operational. As the debt rule takes 
into account the outcomes of the previous three 
years, it is possible to have a breach of the 
benchmark with the introduction of the rule due to 
the conduct of fiscal policy in the past. Three years 
of consistent policy are required to ensure 
compliance with the debt requirement and this 
needs to be taken into account for the introduction 
of the debt rule. 
The new Regulation specifies that “For a Member 
State that it is subject to an excessive deficit 
procedure at [date of entering into force of this 
Regulation … ] and for a period of 3 years from 
the correction of the excessive deficit, the 
requirement under the debt criterion shall be 
considered fulfilled if the Member State concerned 
makes sufficient progress towards compliance as 
assessed in the Opinion adopted by the Council on 
its Stability or Convergence Programme.” This is 
particularly delicate due to the current crisis 
situation, as care needs to be taken to ensure that 
the transition to the application of the debt 
benchmark considers the ongoing surge in debt 
levels due to the crisis and the fact that the existing 
excessive deficit procedures require a correction of 
deficit to below 3% of GDP, not the higher effort 
that would be needed to comply with the debt 
benchmark. 
 
 
 
 
All countries with a debt ratio above 60% of GDP 
are currently in excessive deficit. Until the related 
deadline for correction, countries are required to 
implement the adjustment envisaged in the existing 
recommendations. The obligation to carry out the 
further adjustment needed to reach compliance 
with the numerical debt benchmark, will arise 
when the EDP is abrogated or in the event of a 
revision of the current EDP recommendations.  
In the wake of the debt developments associated 
with the crisis, it can be expected that countries 
with a debt ratio above 60% of GDP will not meet 
the debt benchmark as soon as they are out of the 
current EDPs. Accordingly, it is foreseen that, in 
the Stability and Convergence Programmes 
following the notification of the deficit figure for 
the previous year below 3% of GDP triggering the 
abrogation of the exiting EDP, countries with a 
debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% put forward a plan 
that shows how they will manage their public 
finances to ensure that they are in a position to 
fully meet the debt benchmark at the end of a 
transition period of 3 years.  
The Commission and the Council will assess 
whether the plans are adequate, require the 
possibly necessary adjustment and monitor that 
they are respected. Unless it is assessed to be due 
to unexpected economic event with major 
unfavourable consequences for the Member State's 
government finances, lack of compliance with the 
budgetary targets can be expected to entail the 
opening of an EDP. 
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 Box II.3.3: Accounting for the stock-flow adjustments
As a general rule, the debt ratio equals the deficit ratio plus the growth effect. While this relationship is a 
very useful shorthand for discussing the properties of the benchmark, it omits variables which can be rather 
important in practice. These omitted elements are commonly called the stock-flow adjustment (SFA).  
Contrary to what the name might suggest, the SFA does not only include technical adjustments and 
statistical discrepancies but it also contains the changes in financial assets, which can be rather large in 
certain cases. The need to include financial assets in the assessment of the debt criterion stems from the fact 
that the Treaty defines government debt as gross debt, i.e. the stock of financial liabilities. Any financial 
liabilities incurred, however, always have a counterpart in accounting: either a change in financial assets (in 
case of pure financial transactions) or a non-financial transaction. Since only the latter is reflected in the 
deficit, changes in financial assets must be included in the SFA. 
One of the reason why the change in government debt (and hence the SFA) has gained in importance as an 
indicator of fiscal policy is that the deficit has shown itself to be vulnerable to certain classification issues: 
governments may be tempted to record non-financial (above-the-line) transactions as financial (below-the-
line) ones, since this treatment would have no impact on the deficit but only on the SFA. (1) By the same 
token, positive and persistent SFA is often seen as an indication of underestimated deficits. Of course, the 
SFA may be persistently different from zero for completely legitimate reasons, such as privatisation receipts 
(selling off of fixed assets) or the redemption of government debt. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the 
stock-flow adjustment could be needed when using the change in debt as a fiscal policy indicator. 
A useful way to analyse SFA items is from a fiscal sustainability perspective. The sustainability of the 
public finances remains unchanged when the change in assets (financial or non-financial) matches the 
change in government liabilities. This is due to the fact that – ignoring holding gains or losses – the given 
asset could later be sold and the proceeds could be used to decrease liabilities. (2) While this holds in theory, 
it is rather implausible to assume that all the assets can be liquidated at any given point in time to redeem 
government debt. Therefore, to follow a prudent approach, only sufficiently liquid (and therefore only 
financial) assets should be considered and possibly netted out, when an analysis of the SFA is undertaken as 
part of the consideration of the debt benchmark. 
The most liquid financial asset of the government is its cash reserve and therefore it therefore makes sense to 
disregard exceptional increases in cash when analysing the causes of the changes in debt. Consideration 
could also be given to marketable securities, at least if the market is sufficiently liquid, to determine whether 
a breach of the benchmark provides ground for placing a country in EDP. By contrast, the case for adjusting 
liabilities for changes in loans, where calculating the probability of a default makes establishing a value 
difficult, is weak. Moreover, the change in loans is one of the SFA items where suspicious below the line 
transactions typically appear. Since liabilities falling under the rest of the categories are not included in EDP 
debt, their counterparts on the asset side do not qualify for an adjustment either. 
                                                          
(1) For instance, a loan granted by the government to a public corporation (outside general government) would normally 
be recorded as a financial transaction without an impact on the deficit while increasing the SFA (assuming that the 
government raised the money necessary through issuing bonds). However, if this loan was unlikely to be recovered 
then this would have to be recorded as a non-financial transaction increasing the government deficit instead of the 
SFA. 
(2) In fact, this argument forms the basis of the net debt concept, which looks at financial liabilities in excess of financial 
assets.  
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
As part of the proposals on economic governance 
reform adopted on 29 September 2010, the 
Commission put forward a proposal for a Directive 
setting out minimum requirements for Member 
States' fiscal frameworks with a view to ensuring 
consistency between national fiscal governance 
and Treaty provisions on budgetary discipline. The 
Directive defines budgetary frameworks as 'the set 
of arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions 
that underpin the conduct of fiscal policy'. The 
requirements of the Directive cover five areas of 
budgetary policy-making, namely accounting and 
statistical issues, forecasting practices, numerical 
fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks 
for fiscal planning, and transparency and the 
comprehensive scope of frameworks. 
The choice of a directive as the appropriate vehicle 
for policy action responded to the need to achieve 
balance in Member States' requirements. Unlike 
voluntary standards the directive is binding, setting 
out rules to be enforced, but, unlike a Regulation, 
allows Member States to choose the means by 
which they will comply with its requirements. 
Member States must approve national rules within 
a given transposition deadline and once this 
deadline is passed, the Commission may trigger 
infringement proceedings before the European 
Court of Justice if the provisions contained in the 
directive have not been properly set into Member 
States' respective legal order.  
The use of a directive as legal instrument has been 
chosen precisely because the legislation does not 
aim to achieve maximum harmonisation across 
countries. While it would in theory be possible to 
gather best practices and embed them into the EU's 
legal order, the current approach focuses on the 
minimum requirements necessary to ensure that 
national fiscal policy making can rise up to the 
budgetary requirements in the Treaties. Going 
beyond minimum requirements and aiming at 
desirable features instead would not have been 
compatible with the considerable differences 
between across Member States' administrative and 
institutional structures. These differences mean 
that a single blueprint would not have been optimal 
as it would not, by definition, take into account the 
political and administrative environment in which 
fiscal policy making is set. The choice of 
minimum requirements seeks to apply the lessons 
learnt from features that are conducive to good 
policy making, and allowing Member States the 
discretion of applying them in an appropriate way. 
When exercising its monitoring powers, the 
Commission will assess the effective nature of the 
adopted or existing provisions against the 
Directive's goals, irrespective of the status of the 
legal instruments that will have to be used to reach 
the directive's goals. 
The choice of a directive fits well with the final 
conclusions of the Task Force on economic 
governance chaired by Herman van Rompuy. It 
recommended a two-tier approach combining the 
release of a legally-binding text covering essential 
features, while a set of non-binding requirements 
should be adopted through a voluntary approach in 
the form of a peer review process conducted at the 
Economic Policy Committee. The peer review 
process, which has begun in earnest in May 2011, 
is essentially country-based and encompasses 
additional issues not covered in the directive while 
keeping in mind idiosyncratic domestic features as 
regards national legal systems and institutions. 
Since the directive and the peer review process are 
essentially complementary instruments, the stage is 
set for rapid progress in the field of fiscal 
frameworks, especially in Member States where 
institutional features have been lagging behind. 
Since some Member States are more advanced 
than others, the directive should lead to 
differentiated efforts, with some Member States 
being required to undertake significant reforms to 
comply with the Directive's provisions. However, 
no Member State has reached such a stage where it 
could dispense with any extra steps to implement 
the directive. The adoption of the Directive should 
therefore foster progress in every EU Member 
State. It constitutes a powerful yet smooth 
instrument to produce incremental change in the 
fiscal frameworks of Member States. 
4.2. NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTING AND STATISTICS 
No effective public policy can be undertaken 
without accurate and comprehensive data. Sound 
data are necessary to effectively support the 
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budgetary process at all stages, from budget 
preparation to execution. 
The European Union benefits from a solid 
methodological framework for the production of 
public finance statistics in the form of the 
European System of Accounts 1995. Capitalising 
on this sound methodological basis is a 
prerequisite to ensure the production of high 
quality and comparable statistics across Member 
States. Sound fiscal statistics in turn are crucial for 
a proper functioning of the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework. Issues that have emerged in the 
monitoring of fiscal policy since the onset of the 
crisis, have underscored the importance of the 
availability of timely and reliable fiscal data. In 
particular, it is critical for the general government 
perimeter to be properly ascertained and data 
quality to be carefully checked. 
The directive tackles accounting and statistics in 
its first section, to ensure that sound methodology 
presides over the production of statistics. In 
particular Article 3 of the Directive requires that 
Member States' public accounting system should 
be subject to audits. Audit refers both to internal 
and external audit. Internal audit refers to the 
operation of specific units or departments inside 
each ministry or major body (i.e. this allows for 
small institutional bodies to share the same internal 
audit department) aiming at checking the 
efficiency of operations, the reliability of financial 
reporting and the compliance with laws and 
regulations. In the specific case greater focus is on 
conducting regular reviews of internal procedures 
and integrity of data production systems. External 
audit is carried out by external bodies, whether by 
public institutions such as the Court of Auditors or 
private auditing bodies. Audit should also foster 
the adoption of best international practices 
wherever possible. In the past it was found that 
entities belonging to the general government sector 
were only occasionally or rarely audited. The 
directive makes sure that all government layers are 
subject to regular checks. 
In addition, the Commission will keep up the 
momentum by preparing an assessment by 2012 of 
the suitability of the International Public Accounts 
Standards (IPSAS) for EU Member States. IPSAS 
are based on International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and are prepared by the 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
Board, a Board established under IFAC, the global 
organisation for the accountancy profession. The 
assessment will review the state of play on IPSAS 
implementation within EU countries and the 
suitability of IPSAS for adoption across the EU.  
Article 3 of the Directive also requires Member 
States to publish cash-based fiscal data. It was 
agreed that reporting would be conducted at a 
monthly frequency for the central government, 
state government (regions) and social security with 
each subsector thereof separately identified, before 
the end of the following month. Local government 
would be required to report on a quarterly basis 
only, as the sector may comprise hundreds, if not 
thousands, of smaller reporting entities. The timely 
publication of data might entail the recourse to 
suitable estimation techniques based on sampling, 
with a subsequent revision using complete data. 
While the informational content of monthly data 
taken in isolation may be affected by considerable 
volatility and noise, the time series can reveal 
patterns warranting closer surveillance, which the 
more refined corresponding ESA95 figures would 
confirm only at a later stage. 
 
Table II.4.1: Instruments for the improvement of budgetary frameworks in the EU 
EU Directive on budgetary frameworks EPC Peer Review
Objective Bring national frameworks up to minimum requirements Enhance national frameworks up to desirable requirements
Instrument Directive provisions Policy advice adopted by the EU Economic Policy Committee
Focus Uniform approach for all Member States Country-based
Legal Strength Binding Voluntary
Scope Limited to the directive provisions Unrestricted
Enforcement Possible infringement procedure after transposition deadline 
expires
Peer pressure in regular reviews of national frameworks
Strength Legal certainty and equality of treatment Flexibility
Risks Least common denominator approach Unevenness
Source: Commission services 
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Recent studies undertaken by the ECB show that 
the so-called mixed frequency models, which are 
based on the use of monthly, quarterly and annual 
budgetary data, can provide forecasts of fiscal 
variables that are in some respects superior to 
methods relying exclusively on annual or quarterly 
data. Specifically, the three-frequency structure of 
these models allows to now cast quarterly figures 
by using monthly fiscal statistics and in turn to use 
quarterly and monthly figures to now cast annual 
data. Therefore, provided data are not taken at face 
value, a set of intra-annual fiscal data may provide 
useful information for those in charge of the 
monitoring of budget execution. (38) 
While this is already the case for central 
government in many Member States, readily-
available cash data are not often available for other 
sub-sectors of general government. Member States 
might have to undertake IT-related work, 
especially if government payments are managed 
over several bank accounts or procedures. Such 
investment would provide dividends over the 
medium-term as public finance management 
would become more reactive. 
The timely delivery of cash data will enable a 
better assessment of the latest fiscal trends by 
external bodies competent in the field of public 
finance, fuelling an informed policy debate on 
fiscal policy choices and providing an important 
element of accountability for Parliament, economic 
research institutes and investors. For accountability 
purposes elements explaining how ESA95 data is 
derived from primary sources should also be made 
publicly available. 
Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts 
Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts represent 
an essential component of the budget process. 
Biased or unrealistic macroeconomic and 
budgetary forecasts may considerably hamper the 
effectiveness of fiscal planning and consequently 
impair a government's commitment to budgetary 
discipline. In some cases this might lead to a looser 
fiscal stance than expected in the documents 
presented to national Parliaments, compromising 
the truthful presentation of national budgets. While 
the necessarily contingent nature of forecasting in 
a rapidly-changing environment has to be 
                                                          
(38) See also Silvestrini et al. (2008) 
recognised, the directive sets out the principle of 
realistic forecasts on the basis that transparency 
and analysis of forecasting methodologies can 
significantly increase the quality of national 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for fiscal 
planning. 
Transparency is a key element in ensuring the 
realism of the forecasts used in the budgetary 
process. It should encompass the public 
availability of the official macroeconomic and 
budgetary forecast prepared for fiscal planning, 
and also of the methodologies, assumptions and 
relevant parameters on which these forecasts are 
based. The consideration of alternative scenarios is 
important to analyse how fiscal variables would 
evolve under different economic assumptions. 
While the production of such alternative scenarios 
should not become cumbersome, they can prove 
very useful if the scenarios they are based on or the 
risks they consider, materialise over the course of 
the fiscal year. Alternative scenarios add to the 
credibility of the process by implicitly recognising 
the possibility of deviations from the central 
scenario and provide some estimates of the fiscal 
consequences involved. For example, such 
alternatives can provide a guide to fiscal 
consequences of lower-than-expected growth and 
can guide policy makers to adjust fiscal variables 
appropriately during the year. 
Furthermore the reliability of the forecasts used for 
budgetary planning can be improved through 
comparisons with forecasts of other bodies or 
institutions. Against this background, the 
Commission forecasts can serve as a natural 
benchmark. Significant differences between the 
chosen macro-fiscal scenario and the Commission 
forecasts should be explained, particularly if the 
level or growth of variables in the national 
assumptions departs significantly from the values 
given in the Commission's forecasts. Of course, 
comparison should not be understood as 
alignment: as national budgetary calendars are not 
synchronised with the Commission's forecast 
cycle, different national forecasts remain fully 
legitimate for obvious timing and subsidiarity 
reasons. It is, however, important to foster an 
informed dialogue between the Commission, 
independent economic institutes and more 
generally all relevant stakeholders to strengthen 
the robustness of forecasts and accountability to 
the wider public. 
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Finally, sound operating procedures call for 
independent institutions to undertake ex post 
assessments of forecasting performance. While 
forecasting error remains consubstantial to any 
macroeconomic exercise, significant errors during 
four years in a row would constitute strong 
evidence of systematic bias. The concerned 
Member State would then have to take action and 
report it publicly, according to the terms of the 
Directive. 
Numerical fiscal rules 
Recent economic literature and country-specific 
policy experiences provide ample evidence that 
well-designed numerical fiscal rules significantly 
enhance budgetary discipline. From an empirical 
perspective, lessons learnt from the first decade of 
the euro highlighted the need to complement the 
EU-wide fiscal rules enshrined in the EU Treaty 
with national fiscal rules. With the benefit of 
hindsight, in some Member States national 
stakeholders struggled to meet the level of 
discipline induced by the Stability and Growth 
Pact, leading to weak ownership of the common 
rules when it came to implementing them. As a 
response to this, it was felt that national fiscal rules 
can provide effective domestic leverage for a 
better functioning of the Stability and Growth Pact 
through three different channels. First, national 
fiscal rules should facilitate the implementation of 
EU rules by transposing, in operational terms, the 
EU fiscal targets and anchoring them in national 
policy-making at all government levels. Second, 
national fiscal rules should foster an environment 
conducive to sound fiscal policy through increased 
domestic ownership of fiscal goals. Finally, 
national fiscal rules should provide benchmarks to 
gauge the performance of country-specific fiscal 
policy for transparency and accountability 
purposes both quantitatively and qualitatively. The 
inclusion of numerical fiscal rules in the draft 
Directive is consistent with the Final Report of the 
Task Force on economic governance, which 
includes them among the minimum requirements 
to be fulfilled, and with the spirit of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, given that the EU fiscal 
framework is a rule-based system relying on 
numerical fiscal targets. 
In its Article 5 the directive specifies that Member 
States shall have in place numerical fiscal rules 
that effectively promote compliance with their 
respective obligations deriving from the Treaty in 
the area of budgetary policy. Consistent with 
subsidiarity principles, the directive does not 
earmark one specific type of fiscal rule to be 
adopted by Member States. Given the variety of 
national situations and institutions, a one-size-fits-
all policy would not have been warranted. It is left 
for softer mechanisms such as the peer review 
mechanism conducted at the Economic Policy 
Committee to recommend specific design features 
taking into account each country's legal and 
institutional environment. However, for fiscal rules 
to have a significant effect on the conduct of fiscal 
policy a number of features are key. These features 
are set out in the directive. Their targets and scope 
of numerical fiscal rules must be defined. Effective 
and timely monitoring of the rules must be 
ensured, based on reliable analysis discharged by 
independent bodies or bodies endowed with 
functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities 
of the Member States. Such authorities could 
include the Court of Auditors, in its capacity as a 
public institution with longstanding authority. For 
the effectiveness of any fiscal rule to be ensured, it 
is important that monitoring of the implementation 
be also carried out by a third party, in addition to 
the concerned institution or sub-sector of general 
government. This watchdog position may include 
the possibility for the third party to issue 
suggestions on the design of the underlying fiscal 
rule itself, at the Member State's discretion. 
The directive also calls for 'consequences in case 
of non-compliance' to be set out. Such 
consequences should be understood in the broad 
sense and may not necessarily involve the 
imposition of pecuniary sanctions, but should be at 
least of a reputational nature, e.g. the obligation for 
the Finance Minister to publicly explain why the 
rules were not respected. 
Member States should also specify escape clauses 
from the numerical fiscal rules in force, with a 
limited number of triggering circumstances and 
stringent procedures attached to them. 
Paradoxically, clear and detailed escape clauses 
may reinforce credibility by limiting the list of 
events allowing non-compliance. On the contrary, 
vague escape rules might be perceived as a licence 
to tamper with the rules. Non-existent escape 
clauses represent either a very strong form of 
commitment, or alternatively, may be seen as 
unrealistic, given the wide range of possible 
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exceptional events beyond the government's 
control. 
Considering that by virtue of Protocol 15 of the 
Treaty, the reference values mentioned in Protocol 
No12 are not directly binding on the United 
Kingdom, the obligation to have numerical fiscal 
rules in place will not apply to the United 
Kingdom, although the rest of the directive will. 
Medium term budgetary frameworks 
Although the approval of the annual budget law 
remains the key instrument for adopting fiscal 
policy decisions, most fiscal measures have 
budgetary implications that go well beyond the 
yearly budgetary cycle. While the annual nature of 
budgets has been a standard feature in all Member 
States enabling democratic oversight by elected 
representatives, the adoption of a multiannual 
perspective can improve of quality of fiscal-policy 
making. This multiannual perspective is also 
referred to in the SGP, which requires Member 
States to achieve country-specific medium-term 
budgetary objectives (MTOs) over the economic 
cycle. Reaching such MTOs might take some time, 
especially in adverse economic conditions, so 
multi-annual frameworks are especially useful in 
fiscal consolidation episodes. As back-loading is a 
recurrent feature of fiscal consolidation plans, a 
multi-annual perspective should allow stakeholders 
better to understand the inter-temporal trade-offs 
of national fiscal strategies. Additionally, going 
beyond the annual horizon provides budget 
planners with a better timeframe to manage 
revenue and expenditure. While Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs) are already 
presented from a multi-annual perspective, these 
policy documents have remained of limited policy 
relevance in the domestic debate surrounding the 
discussion of budgetary strategies, despite the fact 
that Member States are supposed to draft their 
budget in accordance with their SCP 
commitments. 
This is why the directive requires that Member 
States establish a credible and effective medium-
term budgetary framework providing for the 
adoption of a fiscal planning horizon of at least 
three years. The precise time period is left to 
countries' discretion. Some might align the 
duration of their MTBF to the parliamentary term 
in order to ensure consistency and accountability. 
The directive also requires Member States to link 
effectively the multi-annual perspective embedded 
into the EU fiscal framework (including the 
achievement of the MTOs) with domestic fiscal 
policy-making. An appropriate breakdown of both 
revenue and expenditure projections is necessary 
to show how fiscal variables should adjust to reach 
the fiscal targets. 
Similarly to the fiscal rules, the directive sets out 
minimum requirements concerning domestic 
MTBFs. Its Article 8 requires Member States to 
establish an effective medium-term budgetary 
framework providing for the adoption of a fiscal 
planning horizon of at least three years to ensure 
that national fiscal planning follows a multiannual 
budgetary perspective. To this end, detailed 
projections of every major expenditure and 
revenue item by general government sub-sectors 
for the relevant period considered in the MTBFs 
should be drawn up. These projections should be 
prepared under the assumption of unchanged 
policies, for practical reasons. 
The MTBFs should provide a comprehensive 
picture for the general government, including 
social security, regional and local government, so 
as to obtain a general view of each sub-sector's 
contribution to the attainment of the shared 
national fiscal objectives. Obviously, the medium-
term structure of the MTBF shall not prevent a 
new government from updating it to reflect new 
circumstances or policy objectives. 
Transparency of general government finances 
and comprehensive scope of budgetary 
frameworks 
The transparency of general government finances 
and the need for a comprehensive coverage of 
national fiscal frameworks are crucial to ensuring 
that the budgetary data used for fiscal planning and 
monitoring provide an accurate picture of the 
current and expected state of public finances. 
Firstly, the growing fiscal decentralisation in a 
significant number of Member States calls for a 
comprehensive scope of the rules governing 
domestic fiscal policy-making if consistency 
between national and EU fiscal governance is to be 
ensured. Specifically, the increasing role of 
territorial governments means that national fiscal 
frameworks must comprehensively cover all 
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general government tiers, if they are to aid 
compliance with the SGP provisions. This implies 
a need for appropriate coordination mechanisms 
across government sub-sectors ('national stability 
pacts'), including the establishment of numerical 
fiscal rules for all layers. In doing so, the draft 
directive may help tackle the potential asymmetry 
regarding the budgetary stability objective between 
the central government, which according to 
Protocol No.12 of the Treaty is the only one 
responsible for fiscal consolidation commitments 
vis-à-vis EU authorities, and regional and local 
governments which manage an increasing share of 
public expenditure. 
Secondly, Article 12 also promotes the 
transparency and reliability of public finances by 
requiring information on specific elements of 
domestic fiscal policy-making that are frequently 
outside the standard budgetary process. Recourse 
to extra-budgetary funds, tax expenditures and 
creation of contingent liabilities (guarantees) may 
obfuscate the true situation and development of 
public finances, thereby hampering the planning 
and the conduct of fiscal policy. 
Rather than demanding a detailed list of all 
operations and transactions carried out by extra-
budgetary funds in the standard budgetary 
information, the provision is meant to make sure 
that all extra-budgetary funds are clearly identified 
and their aggregate impact on the budget balance is 
properly taken into account. 
Likewise, the directive requires Member States to 
publish detailed information on the impact of tax 
expenditures on government revenues. In a 
significant number of Member States, including 
those at the forefront of institutional budgetary 
reforms, the growing recourse to tax expenditures 
has sometimes undermined effective fiscal 
planning and might have been used to circumvent 
some of the fiscal rules currently in place.  
 
 
 
 
Comprehensive and transparent information on 
existing tax expenditures and reliable estimates of 
their impact on the general government balance 
may help reduce their extensive use by raising 
awareness of their full budgetary cost. 
Finally, the existence of contingent liabilities 
deserves due attention for transparency purposes. 
Contingent liabilities encompass possible 
obligations depending on whether some uncertain 
future event occurs, or present obligations where 
payment is not certain or the amount cannot be 
measured reliably. They comprise for instance 
government guarantees, non-performing loans, and 
liabilities stemming from the operation of public 
corporations, including, where appropriate, the 
likelihood and potential due date of expenditure 
contingent liabilities. 
Overall Member States must transpose the 
directive into their national legal order before the 
end of 2013. The deadline should give them 
sufficient time to prepare and implement the 
requested reforms. In 2012, the Commission will 
provide an interim progress report on the 
implementation of the main provisions of the 
directive on the basis of relevant information from 
Member States. The directive itself shall be 
reviewed in 2018 to determine whether all of its 
provisions are still suitable to the evolving 
environment. Along with the peer review 
mechanism among Member States, the directive 
will give a significant impetus to the strengthening 
of fiscal governance in the EU and open new 
avenues for discussion and action in related areas 
related to budgeting and budgetary processes, with 
possible further developments to be expected in 
the coming years. 
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 Box II.4.1: Fiscal Frameworks on the move.
Increased scrutiny and recent theoretical and empirical findings in the literature have reinforced the case for 
reforms of fiscal frameworks. Due to the deeply-rooted nature of some national features, reforms have
usually been carried out gradually. This box describes current reforms undertaken in several Member States. 
In Italy, a reform adopted in 2009 which entered into force in January 2010 overhauled accounting rules  in 
the general government and the budgetary process. This coincided with the introduction of a new 
institutional set-up between central and sub-national governments as part of a move towards fiscal 
federalism. Budgetary targets in the already-longstanding medium-term framework are now specified by
central government sub-sector (central government, regional/local administrations and social security 
bodies). To improve transparency of the budgetary process, accounting methods are to be harmonised across 
all government entities, while a single database shall collect relevant information from all administrations 
for the purposes of budgetary planning and monitoring. 
In the United Kingdom, the three key pillars of a new framework introduced in May 2010, foresee the 
setting of a new "fiscal mandate" targeting the cyclically-adjusted current balance, the setting of a target date 
for net debt to be falling as a percentage of GDP and the establishment of the Office of Budgetary 
Responsibility (OBR). The new government's fiscal mandate requires that the cyclically adjusted current 
budget (public borrowing excluding investment expenditure) should be in balance by the end of a rolling 5-
year forecast period, currently ending in 2015–16. This is supplemented by a debt sustainability target which 
currently requires that public sector net debt as a percentage of GDP is falling by the fixed date of 2015–16. 
Finally, the new Office for Budget Responsibility is tasked with producing the official macroeconomic 
forecast underlying annual budgets. Although this is not required in law, the government took the political 
commitment to follow OBR forecasts in the preparation of the budget. 
In France, the government has announced a Constitutional revision that would embed the principle of 
balanced budgets into the Constitution and enable multi-annual budget framework laws. For each year of the 
multiannual planning, a minimum level of tax receipts, together with a maximum growth rate in volume 
terms of public expenditure will be set. Each year, the annual central government and social security budgets 
will set targets on both the revenue and the expenditure side in line with those presented in the multiannual 
budget planning. 
Countries under adjustment programmes are facing a specific challenge. While the priority has been given to
implement fiscal consolidation in the short term, national authorities have also launched a number of 
reforms with a view to strengthening their fiscal framework at the invitation of the Commission and the 
IMF. These reforms are implemented following adjustment programme conditionalities defined jointly by 
the Commission, the ECB and the IMF. 
In Greece the Memorandum of Understanding foresees a number of 'fiscal-structural' measures: (i) the 
establishment of a medium-term fiscal framework based on rolling three-year expenditure ceilings for 
central government, social security and local government; (ii) the strengthening of the position of the 
Ministry of Finance vis-à-vis line Ministries in both budget preparation and execution phases granting it 
veto power decisions and execution and control over a budget contingency general reserve; and (iii) the 
creation of a budget office attached to Parliament providing independent advice and expert scrutiny on fiscal 
issues. 
In Portugal efforts to improve the budgetary procedure have materialised through a comprehensive 
Budgetary Framework Law adopted by the government in December 2010. The law is deemed to be inspired 
by the letter and spirit of the Commission directive on budgetary framework and aims at establishing: (i) a 
multi-annual framework with expenditure and budget balance rules; (ii) a more comprehensive control of 
public government beyond central government to encompass all sub-sectors of general government as per 
ESA-95 rules; (iii) programme budgeting; and (iv) an independent fiscal council. In addition, the 
government has announced its intention to better monitor State-Owned Enterprises and Public-Private  
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Box (continued) 
 
 Partnerships. These two elements had been previously identified as a potential source of substantial 
liabilities for public accounts. 
In Ireland a comprehensive reform is under preparation, with the introduction of a new Fiscal 
Responsibility Law and the establishment of a Budgetary Advisory Council. The main innovations are 
centred on several complementary fiscal rules. The Public Finances Correction Rule links the fiscal efforts 
to the distance from the Treaty reference values. The Prudent Budget Rule secures a minimum annual 
improvement of the primary budget of 0.5% of GDP until the Medium-Term Objective has been reached. 
The Sustainable Expenditure Growth Rule should prevent a faster growth of gross current government 
expenditure than the underlying medium-term nominal rate of growth in the economy unless funded by 
other sources of revenue. 
In addition, Latvia and Romania have been receiving policy invitations in the context of the EC-IMF 
Balance-of-Payments assistance programme. In Latvia, elements that could contribute to a stable and sound 
fiscal policy are present, but remained underdeveloped. This is why a new Fiscal Responsibility Law and 
related amendments to the Constitution are being prepared. The envisaged constitutional amendments 
envisage the strengthening of the medium-term budgetary framework. Romania is somehow more advanced 
as it adopted a far-reaching fiscal responsibility law introducing eight new fiscal rules applicable to the 
general government sector, including in particular local government. The multi-annual character of these 
rules has been strengthened by embedding them in the Medium-Term Budgetary Framework. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal governance has been shown to be 
instrumental to sound public finances, not least by 
enhancing the likelihood of successful adjustment 
(Larch and Turrini (2008).) There are different 
channels through which fiscal governance might 
impact on public finance outcomes. A direct and 
so far unexplored channel is the effect that fiscal 
governance might have on risk premia paid on 
public debt.  
After times of compressed yield spreads in the 
early years of EMU, the economic and financial 
crisis has witnessed mounting differences in the 
cost of government debt across euro area 
participants. Indeed, at the onset of the new 
millennium, differences in euro area members’ 
government bond yields amounted to no more than 
40 basis points, but they have widened to up to 200 
basis points already in 2009 to reach record levels 
of over 1000 basis points Greece by 2011; 
sovereign spreads of the EU members that have 
not introduced the euro were higher throughout the 
decade but similarly mounted in the wake of the 
crisis, reaching double-digit percentage points in 
Latvia and Lithuania.  
Sovereign spreads are the differential between a 
country’s sovereign bond yield and the yield of a 
risk-free bond. Together with the yield of that 
bond and the amount of debt, these spreads 
establish the cost that governments have to pay for 
new and rolled-over debt. The cost of debt has 
obtained increased significance for EU Members 
recently: as their public debt grew from around 60 
to 80 per cent of GDP on average, interest on debt 
represented 2.7 per cent of total EU GDP in 2010 
and in some countries, interest payments on debt 
accounted for 70 to 80 per cent of the general 
government deficit. Thus, bringing down the cost 
of debt is of paramount importance. Intuitively, 
sovereign spreads have two determinants: the 
probability of the debtor’s default and the pricing 
of the risk implied by this probability. At the end 
of the day, to economise on the expenses to be 
paid for public debt, sovereigns have to improve 
on their long-term solvency, as (except for the 
level of debt) the other determinants of the cost of 
debt are outside governments’ control.  
Frameworks of fiscal governance comprise rules, 
regulations and procedures that shape the planning, 
implementation and monitoring of budgetary 
policies. A growing body of empirical research has 
elaborated on the contribution of fiscal governance 
to fiscal prudence. Well-designed elements of 
fiscal governance can diminish the threat of large 
deficit and unsustainable debt developments and 
should, to the extent that they are credible, 
condition expectations on fiscal policy outcomes. 
Therefore, beyond their indirect effect exerted via 
lower levels of deficit and debt on average, sound 
fiscal governance frameworks should have a more 
direct effect on the expected probability of default 
that should materialise in lower risk premia also 
once deficit and debt levels are controlled for. We 
thus argue that well-designed fiscal governance 
frameworks provide a means to diminish the cost 
of government debt in particular by decreasing the 
risk of default and the premium required on it. As 
shall be set out in Section III.1.4 in detail, the 
determinants of the risk of default – naturally, first 
and foremost, deficits and debt but also the quality 
of fiscal governance, as well as further 
determinants of the sovereign spreads such as the 
level of risk aversion and the risk-free bond yield – 
shape the sovereign spreads multiplicatively. Thus, 
according to our model, the impact of enhancing 
fiscal governance is higher for countries with 
higher levels of deficit and debt, and in times of 
higher risk aversion.  
This Part provides evidence on the impact of fiscal 
governance on sovereign spreads that constitute an 
important component of the cost of public debt. As 
expectations of sovereign default are an important 
determinant of these spreads, we complement our 
analysis by looking at more direct indicators of 
sovereign default probabilities as well: sovereign 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads and sovereign 
credit ratings provided by rating agencies. We 
proceed as follows. We first provide an overview 
of the recent empirical literature on the 
determinants of government bond yield spreads, 
sovereign CDS spreads and sovereign credit 
ratings respectively on the one hand and on fiscal 
governance institutions on the other (Section 
III.1.2.) Next we provide a descriptive analysis of 
the link between sovereign risk premia and fiscal 
governance institutions, in particular numerical 
fiscal rules and fiscal councils; the picture is 
completed by information on CDS spreads and the 
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rating of the European sovereigns by credit rating 
agencies (Section III.1.3.) We then provide 
econometric results on the impact of numerical 
fiscal rules on sovereign spreads in the euro area, 
building on a structural model of such spreads in 
the presence of risk aversion, and present 
predictions implied in our analysis on the impact 
of improving rules-based fiscal governance on the 
sovereign spreads in specific euro area countries 
that would benefit from such improvement most 
(Section III.1.4.)(39) 
1.2. FISCAL GOVERNANCE AND SOVEREIGN 
RISK: REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Empirical research of the past two decades has 
shed light into the role fiscal governance plays in 
determining public finance outcomes. The bulk of 
the contributions is focused on numerical fiscal 
rules. While earlier research concentrated on the 
experience of the US states, sometimes in view of 
obtaining insights for the nascent EMU (von 
Hagen (1991); Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994); 
Alesina and Bayoumi, (1996); Bohn and Inman 
(1996)) the focus of the analysis then shifted to 
Europe. The effectiveness of national fiscal rules 
with respect to fiscal performance has been shown 
to depend on the mechanisms established to 
enforce compliance with the rule (Inman (1996); 
Ayuso-i-Casals, Gonzalez Hernandez, Moulin and 
Turrini (2009)) and on the type of the rule; budget 
balance and debt rules appear to outperform 
expenditure rules (Debrun, Moulin, Turrini, 
Ayuso-i-Casals and Kumar (2008).) Fiscal rules 
are found to be instrumental in initiating lasting 
fiscal consolidations (Larch and Turrini (2008)) 
and in fulfilling medium-term fiscal plans 
presented in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes of EU members, which is a central 
plank of EU budgetary surveillance (von Hagen 
(2010).) The role of fiscal rules in the budgetary 
process has been scrutinised as well: empirical 
evidence is not fully conclusive whether fiscal 
rules serve as commitment devices to effectively 
tie the hands of governments not to pursue short-
sighted and pro-cyclical budgetary policies 
                                                          
(39) Section III.4 is based on Iara and Wolff (2011), that 
is a further development of recent research carried 
out by the Commission services on the impact of 
numerical fiscal rules on sovereign spreads (ibid., 
2010).  
(Debrun and Kumar (2007a) and Debrun et al. 
(2008),) or whether they merely have a signalling 
role and remove information asymmetries between 
governments and the electorate, without changing 
the behaviour of governments (Debrun and Kumar 
(2007b) and Debrun (2007).) On the EU level, 
fiscal rules have been shown to be effective, but to 
lead to significant creative accounting aimed at 
their circumvention (von Hagen and Wolff (2006) 
and Buti, Nogueira Martins and Turrini (2006).) 
Theoretically, it has been elaborated that supra-
national rules are welfare improving relative to 
merely national regimes, but that they cannot fully 
eliminate the deficit bias, which calls for strong 
national rules as well (Krogstrup and Wyplosz 
(2010).)  
A number of empirical contributions also take a 
look at other institutional features of fiscal 
governance. The degree of centralisation of the 
budget process as a remedy to the risk of deficit 
bias resulting from the common pool problem 
inherent to public finance has been well 
documented to result in better fiscal outcomes both 
in the European Union (von Hagen (1992); von 
Hagen and Harden (1994); de Haan and Sturm 
(1994); Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998); 
Hallerberg et al. (2007),) central and eastern 
European countries (Gleich (2002); Yläoutinen 
(2004a) and (2004b); Latin American countries 
(Alesina et al. (1999); Stein et al. (1999)) Asia 
(Lao-Araya (1997) as well as the US States 
(Strauch (1998).) Furthermore, independent fiscal 
institutions have been found to contribute to the 
emergence of fiscal rules or their effective 
enforcement (Debrun (2007).) Most recent 
research has found that the quality of medium-term 
budgetary planning frameworks, and the degree of 
budgetary transparency as well as the tightness of 
numerical fiscal rules help reduce over-optimism 
inherent to first-release macroeconomic data that 
are used for budgetary planning and fiscal 
surveillance (Beetsma et al. (2011).)  
The past several years have also witnessed a surge 
of research on the impact of fiscal variables on 
spreads in government bond yields as well. In an 
international context, a positive relationship 
between public debt and interest rates has been 
consistently confirmed (Edwards (1986); 
Alexander and Anker (1997); Lemmen and 
Goodhart (1999); Lonning (2000); Copeland and 
Jones (2001); Codogno, Favero and Missale 
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(2003).) In the euro area, sovereign spreads are 
documented to be determined by debt, deficits, and 
debt-service ratios (Bernoth, von Hagen, and 
Schuknecht (2004).) On the sub-national level, the 
price of public debt is confirmed to reflect fiscal 
fundamentals (Schuknecht, von Hagen and 
Wolswijk (2009); Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2008); 
Schulz and Wolff (2009).) The global financial 
crisis increased the attention paid to the impact of 
risk perceptions and the increasing relevance of 
domestic fiscal variables on the price of public 
debt (Barrios, Iversen, Lewandowska, and Setzer 
(2009),) as well as on variations in time in the 
weight of various determinants (Bernoth and 
Erdogan (2010).)  
Empirical research has also studied the impact of 
fiscal restraints on the cost of public borrowing, 
looking at US states in particular. Bayoumi, 
Goldstein and Woglom (1995) show that the 
impact of constitutional controls on the cost of 
debt depends on the level of debt: at average 
levels, the presence of such controls is found to be 
associated with a reduction of the interest cost by 
50 basis points. Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) 
confirm the negative impact of fiscal rules on the 
cost of government borrowing. Poterba and 
Rueben (1999) uncover that expenditure, deficit, 
and debt rules (negatively) as well as tax 
limitations (positively) impact on state bond yield 
differentials; debt rules appear to be the least 
effective. Differentiating this result, Johnson and 
Kriz (2005) show that revenue limits have a direct 
impact on state borrowing, while the effect of 
numerical fiscal rules is indirect via improved 
credit ratings. For the euro area, Hallerberg and 
Wolff (2008) reveal that government bond yields 
are determined by institutional characteristics of 
the fiscal process; controlling for institutional 
quality also differentiates the impact of EMU on 
the pricing of sovereign bonds. Bernoth and Wolff 
(2008) highlight the impact of hidden policy 
activity, creative accounting practices, and 
transparency of government budgeting on 
sovereign spreads in the euro area.  
Sovereign CDS spreads are in theory considered to 
measure the premium required on top of a riskless 
bond (Hull et al., 2004). Other than on corporate 
bonds, little research has been done on sovereign 
CDS markets so far; none of this work is directly 
related to fiscal governance. From a pre-crisis 
sample of both developed and emerging-market 
economies, Longstaff et al. (2007) find that 
sovereign CDS spreads are highly correlated, 
implying that the risk premium almost entirely 
compensates for global risk, while local economic 
conditions play a modest role. In the same vein, 
Remolona et al. (2007) analytically separate 
information contained in CDS spreads on 
sovereign default risk and its price to show that the 
risk premium is even larger than for corporate 
CDS spreads, maybe reflecting limited possibilities 
of diversification. Calice et al. (2011) studying 
liquidity spillovers between sovereign bond and 
CDS markets in the euro area show how the crisis 
has changed the mechanism of price formation in 
CDS markets, notably in the euro area: they find 
bond yield spreads determine CDS spreads prior to 
the crisis and the other way around later, and 
confirm an important role of CDS markets for 
price formation of sovereign debt in some euro 
area members but not in those most affected by the 
sovereign debt crisis.  
A third (and more direct) measure of sovereign 
risk is provided by sovereign credit ratings, which 
are supposed to directly translate into probability 
rankings and are independent of valuations of risk. 
Documenting an effect of ratings on sovereign 
spreads on top of publicly available information, 
Cantor and Packer (1996) confirm that such ratings 
are consistent with economic fundamentals, a 
finding confirmed by Afonso et al. (2007). Reisen 
and von Maltzan (1999) apply Granger causality 
tests to find mutual interdependence between 
changes in sovereign ratings and in bond yields 
during the Asian financial crisis. Reinhart (2002) 
argues that sovereign ratings predict defaults but 
fail to do so with currency crises, perhaps due to 
the fact that currency crises significantly increase 
the likelihood of a default. Block and Vaaler 
(2004) finally show by means of studying 
sovereign risk ratings in developing countries that 
the cost of capital increases prior to elections. 
Again, fiscal governance has not yet been 
addressed in this empirical analysis.  
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1.3. FISCAL GOVERNANCE AND SOVEREIGN 
RISK: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
1.3.1. Measures of the quality of fiscal 
governance in EU Member States 
Fiscal governance frameworks have many 
dimensions. Two aspects of specific relevance are 
national numerical fiscal rules and fiscal councils. 
These elements were the focus of the analytical 
work of the Commission services in the past 
couple of years. Following a 2006 mandate of the 
Ecofin Council to conduct a comprehensive 
analysis of fiscal governance in the Member 
States, this analytical work made use of a specific 
dataset compiled on national fiscal governance in 
the EU Member States. To explore the impact of 
the strength of fiscal governance on sovereign 
spreads, we will use two measures of the quality of 
fiscal institutions constructed from these data, 
specifically an index on fiscal rules, and another 
on fiscal councils. Below we explain the 
construction of these indices and describe the 
situation in EU Members according to these 
measures.  
The fiscal rule index is obtained as follows.(40) 
Characteristics of fiscal rules are first graded along 
five dimensions; the scores obtained for each fiscal 
rule in force are then aggregated to a single index 
per country and year. The five dimensions cover 
(1) the statutory base of the rule, (2) room for 
revising objectives, (3) mechanisms of monitoring 
compliance with and enforcement of the rule, (4) 
the existence of pre-defined enforcement 
mechanisms, and (5) media visibility of the rule. 
The scores for each dimension of the fiscal rule are 
aggregated to a single measure of the strength of 
the rule using weights obtained as averages of 
10,000 randomly drawn numbers from a uniform 
distribution.(41) Finally, the measures for each rule 
are added up to a single comprehensive score per 
country and year, where the aggregated scores per 
rule are adjusted by their coverage of general 
                                                          
(40) The design of the fiscal rule index is inspired by Deroose, Moulin and Wierts (2006). 
This index, as well as other information on fiscal 
governance partly since 1990 up to nowadays, can be 
found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_
governance/index_en.htm.   
(41) This technique proposed by Sutherland, Price and Joumard (2005) is applied because 
of the absence of theoretical guidance on the importance of each criterion in the composite 
index of the strength of fiscal rules. 
government finances.(42) An improvement of the 
index is achieved by strengthening one or several 
existing numerical fiscal rules along either of the 
above dimensions, by introducing new numerical 
fiscal rules, or by extending the coverage of 
general government by existing or new rules.  
Graph III.1.1 portrays the strength of rules-based 
fiscal governance according to this fiscal rule 
index in EU Members in 2000, 2005, and 2009.(43) 
The average quality of fiscal governance in the 
EU-27 has improved in the past decade, although 
2009 saw a decline in the quality of fiscal 
governance in several countries: part of the fiscal 
rules were temporarily suspended or overhauled in 
the wake of the economic and financial crisis. 
Countries with above-average standards of rules-
based fiscal governance throughout the decade 
include the Netherlands, Estonia, Denmark, 
Sweden, Luxembourg, Poland, Germany, and 
Belgium; Bulgaria, Spain and France have joined 
this group by strengthening their rules-based 
framework in the time period under review. 
Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, Latvia, 
Romania, Austria, Ireland, and Portugal have 
maintained rules-based fiscal governance 
frameworks with lower than average quality. The 
Czech Republic, Finland and the United Kingdom 
fell into this group in 2009 due to discarding part 
of their rules in the wake of their crises, while 
having a tradition of sound rules-based fiscal 
governance. Finally, Cyprus, Greece and Malta 
have been continuously characterised by the 
absence of numerical fiscal rules. 
In Section III.1.4 we provide results of an 
econometric analysis of the impact of rules-based 
fiscal governance on sovereign spreads in the euro 
area. Therefore in the following we provide a more 
detailed description of the fiscal rule index in those 
euro area members specifically that are included in 
the analysis.(44) Graph III.1.2 shows the 
                                                          
(42) In the presence of more than one rule covering the same government sub-sector, the second and 
third rules obtain weights ½ and 1/3 to reflect decreasing marginal benefit of multiple rules 
applying to the same sub-sector of general government. 
(43) A more detailed look at the fiscal rule index and its 
evolution in the 1990s in euro area countries is 
provided in Subsection III.4.1. 
(44) From the euro area members of 1999, the analysis 
does not include Luxembourg because of the small 
size of its sovereign bond market. German sovereign 
bonds are considered to be free of default risk: data 
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development of the strength of numerical fiscal 
rules in these countries. In the benchmark country, 
Germany, the measure of the strength of numical 
fiscal rules has been above average and constant at 
around 7 throughout the decade. Specifically, 
Germany has operated “golden” budget balance 
rules and rules limiting nominal expenditure 
growth for both the central and federal 
government; budgets of local governments have 
been constrained by debt ceilings and a balance 
budget rule (note that the entry in force of the so 
called “debt brake” for the federal government and 
the Länder, 2001, falls outside the sample period.) 
The strength of the numerical fiscal rules in force 
in the other euro area countries ranged between 
zero – for Greece, that has had no such rule in 
force – and almost ten. Highest values were 
attributed to the Netherlands (index score: 9.5) 
where a real expenditure ceiling and a revenue rule 
were in place for all general government, and 
Spain since 2003 (index score: 9.5 since 2006; 9.7 
in 2003 to 2005 respectively,) that introduced a 
budget balance rule covering all general 
government and tightened restrictions to regional 
debt which applied as from the 2003 budget; the 
budget balance rule was further modified in 2006. 
Countries with below-average fiscal rule index 
scores were Ireland, Portugal, and Italy, while the 
scores of France, Austria, Belgium, and Finland 
qualified these countries as having stronger fiscal 
rules than on average.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   
on Germany are only used among the regressors but 
no additional observations relate to Germany.  
Remarkable changes for the better occurred in the 
case of France in 2006 and  subsequent years: in 
2006 France introduced a rule to pre-commit 
unexpected revenues of central government as well 
as a rule that parliament had to establish a ceiling 
to the growth of health expenditure. In 2008 the 
increase of social security debt was made 
conditional upon an increase in revenues. Finally, 
since 2009, unexpected revenues were 
automatically assigned to deficit reduction. 
Although from a very low level, Ireland also 
improved its rules-based fiscal governance 
framework in 2004, specifically by introducing 
multi-year expenditure ceilings to the central 
budget as well as constraints to local deficits, 
while the strength of the fiscal rules deteriorated in 
Finland after 2007 and in Austria in 2009, in 
particular due to the suspension of rules in force in 
the course of the economic and financial crisis: in 
Finland, a debt rule and budget balance rule 
applied to the central government were no longer 
in force after 2007 and 2008, respectively, while in 
Austria, the budget balance rule laid down in the 
National Stability Pact – that applied to all general 
government – was replaced in 2009 by a nominal 
expenditure ceiling for part of the general 
government budget. 
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Further to numerical fiscal rules, fiscal councils are 
another important element of a sound fiscal 
governance framework. Specifically, fiscal 
councils may assume different tasks that improve 
budgetary outcomes, including inter alia the 
provision of unbiased macroeconomic forecasts for 
budget preparation, the impartial monitoring of 
budget implementation and the respect of 
budgetary objectives, awareness raising about 
short and long-term costs and benefits of 
budgetary measures, and assessments whether 
Graph III.1.1: The fiscal rule index in the EU Member States, 2000, 2005, and 2009 
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Graph III.1.2: The fiscal rule index in 11 euro area members, 1999 to 2009 
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fiscal measures are appropriate in terms of respect 
of rules, stability, and sustainability.  
The fiscal governance database maintained by the 
Commission services includes detailed information 
on independent fiscal institutions that are primarily 
financed by public funds but are functionally 
independent from fiscal authorities.(45) Our 
descriptive analysis in Section III.1.3 contains the 
consideration of the relationship between fiscal 
councils and sovereign spreads. To this end, from 
the information on fiscal councils available in the 
dataset, we construct an index following the 
methodology applied for numerical fiscal rules. 
We specifically consider the areas of activity of the 
fiscal councils, distinguishing (1) the independent 
analysis of fiscal policy developments, (2) the 
provision of macroeconomic and/or budgetary 
forecasts for budget preparation, (3) the issuing of 
normative statements on fiscal policy, and (4) the 
issuing of recommendations on the conduct of 
fiscal policy. For each of these areas we attribute a 
score with value one for mandated tasks and zero 
for no activity in the given area. We then add up 
the scores using random weights similar to the 
construction of the fiscal rule index. The obtained 
scores for each fiscal council are then summarised 
by country, where scores for the second, third and 
fourth fiscal council are down-weighted by ½, 1/3 
etc.  
As concerns the presence and activity of fiscal 
councils, in 2009 (the last year of our database) the 
situation in the EU was as follows. There were 29 
fiscal councils located in 17 Member States, with 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia having no such institution.(46) Typically, 
                                                          
(45) Independent fiscal institutions are non-partisan 
public bodies other than the central bank, 
government or parliament that prepare 
macroeconomic forecasts for the budget, monitor 
fiscal performance and/or advise the government on 
fiscal policy matters. The fiscal governance dataset 
of the Commission services includes Courts of 
Auditors if their activities go beyond the accounting 
control and cover any of the tasks mentioned above. 
Central banks and directorates of ministries of 
finance are not considered, nor are private think 
tanks. 
(46) The United Kingdom established a new independent fiscal 
institution – the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – 
in May 2010, outside the reporting period of the most 
recent update of the fiscal governance dataset. It is 
these institutions were far more common in the 
pre-2004 EU Members, often having a long 
history, in part due to the human resource 
requirements of such institutions which may create 
difficulties for smaller countries. 
Table III.1.1 provides an overview of the main 
tasks of these institutions. As shown, seven of ten 
fiscal councils are entrusted with the independent 
analysis of fiscal policy, while around one half are 
assigned the task of providing independent 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts 
respectively – that are not binding for the 
preparation of the budget in most of the cases 
though. One third of the fiscal councils are 
expected to provide normative statements on the 
conduct of fiscal policy, while two thirds are 
mandated to deliver recommendations. Nine of the 
countries maintaining fiscal councils have two or 
more fiscal councils that may complement each 
other in terms of tasks. Still, in only six countries – 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Hungary, and 
Sweden – are all the four areas of activity 
discussed above part of the mandate of one or 
several fiscal councils. 
Graph III.1.3 shows the index obtained as 
described above from aggregating information on 
the areas of activity of fiscal councils. According 
to this index, in 2009, Sweden had the strongest set 
of fiscal institutions, with an index value of 2. 
Next come Germany, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, 
France, and Belgium, with index values between 1 
and 2. Luxembourg, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, Portugal, the Netherlands, Lithuania, 
Ireland, Spain, Greece and Estonia are countries 
with less strong bodies of independent fiscal 
analysis and advice as of 2009, while as said, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia had no independent fiscal council.(47) 
                                                                                   
mandated to provide binding economic and fiscal forecasts, 
and to assess whether the government is likely to meet the 
established deficit reduction objectives. 
(47) In the context of the EU/IMF balance-of-payments 
assistance programmes, Romania established a fiscal 
council in 2010, while Ireland is presently designing 
such a body.  
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In the above description of fiscal governance in 
EU members, we have considered two dimensions, 
rules-based fiscal governance and fiscal councils, 
although the characterisation of the latter does not 
account for details in the design of the councils 
and their mandate. While the picture obtained may 
 
Table III.1.1: Tasks of independent fiscal institutions in EU Member States 
Country Institution Created
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AT Austrian Institute of Economic Research 1927 no yes no no
AT Institute for Advanced Studies 1963 no yes no no
AT Government Debt Committee 1970 yes yes yes yes
BE High Council of Finance - Section "Public sector borrowing 1989 yes no yes yes
BE National Accounts Institute 1994 no yes no no
DE Advisory Board to the Federal Ministry of Finance 1950 yes no yes yes
DE Joint Economic Forecast project group 1950 no yes no yes
DE Working Party on Tax Revenue Forecasting 1955 no yes no no
DE German Council of Economic Experts 1963 yes no no no
DK Danish Economic Council 1962 yes yes no yes
EE National Audit Office of Estonia 1990 no no yes yes
EL Centre for Planning and Economic Research 1959 yes yes no no
ES Court of Auditors 1978 no no no yes
ES National Committee of Local Administration 1985 no no no yes
FR Court of Accounts 1807 yes no yes yes
FR Economic Committee of the Nation 1952 yes yes no no
HU State Audit Office 1989 yes no yes yes
HU Fiscal Council 2008 yes yes yes yes
IT Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses 1999 yes yes no no
LT National Audit Office of Lithuania 1990 yes no no yes
LU Court of Auditors 1999 yes yes no yes
NL Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 1945 yes yes no no
PT Court of Auditors 1990 yes no no no
PT Budget Technical Support Unit 2006 yes no no no
SE National Institute of Economic Research 1937 yes yes yes yes
SE Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 2007 yes yes yes yes
SI Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 1991 yes yes no yes
SI Fiscal Council 2009 yes no no yes
UK National Audit Office 1983 no no yes yes
Tasks
Tasks: (1) independent analysis of fiscal policy; (2) independent macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts; (3) 
normative statements on the conduct of fiscal policy; (4) recommendations on fiscal policy
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph III.1.3: Fiscal council index in the EU, 2010 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
EE
EL
ES
IT
LT
NL
PT
UK
DK
LU
BE
FR
SI
AT
DE
HU
SE
Fiscal council index
Source: Commission services 
Part III 
Fiscal governance and sovereign spreads 
 
119 
appear partial, we claim that it is representative of 
fiscal governance in EU Members as a whole. 
Indeed, policy experience has shown that the 
quality of elements of fiscal governance along the 
different dimensions tends to correlate: thus 
strengths and weaknesses along different 
dimensions of fiscal governance reinforce each 
other, and the above measures can be used as 
proxies for the quality of domestic fiscal 
governance frameworks of the EU Member States 
altogether.  
1.3.2. Sovereign spreads and fiscal 
governance 
Sovereign bond yields constitute the price of new 
debt including maturing debt that is rolled over. 
Graphs III.1.4 and III.1.5 show the evolution of the 
spreads of 10-year sovereign bonds against the 
benchmark country, Germany, of the pre-2004 and 
more recent EU Members from 2000–2011. In the 
old EU Members, until 2008 bond yields were 
relatively stable, barely exceeding 50 basis points 
(and sometimes even negative) in countries other 
than the UK. In the wake of the economic and 
financial crisis, the years from 2008 witnessed 
higher variation in sovereign spreads and an 
increase in levels to almost 1100 basis points 
specifically for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, but 
to a lesser extent – to up to 250 basis points – for 
Spain, Italy and Belgium as well. 
Sovereign spreads in the new EU Members 
(including the countries that eventually entered the 
euro area)(48) were considerably higher than those 
in the euro area before the onset of the crisis 
already, reflecting multiple factors such as 
differences in market liquidity, institutional 
settings (e.g. concerning the pension system), and 
perceived exchange rate risk. The sharp increase in 
spreads to up to 1100 basis points concerned 
Latvia and Lithuania specifically, but in the second 
semester of 2008 spreads shot up to almost 800 
basis points for Hungary and Romania as well. 
 
 
 
                                                          
(48) No data are available for Estonia. 
Graph III.1.6 gives an indication of the 
relationship between the strength of rules-based 
fiscal governance and sovereign spreads against 
Germany in two groups of EU Members: those 
forming the euro area as of 2009, and the new EU 
Members that have not acceded to the euro area so 
far, from 2000 to 2009, the year with most recent 
information on fiscal governance. Averages of 
sovereign spreads are shown for those members of 
these groups of countries with standards of rules-
based fiscal governance above and below average 
respectively. It should be recalled that a high value 
of the fiscal rule index is achieved by multiple 
rules, rules covering a high percentage of general 
government finance, and/or strong rules in terms of 
the legal base, room for setting or revising the 
constraining objective, the nature of the body in 
charge of monitoring respect and enforcement, 
enforcement mechanisms, and media visibility. 
Both among the euro area members and the new 
EU Members that have not introduced the euro, 
sovereign spreads have been clearly lower on 
average for countries with above average standards 
of rules-based fiscal governance than for those 
with poor or lacking fiscal rules. 
Graph III.1.7 repeats the above exercise grouping 
the countries by the coverage of activities 
performed by their fiscal councils. Again, the 
negative relationship between fiscal governance 
and sovereign spreads is confirmed: both those 
euro area members and new EU countries not 
having introduced the common currency who were 
ranked to be above average in terms of coverage of 
tasks performed by their fiscal councils were 
experiencing lower sovereign spreads than their 
peers with below-average coverage of fiscal 
councils’ activities. 
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Graph III.1.4: Sovereign spreads in the EU15, 2000-2011 
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Graph III.1.5: Sovereign spreads in the New EU Member States, 2000-2011 
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Graph III.1.7: Average CDS quotes on 10-year sovereign bonds of the EU Member States by strength of rules-based fiscal governance, 2008-
2011 
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Graph III.1.6: Average sovereign spreads in euro area Members and non-euro new EU Members by strength of rules-based governance, 
2000 to 2009 
0
100
200
300
400
01
/0
0
07
/0
0
01
/0
1
07
/0
1
01
/0
2
07
/0
2
01
/0
3
07
/0
3
01
/0
4
07
/0
4
01
/0
5
07
/0
5
01
/0
6
07
/0
6
01
/0
7
07
/0
7
01
/0
8
07
/0
8
01
/0
9
07
/0
9
FRI below average, euro area
FRI above average, euro area
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
01
/0
0
07
/0
0
01
/0
1
07
/0
1
01
/0
2
07
/0
2
01
/0
3
07
/0
3
01
/0
4
07
/0
4
01
/0
5
07
/0
5
01
/0
6
07
/0
6
01
/0
7
07
/0
7
01
/0
8
07
/0
8
01
/0
9
07
/0
9
FRI below average, non-euro new EU
FRI above average, non-euro new EU
Source: Commission services. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2011 
 
122 
1.3.3. Other measures of the probability of 
default and fiscal governance 
 
Table III.1.2: Credit ratings of Moody’s of EU Member States 
grouped by their strength of rules-based fiscal 
governance, mid-2009 
Rating Fiscal rule index
Aaa AT (2.2) DE (6.9)
FI (4.6) DK (9.4)
IE (2.2) ES (9.5)
IT (3.7) FR (6.9)
UK (0.0) LU (8.3)
NL (9.4)
SE (9.1)
BE (5.3)
Aa2 PT (1.7)
Aa2 SI (5.1)
Aa3 CY (0.0)
A1 CZ (5.2)
EL (0.0)
MT (0.0)
SK (3.8)
A2
A3 LT (9.5)
Baa1 HU (5.1)
Baa2
Baa3 LV (3.6) BG (10.7)
RO (2.3)
above averagebelow average
Source: Moody’s (credit ratings), Commission services (fiscal rule 
index) 
 
As explained in Section III.1.1, one important 
determinant of the price of debt is the risk that the 
debtor defaults: country differences in this respect 
are reflected in the sovereign spreads. We can 
obtain a more direct indication of a systematic 
relationship between the quality of fiscal 
governance and the price of debt – that is 
determined by the risk of default – by looking at 
the risk of default in groups of countries 
distinguished by their fiscal governance directly. 
In the following, we consider this relationship in 
order to corroborate our findings that were set out 
above, using two standard indicators of the risk of 
default: credit ratings of rating agencies, and CDS 
spreads.  
Turning to the first of these indicators, Table 
III.1.2 lists the sovereign credit ratings of the EU 
Members in mid-2009 produced by Moody’s, 
distinguished by the strength of the country’s 
rules-based fiscal governance as measured by the 
fiscal rule index. Eight of those ten countries with 
above-average rules-based fiscal governance were 
placed in the prime category, while this is only the 
case for one third of the fifteen EU members with 
below average standards of rules-based fiscal 
governance. In contrast, just under half of Member 
States (seven, to be precise) were considered only 
medium grade, with ratings between A1 and Baa3. 
Even if the result is partly driven by the most 
recent developments in Greece and Ireland, this 
provides some evidence that fiscal governance 
contributes to diminishing the risk of sovereign 
default and thereby bringing down the cost of 
public debt. 
Graph III.1.8: Average sovereign spreads in euro area Members and non-euro new EU Members by coverage of activities of fiscal councils, 
2000 to 2009 
0
100
200
300
400
01
/0
0
07
/0
0
01
/0
1
07
/0
1
01
/0
2
07
/0
2
01
/0
3
07
/0
3
01
/0
4
07
/0
4
01
/0
5
07
/0
5
01
/0
6
07
/0
6
01
/0
7
07
/0
7
01
/0
8
07
/0
8
01
/0
9
07
/0
9
FCI below average, euro area
FCI above average, euro area
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
01
/0
0
07
/0
0
01
/0
1
07
/0
1
01
/0
2
07
/0
2
01
/0
3
07
/0
3
01
/0
4
07
/0
4
01
/0
5
07
/0
5
01
/0
6
07
/0
6
01
/0
7
07
/0
7
01
/0
8
07
/0
8
01
/0
9
07
/0
9
FCI below average, non-euro new EU
FCI above average, non-euro new EU
Source:  Commission services. 
Part III 
Fiscal governance and sovereign spreads 
 
123 
Turning now to the second indicator to corroborate 
our findings, Graph III.1.8 shows averages of CDS 
quotes on 10-year sovereign bonds in EU Member 
States again grouped by their the quality of their 
rules-based fiscal governance.(49) While average 
CDS spreads rose to around 300 basis points in 
early 2009 for both groups of countries to drop to 
around 150 basis points thereafter, they only 
slightly increased in the group with strong rules-
based fiscal governance, while the increase was 
substantial in the other group, peaking at almost 
450 basis points most recently. Even if based on 
simple correlations, this picture provides some 
support for the relation between sound fiscal 
governance and the cost of public debt. 
1.4. EFFECTS OF RULES-BASED FISCAL 
GOVERNANCE ON SOVEREIGN SPREADS: 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS  
1.4.1. Econometric analysis 
The above descriptive analysis has provided 
support for the intuition that appropriate structures 
of fiscal governance have the potential to contain 
the price to be paid for public debt. Still, as it relies 
on comparing conditional means for groups of 
countries with different characteristics in terms of 
fiscal governance, it cannot shed light on the 
precise way in which fiscal governance might 
contribute to keeping the cost of public debt low. 
Well-designed fiscal governance has been shown 
to effectively contribute to budgetary discipline 
(see Section III.1.2:) the lower price of public debt 
for countries with higher fiscal governance 
standards may thus well result from simply lower 
deficits and debt in these countries. We argue 
however that fiscal governance also has a genuine 
direct effect on the risk of sovereign default, 
precisely because it may, if effective, constrain 
future realisations of deficit and debt and thus 
maintain a sustainable path of debt evolution. 
Hence, the impact of fiscal governance on 
sovereign spread needs to be studied once deficit 
and debt outcomes are controlled for.  
To show the impact of fiscal governance on 
sovereign spreads, in the following we report an 
econometric analysis of this matter in euro area 
                                                          
(49) No data are available for Cyprus, Estonia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovenia. 
members in 1999 to 2009 developed in Iara and 
Wolff (2011) that proposes a structural model of 
sovereign spreads in the presence of different 
levels of risk aversion. The model is described in 
detail in Box III.3.1. The estimating equation is  
ln_spreadi,t = β1 yieldt + β2 balancei,t  + β3 debti,t  
+ β4 frii,t + β5 ln_riskavt + Ci + ui,t .    
Specifically, the empirical analysis regresses the 
logarithm of the euro area countries’ 10-year 
sovereign bond spreads against Germany 
ln_spread on the levels of the German bunds’ 
interest (yield), the general government budget 
balance (balance) and general governmment debt 
(debt) as % of GDP respectively, a measure of the 
quality of rules-based fiscal governance (fri), and a 
composite logarithmic term ln_riskav derived from 
the spread between US low grade corporate and 
government bonds as a proxy for global risk 
aversion (specifically, riskav corresponds to the 
term 1+ 0.5ρ  (1+ v*) laid out in Box III.3.1.) Data 
are annual averages; i and t are country and year 
indices respectively. While the German bond 
yields, debt and the composite indicator of risk 
aversion are expected to increase the sovereign 
spreads, the general government balance and the 
strength of rules-based fiscal governance should 
decrease them. Note that, because of the log-linear 
nature of the model, determinants exercise their 
impact on sovereign spreads in a multiplicative 
manner. Thus, the potential of an improvement in 
fiscal governance to decrease the price of 
sovereign debt is higher at higher levels of deficit 
and debt according to this approach. 
The analysis from Iara and Wolff (2011) reported 
here covers observations of 10 founding euro area 
countries (with spreads measured against 
Germany)(50) over 1999-2009. The data are used 
as annual averages; the financial data stem from 
Bloomberg, and the fiscal data are from Eurostat. 
The strength of rules-based fiscal governance is 
measured with the fiscal rules index calculated by 
the Commission services as described in 
Subsection III.1.3.1. As outlined above, sovereign 
spreads were below 30 basis points for most euro 
area members, with a slight increase until 2001 
and decreasing in the period between 2001 and 
2006, but they increased and fanned out 
                                                          
(50) Luxembourg is excluded because of the small size of 
its bond market.  
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considerably in the wake of the economic and 
financial crisis, with particularly high values of 
190 basis points reached on average by Greece and 
Ireland and values between 40 and 100 basis points 
for the other euro area members during 2009 (see 
Graph III.1.4.) The ranking of the euro area 
members by the size of the difference of their bond 
yields against Germany was broadly constant in 
the period considered, with France, the 
Netherlands, and Finland being closer to the 
benchmark and Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
being at the higher end of the distribution.  
Another important variable in the analysis is the 
level of risk aversion (more precisely, its nonlinear 
transformation, see Box III.1.1.) The level of risk 
aversion is proxied by the spread between low 
grade US corporate and government bonds. In the 
decade under scrutiny, this measure has moved in 
parallel to the euro area bond spreads: while it 
moved between 130 and 155 basis points in 1999, 
it declined and did not surpass 100 basis points in 
2004, when euro area sovereign spreads were also 
historically low. The US corporate bond spread 
increased during the economic and financial crisis 
and peaked at 755 basis points in 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table III.1.3 we present the results of the above 
model both from static panel regressions 
controlling for unobserved country effects (where 
standard errors are adjusted to clustering at country 
level) and from a dynamic specification using the 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, which accounts 
for endogeneity in the level of general government 
debt, the budget balance, and the level of risk 
aversion. As deficits and debt are endogenous with 
respect to sovereign spreads by construction and 
global risk aversion is very likely to be so, the 
results from the dynamic GMM estimator that 
accounts for such endogeneity (column 3) can be 
considered most appropriate. The description of 
the results below is therefore based on this 
specification. Columns 2 of the above Table – that 
presents a static model – and 4 – that repeats the 
estimation of the dynamic model where 
observations from the last year (2009) are omitted 
– show that the results are stable in qualitative 
terms. 
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The econometric estimations support the existence 
of an independent negative effect of the strength of 
rules-based fiscal governance on sovereign 
spreads, as well as the effects of the other control 
variables as expected. Moreover, the restrictions 
contained in the structural model that ln_riskav 
and yield have coefficients of 1 cannot be rejected. 
Sovereign spreads in euro area countries of the 
2000–2009 decade are above all found to have 
been determined by the risk-free interest and the 
level of global risk aversion. Holding other 
characteristics constant, the increase of the 
benchmark interest rate by one percentage point 
more than doubled the spread, as it had an impact 
via the composite risk aversion term as well. A 
unit increase of the composite risk aversion term 
also resulted in the doubling of the spread. The rise 
in the general government budget balance by one 
percentage point resulted in a decrease of the 
spread by around one fifth, while each percentage 
point of additional general government debt 
increased the spread by around 2 per cent. The 
effect of rules-based fiscal governance estimated 
from the dynamic specification is comparable to 
the improvement of the budget balance: a unit 
improvement of the rules-based framework 
resulted in the decline of the risk premium by 
around 22 per cent.  
1.4.2. Predicted effects of a strengthening of 
rules-based fiscal governance on 
sovereign spreads 
In the previous Section we have reported 
estimation results of a structural model of the 
impact of rules-based fiscal governance on 
sovereign spreads in the presence of risk aversion. 
In the following we study the impact of enhancing 
rules-based fiscal governance frameworks on 
sovereign spreads under specific conditions in 
more detail. First we show the dependence of this 
impact on other characteristics of the country 
under scrutiny; thereafter we take a look at those 
countries specifically that would profit most from 
an upgrade of their fiscal governance frameworks: 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. Indeed 
although sovereign spreads have reached higher 
levels in Spain as well, its rules-based fiscal 
governance framework is comparatively strong: 
other measures are likely to bear more fruit in 
order to achieve fiscal consolidation. 
Due to the log-linearity of the model, in absolute 
terms, the effect of a change in one of the above 
determinants depends on the level of the other 
variables. Therefore, a unit increase in the quality 
of fiscal governance induces a larger drop of the 
sovereign spread in a country with higher deficits 
and public debt. This dependency on the other 
characteristics of sovereign default is shown in 
Graph III.1.9. 
 
Table III.1.3: Econometric estimation of the impact of rules-based fiscal governance on euro area sovereign spreads 
Estimation method FE-OLS GMM GMM
Dependent variable: log yield spread, t
log yield spread, t-1 0.2100 0.1744
(0.1632) (0.1748)
log yield spread, t-2 -0.3838*** -0.4238***
(0.0746) (0.0980)
yield (DE) 0.8399** 0.9794*** 0.9831***
(0.2091) (0.2610) (0.2784)
budget balance -0.1173*** -0.1769*** -0.1664**
(0.0237) (0.0513) (0.0691)
debt 0.0299 0.0186 0.0285
(0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0200)
FRI -0.1209* -0.2166* -0.2575*
(0.0484) (0.0914) (0.1514)
log risk aversion 1.2191*** 0.9161*** 0.9609***
(0.1433) (0.1297) (0.1098)
constant -13.1685*** -11.2593*** -12.0968***
(1.8498) (2.2938) (2.8720)
no. of observations 105 66 56
R² 0.80
time period 1999-2009 1999-2009 1999-2008
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Commission services. 
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The left-hand side panel illustrates how the 
sovereign spread declines at different levels of risk 
aversion (as measured by the spread between US 
low grade corporate and government bonds) as the 
fiscal rule index improves from 0 to 10 for sample 
average values of the variables (specifically, a 
budget deficit of 2.6 per cent and a debt level of 71 
per cent of GDP.) The right-hand side panel shows 
the decline in the spreads at different levels of risk 
aversion under conditions of a four per cent 
general government budget deficit and general 
government debt of 100 per cent of GDP. At the 
average sample values (left-hand side panel), the 
spread declines by up to around 150 basis points, 
whereas for the high-deficit, high-debt case the 
reduction of the spread could be up to 250  basis 
points under circumstances of extreme risk 
aversion.  
The average score of the fiscal rule index in the 
euro area countries from the sample in the past 
decade was around 5: this corresponds to the 
quality of rules-based fiscal governance in 
Belgium. The countries where the strength of 
rules-based fiscal governance was below average 
in 2009 were Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and 
Finland; of these, the first four are facing 
particularly high consolidation pressures. Graph 
III.1.10 shows how the differential of sovereign 
yields against the risk-free rate in four countries, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal, would have 
changed, had these countries had rules-based fiscal 
governance structures of average quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, predicted reductions in sovereign 
risk premia are highest for the year 2009, when 
global risk aversion was particularly high. In the 
case of Greece – with a budget deficit of 13.5 per 
cent and a public debt burden of 115 per cent of 
GDP in 2009 – the establishment of a rules-based 
fiscal governance framework of average quality 
would have implied the reduction of the spread by 
130 basis points in such a year. Ireland also had a 
budget deficit of 14 per cent in 2009 but public 
debt only amounted to 63 per cent of GDP; while 
its rules based fiscal governance framework was 
rather weak, with a fiscal rule index value of 
around 2. According to the above model, the 
strengthening of its fiscal governance framework 
to the average level would have allowed a decline 
in the spread against the risk-free rate by almost 
100 basis points. Italy in turn had a rules-based 
fiscal governance framework in place that was 
assigned the fiscal rule index value of 3.7, 
comparatively close to the average level (with a 
fiscal rule index value of 5.) At the same time, it 
had a deficit of 5.3 per cent in 2009 and a public 
debt level of 115 per cent of GDP. The 
enhancement of its rules-based fiscal governance 
framework to average would still have implied a 
reduction of its sovereign risk premium by about 
30 basis points in 2009. Finally, the gain for 
Portugal from such institutional improvement – 
with a deficit of 9.4 per cent and a debt level of 77 
per cent in 2009 – would have amounted to 50 
basis points. 
Part III 
Fiscal governance and sovereign spreads 
 
127 
1.5. CONCLUSION  
Sovereign spreads shape the price of new and 
rolled over debt. After relative stability in the first 
half of the last decade, sovereign spreads in the 
euro area and the EU have increased in the wake of 
the economic and financial crisis, in some 
countries with particularly high fiscal challenges to 
extraordinary extents. Therefore, for these 
countries specifically but also for others, any 
means to reduce these spreads is of particular 
budgetary importance.  
Strong frameworks of fiscal governance might 
provide a powerful way to contain sovereign 
spreads and the corresponding cost of public debt. 
Indeed, as shown in Section III.1.3, sovereign 
spreads have been consistently lower in countries 
with better fiscal governance; this is also true for 
more direct measures of sovereign default such as 
CDS spreads or credit ratings.  
 
 
 
 
 
Although suggestive, conditional means do not 
substitute for a more thorough multivariate 
analysis. As shown in Section III.1.4, the results of 
such analysis based on a structural model of 
sovereign spreads at different levels of risk 
aversion developed by Iara and Wolff (2011) 
confirm that stronger fiscal governance decreases 
the risk of default and sovereign spreads by its 
own, not only indirectly considering the fact that 
countries with strong fiscal governance are better 
performers in terms of deficits and debt. The 
members of the euro area currently in difficulty 
would have benefitted from lower sovereign 
spreads by up to 130 basis points, had their rules-
based fiscal governance been comparable to the 
average of the euro zone (represented by Belgium) 
in the past decade. 
 
 
Graph III.1.10: Predicted impact of a strengthening of rules-based fiscal governance on sovereign risk premia in selected euro area members 
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 Box III.1.1: The impact of rules-based fiscal governance on sovereign spreads in  the 
presence of risk aversion: a structural model.
To investigate the impact of rules-based fiscal governance on risk premia in euro area government bond 
markets in the presence of different attitudes towards risk, consider an investor who might use an amount of 
wealth of 1 to acquire a risk-free bond paying interest v*, or alternatively hold a bond of country i that 
delivers repayment with interest amounting to 1 + v* + vi, but that might default on its debt with probability θ i ∈ ]0; 1[. Against the alternative of holding the asset with zero risk, the sovereign bond of country i will 
deliver expected additional wealth of E(Ii) = – (1+ v*) θ i + (1– θi) vi. Assuming E(Ii) = 0 (i.e. actuarial 
neutrality,) the compensation for the possible event of default is  
 vi =  (1+ v*) θ i (1– θ i)-1 = (1+ v*) τi ,   
where τi = θ i (1– θ i)-1 is the odds of default. It is further assumed that investors’ utility functions are twice 
differentiable and strictly increasing: U′(X) > 0. Risk-averse investors specifically have concave utility 
functions: U″(X) < 0. From the condition of indifference between purchasing bonds of country i and the 
certainty equivalent to such activity, the Arrow-Pratt measure of the risk premium πi  can be established as πi  =  0.5 σ ²i  ρ, where ρ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and σ ²i  is the variance of outcomes from 
holding country i’s sovereign bonds (Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2005).) The risk premium switches 
signs with the coefficient of risk aversion and is zero in the presence of risk neutrality. The variance can be 
shown to be σ ²i  = (1+ v*)²τi .  
To offer an alternative to the risk-free bond to risk-averse investors, the sovereign bond of country i has to 
offer an overall excess return si over v* of vi (this part is to compensate for the possibility of default) topped 
up by the risk premium π i (which is to compensate for accepting the risk.) Using the above expressions, the 
spread si is  
si = vi + πi  = (1+ v*)τi [1+ 0.5ρ (1+ v*)] . 
This equation shows how the spread of country i’s sovereign bonds over the risk-free return v* is depending 
on the odds of default τ i  - that is a nonlinear function of the probability of default, θ i : it has an immediate 
effect via the compensation for the probability of default, vi , as well as an effect via the Arrow-Pratt risk 
premium. The latter is amplified by the level of risk aversion ρ as well as by the level of risk-free return v*.  
To derive the estimating equation, the standard assumption is employed that the default probability θ i is a 
logistic function of a measure Yi that in turn linearly depends on a set of exogenous regressors Xi, parameters β, and a stochastic error term ε ~ i.i.d.:  
θ i =  P (I  = –1 | Yi) =  e Yi (1+ eYi )-1 with Yi = Xi'β + εi . 
Inserting this expression for θ i into the above spread equation, taking logs and rearranging terms results in 
ln si =   v* + Xi’β + ln (1+ 0.5ρ  (1+ v*)) + ε´i .  
The determinants of country i’s default risk – the elements of Xi – include the standard determinants of the 
sovereign debtor’s solvency: the actual levels of debt (debt) and the budget balance (balance,) institutional 
characteristics of the country that are constant over time (C,) and time-varying characteristics. The quality of 
rules-based fiscal governance is part of these time-varying institutional characteristics. It has in the above 
model, just as all determinants of the default probability, a non-linear impact on the sovereign spreads, 
which is amplified by the level of risk aversion. 
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The financial and economic crisis that hit all 
advanced economies between 2008 and 2010 
severely affected the public finances of most EU 
Member States. As Part I showed, there has been a 
sharp deterioration of government budget balances 
and a parallel increase in debt to GDP ratios. In 
some Member States, the situation of the public 
finances became so critical as to put their fiscal 
sustainability at risk. The spreads on sovereign 
interest rates increased and large financial 
assistance packages from the European Union and 
the IMF were negotiated for the most severely 
affected euro area countries. In parallel, a 
permanent mechanism, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) was agreed upon to provide 
assistance to euro area Member States in the 
future. 
The ESM will only provide funding to countries 
under strict conditionality and only after a fiscal 
sustainability assessment shows the country to be 
solvent. Such an assessment will typically require 
two types of analysis: first, an assessment of the 
short-term liquidity needs of the country, and, 
second, a medium to long term assessment of debt 
sustainability which analyses the public sector's 
ability to pay back its debt. The two aspects of the 
analysis are both necessary and interconnected. 
The present Part presents the methodologies that 
are being examined as possible means to conduct 
such future analysis. Both short-term liquidity and 
medium to long-term sustainability are addressed 
in the various methodologies under development. 
The assessment of the long-term sustainability of 
the public finances is a well-established part of EU 
multilateral surveillance since the 2005 reform of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Its main 
application is in contributing to the assessment of 
fiscal policy in the plans contained in the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) submitted 
yearly by Member States.  
Most of the existing analysis used by the 
Commission – and the International Monetary 
Fund and, in part, by rating agencies –is based on 
the concept of government's intertemporal budget 
constraint (IBC) which defines fiscal solvency. 
The IBC is satisfied as long as the outstanding 
stock of debt is fully offset by the present value of 
the flow of future primary surpluses. The analysis 
is therefore based on indicators capturing whether 
past or foreseen developments in fiscal variables 
are consistent with the fulfilment of the IBC and, 
in case they are not, quantifying the magnitude of 
the required fiscal adjustment to ensure fiscal 
solvency. The constraints of economic and 
political feasibility are taken into account as far as 
possible.  
The sustainability analysis undertaken by the 
Commission looks at the risks to fiscal 
sustainability under the assumption of no-policy 
change in the government budget on the basis of: i) 
the current structural budgetary position; ii) the 
budgetary challenge posed by population ageing 
over the longer term. Where the IBC is not 
satisfied, the need to introduce structural reforms, 
including of pension systems, and/or to consolidate 
the public finances is highlighted. By stressing the 
need for appropriate time-consistent policies to be 
adopted soon after the challenges are identified, 
the analysis should help avoid a situation where 
abrupt policy changes are introduced at the last 
moment. In the circumstances where no structural 
reforms are needed, attaining fiscal sustainability 
typically entails  reaching and maintaining a sound 
fiscal position which should broadly be in line with 
the medium-term objective for the government 
budgetary position (MTO.)  
The EU approach also considers i) medium-term 
debt projections under alternative consolidation 
scenarios; ii) a medium-term indicator of the 
sustainability of the government finances 
measuring the adjustment in the structural primary 
balance required between the end year of the 
current SCP years and 2020, which allows 
reaching the level of structural balance such that, if 
kept constant, brings debt to a given debt target by 
2030; and iii) two sustainability gap indicators. 
These are the S1 indicator which measures the 
upfront adjustment to the structural primary 
balance required to reach the debt-to-GDP target 
of 60 percent in 2060 and the S2 indicator which 
shows the upfront permanent adjustment to the 
structural primary balance required to fulfil the 
infinite horizon intertemporal budget constraint. 
The experience during the latest recession 
highlighted that the current EU sustainability 
analysis, although valid,  could be complemented 
by other analytical tools to help anticipate episodes 
of severe public finance distress such as those 
which have occurred in some EU Member States. 
Such tools could take a larger spectrum of aspects 
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of the economy into account when assessing the 
solidity of government balances and plans. 
Starting from these considerations, possible 
methodologies for expanding the sustainability 
analysis in four directions are being analysed. 
First, given the key role that the banking sector had 
on the government finances in a number of EU 
countries as a result of the crisis, the EU analysis 
could been enriched with a methodology based on 
a value-at-risk analysis. This aims at calculating 
the probability distributions of aggregate banking 
losses and their direct impact on government 
finances, by country. The methodology and 
tentative results for a subset of four EU Member 
States to illustrate it are presented in Chapter IV.2. 
It is shown that, for the three euro area countries in 
this subset, the probability that, due to a banking 
crisis hitting public finances, Member states 
become high risk in terms of the sustainability 
indicator S2 due to the a banking crisis affecting 
the public finances are not negligible, in the sense 
of lying above 0.1%. 
However, the difficulties which currently affect the 
public finances in Europe are not exclusively 
linked to a banking sector under strain. Therefore, 
a broader spectrum of variables, both fiscal and 
non-fiscal, would also require to be regularly 
monitored in order to detect risks of upcoming 
fiscal crises in line with the reform of the 
European economic governance. Thus a possible 
approach of setting up an early warning system 
could rely on monitoring additional fiscal variables 
such as the maturity structure (in terms of length) 
of the government debt, as well as trends in 
competitiveness, credit growth and private sector 
indebtedness. Chapter IV.3 presents an early 
warning signal methodology aimed at the early 
identification of risks of public finance distress, in 
line with the methodologies being developed in the 
academic literature. The approach calculates 
thresholds for a large set of fiscal and non-fiscal 
variables based on their behaviour in the periods 
predating past episodes of fiscal distress, so that an 
alarm signal can be identified whenever these 
thresholds are exceeded. The main finding from 
this methodology is that financial and 
competitiveness variables appear to have a 
stronger predictive power than the pure fiscal 
variables/ indexes. Even if the result is likely to be 
driven in part by data on the current crisis, this 
observation is an argument for having an 
integrated fiscal-macro surveillance process, as the 
one which is carried out in the EU in the context of 
the European Semester. 
The current EU methodology could also be 
reinforced by the estimation of country-level fiscal 
reaction functions. The EU methodology compares 
sustainability indicators to the primary balances 
observed in a peer group of countries in order to 
assess the feasibility of fiscal consolidation 
programmes. The fiscal reaction function allows 
the comparison of government programmes with 
past public finance behaviour of the group of peer 
countries, while controlling for a number of 
macroeconomic and institutional determinants. 
This allows for a sounder comparison. Chapter 
IV.4 presents an econometric estimation of a fiscal 
reaction function for the EU27 based on the 
longest available series for fiscal variables. The 
estimates are combined with the EU intertemporal 
budget constraint to calculate sustainable debt 
levels under different assumptions for the interest 
rate-growth rate differential. Current debt levels 
can then be compared with these thresholds to 
draw a first assessment of whether a Member State 
is fiscally sustainable. Estimates, even though 
relatively imprecise, indicate that current deficit 
forecasts point to a more restrictive stance than 
predicted by the model, albeit lying within the 
predicted range. Estimates for sustainability are in 
general in line with a priori expectations, with 
weaker member states being flagged as 
unsustainable.  
Finally, Chapter IV.5 introduces a model-based 
analysis. A general equilibrium approach is used, 
so the inter-linkages between fiscal variables and 
macro-economic developments are taken into 
account. Based on the Commission's QUEST 
model, the chapter presents tentative estimates of 
revenue-maximising tax rates based on the Laffer 
curve – which relates taxation revenues with 
taxation levels – for three different categories of 
tax and for the EU as a whole. This figure can be 
compared with current tax rates to provide a 
measure of the available margin for discretionary 
tax increases in the context of a fiscal 
consolidation programme. The chapter presents an 
illustrative simulation of the general equilibrium 
effects of a tax-based fiscal consolidation, and 
compares gradual versus abrupt consolidations, 
showing the greater feasibility of the first one. The 
main policy conclusions are that purely revenue-
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based consolidations, when feasible, are very 
costly in terms of output. Fiscal consolidations 
should be implemented in a timely manner, as this 
contains the accumulated debt stock and allows the 
consolidation to be smoother. 
The forthcoming Commission report on "Tax 
reforms in EU Member States 2011" will 
complement this report by identifying various 
challenges faced by euro area Member Sates in the 
area of tax policy in the wake of the crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The report analyses the potential for making use of 
taxation – as a complement to expenditure control 
– to ensure fiscal sustainability. The report also 
addresses the issues of the quality of taxation, in 
particular the need to make the tax structure more 
growth friendly and to improve the design of 
individual taxes. 
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The financial and economic crisis that hit all 
advanced economies from 2008  severely affected 
the public finances of most EU Member States. As 
part I showed, there has been a sharp deterioration 
of government budget balances and a parallel 
increase in debt to GDP ratios. In some Member 
States, the situation of the public finances became 
so critical as to put their fiscal sustainability at 
risk. The spreads on sovereign interest rates 
increased (51) and large financial assistance 
packages from the European Union and the IMF 
were negotiated for Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
In parallel, a permanent mechanism, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM)(52) was agreed upon 
to provide assistance to euro area Member States 
in the future. 
The ESM will only provide funding to countries 
under strict conditionality and only after a fiscal 
sustainability assessment shows the country to be 
solvent. Such an assessment will typically require 
two types of analysis: first, an assessment of the 
short-term liquidity needs of the country, and, 
second, a medium to long term assessment of debt 
sustainability which analyses the public sector's 
ability to pay back its debt. The assessment of the 
short term liquidity needs should be the outcome 
of a comparison between the cash situation of the 
government, its incoming revenues and payments 
and its capacity to raise the necessary liquidity on 
the markets. The medium to long-term 
sustainability analysis is a measure of the public 
sector's ability to pay back all its outstanding and 
future debt, or to implement the policies that set 
the debt to GDP ration on a downward path.(53) 
 The two aspects of the analysis are both necessary 
and interconnected. (54) After all, analysing 
solvency over longer time horizons is of limited 
interest if the government does not have enough 
cash or market access over the short term; 
solvency does not necessarily guarantee access to 
                                                          
(51) This situation is unprecedented within the Euro-area. So 
far, markets had considered government bonds of all EMU 
Member States to be equivalent in terms of risk, leading to 
zero or minor interest rates spreads vis-à-vis the German 
Bund. 
(52) For more details see Box II.2.1 in Part II. 
(53) See Blanchard et al. (1990) Trehan and Walsh (1991) and 
Chalk and Hemming (2000). 
(54) Other potentially relevant aspects are not treated here, like 
for example the potentially impact of self-fulfilling 
expectations in the financial markets. 
the financial markets in the short run. Even if a 
government enters into a process of fiscal 
adjustment that would lead to a lasting reduction in 
the debt ratio, markets may take a long time before 
acknowledging the credibility of the process. A 
solvent government may therefore not be able to 
borrow on the financial markets at acceptable 
rates. On the other hand market expectations are at 
least partly driven by an analysis of medium-term 
sustainability.(55)  
Traditionally, the long-term analysis of 
sustainability has been based on the concept of 
inter-temporal government budget constraint 
(IBC). The IBC can be shown to be equal to 
( )∑= +∞→ −+−=
n
i
i
it
n
t r
db
1 1lim γ  where b is the ratio 
of outstanding public debt over GDP at the end of 
period t, d is the primary government deficit (i.e. 
the difference between non-interest expenditures 
and revenues) over GDP, r is the real interest rate 
on government debt and γ is the real growth rate of 
GDP, with both assumed to be constant.(56)  
The IBC is satisfied as long as the outstanding 
stock of debt is fully offset by the present value of 
the flow of future primary surpluses. The 
traditional analysis is therefore based on indicators 
capturing whether past or foreseen developments 
in fiscal variables are consistent with the fulfilment 
of the IBC and, in case they are not, quantifying 
the magnitude of the required fiscal adjustment to 
ensure fiscal solvency. The constraints of 
economic and political feasibility are taken into 
account as far as possible.  
There is a large body of literature which derives 
and applies a number of methodologies to assess 
government debt sustainability by taking the IBC 
as the starting point. It can be divided into four 
strands: 
i) the “econometric approach”  tests empirically 
whether the time series process generating fiscal 
                                                          
(55) See for example Barclays (2011) or Moody's (2009). 
(56) It is standard to derive the equation in the text starting from 
the one-period government budget constraint written in 
terms of ratios over GDP,  linearising it, solving it forward 
and combining it with  the no-Ponzi condition (or 
transversality condition) ruling out the possibility that the 
discounted value of the debt ratio at the end of time horizon 
is strictly positive. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2011 
 
136 
data is consistent with the fulfilment of the present 
value budget constraint (among many Hamilton 
and Flavin (1986), Threhan and Walsh (1988) and 
(1991), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Wilcox (1989), 
Kremers (1989), Bohn (2005) and (2007) and 
Mendoza and Ostry (2008);)  
ii) the “gap approach” chooses indicators of fiscal 
sustainability in terms of the required adjustment 
of primary balance (mainly.) The indicators 
include the  over-borrowing index, which is equal 
to the current debt ratio divided by the present 
discounted value of future primary surpluses (IMF  
(2003);) the primary gap indicator (Blanchard 
(1990),) which takes the difference between the 
actual primary balance and the debt-stabilising 
primary balance; the tax gap indicator (Blanchard 
et al. (1990),) defined as the difference between 
the constant tax rate which would be required to 
fulfil the inter-temporal budget constraint for a 
given path of government expenditure and the 
current tax rate. A variation on this theme is found 
in the practical applications with finite horizons, in 
which the focus is to assess whether the current 
policy stance is consistent with reaching a desired 
debt level at the end of the horizon (Blanchard et 
al. (1990); Polito and Wickens (2005) and Uctum 
and Wickens (2000);)  
iii) the “threshold approach” focuses on country-
specific policy surveillance (see IMF (2002), 
(2004) and (2010); and Abiad and Ostry (2006)) 
and is aimed at the early detection of debt-related 
vulnerabilities via the identification of threshold 
levels beyond which a country would be at serious 
risk of debt distress; and  
iv) the “stochastic approach” is based on the idea 
that a probabilistic methodology is more adequate 
than a deterministic one in order to assess debt 
sustainability (Barnhill and Kopits (2003), Garcia 
and Rigobon (2004) and Celasun et al. (2006) 
apply a value-at-risk approach; Mendoza and 
Oviedo (2004) derive debt limits in a general 
equilibrium setting under uncertainty.)  
1.1. THE TRADITIONAL COMMISSION 
APPROACH 
The assessment of the long-term sustainability of 
the public finances is a well-established part of EU 
multilateral surveillance since the 2005 reform of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP.) Its main 
application is in contributing to the assessment of 
fiscal policy in the plans contained in the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) submitted 
yearly by Member States.  
The sustainability analysis undertaken by the 
Commission can be categorised as part of the 'gap 
approach'. It looks at the risks to fiscal 
sustainability under the assumption of no-policy 
change in the government budget on the basis of: i) 
the current structural budgetary position; ii) the 
budgetary challenge posed by population ageing 
over the longer term. Where the IBC is not 
satisfied, the need to introduce structural reforms, 
including of pension systems, and/or to consolidate 
the public finances is highlighted. By stressing the 
need for appropriate time-consistent policies to be 
adopted soon after the challenges are identified, 
the analysis should help avoid a situation where 
abrupt policy changes are introduced at the last 
moment. Under most circumstances attaining fiscal 
sustainability entails reaching and maintaining a 
sound fiscal position which should broadly be in 
line with the medium-term objective for the 
government budgetary position (MTO.) In this 
way, the Commission analysis both highlights the 
contribution of sound fiscal policies in the medium 
term and emphasises long-term to fiscal 
sustainability. 
 In the EU approach the following aspects are 
analysed. 
Medium term debt projections and alternative 
consolidation scenarios 
Every year, an assessment of the medium-term 
debt dynamics is made, based on the data 
contained in the most recent SCPs submitted by 
Member States, reflecting planned changes in 
fiscal policy.(57)  
This assessment produces illustrative projections 
for the gross government debt to GDP ratio up to 
2020, built around a "programme scenario" which 
assumes that structural primary balances are 
adjusted according to the plans in the programmes 
and are kept constant thereafter – except that 
changes in the cost of ageing are accounted for. 
                                                          
(57) In the present Section the 2011 SCPs presented in 2011 are 
used. See Part I for the details. 
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(58) This allows disentangling the various drivers 
of the projected evolution of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. 
The evolution of debt is then considered under 
different assumptions on government behaviour, 
namely under an assumption of no consolidation at 
all and under an assumption that consolidation is 
made on a no-policy change basis where legislated 
measures are measured (this is the "2012 COM 
scenario", based on the Commission services' 
Spring 20111 forecast.) (59) 
The EU analysis is based on a graph similar to  
Graph I.3.15 in Part I, which depicts the projected 
evolution for the government gross debt ratio for 
the EU as a whole.(60) The graph compares the 
"programme scenario" – which in the example 
depicted would lead to a decreasing debt to GDP 
ratio from 2013 but without achieving the Treaty 
reference value of 60% of GDP by 2020 – to the 
"2012 COM scenario" – which in the example 
presented shows that based on the estimated 
structural primary balances in 2012, debt would 
continue increasing to about 90% of GDP by 2020, 
though with large differences across countries – 
and to the "2010 scenario" – which shows that 
fiscal positions reported in the programmes would 
result in debt increasing rapidly to reach 120 % of 
GDP in 2020.(61) 
                                                          
(58) In the "programme scenario", the macroeconomic 
assumptions up to 2014 (or the last year of programme) are 
those reported in the SCPs. As a general rule output gaps 
are assumed to close in 2015 (2017 for certain countries), 
after which the potential growth rates converge to the long-
term trend as agreed by the Commission and AWG/EPC 
and published in the 2009 Ageing Report (European 
Economy 2/2009) 
 
(59) Growth projections in the SCPs are, on average, broadly in 
line with the 2011 Spring Commission forecast but with a 
significant gap for some individual countries. More details 
are found in Chapters I.31 and I.3.5. 
(60) The evolution of the debt ratio can be decomposed as 
follows: 
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       where t is a time subscript; D, PD, Y and SF are the stock 
of government debt, the primary balance (which includes 
age-related expenditure), nominal GDP and the stock-flow 
adjustment respectively, and i and y represent the average 
cost of debt and nominal GDP growth (Cfr. European 
Commission (2010) page 150). 
 
(61) The macro-economic scenarios in the SCPs may be on the 
optimistic side (a phenomenon observed in the past). By 
 The comparison of the scenarios based on the 
Commission forecast with the program scenario 
provides a first indication of the consolidation 
effort that a Member State still has to make in 
terms of the measures it has to legislate for. 
Moreover, the use of COM forecast should reduce 
the impact of the over optimistic macroeconomic 
assumptions which have been shown to be a 
feature of the SCPs. 
Finally, in order to assess the robustness of the 
results, projections based on risk scenarios that 
depart from the programme baseline to take 
account of possible slippages in consolidation, 
lower GDP growth and higher real interest rates 
are also presented. 
Medium term sustainability indicators 
A medium term indicator of the sustainability of 
government finances is also computed. The 
indicator measures the adjustment in the structural 
primary balance required between the end year of 
the programmes and 2020, to reach the level of 
structural balance which, if kept constant, brings 
debt to a given debt target by 2030.(62) 
This indicator provides an assessment of the 
adjustment which is required for a Member State 
to reach a predefined debt level and can be 
compared to past episodes to benchmark its 
feasibility.  
As an example, the 2011 data for the EU as a 
whole show that in order to reach a debt level of 
60 percent of GDP by 2030, the adherence to the 
fiscal plans in the SCP throughout the programme 
period would not suffice. The further necessary 
cumulative consolidation effort required by 2020 is 
computed (in this case it equals 1.0 percentage 
point of GDP, i.e. 0.15 percentage points of GDP 
per annum.) However, assuming that SCP plans 
are respected, implies a lower effort than the one in 
the "2010 scenario" or the one in the "2012 COM 
scenario" (as computed in Chapter I.3.5, in the 
"2010 scenario" a further cumulative effort of 5.3 
                                                                                   
using the latest independent COM forecast, this potential 
effect would be reduced.  
(62) The structural primary balance is assumed to be linearly 
improving through 2020; thereafter, while it tends to 
deteriorate due to the cost of ageing, its level still 
guarantees that the debt target is reached by 2030.  
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percentage points of GDP is required, while in the 
"2012 COM scenario" a further cumulative effort 
of 3.3 percentage points of GDP is required.)   
The next step would be to compare the required 
adjustments to the historical experience. In this 
example the required adjustment implied by the 
"2012 COM scenario" would not be 
unprecedented. The general government balance 
has improved considerably in Denmark between 
1982 and 1986 (by a total of broadly 14 percentage 
points of GDP,) in Greece between 1990 and 1994 
(9.3 percentage points,) in Finland from 1996 to 
2000 (9 percentage points,) in Sweden between 
1982 and 1987 and from 1993 to 2000 (by around 
10 percentage points and 12.5 percentage points, 
respectively), in the United Kingdom from 1993 to 
2000 (by 11.2 percentage points) and in Cyprus 
from 2003 to 2007 (by 9.5 percentage points.) 
Figures in cyclically adjusted term have a similar 
order of magnitude. 
The consolidation requirements shown here are 
useful in a post-crisis environment to show the 
necessary adjustments to bring debt down to 
manageable levels in the coming two decades. 
However, the demographic developments after 
2030 will further slow output growth and increase 
ageing-related costs. Thus, to take into account all 
the challenges ahead, an even longer term view 
would be warranted.  
Long-term indicators 
The long-term sustainability of the public finances 
is usually assessed by checking the fulfilment of 
the IBC, which tests the capacity of a country to 
meet its net debt obligations through the stream of 
future primary surpluses. With reference to a finite 
and an infinite horizon for the budget constraint, 
two sustainability gap indicators are derived: (63)  
• the S1 indicator shows the upfront adjustment 
to the structural primary balance required to 
reach the debt to GDP threshold of 60 percent 
in 2060. The timescale has been chosen to be 
long enough to allow the impact of ageing to be 
analysed in a meaningful way while still 
remaining within sight. 
                                                          
(63) For more details on the two indicators, including their 
derivation, see European Commission (2009).  
• the S2 indicator shows the upfront permanent 
adjustment to the structural primary balance 
required to fulfil the infinite horizon 
intertemporal budget constraint. 
The sustainability indicators quantify the gap that 
must be closed immediately and permanently to 
ensure the sustainability of the public finances 
taking into account the implicit costs from ageing 
population: the larger the value of these indicators, 
the greater the required adjustment to the structural 
primary balance to ensure intertemporal 
solvency.(64)  
Graph I.3.16 and Graph I.3.17 in Section I.3.5 
show the S2 sustainability indicator in the "2010" 
scenario and in the "programme" scenario 
respectively. These graphs are used to i) compare 
sustainability gap after and before the programme 
(for example LU and FI have higher sustainability 
gaps in the programme scenario); and ii) to classify 
countries into risk categories in terms of long-term 
sustainability of public finances.(65)  
1.2. SOME NEW POSSIBLE INDICATORS FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
The experience during the latest recession 
highlighted that the current EU sustainability 
analysis, although valid,  could be complemented 
by other analytical tools to help anticipate episodes 
of severe public finance distress such as those 
which have occurred in some EU Member States. 
Such tools could take a larger spectrum of aspects 
of the economy into account when assessing the 
solidity of government balances and plans.  
Starting from these considerations, the 
Commission services therefore have started an 
ongoing effort to expand sustainability analysis. F 
our possible approaches to extend sustainability 
analysis are being analysed in this report. First, 
given the key role that the banking sector had on 
the government finances in a number of EU 
                                                          
(64) A negative value indicates that the intertemporal budget 
constraint is met under current policies and future expected 
implicit liabilities so slightly looser fiscal policy is 
affordable. 
(65) The Commission defined three categories of countries. 
Gaps in excess of 2 percent are judged to display medium 
risk, while gaps over 6 percent display high risk. Gaps 
below 2 percent are consistent with low risk. 
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countries as a result of the crisis, the EU analysis 
has been enriched with a methodology based on a 
value-at-risk analysis. This aims to calculate the 
probability distributions of aggregate banking 
losses and their direct impact on government 
finances, by country. The methodology and 
tentative results for a sub-set of EU Member States 
are presented in Chapter IV.2. The distribution 
probability on banking losses is directly related to 
the gap approaches in that it provides an estimate 
of the resources that would be necessary in case 
the government had to intervene to save the 
banking sector in the case of a banking crisis. 
Unless the required resources had been 
accumulated in dedicated funds, the result would 
be an increase in debt. Therefore the approach 
presented in Chapter IV.2 enlarges the set of risk 
which can be taken into account in the current EU 
sustainability assessment and allows the 
computation of the improvement in government 
balances necessary to secure debt sustainability in 
the case of a banking crisis and to attach to it a 
certain probability distribution.   
Given that the current EU methodology – in line 
with all methodologies based on the gap approach 
– compares primary balance-based indicators of 
sustainability to the observed primary balances in 
order to assess the feasibility of fiscal 
consolidation programmes, the benchmark primary 
balances provide a useful indication for 
sustainability assessments. The easiest benchmark 
is provided by the observed primary balances 
observed in a peer group of countries. The fiscal 
reaction function approach presented in Chapter 
IV.4 allows a sounder comparison of government 
programmes with past public finance outcomes of 
a group of peer countries, as econometric 
techniques allow for a number of macroeconomic 
and institutional determinants to be controlled for. 
In Chapter IV.4 a fiscal reaction function is 
estimated. The estimates are combined with the 
EU intertemporal budget constraint to calculate 
sustainable debt levels under different assumptions 
for the interest rate-growth rate differential. 
Current debt levels can then be compared with 
these thresholds to draw a first assessment of 
whether a Member State is fiscally sustainable. 
However, it has clearly emerged from the crisis 
that difficulties which can affect the government 
budget are not exclusively linked to the situation of 
the  government finances or to a banking sector 
under strain. Therefore, in line with the reform of 
the European economic governance, a broader 
spectrum of variables, both fiscal and non-fiscal, 
has to be monitored in order to detect risks of 
upcoming fiscal crises.  An early warning system 
is therefore presented in Chapter IV.3, which relies 
on monitoring additional fiscal variables – such as 
the maturity structure of the government debt – as 
well as trends in macro-financial economic 
variables – competitiveness indicators, credit 
growth and private sector indebtedness – to 
produce an indicator of a country's fiscal crisis 
vulnerability based on the values of selected 
relevant variables. Such an indicator of fiscal 
vulnerability is used as a signal allowing the early 
identification of risks of public finance distress. 
The value it assumes in a given country in a given 
year can be compared against the critical value of 
the indicator: indicator values beyond the relevant 
threshold provide warnings of fiscal crisis risks for 
the following year. This methodology is useful in 
the overall assessment framework because of its 
complementarities with existing methodologies. 
Indeed, the analysis of the results obtained for the 
vulnerability indicator necessitates the 
consideration of which variables drive the outcome 
of the exercise on a country by country basis. This 
in turn is an exercise in judgement, making the 
signals approach an instrument that is best used at 
the beginning of the assessment procedure with the 
aim of understanding the possible sources of risk 
for government finances.    
The instruments presented up to now are useful 
tools to assess debt sustainability but require the 
assumption that the feedback effects between fiscal 
and economic variables are small. However, 
especially when large consolidations are 
implemented by governments, this assumption 
proves weak and it becomes necessary to assess 
the feasibility of the consolidation policies given 
their effects on the economy. Indeed, the ability to 
run primary surpluses is constrained by fiscal 
limits, i.e. the constraints that the behaviour of the 
economy puts to the capacity of governments to 
conduct the desired fiscal policy. To evaluate such 
limits, Chapter IV.5 introduces a model-based  
general equilibrium approach which allows taking 
into account the inter-linkages between fiscal 
variables and macro-economic developments. The 
Chapter is based on the Commission's QUEST 
model, and presents tentative estimates of revenue-
maximising tax rates based on the Laffer curve – 
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which relates taxation revenues with taxation 
levels – for three different categories of tax and for 
the EU as a whole. The analysis shows i) that the 
maximum revenue collectable by the government 
depends on the tax instrument used, with labour 
income taxation facing the tightest limit; ii) that 
highly elastic tax bases amplify the output costs of 
higher taxation; and iii) that the timing of 
consolidation is a relevant variable when assessing 
sustainability. Keeping these points in mind, model 
simulations can add relevant information to the 
sustainability analysis in two ways. First, they 
provide a rough benchmark against which it is 
possible to compare existing effective tax rates. 
Second, different consolidation composition and 
timing scenarios can be compared via a measure of 
their output costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To conclude, the present part provides possible 
new instruments that can be used in sustainability 
analysis and in the related analysis of 
consolidation packages. 
As it will be seen later, these new instruments 
provide different indications on sustainability and 
should therefore used together and provide a 
substantive part of the analytical support for an 
informed decision on the sustainability of debt in a 
given country.  
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The crisis has shown that the traditional analysis 
described in the previous Chapter has various 
limitations, such as not recognising that the 
balance sheets of governments and of banks are 
interconnected and can affect each other in both 
directions.  
A change in the value of sovereign bonds can, for 
example, affect banks, as high graded government 
bonds are used by the Eurosystem banks as 
collateral to obtain liquidity from the ECB, with 
the amount of the liquidity being dependent on the 
grading of the assets.(66) Given the high integration 
of capital markets, a downgrading of any sovereign 
in the euro area can have broad spillover effects on 
Eurosystem banks. 
In the other direction, the government budget can 
be directly affected by banks' balance sheets if the 
governments decide to support part of the banking 
system in case of financial troubles, and indirectly 
affected in the event of a banking crisis due to the 
its fiscal consequences. 
The main weakness exposed by the events of 
recent years is that no account was taken of the 
potential consequences of the condition of the 
financial sector on government finances. The 
present Chapter focuses therefore on the direct 
impact that weak balance sheets of banks have had 
or could still have in the future on governments' 
balance sheets. 
Since the outbreak of the crisis, governments and 
central banks have been involved in the rescue of 
failing banks via state aid, albeit to a different 
extent in different countries. As Graph IV.2.1 
shows, government assistance to the banking 
sector has, overall, been sizable and in more than 
half of Member States has exceeded 5% of GDP. 
Currently, sizable rescue measures to the banking 
sector weigh heavily on the public finances, most 
                                                          
(66) In order to protect the Eurosystem against losses arising 
from a counterparty default and the subsequent need to 
realise these underlying assets, the ECB applies risk control 
measures that are uniform across the euro area, such as, 
inter alia, assets of a certain quality and haircuts. Similar 
procedures are used by other monetary authorities. 
particularly in Ireland, the UK, Denmark, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Austria and Germany. 
Government assistance to the banking sector 
includes various measures such as capital 
injections, liquidity interventions, asset relief and 
guarantees. The strongest form of intervention 
form is recapitalisation, when a bank receives 
capital injections, either via a national scheme or 
via an ad hoc individual rescue operation. This can 
involve the government acquiring stakes in the 
banking sector, or supporting such acquisitions by 
third parties. Some countries issued guarantees on 
banks' liabilities (bond issuance) although the 
coverage of the guarantees varied by country. 
Asset relief interventions include the ring-fencing 
of toxic and impaired assets and the setting up of 
"bad banks", while liquidity support interventions 
are interventions aiming at supporting liquidity and 
providing extra financing to the bank via to a state 
guarantee. This includes a broad range of 
interventions, such as liquidity facilities at central 
banks when there is an explicit guarantee by the 
state, loans by the Treasury or high quality assets 
swaps. Liquidity support interventions were 
sizable in the many non-euro area EU countries, as 
these countries did not have access to the ECB's 
liquidity. Within the euro area, some banks were 
also able to avail themselves of their national 
central banks' emergency liquidity assistance 
(ELA). 
As compared to the overall amounts of EU 
domestic public interventions, financial assistance 
and rescue package measures have been 
significantly smaller in most of the new Member 
States. This is due to a dominating presence of the 
foreign owned banks. The parent banks of these 
subsidiaries and branches maintained the 
exposures and provide additional capital as 
required. 
Currently, exit strategies from public support to 
banks have been initiated. However, the situation 
differs across Member States as, in some countries 
such as the Netherlands, France and Austria, banks 
have started to return the state aid, while in other 
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countries government assistance to the financial 
sector has been provided recently.(67)  
However, in the majority of countries where the 
banks received state aid, the financial system 
remains fragile. This means that the exit from 
crisis support measures will need to be carefully 
managed between the need to safeguard macro-
financial stability and the need to preserve fiscal 
credibility. In some countries banks' profitability 
outlook is uncertain given a sluggish recovery, 
heavy exposures to the real estate sector and 
tensions in the sovereign debt market. This could 
signal that directly or indirectly – via reduced 
growth – the costs for the government finances are 
unlikely to be reduced in near term. 
On the basis of the above considerations, the 
importance of quantifying the effect that a banking 
system faced with financial difficulties could have 
on the stability of government finances is clear. 
The remainder of this Chapter will present the 
                                                          
(67) It is noted that the banks, which receive the state aid have 
to undergo a restructuring process. An intensive banking 
sector restructuring process is currently underway in 
Germany, Ireland, Greece, Denmark and Spain. In other 
countries, including Austria and Belgium, the restructuring 
is closer to the finalisation. This is a prerequisite for banks 
to reimburse governments.  
results of the Commission's estimation of the direct 
potential impact of bank losses on government 
finances, which has been developed to address 
these issues. The Commission's analysis is based 
on the results of the SYMBOL (SYstemic Model 
of Banking Originated Losses) model(68) for the 
evaluation of the probability distribution of the 
systemic losses in the banking sector which may 
potentially affect government finances. 
This model starts by estimating the probabilities of 
a default of bank obligors as assessed by the 
country's banking system regulator. It then uses 
these estimates to evaluate the default risk of 
individual banks, and aggregate individual bank 
losses to estimate the distribution of losses for the 
banking system as a whole. This aggregated 
distribution by country can be obtained under 
different conditions. By considering different 
regulatory regimes and the risks they entail, an 
estimate of the possible cost to the public finances 
is then computed in the various considered 
conditions.  
                                                          
(68) SYMBOL has been initially developed by a joint team of 
Commission services together with academic experts on 
banking regulation. The methodology used is explained in 
De Lisa, Zedda, Vallascas, Campolongo and Marchesi 
(2010) . 
Graph IV.2.1: EU public interventions in the banking sector as of 31/10/2010 (in % of GDP) 
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An important strength of the model is to use 
publicly available information to estimate each 
bank's portfolio riskiness and to use such 
information to compute a probability distribution 
of aggregate bank losses. The methodology does 
however also have some weaknesses. First, 
publicly available data on the banking system do 
not have sufficient coverage in all EU countries. 
Second, the model's calculations rely on how 
regulators model banks' losses when computing 
capital requirements. Third, the model does not 
directly include a link to the general economic 
situation. Finally, banks' capital requirements are 
not only composed of their credit risk component 
(although credit risk is normally a very 
preponderant part of capital requirements,) while 
SYMBOL currently assumes that all banks assets 
consist entirely of loans, so that all capital 
requirements are considered as for credit risk. 
The rest of this Chapter will briefly present the 
model methodology, discuss its weaknesses and its 
possible future developments, and present some 
results for four EU Member States (DE, IE, PT, 
SE) which are chosen for illustrative purposes. 
2.2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ISSUES 
SYMBOL estimates the systemic losses and 
liquidity shortfalls deriving from banks' defaults, 
explicitly linking Basel capital requirements to the 
other key tools of the banking safety net. These are 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS), aimed at 
protecting depositors, and bank Resolution Funds 
(RF), aimed at allowing the orderly resolution of 
failing banks blocking spill-over/contagion 
effects.(69) 
SYMBOL operates on the basis of two steps: i) the 
estimation of a default probability for the assets of 
any individual bank exploiting the features of the 
Basel FIRB loss distribution function; ii) the 
estimation of a distribution of aggregate losses by 
country on the basis of the individual banks' asset 
default probability. 
                                                          
(69) Resolution Funds are privately financed funds whose 
function is to support crisis management authorities in their 
effort to avoid contagion between banks and limiting 
systemic risk. These funds have already been created and 
financed in some EU Member States.  
The estimates of aggregate country-level 
distributions of bank losses are performed 
according to different regulatory and institutional 
scenarios. It is thus possible to provide an 
assessment of the relevance of potential bank 
losses on the public finances under different 
circumstances. 
Estimation of default probabilities of assets of 
individual banks  
This subsection describes the first step of the 
SYMBOL model which is to obtain the default 
probabilities of the assets of individual banks from 
the publicly available information on their 
accounts and on the regulatory framework. As the 
estimation possibilities are very much determined 
by the available data, the subsection also describes 
the data used to undertake this analysis and the 
simplifying assumptions that are necessary in order 
to use it which are key to gaining an understanding 
of both the scope and the limitations of the 
SYMBOL estimates. 
SYMBOL estimates the probability distribution of 
individual bank losses based mainly on two main 
sources of information: i) publicly available 
financial statements; and ii) publicly available 
regulatory capital requirements imposed by the 
national regulators from which it is possible to 
estimate  the implied average probability of default 
of the bank's asset/loan portfolio. Some 
explanatory preliminary comments are necessary 
concerning both of them. 
The main data source is Bankscope, a proprietary 
database of banks' financial statements produced 
by the private company Bureau van Dijk. The 
dataset covers a representative sample of banks in 
most EU countries. When needed and when 
possible, data are integrated with public 
information on bank's financial statements released 
by supervisory authorities and/or central banks.(70) 
In addition, ECB data have been used to complete 
or correct the dataset.(71) Table IV.2.1. presents 
                                                          
(70) The European Commission asked the Member States' 
supervisory authorities and/or central banks for data. 
Among the Member States used in the analysis presented in 
this Chapter, only Ireland provided the requested 
information. The Bankscope sample is sufficiently 
representative of the entire bank population in the 
remaining countries.  
(71) Data from the ECB have been used for the following 
purposes: i) in some cases missing values for certain key 
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aggregated information on a selection of key 
variables for the samples of banks used in the 
simulations. The year of reference is 2009. The 
first column of the Table shows the coverage of 
the samples, expressed as the percentage of total 
assets of the banks in the samples and an estimate 
of the total assets for the entire population of banks 
in each Member State. The latter is obtained from 
the 2010 ECB EU banking structures publication, 
and it is computed as the amount of total assets for 
all banks minus total assets of branches from 
branches abroad.(72) 
While the data coverage for the four the countries 
presented here is satisfactory, good levels of data 
coverage will have to be achieved for all EU 
countries for the exercise to be a helpful addition 
to the regular sustainability assessment within the 
EU. 
In terms of the timing of the assessments, as 
financial statements relative to a given year are 
usually prepared at the end of the fiscal year, the 
relevant data only become available in Bankscope 
around September of the following year. For this 
reason, the SYMBOL analysis in the current 
Chapter uses 2009 data, as the full set of 2010 data 
would only be available from end of September 
2011. 
Banks operate within a regulatory framework 
known as the Basel framework which imposes 
minimum capital requirements for credit risk that 
allow banks to absorb all unexpected losses with 
an ex ante 0.1% probability or more. Unexpected 
losses are computed by regulators by category of 
                                                                                   
variables from the Bankscope sample have been filled in 
using estimations obtained from the ECB aggregated data; 
ii) ECB data were used to assess the coverage of the 
Bankscope sample and to rescale SYMBOL results to the 
entire population of a country's banks; iii) to check on the 
reliability of data on interbank positions in Bankscope. 
(72) European Central Bank (2010). 
loans according to a standard statistical model of 
credit risk and an assessment made by each bank 
of the default probability of each loan class which 
is not made public. The model adopted by the 
regulators is public,(73) as are all relevant 
parameters used for its computation, with the 
exception of the default probabilities of the banks' 
obligors assessed by the banks themselves and 
validated by the regulators. SYMBOL estimates 
the implied average default probability of the 
obligors  which reflects the assessment of the 
banks – based on the assumption that banks' assets 
consist entirely of loans – using publicly available 
data on capital requirements and based on the 
values for the other parameters of the credit risk 
model set by the regulator.(74) 
The average probability of default of the credit 
portfolio of each bank is thus estimated 
consistently with capital requirements, while other 
variables (LGD, maturity, etc.) are set at their 
default values. 
This estimate can then be used to enter the second 
stage of the assessment which looks at the overall 
losses of all banks in an economy and is described 
in the next subsection. 
                                                          
(73) For the purposes of the SYMBOL model, unexpected 
losses are computed according to the Basel Foundation 
Internal Ratings Based (FIRB) formula, which is an 
industry model of credit risk. It is a calibrated version of 
the Vasicek model for portfolio losses, which is explained 
in more detail in Vasicek (1991). The recent revision of the 
Basel framework, known as Basel III, has modified some 
of the parameters of the FIRB formula and raised the 
standards banks' capital must satisfy in order to meet 
minimum capital requirements. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2005) discusses the Basel FIRB 
approach in more detail, while the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2010) provides details on the Basel 
III accord. 
(74) The other parameters set at their default values are the Loss 
Given Default (LGD) parameter, the correlation between 
banks' assets, maturity and other correction parameters. 
 
Table IV.2.1: Description of the samples used for the SYMBOL simulations, data as of end 2009 
Sample % 
Population 
Total Assets 
(m€)
Total Liabilities 
(m€)
Total Interbank 
Debt    (m€)
Total Interbank 
Credit   (m€)
Total Covered 
Deposits (m€)
Total Capital 
(m€)
DE 64.19% 4 648 331 4 415 620 1 086 016 790 975 1 093 841 232 711
IE ( 1 ) 101.91% 1 221 181 1 155 789 276 738 148 729 147 145 65 392
PT 66.49% 323 762 297 421 43 561 34 505 82 952 26 342
SE 52.37% 455 355 422 301 97 604 122 872 75 383 33 054
(1) Data for IE are from the Supervisory Authority 
Source: Bankscope, Eurostat 
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Computation of aggregate bank losses and 
the different scenarios 
At this point, the average probability of default of 
the credit portfolio of each bank is estimated. A 
distribution of individual bank losses can be 
computed on the basis of the estimated average 
probability of default of each individual bank's 
obligors.(75) This subsection describes how the 
estimated average probabilities of obligors' default 
are used in the second step to compute the 
individual distribution probabilities of banks' 
losses and the probability distribution of 
aggregated bank losses.  
It has to be noted that both the individual default 
probabilities of the banks and the aggregate loss 
probability cannot be computed independently 
from the default probabilities of other individual 
banks: the probability of default of each bank 
depends – via the interbank market – on the 
probability that other banks fail. The only case 
where this does not hold is the case of no 
contagion effect between the banks. The individual 
default probabilities of the banks (and the 
probability distribution of aggregate losses which 
result as the sum of them) can thus only be 
computed interactively with the probabilities of 
default of individual banks. The process is thus the 
following: probability distributions of defaults of 
individual banks are computed interactively and, at 
the end of the process, the probability distribution 
of aggregate losses is computed.  
More precisely, starting from the estimates of the 
average probability of default, SYMBOL generates 
individual bank credit losses via a Monte Carlo 
simulation according to the Basel II FIRB function 
loss distribution.  
Banks' simulated losses are then compared with 
banks' capital: whenever losses exceed capital, 
banks are considered to default. Individual banks' 
excess losses (i.e. losses exceeding banks’ total 
capital) are combined to gain an estimation of the 
overall aggregate bank excess losses for a given 
country.  
                                                          
(75) The probability of individual bank default is obviously 
different – even though related - from the probability of 
default of its obligors, because the former also depends 
inter alia, on i) the possibility that other banks fail and 
transmit their losses to the bank via the interbank market 
and ii) the functioning and the capacity of intervention of 
the regulatory system at large. 
The probability distribution of aggregate losses is 
computed under two possible conditions. The first 
is named "no-contagion": banks are considered to 
default in an orderly fashion with no contagion 
effects to other banks via the interbank market. 
The second is named "contagion": defaulting 
banks are considered to create contagion effects to 
other banks via the interbank market. This captures 
systemic linkages between banks which go beyond 
the correlations of their assets. (76)  
Whenever a bank defaults, it is assumed that 40% 
of the amount of its interbank debits are passed as 
losses to creditor banks and distributed among 
them.(77) Losses are distributed according to a 
criterion of proportionality: the portion of loss 
absorbed by each surviving bank is proportional to 
the share of its creditor exposure in the interbank 
market. A contagion effect is possible whenever 
with this additional loss causes other bank defaults, 
with several rounds being possible.  
Aggregated losses are finally obtained with and 
without contagion and are calculated as the sum of 
the losses in excess of banks' capital over the entire 
bank sample. Losses are then divided by the 
sample size in percentage of the population to 
obtain the aggregated loss distribution for the 
entire population. 
The following points should be noted: 
i) the SYMBOL model's simulations rely on the 
Vasicek model as calibrated by regulators in the 
FIRB loss distribution function. Potential issues 
linked to the characteristics of this formula and 
                                                          
(76) Only contagion via the domestic market is modelled in the 
current version of SYMBOL. The correlation between the 
assets of obligors appears in the Monte Carlo simulations: 
This simulation takes into account the correlation between 
the assets of different banks due to the presence of 
common shocks in the economy via the utilization of 
correlated distributions in the simulations. 
(77) Two assumptions made: the 40% percentage of interbank 
debits that are passed as losses to creditor banks in case of 
failure, and the criterion of proportionality used to 
distribute these losses across banks, which is dependent on 
the fact that a bank-to-bank interbank lending matrix is not 
available to the Commission. A loss of 40% on the 
interbank exposure is coherent with the upper bound of 
economic research on this issue. See e.g.: James (1991), 
Mistrulli (2007) and Upper and Worms (2004). Concerning 
the fact that the model distributes extra losses according to 
a criterion of proportionality, a sensitivity test has been 
developed which demonstrated that results of SYMBOL 
are not relevantly affected by this assumption. 
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whether its calibration is appropriate in 
representing credit risk can obviously have a 
strong influence the results of the simulations. 
ii) banks' capital requirements are not only 
composed of their credit risk component. There are 
capital requirements that derive from market risk 
and operational risk. The main assumption 
currently behind SYMBOL is that banks assets 
consist entirely of loans, so that all capital 
requirements are considered as for credit risk. 
Except for very large banks with extensive and 
complex trading activities, this assumption is not 
excessively distortive as the credit risk component 
of capital requirements usually accounts for a very 
large share of total capital requirements.(78)  
iii) the estimated average obligors' default 
probability by bank is based on the assessment 
made by banks and validated by the regulators. If 
banks and regulators wrongly assess the quality of 
a certain category of loans for a given bank this is 
reflected in the estimates of the model. 
iv) a split of assets/loans into classes for which 
different obligors' specific probabilities of default 
are computed, would be desirable in order to refine 
the results of the simulations. However, the 
currently available public information contained in 
the Bankscope database does not allow this as the 
information on the split of capital requirements per 
asset class is needed.  
The impact of aggregate bank losses on 
government finances 
Once the aggregate bank loss estimates are 
obtained, it is possible to extrapolate and estimate 
the potential risk for public finances deriving from 
default in the banking sector. This subsection 
explains how such estimation is made.  
The underlying assumption used is that losses 
generated in the banking system are first covered 
by banks' capital and, when this is insufficient, by 
the various tools present in the regulatory financial 
safety net. It is then assumed that the losses that 
                                                          
(78) The Bankscope database reports the split of the minimum 
capital requirements among credit risk, market risk, and 
operational risk. The average shares (over the entire 
Bankscope sample) of minimum capital requirements for 
each of these classes are 89.16%, 7.67% and 3.18% 
respectively. 
cannot be absorbed by these instruments are 
covered by the government balances, where 
possible, as has occurred in the current financial 
crisis. The subsection presents estimates of the 
magnitude of the burden on the public finances for 
the four countries under consideration, namely 
Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden. 
The sequence assumed in the analysis is that when 
losses from obligors materialise, they are first 
covered with bank's capital (given by the sum of 
minimum capital required by regulation plus 
excess capital, if any.) If this capital is not 
sufficient, the bank defaults and the DGS/RF are 
called upon to intervene respectively to ensure that 
covered depositors are unaffected and the orderly 
resolution of the defaulting bank in order to 
prevent contagion effects. In the event that the 
DGS/RF funds are not sufficient to absorb the 
losses, it is assumed that these pass through to the 
government finances, as has occurred in the 
current financial crisis.(79) 
The model estimates the probability that public 
finances are hit by bank losses. It also estimates 
the amount of funds that should be injected into 
the banking system by public interventions when 
the protection given by all existing tools of the 
financial safety net have been exhausted. 
The assumption is made that the total amount of 
funds available for DGS and RF is the higher of 
1.5% of covered deposits and 0.3% of total non-
equity liabilities of the banking system in any EU 
Member State.(80) Therefore the total amount of 
DGS+RF in the four considered MS is  31.308 
million euro for Germany, 3.423 million euro for 
Ireland, 1.686 million for Portugal and 2.510 
million for Sweden. 
The model is run under different regulatory and 
effectiveness settings, obtained by modifying some 
                                                          
(79) DGS and RF are assumed to cover part of the excess losses 
deriving from bank defaults in order to protect depositors 
and block spill-over/contagion effects respectively. 
Liquidity effects deriving from bank defaults are assumed 
to be neutralised by the intervention of a third party 
liquidity provider such as a central bank. 
(80) Rules on the determination of the total amounts of funds 
available to DGS and RF in each MS are still under 
negotiation in the Council and Parliament. The rule used 
here for simulation purposes does not necessarily reflect 
the final form of the rule as it will eventually be adopted. 
Results could be subject to change depending on the final 
form of the rule. 
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of the assumptions that underlie it, so that various 
scenarios are possible. We present five scenarios, 
resulting from the combination of four factors: 
capital requirements, DGS/RF, the bail-in 
arrangements, contagion effects between banks. In 
more details, the factors considered are: 
i) banks can be considered as needing to meet 
Basel II requirements, which are satisfied by their 
2009 capital without the need for 
recapitalization,(81) or they can be required to 
recapitalize in order to meet minimum capital 
requirements based on new and stricter definitions 
of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) and capital 
provided under Basel III. Within the Basel III 
definition, minimum capital requirements can be 
set at their current 8% level of RWA  or banks can 
be assumed to be asked to hold a capital 
conservation buffer so that their minimum capital 
ratio reaches 10.5%.(82) 
ii) DGS/RF can be set up or not , i.e. part of the 
losses can or cannot be absorbed by these two 
entities.(83) 
                                                          
(81) Effective capital for SYMBOL simulation purposes is in 
this case calculated based on the 2009 publicly reported 
capital and an estimate of the effects of applying the new 
Basel III definitions of capital and RWA, without 
recapitalizing. Estimates of the impacts of the new 
definitions on 2009 capital levels are based on results of 
the comprehensive quantitative impact study by the 
European Banking Authority. 
(82) SYMBOL can currently take account of the consequences 
of the introduction with Basel III of changes in the 
definition of capital and of RWA in the trading book, 
securitisation and counterparty risk, as well as the 
introduction of the capital conservation buffer. The 
leverage ratio and the new measures on liquidity could 
possibly be factored into the methodology on the basis of 
how they modify contagion between banks via the 
interbank market. 
(83) Given the purpose of the RF, which is to allow the orderly 
resolution of banks, the absorption of losses can also be 
seen as associated to the move from a situation where 
contagion between banks takes place to another where 
contagion does not take place. 
iii) settings are presented that differ with respect to 
the existence of a legal framework able to ensure 
that part of the losses of defaulted banks can be 
effectively bailed in. In particular, in the bail in 
setting, bondholders and non-covered depositors 
(84) are assumed to absorb bank losses out of the 
scope of intervention of DGS/RF.(85) In the no bail 
in setting, it is assumed that DGS + RF are unable 
to intervene in a selective way, so that they end up 
also covering the exposure of bondholders and 
non-covered depositors of the defaulting banks.(86) 
iv) the presence or absence of contagion effects is 
also considered. 
Five scenarios are presented in Table IV.2.2, with 
scenario 1 representing the highest public finance 
risk and scenario 4a the lowest. 
The scenarios provide an illustration of the effects 
that the various regulatory measures aimed at 
strengthening the financial safety net might have 
on the public finances. In the riskiest scenario 
banks are assumed to satisfy capital requirements 
with capital considered according to the less 
stringent definition of Basel II. DGS/RF are not 
considered to be in place, there is no bail in and 
contagion effects are assumed to exist. In the least 
risky scenario, banks are assumed to satisfy a 
minimum capital requirement of 10.5% 
(representing the fact that a capital conservation 
                                                          
(84) Depositors covered by DGS are only eligible depositors up 
to 100,000 EUR. Non-eligible depositors are for example 
credit institutions, other financial institutions, insurances 
and pension funds. 
(85) The share of losses belonging to bondholders and non-
covered depositors is estimated on as the ratio between the 
amount of bonds plus non-covered deposits and total non-
equity liabilities. 
(86) Note that in the No Bail-In scenario potential dynamic 
moral hazard problems arising from the coverage of the 
losses of all bank creditors by DGS and RF are currently 
not considered. Note also that in the bail in setting, once 
the DGS + RF funds are exhausted, the State intervenes to 
absorb with the same modalities of the DGS + RF, i.e. not 
absorbing losses hitting bondholders and non-covered 
depositors. 
 
Table IV.2.2: Scenarios definition 
Basel 3
10.50%
1 X X X X
2 X X X X
3 X X X X
4 X X X X
4a X X X X
Capital Setting DGS/RF Setting Bail in Contagion
Scenario Basel 2 Basel 3 8% No NoYes Yes No Yes
Source: Commission services. 
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buffer is introduced on top of the 8% capital 
requirement,) with capital considered according to 
the more stringent definition of Basel III. DGS/RF 
are also considered to be in place, part of the losses 
is absorbed by bondholders/non-eligible depositors 
(bail in) and the legal framework is able to block 
contagion effects between banks. In between the 
most and least risky scenarios, there are three 
scenarios where banks start recapitalizing 
according to the new Basel III rules but without 
holding the capital conservation buffer, and DGS 
and RF are in place (contagion and no contagion 
are both considered, as well bail in and no bail in.) 
Scenario 1 represents the situation at the beginning 
of the crisis, scenario 2 represents the situation as 
it is now, with some elements of Basel III 
introduced but without a functioning RF to stop 
contagion. Scenario 3 represents the situation in 
which a RF is introduced, thus eliminating 
contagion. Scenario 4 is like scenario 3, but with 
the successful implementation of bail in. Scenario 
4a is like scenario 4, but with all banks increasing 
their capital to comply with the countercyclical 
buffer.(87) 
2.3. RESULTS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
ASSESSMENT 
Aggregate loss distributions computed using 
SYMBOL are used to assess sustainability of 
government finances with respect to defaults in the 
banking system generated by credit risk by looking 
at three indicators. 
The main basis for an assessment is the 
distribution of costs for public finances which is 
presented in Table IV.2.3. The table presents 
selected percentiles of the probability distribution 
of the costs for government finances, starting from 
the last decile. To facilitate the reading of the 
results, costs have been expressed as percentage of 
                                                          
(87) The possible regular utilization of SYMBOL in the 
sustainability assessment will require a detailed by country 
analysis of the regulatory framework, in order to represent 
at best the reality of the countries. For example, the 
Commission is currently preparing a legislative proposal 
aiming at reinforcing bank supervision and at introducing 
resolution mechanisms. The implementation of such a 
provision would change the situation within the EU 
towards scenario V, the least costly for government 
finances. This proposal, if enacted, would certainly have an 
effect on the results of the model. 
GDP. Given that the bank data refer to 2009, 2009 
GDP has been chosen. In the estimation of costs, 
the distribution of banking system losses is 
rescaled on the basis of the size of the sample 
employed (see Table IV.2.1) in order to make data 
comparable and to evaluate the costs to the public 
finances with respect to GDP.  
The table can be read in the following way: in the 
case of Germany under scenario 1, with probability 
99% the costs for the German government from an 
aggregate failure of banks is below 0.1% of GDP 
(clearly with a probability of 1% losses would be 
larger.) 
A comparison across countries requires attention: 
for example, the expected loss cannot be read as an 
indication of the riskiness of the country because 
countries with better regulatory system will tend to 
have higher average losses.  Indeed a good 
regulatory system will cover small losses (which 
happen with much higher probability) and will 
only leave big losses, thus increasing the average 
loss. The comparisons of values at the same 
percentile or of averages conditional at a given 
percentile are correct. 
Some indicators of sustainability 
The first indication of the risk run by government 
finances is the probability that the public finances 
are hit by losses deriving from bank defaults, with 
the caveat expressed above (for a precise definition 
see Box IV.2.1.) These probabilities are presented 
in Graph IV.2.2. They are derived from the 
information presented in Table IV.2.3 by looking 
at the probability of having any loss occurring in 
any of the five scenarios.  
This indicator shows that, both in the previous 
regulatory situation (as modelled by scenario 1) 
and in the current one (as modelled by scenario 2,) 
Ireland and Portugal have a relatively high 
probability of being in the situation where 
government finances have to cover losses 
generated in the bank system.(88) This indicator, 
however, does not yield much information on the 
size of the losses that might hit the public finances 
                                                          
(88) It should be borne in mind that in the current analysis it is 
assumed that liquidity is not provided by the government 
finances, as it is stated above. 
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and reflects the cases of relatively small losses 
from minor defaults in the banking sector.  
A second more informative indicator is to see the 
loss which the countries might face in the current 
regulatory situation (as modelled by scenario 2) 
 
Table IV.2.3: Selected percentiles of the distribution of costs for public finances (% 2009 GDP) 
DE IE
Scenario 1 2 3 4 4a 1 2 3 4 4a
90 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
95 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
97 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 42.77% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.25 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 45.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.5 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 47.73% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.75 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 52.20% 3.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.9 13.55% 12.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 56.53% 40.98% 0.54% 0.00% 0.00%
99.925 14.97% 13.49% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 57.94% 43.25% 1.15% 0.00% 0.00%
99.95 16.36% 14.92% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 59.92% 46.30% 2.09% 0.00% 0.00%
99.975 17.90% 16.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 63.25% 50.60% 3.91% 0.05% 0.00%
99.99 19.50% 18.08% 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 67.97% 55.45% 6.59% 1.02% 0.29%
99.995 20.76% 19.34% 0.74% 0.00% 0.00% 71.66% 59.22% 9.09% 1.93% 1.14%
99.999 24.05% 22.71% 2.81% 0.71% 0.76% 81.95% 69.24% 15.65% 4.31% 3.38%
PT SE
Scenario 1 2 3 4 4a 1 2 3 4 4a
90 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
95 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
97 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.25 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.5 0.68% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.75 3.24% 0.59% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.9 8.55% 3.12% 0.59% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.925 9.95% 4.39% 1.06% 0.00% 0.00% 2.27% 1.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.95 11.56% 6.72% 1.76% 0.14% 0.00% 3.34% 2.48% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
99.975 13.83% 9.81% 3.03% 0.66% 0.03% 5.49% 4.64% 0.91% 0.00% 0.00%
99.99 16.66% 12.94% 4.86% 1.42% 0.72% 19.94% 19.08% 2.55% 0.52% 0.35%
99.995 19.06% 15.52% 6.44% 2.07% 1.32% 22.23% 21.37% 3.96% 1.08% 0.88%
99.999 24.95% 21.60% 10.51% 3.75% 2.93% 27.22% 26.36% 7.74% 2.61% 2.37%
Source: Commission services 
 
Graph IV.2.2: Probability of public finances being hit by losses deriving from banks' default 
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with a given probability, such as 0.1%.(89) As 
Table IV.2.3 shows, in this very unlikely situation 
Ireland would be exposed to a very burden on its 
public finances, equal to 40.98% of GDP, which is 
mostly related to the possibility of contagion 
between banks. This latter point can be seen by the 
fact that the value of the burden decreases by two 
orders of magnitudes in Scenario 3. 
A third sustainability indicator is the probability 
that, due to a banking crisis hitting public finances, 
a MS becomes high risk in terms of the 
sustainability indicator S2. This corresponds to the 
probability that S2 exceeds 6%.(90) As a first 
approximation we assume that all costs due to 
losses in the banking system are paid by Member 
State in the current year thus increasing the 
primary deficit by a corresponding amount.(91) 
Table IV.2.4 presents the results for the four 
Member States under consideration. 
This indicator, under scenario 2, gives a relatively 
high probability that Ireland and Portugal become 
high risk. Once again Sweden emerges as a 
relatively safe country as far as the risks to the 
public finances coming from the banking sector 
are concerned. 
2.4. CONCLUSIONS 
SYMBOL allows the estimate of aggregate bank 
losses which have potentially to be borne by 
government finances, as occurred in recent years. 
As the analysis of Chapter IV.3 will show, the 
assessment of the riskiness of a country's 
government debt is also influenced by variables 
                                                          
(89) A default rate of 0.1% corresponds a rating class in 
between A- and BBB+ in the Standard & Poor 
classification - see Standard and Poor’s (2009). 
(90) See European Commission (2009).  
(91) Potential impacts on interest on the government debt might 
also be included. 
additional to traditional government fiscal 
variables. SYMBOL allows this by using only 
publicly available information and is therefore a 
strong tool to be used in such an assessment. 
While the model has weak points, certain 
weaknesses can be addressed. In particular work 
can be undertaken along two lines: first, co-
operation with national regulators will be 
important in addressing data issue. Second, the 
relationship between average default probabilities 
and macro-economic scenarios has to be explored, 
in order to extend the areas in which SYMBOL 
can be used. 
Given the value of the S2 indicator as of 2009, the 
threshold to become high risk is computed as 
(max(6% - S2(2009),0)) * GDP(2009). 
In each scenario the probability that losses hitting 
the public finances are higher than a defined 
threshold gives the probability that a MS would be 
classed as high risk in terms of S2, or if it is 
already high risk, that its sustainability worsens.  
 
 
 
Table IV.2.4:  Probability of becoming high-risk due to a banking crisis 
6-S2
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 4a (% of GDP)
DE 0.11% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.80%
IE ( 1 ) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -9.00%
PT 0.49% 0.25% 0.09% 0.02% 0.01% 0.50%
SE 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.20%
Probability S2>6%Country
Source: Commission services 
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 Box IV.2.1: Definition of the probability that government finances are hit by losses deriving 
from banks defaults.
This probability PPF is taken from distribution of banking system losses and is obtained as follows  
Scenario 1: Denoting by L(c) the distribution of banking system losses with contagion under the considered 
setting (Basel 2 definition of capital, capital at least equal to 8% of their RWA, No RF/DGS and No Bail-In) 
we have that: 
PPF = P[L(c)(Basel 2)>0]. 
Scenario 2: banks comply with stricter Basel 3 rules for capital with a capital at least equal to 8% of their 
RWA. RF/DGS are in place and absorb losses up to their available funds, FDGS/RF. However they are not 
effective in blocking contagion effects. Thus we have: 
PPF = P[L(c)(Basel 3, no countercyclical buffer) – FDGS/RF>0]. 
Scenario 3: the presence of DGS/RF becomes effective in blocking contagion, thus we use the distribution 
of losses without contagion (L(nc)) to estimate the probability that public finances need to cover losses: 
PPF = P[L(nc)(Basel 3, no countercyclical buffer) – FDGS/RF>0]. 
Scenario 4: part of the losses is absorbed by bondholders and non-eligible depositors, or in other words 
DGS/RF only absorb losses there are in theory responsible for: 
PPF = P[L(nc)(Basel 3, no buffer) α– FDGS/RF>0],  
  α = (Covered Deposits + Interbank Debts)/(Total liabilities) 
Scenario 5: banks hold the capital conservation buffer: 
PPF = P[L(nc)(Basel 3, buffer) α– FDGS/RF>0],  
 α = (Covered Deposits + Interbank Debts)/(Total liabilities) 
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3.1. FISCAL CRISIS RISK MODELS IN 
SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORKS AND EARLY WARNING 
SYSTEMS 
Fiscal crisis risk models aim at a timely detection 
of risks of debt distress. 
Such models are currently used within two 
different institutional frameworks. First, they are 
taken into consideration by the IMF as providing 
complementary information to the framework used 
for assessing external and fiscal sustainability 
(DSA) in the context of Fund-supported 
programmes and Article IV surveillance.(92) As the 
DSA is designed to support informed judgements 
on sustainability, fiscal crisis risk models can 
contribute relevant additional information by 
determining critical thresholds for a set of 
variables and for composite indicators combining 
them. This type of analysis can aid the 
understanding of fiscal crisis risks, although 
country-specific expertise also plays an important 
role. 
Second, fiscal crisis risk models have recently 
become a building block of the so called joint 
IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise (EWE:)(93) this 
was created upon the request of the G-20 in 2008 
as the crisis showed the need to improve policy-
makers' ability to spot risks and vulnerabilities 
quickly, in order to be able to coordinate early 
policy responses.  
This Chapter presents a fiscal crisis risk model 
based on the non-parametric "signals approach" 
used in the IMF-FSB EWE. The model provides 
thresholds, based on past behaviour, beyond which 
fiscal crisis signals are detected for: 1) each 
individual variable included in the analysis, 2) a 
composite indicator incorporating all variables, 3) 
thematic composite indicators referring to different 
subsets of variables (fiscal, financial and 
competitiveness variables.) 
                                                          
(92) The DSA is very similar to regular DG ECFIN's own debt 
sustainability framework as it is based on baseline 
medium-term debt projections and a standard set of 
calibrated sensitivity tests. A detailed description of the 
DSA is provided in IMF (2008), IMF (2003b) and IMF 
(2002). 
(93) See IMF (2010). 
The signals approach produces an indicator of a 
country's fiscal crisis vulnerability based on the 
values of selected relevant variables. The 
methodology allows the consideration (and 
aggregation into an overall index) of a large set of 
variables, thus permitting a rather comprehensive 
analysis of underlying vulnerabilities. Using the 
results obtained for the overall vulnerability 
indicator and the thematic indicators to give 
concrete guidance in a SAF requires careful 
consideration of which variables drive the outcome 
of the exercise on a country by country basis. This 
in turn is an exercise in judgement, making the 
signals approach an instrument that is best used at 
the beginning of the assessment procedure.  
Guidance as to how the results obtained with this 
methodology could be used in a regular fiscal 
crisis early warning exercise is provided in this 
Chapter. The overall indicator of fiscal crisis 
vulnerability is computed for a selected sample of 
countries in each year and is compared against the 
critical threshold identified. Indicator values 
beyond the threshold for a country in a given year 
provide warnings of fiscal crisis risks for the 
following year. The values of thematic indicators 
(grouping different subsets of variables – fiscal, 
financial, competitiveness) and of the individual 
variables themselves relative to their respective 
thresholds are also used to complete the picture of 
the sources of vulnerabilities and to highlight areas 
where early policy intervention might be required. 
Finally, alongside the analysis of values taken 
against critical thresholds at a certain point in time, 
the monitoring at country level should also pay 
attention to the evolution of the fiscal crisis 
vulnerability indicator over time, with increases in 
the value of the indicator highlighting increased 
vulnerability. This is of course also relevant in 
cases where countries remain below the critical 
threshold of fiscal crisis risk. 
3.2. THE "SIGNALS APPROACH": DESCRIPTION 
OF THE METHODOLOGY 
The fiscal crisis risk model we have developed is 
based on the non-parametric "signals approach" 
pioneered by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 
(1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and 
used in a number of early warning systems for 
different types of crises, including currency, 
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banking, fiscal crises.(94) Interesting work using 
this approach for the identification of fiscal crises 
has recently been conducted at the IMF (Baldacci, 
Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu and Mazraani 
(2011).) 
The signals approach is based on the observation 
that economies behave in a systematically different 
way in periods preceding crisis events. The 
methodology allows the identification of 
indicators, among a set of selected relevant 
variables, whose anomalous behaviour could hint 
at a developing crisis. By including a large set of 
variables in the analysis the model can usefully 
provide a relatively objective and systematic 
starting point for crisis prediction. (95) The 
methodology is based on three steps: first, a set of 
variables is chosen, which are thought to be 
relevant for prompting fiscal crises; second, the 
triggering thresholds are determined in order to 
maximize the signalling power of the model; third, 
variables are aggregated into a composite indicator 
of fiscal crisis vulnerability. The monitoring of 
fiscal developments aimed at an early detection of 
possible fiscal stress can then be implemented. 
The methodology rests on prior decisions to be 
made about four elements of the analysis: i) the 
exact definition of a crisis; ii) a list of the main 
variables correlated with crisis events that are to be 
analysed; iii) a criterion to calculate the threshold 
for each variable so that for values of the variable 
above (below) the threshold a crisis signal is sent; 
iv) the determination of the "signalling window", 
i.e. the horizon ahead of the observation of the 
variables over which the crisis prediction is to be 
extended. 
3.2.1. The definition of fiscal crisis 
Among the possible definitions of fiscal crisis 
proposed in the literature,(96) the analysis used in 
                                                          
(94) Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) focussed respectively on currency 
crises and on banking and currency crises; currency, 
banking and debt crises are the object of analysis in 
Hemming, R., Kell, M., and A. Schhimmelpfennig (2003); 
sovereign debt crises are analysed in Manasse, P., Roubini, 
N., and A. Schimmelpfennig (2003); financial crises are the 
focus of the analysis in Brüggermann, A. and T. Linne 
(2002).  
(95) Hemming, R., Kell, M., and A. Schhimmelpfennig (2003). 
(96) Hemming et al. (2003) define debt crises as events that take 
place when one or both of the following conditions apply: 
1. there are arrears of principal or interest on external 
this Chapter is based on the definition used in 
Baldacci et al. (2011). Accordingly, a crisis 
episode is identified if any of the four following 
criteria is satisfied: 
• the yearly inflation rate is above 35%, 
capturing a moderate implicit default event (97) 
(as the analysis presented here looks at EU 
countries plus a small number of other 
advanced economies, this threshold is applied 
to all countries, including Eastern European 
countries. This is different from Baldacci et al., 
where the 35% threshold is used only for 
advanced economies with a 500% threshold 
being used for emerging economies, including 
most Eastern European countries;) 
• sovereign bond yield spreads are two standard 
deviations above the country-specific mean (or 
exceed 1,000 basis points for emerging 
economies), highlighting significant market 
financing pressure;(98)  
• public debt default is reported based on 
Standard &Poor's definition (including failure 
to service debt as payments come due and 
distressed debt exchanges), or a 
restructuring/rescheduling is reported (defined 
as any operation altering the terms of the debt-
creditor contract;) 
• a large-scale IMF-supported programme is in 
place, defined as one with access to more than 
100% of the country quota (typically non-
concessional loans as part of an adjustment 
                                                                                   
private and public debt to commercial creditors of more 
than 5% of total outstanding public and private external 
debt; 2. there is a rescheduling or debt restructuring 
agreement with commercial creditors from the World Bank 
Global Development Finance database. Manasse et al. 
(2003) define sovereign debt crises as cases where: 1. 
countries are classified as being in default based on S&P; 
2. countries receive large non-concessional IMF loans with 
access to more than 100% of quota.  
(97) Baldacci et al. (2011) justify this threshold based on the 
average haircut on debt in case of external debt 
restructuring as from Sturzenegger, F., and J. Zettelmeyer 
(2006). 
(98) More precisely this is computed by taking both annual and 
monthly data on yields spreads and considering that a given 
year is a crisis event if the annual data exceeded either two 
standard deviations (in terms of annual data) or 10 percent, 
or the monthly data exceeded the thresholds (with standard 
deviation calculated using the monthly data) for at least 6 
months of the year. 
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programme.) Such a case is thought of as an 
implicit default that was only avoided through 
the adjustment programme and a large financial 
package from the IMF. 
The consideration of sovereign bond yield spreads 
is the main novelty of the fiscal crisis definition 
introduced by Baldacci et al. This allows to 
capture severe fiscal distress events that do not 
result into defaults, implicit defaults or 
restructuring and would therefore be missed by the 
definition of fiscal crisis traditionally used in the 
literature. 
3.2.2. The set of variables used to predict fiscal 
crises 
Two groups of variables are used in the analysis 
presented here: purely fiscal variables 
(complemented by a variable, the projected old-
age dependency ratio, capturing demographic 
trends relevant for age-related public expenditure) 
and macro-financial variables. This acknowledges 
the role played by general macroeconomic, 
financial and competitiveness variables in the run 
up to fiscal crises. The precise set of indicators 
currently used has been selected based on 
theoretical considerations, the analysis of the 
behaviour of the variables on the eve of fiscal 
crises and performance in terms of fiscal crisis 
prediction in the context of the applied 
methodology. A summary of the data is given in 
Table IV.3.1. Other variables could of course be 
considered and tested in the future in the 
perspective of obtaining the best performing 
composite indicator of fiscal crisis vulnerability.  
General government gross debt (and its change), 
short-term debt, balance and primary balance, 
cyclically adjusted balance, change in expenditure 
and in final consumption expenditure of general 
government, change in projected age-related public 
expenditure are among the fiscal variables we 
selected (see Table IV.3.1 for the full list of 
variables.)(99) By applying the methodology to 
                                                          
(99) To predict fiscal crises, the following set of fiscal variables 
is used in Baldacci et al. (2011): general government gross 
debt, cyclically adjusted primary balance, interest rate-
growth rate differential, gross financing needs, share of 
short-term debt, share of debt held by non-residents, 
weighted average maturity of general government debt, 
long-term projected change in public health expenditure 
and public pension expenditure, together with fertility rate 
and old-age dependency ratio. As predictors of debt crises, 
these variables, the objective is to assess by how 
much they deteriorated on the eve of past fiscal 
crises and translate this into a threshold for each 
variable beyond which a fiscal crisis signal would 
be sent in the context of an early warning exercise. 
Among the macro-financial variables that we 
analyse are net financial assets of the total 
economy, net savings of households and non-
financial corporations, private sector debt, net 
acquisition of financial assets for the private 
sector, leverage of financial corporations, short-
term debt of non-financial corporations, and 
competitiveness variables like the change in the 
real effective exchange rate, the change in nominal 
unit labour costs and the current account. 
3.2.3. The method used to calculate the 
thresholds 
The signals approach is designed to find an 
optimal threshold (for each variable included in the 
analysis) that maximises the ability to predict a 
crisis based on the value taken by the variable. 
This requires the following steps. First, it is 
understood that a variable will be sending a "crisis 
signal" when it takes a value above (below) such 
optimal threshold (depending on the variable,)(100) 
while a signal of no crisis will be sent with a value 
below (above) the same threshold. Second, using 
historical data signals sent by the variable for the 
different countries and years are compared to the 
crisis definition. A signal is correct when for the 
country in question the variable indicated a crisis 
(non-crisis) year and indeed the year following that 
in which the signal is recorded turns out to be a 
crisis (non-crisis) year. On the contrary, a signal is 
wrong when the variable signalled no crisis ahead 
of a crisis year (type II error) and when it signalled 
a crisis ahead of a non-crisis year (type I 
error.) (101) The optimal threshold is chosen in a 
                                                                                   
Hemming et al. (2003) use among others the following 
fiscal variables: overall balance, primary balance, debt, 
short-term debt, foreign debt, total expenditure, interest 
expenditure, defence expenditure, social expenditure, total 
revenue, non-tax revenue. 
(100) For the change in public debt over GDP, for instance, a 
value above the optimal threshold would signal a fiscal 
crisis, while for the general government balance over GDP 
a value below the optimal threshold is taken as a crisis 
signal. 
(101) Thus type I errors are the false positive signals that the 
variable sends and type II errors are the false negative 
signals sent by the variable 
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way to minimise the share of not signalled crises 
plus the share of non-crises signalled as crises (see 
Box IV.3.1 for more details.)(102) 
3.3. A COMPOSITE INDICATOR OF FISCAL 
CRISIS VULNERABILITY 
Results obtained through the application of the 
methodology described above can be used to 
construct a composite indicator of vulnerability to 
a fiscal crisis by incorporating all the variables 
listed in Table IV.3.1.(103) When a variable signals 
a crisis, the variable indicator is set to 1. Then this 
indicator is weighted by the predictive power of 
the variable, computed as one minus the sum of 
type I and type II errors. Finally, the composite 
indicator is obtained by summing all these 
weighted indicators, and normalising the sum of 
the weights to 1. This last step is done by dividing 
each predictive power by the sum of the predictive 
powers of all the variables that are available for 
this country and year (see Box IV.3.2 for more 
details.) As the value of the fiscal crisis 
vulnerability indicator for a certain country and 
year is obtained by summing weighted signals sent 
by the variables available for this particular 
country and year, the value of the indicator will be 
higher the greater the number of variables that are 
"flashing" in correspondence to that country/year, 
signalling a crisis for the following year, and the 
higher the predictive power of the flashing 
variables (i.e. the variables' estimated ability to 
send the right signals.) 
The methodology to determine the thresholds can 
be in turn applied also to the composite indicator. 
                                                          
(102) As data for the  variables at time t are used to predict 
outcomes (crisis/no crisis) one year ahead, at t+1 a 
technical issue arises in that it has to be decided if only first 
years of crisis episodes are used for the calculation of the 
thresholds or all crisis years. The first option was retained. 
Thresholds calculated by using only the first years of crisis 
are preferable in that they are consistent with an exercise of 
fiscal crisis prediction starting from "normal times". The 
calculation of thresholds based on all crisis years has the 
advantage of relying on a larger information set (thus 
producing results that tend to be more sTable) but is 
spurious in terms of possible interpretation of results 
obtained (the approach reflects the idea of crisis prediction 
starting from a year that could be of crisis or non-crisis 
without distinguishing between the two, while a difference 
in terms of variables' behaviour between the two cases is to 
be expected).  
(103) This is standard practice. See Baldacci et al. (2011), IMF 
(2010) and Reinhart et al.(2000). 
A value of the fiscal crisis vulnerability indicator 
beyond the optimal threshold for a certain 
country/year would then provide a signal of 
incoming fiscal crisis in the country in question for 
the following year.  
Given that we use different subsets of variables 
(fiscal, financial-competitiveness) as possible 
predictors of fiscal crises, thematic composite 
indicators are also constructed (exactly in the same 
way as the overall indicator) with regard to each of 
these subgroups, on top of the overall composite 
indicator.(104) By analysing values taken by these 
thematic indicators for each country/year, 
information can be derived on the type of 
vulnerabilities (fiscal, financial, competitiveness) 
that are behind fiscal crisis risks signalled by the 
overall indicator. 
3.4. DATA AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
3.4.1. The data 
The analysis is based on a panel of 33 countries 
(all EU countries except CY, LU and MT, and 
other nine advanced economies.)(105) Data come 
from AMECO, the IMF's World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) and the Bank for International 
Settlements. Table IV.3.1 report the source and 
descriptive statistics of each series used. 
Whenever possible we used time series covering 
the period 1970-2010 but for a number of variables 
data are only available starting from 1995. Data for 
2010 or 2009-10 were extrapolated for some 
variables for which observations were missing.(106) 
                                                          
(104) For the time being we have constructed a single composite 
indicator for financial-competitiveness variables given the 
limited number of competitiveness variables we currently 
have. Distinguishing between the two would anyway be 
preferable, depending on a sufficient number of variables 
becoming available. 
(105) CY, LU and MT are excluded from the sample as we 
currently miss the necessary information on recorded fiscal 
crisis events over the past four decades. The other 9 
advanced economies included in the analysis are: Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, US. 
(106) If both 2009 and 2010 values were missing, and if the 
variable represented a net stock or flow of financial assets 
or a net saving rate, then these two missing values were set 
equal to the 2008 value. If 2010 only was missing, it was 
set equal to the average of the previous 3 years (except for 
the stock or flow of financial assets for which the 2009 
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 The identification of fiscal crisis events over the 
time interval 1970-2010 is borrowed from 
Baldacci et al. (as already said, slightly revised to 
account for the different application of the 
                                                                                   
value was taken.) These assumptions practically do not 
affect the optimal thresholds when using a one-year 
signalling window as the 2010 values of the variables do 
not enter into the computation. 
inflation rate criterion.)(107) The sample contains 
143 fiscal crisis years regrouped in 54 episodes, 
leading to an average duration of about 3 years for 
each crisis episode. There are however 21 one-year 
episodes. The number of countries (per year) 
                                                          
(107) As specified in Baldacci et al. (2011), data on debt default 
and restructuring were obtained from S&P; information on 
exceptional IMF-supported programmes comes from the 
IMF's Finance Department database; data on sovereign 
bond yields at annual and monthly frequencies were 
obtained from IMF's International Financial Statistics 
(IFS), Bloomberg and Datastream. 
 
Table IV.3.1: Descriptive statistics and sources 
variable mean sd min p10 median p90 max no. obs source
AMECO, 
WEO
AMECO,
WEO
AMECO,
WEO
AMECO,
WEO
AMECO,
WEO
AMECO, 
WEO
Short-term debt, gov't, % GDP 10.1 8.7 0 2.3 7.7 22.4 54 548 BIS
Net debt, % GDP 28.4 49.4 -208.4 -13.9 35.7 82.9 119.3 586 WEO
AMECO, 
WEO
AMECO, 
WEO
Change in final consumption 
expenditure of gen. gov't, % GDP 0.2 1 -7.9 -0.7 0.1 1.2 7.2 906 AMECO
Net financial assets, total economy, % 
GDP -24.1 38.5 -174.8 -77.4 -17.7 18.4 74.5 342 AMECO
Net savings of households, % GDP 4 4.8 -16.3 -1.6 4.1 8.6 22.2 591 AMECO
Net savings of non-financial 
corporations, % GDP 3.7 3.7 -7.6 -0.4 3.5 7.8 35.4 551 AMECO
Private sector debt, % GDP 113.6 63.1 2.3 35.6 117.6 202.3 331.6 335 EUROSTAT
AMECO, 
WEO
Leverage, financial corporations 6.2 3.5 1.6 3.1 5 10.8 21.3 344 AMECO
Short-term debt, non-financial corp., % 
GDP 1.6 1.8 0 0.1 1.2 3.3 13.2 327 BIS
Real short-term interest rate 2.1 3.9 -23.3 -2 2.2 6.3 20.1 833 AMECO
Construction, % value added 6.6 1.6 2.7 4.8 6.5 8.8 13.5 1010 AMECO
Current account, % GDP -1.5 5.5 -26.9 -7.8 -1.4 4.5 17.9 912 WEO
Avg growth rate of real effective 
exchange rate, based on exports 
deflator, ref 35 countries
1.3 3 -5.9 -1.9 0.9 5 13.1 372 AMECO
Average growth rate of nominal unit 
labour costs over last 3 years 7.6 14.9 -3.4 0.4 4 16.1 204 892 AMECO
Real GDP growth 2.6 3.6 -32.1 -0.8 3 6.2 13.1 1041 AMECO
GDP per capita in PPP, % of US level 69.4 22 16.2 33.2 74.9 91.5 129.3 1073 AMECO
EUROSTAT, 
AWG project.
OECD, WHO
ESSPROS, 
AWG project.
Balance, % GDP -2.4 4.3 -30.9 -7.5 -2.6 2.5 19.1 1021
Primary balance, % GDP 1.1 3.8 -28.2 -3.2 0.7 5.6 20.6 998
Cyclically adjusted balance, % GDP -2.9 3.5 -15.2 -7.4 -2.9 1.5 8.7 830
Stabilizing primary balance, % GDP 0 2.7 -19.1 -3 0 3.1 16.4 854
Gross debt, % GDP 51.5 30.1 3.7 16.4 48.4 93.5 217.6 945
Change in gross debt, % GDP 1 4.8 -25.5 -3.9 0.4 6.2 41.7 912
Interest rate-growth rate differential -1.8 7.9 -74.7 -11 0 5.1 25.2 833
Change in expenditure of gen. gov't, % 
GDP 0.3 2.4 -20.8 -1.9 0.2 2.9 15.5 960
Net acquisition of financial assets, 
private sector, % GDP 14.8 8.4 -4.1 5.5 13.5 23.9 58.8 334
Old-age dependency ratio 20 years 
ahead 25.7 5.8 15.4 18.2 24.8 33.9 44.7 1041
Avg yearly change in projected age-
related public expenditure as % of GDP 
over next 30 years
0.1 0.1 -0.1 3730 0.1 0.2 0.3
Note: 2010 values are excluded from the descriptive statistics as they are not used to compute the thresholds. 
Source: Commission Services 
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experiencing a fiscal crisis is reported in Graph 
IV.3.1. Graph IV.3.2 below provides the same 
information separately for the four components of 
the fiscal crisis definition. 
3.4.2. Preliminary results    
Preliminary results are reported in Table IV.3.2 for 
1) the individual variables; 2) the two composite 
indicators constructed using respectively only 
fiscal and financial-competitiveness variables; and 
3) the overall composite indicator. The Table 
reports the threshold obtained by applying the 
methodology, together with the indication of the 
interval (above/below the threshold) where values 
of the variable would indicate no fiscal crisis risks; 
the type I and type II errors (i.e. respectively the 
number of crisis signals sent ahead of no crisis 
over the total number of non-crises and the number 
of no-crisis signals sent ahead of crises over the 
total number of crises, based on past behaviour;) 
the signalling power of the variable,(108) which 
provides a measure of the variable's reliability as a 
fiscal crisis predictor; the number of crisis and 
non-crisis events entering the computation of the 
threshold.(109) 
                                                          
(108) The signalling power is given by 1-(type I error + type 2 
error). See Box IV.3.2 for details. 
(109) The number of crisis and non-crisis events in Table IV.3.2 
differs by variable depending on data availability (for 
variables for which longer time series are available the 
calculation of the threshold can be based on a larger 
number of past crisis and non-crisis events).  
For the overall composite indicator, a threshold of 
0.45 is obtained, meaning that for values at t 
greater than 0.45 a fiscal crisis would be signalled 
for t+1. Corresponding to this threshold, the 
indicator would have signalled a crisis when 
instead no crisis was looming ahead (type I error) 
for 17% of past non-crisis events, while it would 
have signalled no crisis ahead of a crisis (type II 
error) for 27% of past crisis events. Equivalently, 
the indicator would have properly identified 73% 
of past crisis events and 83% of past non-crisis 
events, highlighting quite a good overall 
performance for this type of methodology (110) 
(reflected in the relatively high signalling power of 
0.56.) Positive is also the fact that the indicator 
displays a relatively good performance at not 
missing crises (the predictive error entailing more 
serious consequences between the two.) 
                                                          
(110) As indicated in the relevant literature, non-negligible 
predictive errors are typically recorded with early warning 
system methodologies. The size of the errors reported in 
Table IV.3.2  are in line with findings in other studies. See 
Baldacci et al. (2011) and Hemming et al. (2003).  
Graph IV.3.1: Number of countries in the sample experiencing a fiscal crisis, 1970-2010 
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Source: Data on fiscal crises from Baldacci et al. (2011) 
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Results in Table IV.3.2 show that the financial-
competitiveness index has a better performance at 
predicting fiscal crises than the fiscal index (a 
signalling power of 0.52 against 0.22.) Overall, 
financial-competitiveness variables seem to be 
better "leading indicators" for fiscal crises than 
fiscal variables are, when relying on 1-year ahead 
crisis signals. 
With regard to individual variables, all thresholds 
reported in Table IV.3.2 are "meaningful" in the 
sense of lying in the crisis-prone tail of the 
respective variables' distributions. For instance, the 
variable gross debt over GDP would send crisis 
signals for values greater than 103% and the 
change in gross debt over GDP for values greater 
than 6.6%.  
Among the fiscal variables, the primary balance 
and the cyclically adjusted balance over GDP turn 
out to be the best predictors of fiscal crises, 
displaying some of the highest signalling powers 
(0.12 to 0.25) and the lowest rates of missed crises 
(32 to 43%.) Net debt, the change in gross debt 
over GDP, the change in general government final 
consumption expenditure over GDP, the projected 
old-age dependency ratio and the change in 
projected age-related public expenditure over GDP 
also display higher signalling powers in relative 
terms, though accompanied by higher rates of 
missed crises (all above 60%.) 
Graph IV.3.2: Number of countries in the sample in default or restructuring, under IMF-supported programmes, experiencing high inflation 
rates or bond yield pressure, 1970-2010 
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Among the financial variables, best predictors of 
fiscal crises are the net financial assets of the total 
economy over GDP, the net savings of households 
over GDP, the private sector debt over GDP and 
the leverage of financial corporations (signalling 
powers between 0.2 and 0.65 and rates of missed 
crises between 8 and 30%.) Among the 
competitiveness variables, the current account over 
GDP, the average growth rate of the real effective 
exchange rate and of nominal unit labour costs 
perform all well (signalling powers between 0.22 
and 0.41 and rate of missed crises between 14 and 
47%.) Construction as a share of value added and 
the level of GDP per capita in PPP (as % of US 
level) also have a good performance in terms of 
signalling power (0.26-0.27) as well as in terms of 
rate of missed crises (25 and 32% 
respectively.)(111) 
                                                          
(111) The good performance of most of these financial and 
competitiveness variables could be expected based on the 
In general terms, and as one would expect, results 
in Table IV.3.2 show that the joint consideration of 
all these variables combined into a composite 
indicator tends to provide better results in terms of 
                                                                                   
event study analysis that shows a statistically significant 
difference in behaviour for  a number of them on the eve of 
a fiscal crisis. The analysis is not presented here because it 
would be partly redundant. Based on it, fiscal variables do 
not seem to be significantly different in the pre-crisis entry 
year relative to non-crisis times. This holds also for 
variables, like the change in gross debt over GDP, the 
primary balance and the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance over GDP, the change in general government 
expenditure and final consumption expenditure, for which 
a statistically significant difference is indeed observed in 
the crisis entry year. On the contrary, some financial and 
competitiveness variables display a significantly different 
behaviour in the run up to fiscal crises. This is the case, for 
instance, for the net financial assets of the total economy 
over GDP, the current account over GDP, the short-term 
debt of non-financial corporations, construction as a share 
of value added, as well as the GDP per capita in PPP (as % 
of the US level), all of which have indeed a nice 
performance in our fiscal crisis risk model. 
 
Table IV.3.2: Thresholds and signalling power of variables and composite indicators 
Variables Safety 
interval
Threshold Signalling 
power
Type I error Type II error Crisis no. No-crisis 
no.
Balance, % GDP > -10.12 0.07 0.04 0.89 38 929
Primary balance, % GDP > 0.44 0.12 0.45 0.43 37 910
Cyclically adjusted balance, % GDP > -3.31 0.25 0.43 0.32 31 765
Stabilizing primary balance, % GDP < 2.55 0.05 0.12 0.83 29 791
Gross debt, % GDP < 103.62 0.03 0.06 0.91 33 871
Change in gross debt, % GDP < 6.59 0.11 0.08 0.81 32 843
Short-term debt, gov't, % GDP < 14.55 0.05 0.19 0.76 21 506
Net debt, % GDP < 58.11 0.13 0.19 0.68 22 539
Interest rate-growth rate differential < 5.94 0.07 0.07 0.86 28 771
Change in expenditure of gen. gov't, % GDP < 2.26 0.08 0.13 0.79 34 886
Change in final consumption expenditure of gen. 
gov't, % GDP
< 0.52 0.15 0.25 0.61 33 830
Old-age dependency ratio 20 years ahead < 32.69 0.1 0.14 0.76 41 928
Average yearly change in projected age-related 
public expend. as % of GDP over next 30 years
< 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.77 13 347
Fiscal index < 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.54 50 1145
Net financial assets, total economy, % GDP > -47.81 0.65 0.19 0.15 13 316
Net savings of households, % GDP > 3.1 0.28 0.42 0.3 20 555
Net savings of non-financial corp., % GDP > 1.39 0.16 0.24 0.6 20 514
Private sector debt, % GDP < 73.44 0.27 0.65 0.08 13 307
Net acquisition of financial assets, private sector, 
% GDP
> 9.95 0.16 0.22 0.62 13 308
Leverage, financial corp. < 3.81 0.2 0.73 0.08 13 318
Short-term debt, non-financial corp., % GDP < 3.06 0.38 0.12 0.5 12 310
Real short-term interest rate < 5.56 0.12 0.14 0.74 31 770
Construction, % value added < 6.5 0.27 0.48 0.25 40 915
Current account, % GDP > -4.95 0.41 0.18 0.41 41 797
Average growth rate of real effective exchange 
rate, based on exports deflator, ref. 35 countries
< 1.97 0.22 0.31 0.47 17 337
Average growth rate of nominal unit labour costs 
over last 3 years
< 2.96 0.28 0.58 0.14 37 813
Real GDP growth > -0.89 0.1 0.07 0.83 41 937
GDP per capita in PPP, % of US level > 73.21 0.26 0.43 0.32 44 963
Financial-competitiveness index < 0.6 0.52 0.19 0.29 52 1009
Overall index < 0.45 0.56 0.17 0.27 52 1174
Note: thresholds are calculated using only first year of crisis episodes. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph IV.3.3: Evolution of the fiscal crisis vulnerability index for selected economies, 1996-2010 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
DE FR IT
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
IE SE UK
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ES EL PT
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EE HU PL
Source: Commission services. 
 
161 
early warnings of fiscal crises than the separate 
observation of the individual variables (though the 
latter is of course always needed to understand the 
specific sources of vulnerability.) The overall 
index of fiscal crisis vulnerability could therefore 
be a very useful building block of an early warning 
system. A regular monitoring of the index should 
consider both its level (above or below the critical 
threshold of 0.45) as well as changes in the index 
over time reflecting improvements/deteriorations 
in terms of fiscal crisis vulnerability for the 
country concerned. 
This type of analysis is presented jointly for a 
number of EU countries in Graphs IV.3.3 and 
IV.3.4. In Graph IV.3.3 values taken by the overall 
index in 2008-10 are considered relative to the 
0.45 threshold. Over this time interval the index 
would consistently signal a few countries (SE, NL, 
BE, DE, DK, AT, FI and FR) as remaining broadly 
on the safe side for the following year. Countries 
that exceeded to the greatest extent the threshold 
for fiscal crisis vulnerability are EL, RO, PT, LV, 
PL, LT, EE and IE in 2008; EL, RO, PT, LV, ES, 
LT and BG in 2009; EL, RO and PT in 2010.(112) 
Graph IV.3.4 provides information on the 
evolution of the fiscal crisis vulnerability index 
between 1996 and 2010 for selected EU countries. 
Spikes in the time series are particularly evident 
for IE, ES, EL, PT, EE and PL in 2008-09. 
The analysis of the overall index should be 
complemented by the analysis of the thematic 
composite indicators (the fiscal index and the 
financial-competitiveness index in Table IV.3.2 – 
though it would be preferable to distinguish 
between financial and competitiveness indicators 
as soon as a sufficient number of variables become 
available.) These two indicators provide 
information on respective contributions of 
different groups of variables to fiscal crisis 
vulnerability. The analysis should then be further 
deepened at individual variable level (by 
comparing the value taken by each variable to its 
threshold) to have the full picture of where 
vulnerabilities stem from. Table IV.3.3 presents 
                                                          
(112) The low value of IE is explained by the fact that IE does 
not provide series for the financial variables which are 
consolidated by national account subsector. Non-
consolidated data will be used in the regular assessment. 
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results of this type of analysis for Greece (values 
of variables beyond the respective thresholds for 
fiscal crisis risk are in bold.) 
Results show that for Greece many fiscal variables 
have consistently signalled crisis risks starting 
already from 2002 (see in Table IV.3.3 for years 
following 2006, the primary balance, cyclically 
adjusted balance, gross and net debt, and change in 
projected age-related public expenditure, almost all 
fiscal variables with relatively high signalling 
power,) while the change in gross debt over GDP 
has started flashing in 2009. Fiscal crisis signals 
have been sent by macro-financial variables with 
some of the highest signalling powers, like net 
financial assets of the total economy, net savings 
of households and private sector debt, since 2007, 
and the leverage of financial corporations also 
started flashing in 2008. On the competitiveness 
side, the current account over GDP and the growth 
rate of nominal unit labour costs have been 
flashing over all four years. Thus not only the 
overall indicator correctly pointed at weaknesses in 
Greece, but also the analysis of the sub-indices and 
of the single variables showed that both the 
government (the fiscal side) and the private sector 
(the macro-financial side) had put in place a 
dangerous excess of consumption accompanied 
with a process of debt accumulation. 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS 
The present Chapter has provided indications on 
the usefulness of the utilization of the fiscal stress 
analysis in regular early warning and sustainability 
frameworks with the computation of crisis 
thresholds and vulnerability indicators and their 
evolution. 
The most interesting conclusion of the Chapter in 
the current context is that financial and 
competitiveness variables appear typically to have 
a stronger predictive power than the pure fiscal 
variables/ indexes. Even if the result is likely to be 
driven in part by data on the current crisis, this 
observation is an argument for having an 
integrated fiscal-macro surveillance process, as the 
one which is carried out in the EU in the context of 
the European Semester 
. 
Graph IV.3.4: The fiscal crisis vulnerability index in EU countries, 2008-10 
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The analysis conducted here follows the one 
proposed in European Commission (2010) on 
macro-financial risk indicators and still needs to be 
developed in the following directions. First, the set 
of relevant variables has to become as 
comprehensive as possible, because the quality of 
the analysis which is made starting from the index 
depends on the variables that compose it. While in 
the case of Greece the crisis originated from many 
indicators – maybe a sign that the crisis was going 
to be very severe - this type of analysis repeated 
for all EU Member States allows the identification 
of country-specific sources of vulnerabilities that 
are behind early warning signals. The narrative 
that can be drawn from the indicator obviously 
depends on the variables that compose it. Finally, 
caution is needed when interpreting the results 
obtained with this methodology and users should 
also be aware of some limitations the signals 
approach has. First, the method does not take into 
account the correlation between variables. Second, 
it does not allow testing for statistical significance 
of individual variables. Thus, the integration of 
this methodology into an overall sustainability 
assessment framework that integrates different 
approaches would allow gaining the advantages of 
this method, while compensating for its limitations 
through the use of complementary models and 
tools.(113)  Finally, it has to be considered that all 
the analysis made here is “in sample”, in that it has 
been made with data available after the crisis 
events. Applying it to future events may be less 
compelling, especially as these could originate 
from a branch of the economy not covered by the 
variables considered in the index. 
                                                          
(113) As it is clear from the methodological Section, the 
approach we have adopted with this fiscal crisis risk model 
differs from a multivariate econometric approach (logit or 
probit modelling) that is also used in the empirical crisis 
literature. In setting up an early warning system for fiscal 
crises, the idea would be to integrate both approaches 
(parametric and non-parametric) given that the two tend to 
be complementary under various respects. While the non-
parametric signals approach allows for a transparent link 
between individual variables and composite indicators and 
can meaningfully incorporate a large number of variables 
in the analysis, the parametric logit/probit modelling 
approach allows taking into account the correlation 
between variables and testing for statistical significance of 
individual variables. A logit/probit modelling for fiscal 
crises will be object of further work in the near future. 
 
Table IV.3.3: The fiscal crisis vulnerability analysis for Greece 2007-10 
Variable Threshold 2007 2008 2009 2010
Balance, % GDP -10.12 -6.69 -9.78 -15.59 -10.41
Primary balance, % GDP 0.44 -1.99 -4.82 -10.35 -4.94
Cyclically adjusted balance, % GDP -3.31 -7.49 -10.42 -14.95 -8.23
Stabilizing primary balance, % GDP 2.55 -2.67 0.58 6.14 8.15
Gross debt, % GDP 103.62 105.41 110.72 127.10 142.75
Change in gross debt, % GDP 6.59 -0.69 5.31 16.38 15.66
Short-term debt, government, % GDP 14.55 5.93 8.50 8.27 8.83
Net debt, % GDP 58.11 80.35 83.40 96.83 109.51
Interest rate-growth rate differential 5.94 -2.70 0.57 5.50 6.28
Change in expenditure of general government, % GDP 2.26 1.49 3.01 3.20 -3.37
Change in final consumption expenditure of general government, % GDP 0.52 0.26 0.22 2.45 -2.38
Old-age dependency ratio 20 years ahead 32.69 36.69 37.25 37.81 38.47
Avg yearly change in projected age-related public expenditure as % of GDP 
over next 30 years 0.18 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.35
Fiscal index 0.35 0.56 0.62 0.91 0.79
Net financial assets, total economy, % GDP -47.81 -112.73 -99.42 -110.42 -110.42
Net savings of households, % GDP 3.1 -2.10 -5.64 -2.25 -3.33
Net savings of non-financial corporations, % GDP 1.39 3.15 6.15 4.58 4.63
Private sector debt, % GDP 73.44 107.23 119.13 123.46
Net acquisition of financial assets, private sector, % GDP 9.95 15.36 14.63 2.62 2.62
Leverage, financial corporations 3.81 3.19 13.16 9.34 8.56
Short-term debt, non-financial corporations, % GDP 3.06
Real short-term interest rate 5.56 1.19 1.31 -0.05 -1.67
Construction, % value added 6.5 6.50 5.06 4.46 4.06
Current account, % GDP -4.95 -14.40 -14.55 -11.21 -10.84
Avg growth rate of real effective exchange rate, based on exports deflator, 
ref 35 countries 1.97 0.16 0.53 2.00 1.47
Average growth rate of nominal unit labour costs over last 3 years 2.96 3.01 3.82 4.90 3.30
Real GDP growth -0.89 4.28 1.02 -2.04 -4.47
GDP per capita in PPP, % of US level 73.21 60.94 64.10 64.15 59.97
Financial-competitiveness index 0.6 0.72 0.69 0.84 0.75
Overall index 0.45 0.67 0.67 0.86 0.76
Source: Commission services. 
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 Box IV.3.1: The methodology for the calculation of the thresholds
As explained in the main text, the optimal threshold for each variable is chosen in a way to minimise, based 
on historical data, the number of crisis signals sent despite no crisis materialising (as recorded in the data 
based on the definition of fiscal crisis in Section III.2.1) plus the number of no-crisis signals sent ahead of 
crises, with different weights attached to the two components. Table A.1 represents the four possible 
combinations of events, between crisis or no-crisis signals sent by the variables and crisis or no-crisis 
episodes following the signals as recorded in the data.   
 
Table A.1 – Possible cases based on type of signal sent 
by the variable at t-1 and state of the world at t 
 Crisis episode Non-crisis episode 
Crisis signal 
 
True Positive signal 
 
 
False Positive signal 
(Type I error) 
 
No-crisis 
signal 
 
False Negative signal 
(Type II error) 
 
 
True Negative signal 
 
 
 
Formally, for each variable i the optimal threshold (
*
it ) is such as to minimise the sum of type I and type II 
errors for variable i  as from the following total misclassified error function defined for indicator i 
( iTME ) (1): 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
NC
tFP
C
tFNtTMEt iiiiii
Tt
i
ii
+==
∈
minarg*                               i = 1,…, n                     (1) 
 
where iT  = set of all values taken by variable i over all countries and years in the panel; ( )ii tFN  = total 
number of false negative signals sent by variable i (over all countries and years) based on threshold it ; ( )ii tFP  = total number of false positive signals sent by variable i (over all countries and years) based on 
threshold it ; C = total number of fiscal crisis events recorded in the data; NC = total number of no-fiscal 
crisis events recorded in the data (2); n = total number of indicator variables used. It is straightforward to see 
from (1) that in the minimisation problem False Negative signals are weighted more than False Positive 
signals as: 
                                                          
(1) Following this methodological approach, the optimal threshold will be such as to balance type I and type II errors. For 
variables for which values above the threshold would signal fiscal crises, a relatively low threshold would produce 
relatively more false positive signals and fewer false negative signals, meaning higher type I error and lower type II 
error; the opposite would be true if a relatively high threshold was chosen. 
(2) Here we simplify on the total number of crisis and non-crisis events as in fact these numbers vary across variables. 
This is due to the fact that data availability constraints do not allow us to use the whole series of crisis and non-crisis 
events for all variables.  
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Box (continued) 
 
 
NCC
11 >                                                                      
  
This is due to the fact that the total number of fiscal crises recorded over a (large enough) panel of countries 
will be typically much smaller than the total number of non-crisis events. This is a positive feature of the 
model as we might reasonably want to weight the type II error more than the type I errors given the more 
serious consequences deriving from failing to correctly predict a fiscal crisis relative to predicting a fiscal 
crisis when there will be none. 
The threshold for indicator i (with i = 1,…, n) obtained from (1) is common to all countries in the panel. In 
the model presented here this is defined as a common absolute threshold (a critical value for the level of 
public debt to GDP, or general government balance over GDP, for instance) but it could also be defined as a 
common relative threshold (a common percentage tail of the country-specific distributions). (Reinhart, 
Goldstein and Kaminsky (2000) and Hemming, Kell and Schimmelpfennig (2003)) In the latter case, while 
the optimal percentage tail obtained from (1) is the same for all countries, the associated absolute threshold 
will differ across countries reflecting differences in distributions (country j's absolute threshold for indicator 
i will reflect the country-specific history with regard to that indicator). Both the aforementioned methods 
were applied and a decision was made to focus exclusively on the first for the time being, given that the 
second one tends to produce sensible country-specific absolute thresholds for indicator i only for those 
countries having a history of medium to high values for the indicator concerned (or medium to low, 
depending on what the crisis-prone side of the distribution is), while country-specific thresholds would not 
be meaningful for the rest of the sample.  
The TME function in equation (1) is the criterion that was used to calculate the thresholds but it is not the 
only possible criterion used in the literature. The minimisation of the noise-to-signal ratio (NSR) is another 
possible option. In this case the optimal threshold for indicator i (
*
it ) is obtained as: 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) CtTP
NCtFPtNSRt
ii
ii
ii
Tt
i
ii
==
∈
minarg*                                      i = 1,…, n                              (2)
 
where ( )ii tTP  = total number of true positive signals sent by variable i (over all countries and years) based 
on threshold it . Thresholds for the fiscal crisis risk model were also derived using this second criterion, but 
the TME minimisation was preferred based on the size of the total errors produced (same choice and 
justification offered by Baldacci et al. (2011)) 
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 Box IV.3.2: The calculation of the index of fiscal crisis vulnerability
The fiscal crisis vulnerability index is constructed in the context of the IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise 
and in a similar way to Baldacci et al. (2011) and Reinhart et al. (2000).1 A value of 1 is assigned for every 
variable i for a country j and year t, that signals a fiscal crisis for the following year (a dummy 
id  is created 
for each variable i such that 1=ijtd  if a crisis signal is sent by the variable and 0=ijtd  otherwise, i.e. if 
a no-crisis signal is sent or the variable is missing). The value of the composite indicator for country j and 
year t ( jtI ) is then calculated as the weighted number of variables having reached their optimal thresholds 
with the weights given by the "signalling power" of the individual variables: 
∑∑∑ =
=
= ⋅
==
n
i
i
jtn
k
k
k
jt
i
n
i
i
jtijt d
zh
zdwI
1
1
1                                                                                           (3)   
 
where n = total number of variables; iz = 1 – (type I error + type II error) = signalling power of variable i; 
and { }1,0∈kjth  is an indicator variable taking value 1 if variable k is observed for country j at time t and 0 
otherwise.2 The variables are therefore assigned higher weight in the composite indicator, the higher their 
forecasting accuracy.3  
                                                          
1 The difference with Baldacci et al. (2011) is that the analysis presented here does not a system of "double weighting" 
of each variable incorporated in the composite indicator based on the weight of the subgroup of variables it belongs to 
(i.e. fiscal and financial-competitiveness variables in this case) and the weight of the individual variable within the 
group. The difference with Reinhart et al. (2000) is in the way the individual variables' weights are computed (they 
use as weights the inverse of the noise-to-signal ratios of the individual variables as they apply the NSR criterion, 
rather than the TME used here – see  Box IV.3.1).  
2 This ensures that the sum of the weights is equal to 1 regardless of data availability (which is of course necessary to 
be able to analyse the evolution of the index.) 
3 Moreover, as evident from (3), the weight attached to each variable is decreasing in the signalling power attached to 
the other variables, as well as in the number of variables available for a given country and year.  
 
 
4. FISCAL REACTION FUNCTIONS AND DEBT THRESHOLDS 
FOR THE EU 
 
167 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The results of estimations of a set of Fiscal 
Reaction Functions (FRF) for the EU are presented 
in this Chapter. The model evaluates the empirical 
response of the primary balance to the outstanding 
level of public debt, after controlling for a number 
of economic and institutional variables.  
The main idea of this approach is to define fiscal 
solvency as being fulfilled when the response of 
the primary surplus to debt is positive. A positive 
response of the primary surplus to debt intuitively 
indicates that the government counteracts a rising 
debt ratio by increasing its primary balance or, 
conversely, runs a lower surplus whenever debt is 
at a relatively lower level.  
This methodology can enrich sustainability 
analysis in two ways. First, predictions for the 
primary balance in 2011 and 2012 are computed 
on the basis of the estimated FRF model and are 
used as a benchmark for existing primary balance 
forecasts by the Commission. A statistically 
significant difference would indicate that forecasts 
are upward or downward biased, compared to what 
could be expected from historical fiscal behaviour 
in the EU in situations with similar debt ratios, 
cyclical developments and other relevant factors.  
Second, the estimates of the primary balance 
obtained from the FRF are used as a basis for 
calculating thresholds for sustainable debt for each 
EU Member State, following the standard inter-
temporal condition for government solvency. 
Current debt ratios are assessed against those 
thresholds in order to evaluate the sustainability of 
Member States' fiscal positions.     
4.2. ESTIMATING A FISCAL REACTION 
FUNCTION FOR THE EU: SOME TECHNICAL 
ASPECTS 
The approach presented in this Chapter is inspired 
by a strand of the literature on public debt 
sustainability which adopts the FRF as the main 
empirical tool to test whether governments fulfil 
intertemporal solvency requirements. Key papers 
are Bohn (1998) and (2005); IMF (2003); 
Mendoza and Ostry (2008); Celasun et al., (2006), 
Ghosh et al., (2010), with the main reference being 
the seminal paper by Bohn (1998) which argues 
that governments are solvent under very general 
conditions as long as the primary balance increases 
with the outstanding stock of debt. A practical 
advantage of such a criterion is that it is 
independent of information regarding the discount 
rates, interest rates on government bonds and inter-
temporal preferences.  
The equations estimated in these papers normally 
include further (non-debt) determinants of the 
primary surplus on the right-hand-side. Examples 
of frequently used determinants are the output gap, 
to account for business cycle effects, and the 
temporary component of public expenditure (e.g. 
military outlays during wars). Depending on the 
specific features of countries considered, other 
variables such as inflation, trade openness, 
commodity (or oil) prices and the quality of the 
budgetary framework may also be included. 
A further refinement is to test for the possibility of 
a non-linear relationship between debt and the 
primary surplus, i.e. to see whether the magnitude 
of the fiscal response changes with the level of 
debt. This could occur if the surplus rises with debt 
only when the debt ratio exceeds a certain 
threshold. A number of papers find evidence of 
such a non-linear response although with partly 
conflicting results between advanced and emerging 
economies. A stronger response of the primary 
surplus with greater debt levels is found among 
industrialised countries in Bohn (1998), for the US 
case, and IMF (2003), for a broader sample of 
countries, whereas Abiad and Ostry (2005), IMF 
(2003), Celasun et al. (2006) and Mendoza and 
Ostry (2008) find that such response tends to 
weaken among emerging economies when debt 
exceeds 50% of GDP. However, Mendoza and 
Ostry (2008) find no evidence of a positive 
response of the primary surplus to debt within a 
sub-sample of advanced economies with high debt. 
Similar evidence is found in Ostry et al. (2010).  
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The specification chosen 
As the focus of this exercise is on debt 
sustainability and one of the aims is to have a 
benchmark for standard sustainability indicators 
expressed in terms of primary balance, the overall 
primary balance (as a % of GDP) is chosen as 
dependent variable.(114)  
In line with the existing literature explanatory 
variables include: 
• The variables used in the Barro model (see 
Barro (1979),) which constitutes the theoretical 
basis for the econometric specification, i.e. the 
lagged debt to GDP ratio, the output gap to 
account for business cycle effects on fiscal 
policy, the cyclical component of government 
final consumption expenditures to account for 
tax-smoothing considerations in setting fiscal 
policy; (115)  
• a number of political and institutional control 
variables like the occurrence of elections, the 
size of the government's parliamentary 
majority, political stability, ideology and 
fragmentation of government, the strength and 
coverage of fiscal rules,(116) and dummy 
variables for the years in run-up to EMU, and 
those of the latest economic downturn (2009–
10) and for whether the country belongs to the 
euro area or is a recently acceded Member 
State. 
                                                          
(114) Robustness checks have been carried out by also 
considering CAPB, but the results remain essentially 
unchanged. The latter is commonly used in papers focusing 
on the discretionary response of fiscal policy to the 
business cycle (see Gali and Perotti (2003), European 
Commission (2006), Ayuso et al. (2010) and Turrini 
(2008),) thereby capturing the existence of an output 
stabilisation motive in setting fiscal policy. 
(115) See Bohn (1998) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008). The 
chosen specification controls for the effect of temporary 
fluctuations of GDP and government expenditures. 
Whereas the former is measured by the output gap, the 
latter is captured by de-trending the series for final 
government consumption expenditures (as a share of GDP) 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, with the smoothing 
parameter set at 100.   
(116) This information is summarised by a Fiscal Rules Index 
(FRI) assigning greater scores to more stringent rules 
and/or rules with a broader coverage. The index is 
compiled by Commission services.  
•  the current account balance (as a share of 
GDP).(117) 
The main model is estimated for the EU using a 
Fixed Effect (FE) estimator and includes the 
lagged dependent variable among the regressors. 
As data for fiscal rules (FRI) are only available for 
the period 1990–2008, Table IV.4.1 presents 
results for two different time periods, i.e. 1990–
2008 and 1975/80–2010, with the longer time 
period excluding FRI and including the dummy for 
the recent economic downturn. Instrumental 
variables are used for the output gap and for the 
current account.(118) The regression presented in 
column (1) of the table only includes the lagged 
debt and economic controls, whereas the one in 
column (4) also includes FRI and the whole set of 
political variables and dummies mentioned above. 
Column (2) retains FRI and the most significant 
political variables. Column (5) presents the same 
regression as in column (2) with the exclusion of 
FRI which allows a larger number of observations 
to be used.  
Finally, column (3) presents the same regression as 
column (5) while replacing the ESA95 primary 
surplus data with linked (i.e. ESA95 and non-ESA) 
data allowing a further rise in the number of 
observations. (119) 
The coefficient of the lagged debt to GDP ratio is 
positive and significant in all the above 
regressions, and is robust to the introduction of 
political and institutional variables and 
dummies.(120) The primary balance appears to have 
                                                          
(117) This controls for possibilities of 'twin deficits', i.e. external 
deficit being associated to fiscal deficit (Mendoza and 
Ostry (2008)). 
(118) For both variables, causality can run in both directions, i.e. 
from the variable in question to the primary balance and 
vice versa. In other words the two variables may be 
endogenous. Therefore, to avoid risk of biased estimations, 
they are instrumented by the lagged output gap and the 
contemporaneous US output gap and by the lagged current 
account, respectively. See Ayuso et al. (2008) and Gali and 
Perotti (2004). 
(119) In this regression the output gap as a percentage of trend 
output (i.e. ogtrend), instead of potential output, is used 
given its longer time coverage which allows to match the 
longer time coverage of linked primary balance series.   
(120) The debt coefficient retains its sign and significance also in 
the model excluding the lagged dependent variable, with a 
larger coefficient in absolute value. As the literature does 
not provide clear cut indications as to whether the lagged 
dependent should be excluded or not, it was included given 
its strong statistical significance suggesting a certain degree 
of time persistence in primary balance.      
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a strong degree of time persistence as the lagged 
dependent variable is always positive and highly 
significant.   
Among the other explanatory variables, the 
cyclical component of government consumption 
expenditures has a negative and very robust effect 
on the primary balance, as expected. The output 
gap only has a significant coefficient in the 
regressions covering a longer time span (columns 
(3) and (5)) with a negative sign, suggesting some 
degree of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. The 
current account balance has a positive and 
significant coefficient. Among political and 
institutional variables, the strength and coverage of 
fiscal rules and the size of government majority 
have a positive effect on primary balance, whereas 
during election years the balance is ceteris paribus 
lower. Finally, the dummy for crisis years has a 
strong negative impact on primary balance 
(columns (3) and (5)) whereas the enlargement 
dummy has a positive sign, albeit significant only 
in regressions covering a longer time span 
(columns (3) and (5).) The specifications in 
columns (2) and (3) have been chosen as 
benchmark regressions (highlighted in bold) to be 
used later on in the analysis for the calculation of 
debt thresholds. The former regression includes 
FRI and the more robust political variables, i.e. the 
size of government majority and the occurrence of 
elections, and covers the 1990–2008 period. The 
latter retains the majority and election dummies 
while excluding FRI and using linked ESA and 
non-ESA series for the primary balance allowing a 
much larger number of observations to be used in 
the estimation.(121)   
The robustness of the results has been tested by 
repeating the FRF estimates using different 
estimation methodologies. For simplicity only the 
specification of the first benchmark regression has 
                                                          
(121) Covering a longer time span allows to significantly reduce 
the inconsistency of FE estimators in dynamic panel data 
models. The regression in column (3) covers an average of 
25.7 observations per country, thereby fulfilling 
comfortably the rule of thumb that T should be larger than 
20 to overcome the inconsistency of FE estimators in 
dynamic panels (Bond (2002)). Hence, the robustness of 
estimates of regression in column 2 (i.e. the one with a 
shorter time coverage) can be checked by comparison with 
the regression in column (3). As the results of the two 
regressions are qualitatively similar (except for the output 
gap) estimates of the regression in column 2 can be 
considered as reliable.  
 
Table IV.4.1: FRF for EU27, dependent variable: primary balance (% of GDP) - fixed effect estimator 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
VARIABLES pbal_gdp_esa pbal_gdp_esa pbal_gdp_lnkd pbal_gdp_esa pbal_gdp_esa
ogpot 0.0114 -0.0328 0.0825 -0.134**
ca_gdp 0.121*** 0.131*** 0.0893*** 0.142*** 0.140***
L.pbal_gdp_esa 0.654*** 0.466*** 0.483*** 0.614***
L.debt_gdp 0.0314*** 0.0327*** 0.0271*** 0.0377*** 0.0314***
cyc_govcons_gdp -1.193*** -0.861*** -1.016*** -0.831*** -1.056***
fri 0.335** 0.144
maj 4.097*** 2.198** 4.580*** 2.509**
checks -0.0649
stabs 0.226
legelec -0.373** -0.406** -0.336* -0.407**
govfrac -0.745
polariz 0.0662
gov1rlc -0.00296
dummy_runup_EMU -0.0976
dummy_ea -0.195 0.0477 -0.31 -0.0112
dummy_enlarg 0.348 0.677** 0.477 0.820**
dummy_crisis -3.129*** -3.444***
ogtrend_fa10 -0.103**
L.pbal_gdp_lnk 0.614***
Constant -1.345*** -3.194*** -2.038*** -3.347*** -2.370***
R-squared 0.6063 0.5143 0.6594 0.5665 0.6509
Observations 564 414 693 378 563
Number of cn_num 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: variable statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Definition of variables: 
Ogpot=output gap (% of potential GDP); ca_gdp= current account balance (% of GDP); L_pbal_gdp_esa=Lagged Primary balance (% of GDP) – ESA 
series only; L.debt_gdp = lagged government debt-to-GDP ratio: cyc_govcons_gdp = temporary fluctuations of government final consumption 
expenditures (as a % of GDP); FRI = fiscal rules index; Maj= size of government parliamentary majority (in %); checks = Checks and balances 
(number of decision-makers with veto power on government decisions); legelec = dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has legislative elections 
in that year, 0 otherwise; govfrac = government fragmentation (number of parties in government coalition); polariz = government polarization 
(ideological range between the two government parties ideologically more distant); gov1rlc = ideology of main government party; ogtrend = output 
gap as % of trend GDP; L.pbal_gdp_lnk = lagged primary balance (% GDP) – linked (ESA and non-ESA) series. 
Source:  Commission services calculations from AMECO and the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (WBDPI). 
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been considered.(122) Estimations are run 
alternatively with pooled OLS, a Random Effect 
estimator and a GMM estimator, to account for the 
possible inconsistency of FE estimators in dynamic 
panel data. Overall, coefficient estimates remain 
qualitatively similar to those in Table IV.4.1, (123) 
with the exception of government majority 
becoming insignificant in the GMM estimates. 
Further robustness checks have been conducted. 
First, the model has been tested separately for the 
EU15 and the EU12, with the latter including the 
new Member States. Only the two benchmark 
regressions have been considered for simplicity. 
The coefficient of the debt term remains positive 
and significant for both subsamples even if it is 
larger for the EU12 (around 0.06) sample. The size 
of the government majority and fiscal rules only 
have a large positive impact on the primary 
balance among the EU12 while being positive but 
insignificant among the EU15. Similarly the 
election variable, albeit negative in all regressions, 
is significant only among EU15 countries.  
Second, the literature has found evidence that the 
response of the primary balance to debt may be 
non-linear (see Section IV.4.1;) its size may vary 
with the level of outstanding debt with primary 
balance reacting more strongly when the debt ratio 
exceeds a given threshold, at least in advanced 
economies. Tests have been made on a spline for 
the debt ratio at 60% of GDP– in order to test 
whether a change in the response of primary 
balance occurs when debt exceeds this level – and 
on a quadratic and cubic term for debt. The test 
points to insufficient robustness of the evidence for 
a non-linear response to debt, so the linear 
specification is retained for the benchmark 
regressions.(124)  
                                                          
(122) As explained above, the risk of inconsistent estimates is 
substantially reduced in the second benchmark regression 
given the longer time coverage. 
(123) This is true in particular for GMM. Pooled OLS and RE 
estimates are likely to be biased given that they do not 
control for unobserved (country) heterogeneity (pooled 
OLS) or assume country effects to be uncorrelated with the 
regressors, which is highly unlikely (RE). 
(124) Detailed results of FRF with different estimation 
techniques, of EU15 vs. EU12 and with non-linear 
response to debt are available upon request.  
4.3. PREDICTIONS OF PRIMARY BALANCE IN 
2011 AND 2012 BASED ON THE FRF 
The estimated primary balance ratios can be used 
to formulate out of sample predictions for the 
primary balance for the years 2011 and 2012. 
These can be compared with the most recent 
primary balance forecasts available in 
AMECO.(125)  
Predictions are calculated as fitted primary balance 
values based on estimated FRF coefficients in the 
longer benchmark regression and on existing 
Commission forecasts for 2011 and 2012 for all 
explanatory variables.(126) Graph IV.4.1  displays 
the model's predictions for the primary balance 
2011 on the upper chart and for 2012 on the lower 
chart, against corresponding Commission 
forecasts. 
The results indicate that the existing European 
Commission forecasts may be biased upward for 
2011 and, to a lesser extent, 2012 compared to 
Member States' historical surplus-generating 
capacity. FRF predictions for the primary balances 
of twenty-five and twenty-two Member States are 
worse than the Commission forecasts in 2011 and 
2012, respectively, although the magnitude of the 
gap varies by country. Exceptions to this pattern 
are HU and LV in 2011 and EE, EL, HU, IE and 
LV in 2012. This is to some extent unsurprising, as 
in the current (quite exceptional) circumstances 
many countries have introduced sizeable 
consolidation measures in order to counteract the 
effect of the economic downturn on fiscal balances 
and such measures may have lasting implications 
on their public finances over next years.    
                                                          
(125) The Commission's Autumn 2010 forecasts are used here. 
(126) 2011 and 2012 updates of the electoral dummy (i.e. 
legelec) are based on information available in the European 
Election Database constructed as part of the European 
Sixth Framework Research Programme "Citizens and 
Governance in a Knowledge-based Society" (CivicActive), 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_databa
se/. As for the variable on government majority in 
parliament (maj), values for 2011 or for both 2011 and 
2012 have been set equal to the one in 2010 whenever no 
elections occurred/are scheduled in these years. If an 
election took place/is scheduled in 2010/2011 then maj for 
the following year(s) is set at a value equal to the country 
average of maj over the sample period (in the absence of 
better information).   
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Graph IV.4.1: Primary balance forecast vs. (point) prediction from 
FRF model 
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Notes: One figure for Ireland in 2011 is below the minimum number 
shown in the axis. 
Source: Commission services calculations based on AMECO and World 
Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
To compare the two figures more appropriately, 
one standard deviation of the FRF estimated 
regression is added and subtracted to the (point) 
estimates of primary balance in 2011 and 
2012.(127)   
Graph IV.4.2 plots existing forecasts against those 
ranges represented by a minimum and maximum 
predicted primary balance per country. 
                                                          
(127) This implicitly assumes that the width of the range is the 
same for all Member States, i.e. the predicted value for 
primary balance +/- 1.83, which is the value of the 
regression's standard deviation. 
Graph IV.4.2: Primary balance forecast vs. min and max 
prediction from FRF 
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Notes: The figures for Ireland in 2011 are below the minimum number 
shown in the axis. 
Source: Commission services calculations based on AMECO and World 
Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
In 2011, existing forecasts lie outside the range 
predicted by the fiscal reaction function for a 
majority of EU Member States, i.e. sixteen out of 
twenty-seven, with fifteen of them posting a 
forecast which exceeds the maximum predicted 
value; whereas only LV forecasts a primary 
balance which is worse than the minimum 
prediction. On the other hand, forecasts lie within 
the predicted ranges for most Member States in 
2012. There are only five exceptions to this 
pattern; DE, IT, LU and SE post forecasts 
exceeding the maximum predicted primary balance 
while LV has a forecast balance worse than the 
minimum prediction. It should be noticed that the 
predicted ranges of primary balance values are 
quite large, with a difference of about 3.6 pp of 
GDP between the lower and upper end, indicating 
a rather imprecise estimate. 
An alternative approach which allows for the 
predictions' ranges to vary by country is to add to 
(subtract from) point estimates for 2011 and 2012 
the average of the three best (worst) shocks to the 
primary balance over the sample period, as 
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measured by the three highest (lowest) residuals of 
the FRF regression. This would provide a measure 
of the uncertainty of predictions reflecting the 
country specificities more closely. Graph IV.4.3 
plots those ranges against existing primary balance 
forecasts.  
Graph IV.4.3: Primary balance forecast vs. predictions from FRF 
+/- average of three best/worst primary balance 
shocks 
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Notes: The figures for Ireland in 2011 are below the minimum number 
shown in the axis. 
Source: Commission services calculations based on AMECO and World 
Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
As with Graph IV.4.2, the ranges of the predicted 
primary balance values tend to be quite sizeable, 
albeit with large variation by country. Contrary to 
the upper chart of Graph IV.4.2 the primary 
balance forecasts now tend to also lie within 
predicted ranges in 2011, although eight Member 
States still exceed the best prediction. As the upper 
chart of Graph IV.4.3 shows, Latvia still posts a 
forecast lower than the worst prediction.  In 2012 
the primary balance forecasts lie outside predicted 
ranges only in the cases of IT and SI where they 
exceed the best prediction.  
4.4. THRESHOLDS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEBT 
The estimates for the primary surpluses derived 
from the FRF model can be seen as capturing the 
structural surplus-generating capacity of countries 
included in the sample and can then be used to 
calculate sustainable debt thresholds via the 
standard IBC.(128) In steady state, a given stock of 
government debt is sustainable if it does not 
exceed the ratio of the steady state primary surplus 
relative to the steady-state interest rate-GDP 
growth rate differential. Therefore, by plugging the 
average estimated primary balance into the 
solvency condition and solving the equation for the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, an estimate of the maximum 
debt ratio which meets sustainability requirements 
given a country's surplus generating capacity can 
be obtained. This value can be called the debt 
sustainability threshold, or, more simply, the debt 
threshold (DT).  
ii
FRF
i
i gr
pDT −=   (1) 
where FRFip is the average estimated primary 
balance (as a share of GDP) based on the Fiscal 
Reaction Function over the period covered by the 
model for country i and ir and ig are, 
respectively, the average real interest rate and real 
GDP growth rate for country i over the same 
period.(129)  
Primary balance estimates were derived from the 
two regressions of columns (2) and (3) in Table 
IV.4.1.(130) The interest-growth rate differentials 
have been calculated as the average difference 
between the implicit interest rate on gross public 
debt and the growth rate of GDP at current market 
prices over three different periods, (1990–2010, 
1975–2010 and 2008–2014)(131) to test the 
sensitivity of debt thresholds to different interest-
growth assumptions.  
There is one important caveat which needs to be 
underlined at this point of the analysis. The 
                                                          
(128) See Abiad and Ostry (1996). 
(129) Debt thresholds can in principle be calculated using 
alternative estimates of the primary balance, such as 
historical averages or existing forecasts. However, 
estimates based on the FRF have the advantage of being 
based on a model of fiscal behaviour. In any case FRF-
based thresholds can be compared to those based on 
different primary balance figures in order, for instance, to 
assess the degree of realism of fiscal plans relative to past 
surplus-generating capacity. 
(130) It is recalled that they cover the 1990–2008 period and the 
1975–2010 period, respectively. 
(131) This uses Commission (AMECO) forecasts for 2011 and 
2012 and internal Commission forecasts for 2013 and 
2014. 
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calculation of the debt threshold makes economic 
sense only when both the mean primary balance 
and the interest rate-growth differential are 
positive. In cases when real GDP growth 
systematically exceeds the real interest rate any 
debt-to-GDP ratio can be sustained.(132) On the 
other hand a negative steady-state primary balance 
(with a positive interest-growth differential) would 
imply a negative debt threshold, which is also a 
trivial outcome for our purposes. 
The sample used in this exercise includes cases 
where either the mean primary balance or the 
average interest-growth differential is negative. 
Hence, a correction has been made in order to 
minimise the exclusion of individual countries 
from the threshold calculation. For countries where 
the overall average of the estimated primary 
balance is negative, it is replaced with the average 
based exclusively on positive primary balance 
values. This implies that the surplus-generating 
capacity is over-estimated for this group of 
countries. The same methodology has been applied 
to the interest-growth differential, implying, for 
those countries where the overall average interest-
growth differential was negative, an over-
estimation of the historical burden of servicing a 
given amount of debt. In this way, debt thresholds 
could be calculated for all 27 Member States, 
based on the longer set of primary balance 
estimates (i.e. covering the 1975–2010 period), 
and for 25 Member States based on the shorter set 
of estimates (covering the 1990–2008 period). This 
latter group excludes PL and SK, for which the 
estimated primary balance was never positive over 
that period.  
Member States' debt thresholds derived from the 
1975–2010 benchmark FRF regression (excluding 
FRI) and the 1990–2008 benchmark regression 
(including FRI) are shown in Graphs IV.4.4 and 
IV.4.5, respectively, against current (i.e. 2010) 
debt to GDP ratios. In these graphs, the lower bar 
for each country represents the debt to GDP ratio 
in 2010, and the three remaining bars represent 
debt thresholds corresponding to the average 
interest rate-growth rate differentials over three 
different periods, i.e. 1990–2010, 1975–2010 and 
2008–2014.(133) This allowed the assessment of the 
                                                          
(132) See Blanchard (1990). 
(133) For the 2008–2014 period negative averages of the growth-
adjusted interest rate where not corrected by restricting 
robustness of the sustainability ranking relative to 
the historical and forecast growth-adjusted interest 
rate. 
Graph IV.4.4: Debt sustainability thresholds - mean estimated 
primary balance 1975-2010, mean interest-growth 
differentials over 3 different periods - vs. current 
debt (% of GDP) 
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Notes: DT1, DT1bis, DT1ter = Debt Threshold 1, 1bis and 1ter derived 
from primary balance estimates from a Fiscal Reaction Function 
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them to positive values, as the time length of the period is 
too short. Hence DT1ter and DT2ter could not be 
calculated for 5 countries: BG, LU, PL, RO and SE. 
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Graph IV.4.5: Debt sustainability thresholds - mean estimated 
primary balance 1990-2008, mean interest-growth 
differentials over 3 different periods - vs. current 
debt (% of GDP) 
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Notes: DT2, DT2bis, DT2ter = Debt Threshold 2, 2bis and 2ter derived 
from primary balance estimates from a Fiscal Reaction Function 
covering the 1990-2008 time period (subject to data availability for 
individual countries) and from the average interest rate-GDP growth rate 
differential over the 1990-2010, 1975-2010 and 2008-2014 period using 
Commission forecasts for years 2011 to 2014. Figures for thresholds in a 
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Source: Commission services calculations based on AMECO and World 
Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
The interpretation is straightforward. Whenever a 
country's current debt ratio exceeds the debt 
threshold, the implication is that its current debt 
position is not sustainable given its surplus-
generating capacity as identified from the FRF 
model.  
To a large extent, different models give 
(reassuringly) the same result in terms of 
sustainability. Countries where the current debt 
ratio exceeds debt thresholds based on both FRF 
models regardless of the reference period for the 
interest-growth differentials  are CZ, DE, EL, IE,  
LT, LV, PT and RO. FR, IT and ES come next, by 
exceeding the threshold in five cases out of six. On 
the opposite end of the ranking are BG, DK, FI, 
LU, MT, NL and SE, which never exceed the 
threshold, and BE and SI which exceed it only in 
one out of six cases. AT and UK are fiscally 
unsustainable under the first model and sustainable 
under the latter one whereas the reverse occurs for 
HU, which is likely to reflect divergent surplus 
generating capacities between the shorter (1990–
2008) and longer (1975–2010) periods 
considered.(134)  
The position of each Member State relative to the 
rest of the EU can be more easily seen in Graph 
IV.4.6, where countries are ranked from the most 
to the least fiscally sustainable based on the 
difference between their debt threshold and their 
current debt ratio. The graph compares the country 
ranking across the two FRF models for all three 
sets of interest-growth differentials considered. It 
also includes a graph comparing the ranking based 
on the mean vs. median estimated primary balance 
(corresponding to the 1990–2008 FRF model)(135) 
and interest-growth differential (over the 1990–
2010 period.) Overall, the ranking is fairly robust 
across FRF models and different sets of interest-
growth differentials, particularly for countries at 
the top and bottom ends of the scale. FI, DK, BE, 
NL, LU, SE and BG systematically cluster as the 
most fiscally sustainable countries and EL, IE, PT, 
LV, LT as the least sustainable ones. 
In order to provide a simple test on the extent to 
which surplus-generating capacity needs to be 
improved in order to turn a fiscally unsustainable 
country into a sustainable one, debt thresholds 
have been recalculated based on the average of the 
best 3-year estimated primary balance. This tests 
whether the current debt ratio would become 
sustainable if the future surplus-generating 
capacity of the country would equal the best 
primary balance performance achieved in the past 
according to the FRF model.(136)  
 
                                                          
(134) A robustness check has been undertaken by calculating 
debt thresholds based on median (instead of average) 
figures, for both the estimated primary balance and the 
interest-growth differential. Although the country ranking 
in terms of sustainability does not change (see Graph 
IV.4.6, last Graph, below) the assessment of debt 
sustainability becomes generally more benign. 
(135) See footnote 22. The country ranking becomes even more 
robust across the two FRF models and different sets of 
interest-growth differentials when median figures are used 
instead of averages (not shown in the Graph).   
(136) The exercise is done only with the average growth-adjusted 
interest rate for 1990-2010. 
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Graph IV.4.7 and IV.4.8 show the debt thresholds 
based on the best estimated primary balance 
(DT1best and DT2best) together with the general 
thresholds (DT1 and DT2,) both derived from the 
first and second FRF model, respectively, against 
the current debt ratio.(137) 
Obviously the level of sustainable debt increases 
significantly for many Member States according to 
DTbest, shifting the sustainability assessment from 
negative to positive for AT, DE, ES, FR, UK, IT, 
PT according to the first FRF model, and for CY, 
DE, ES and IT according to the second FRF 
                                                          
(137) As explained above whenever the overall average of 
estimated primary balances was negative, it has been 
restricted to positive primary balance values in order to 
increase the number of countries included in threshold 
calculation. This implies that for those countries with only 
one or two positive values for the estimated PB the main 
debt threshold already implies a significant over-estimation 
of surplus-generating capacity and would decrease if based 
on the best 3 year PB values. These countries were then 
excluded from calculation of DTbest, i.e. CZ, LV, PL and 
SK in Graph IV.4.7 and CZ, MT and SI (besides PL and 
SK for which not even the general DT2 could be 
calculated) in Graph IV.4.8. For a number of countries, 
which are shown in the graphs, DTbest is equal to the main 
DT which is explained by the fact that their best 3 primary 
balances in the model were the only positive ones so that 
the main threshold was already restricted to those values: 
RO and SI in Graph IV.4.7 and RO and LV in Graph 
IV.4.8.    
model. However a few Member States remain 
fiscally unsustainable even under this more 
"optimistic" scenario. These are EL and IE 
according to the first model and FR, EL, HU, IE 
and PT according to the second FRF model.  
Graph IV.4.7: Debt sustainability thresholds - 1. historical norm 
1975-2010 2. best 3 years estimated primary balance 
- vs. current debt (% of GDP) 
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Note: Figures for thresholds in a few countries exceed the maximum 
value of the axis (200%). 
Source: Commission services calculations based on AMECO and 
WBDPI. 
 
Graph IV.4.6: Debt sustainability ranking 
DT2 - 2nd FRF model; r-g 1990-2010 - mean vs. median
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Source: Commission services calculations based on AMECO and World Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
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Graph IV.4.8: Debt sustainability thresholds - 1. historical norm 
1990-2008 2. best 3 years estimated primary balance 
- vs. current debt (% of GDP) 
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Note: Figures for thresholds in a few countries exceed the maximum 
value of the axis (200%). 
Source: Commission services calculations based on AMECO and 
WBDPI. 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
It is important to underline that calculations such 
as those presented here have to be considered with 
caution. Thresholds are very sensitive to i) choices 
made in FRF estimation process including the 
estimation period and ii) choices on the interest 
rate-growth rate differentials. Despite several tests 
and robustness analyses, such choices still contain 
elements of arbitrariness. Moreover it has already 
been stressed that the estimates are not very 
precise, in that the standard errors are relatively 
large.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With all these caveats in mind, the methodology 
presented here is useful in that the FRF provides a 
sound historical benchmark against which to 
compare future plans. The usefulness of the 
methodology is also confirmed by the fact that 
results are reasonable and conform to ex-ante 
expectations for most Member States, with 
Germany being the main exception. This can easily 
be explained from the fact that the results are 
mostly driven by the relatively low surplus-
generating capacity over the periods 
considered.(138) As with any benchmarking 
exercise, this constitutes the first step towards an 
understanding of the country's situation which 
makes this methodology a very useful tool for 
sustainability analysis.  
                                                          
(138) One should take into account the specific circumstances of 
this country during the 1990s linked to the reunification 
process followed by the exceptionally low growth of the 
early 2000s. Moreover, Germany becomes fiscally 
sustainable if thresholds are based on the best fiscal 
performances achieved over the model period (see results 
for DT best). 
5. A MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
177 
The instruments presented in Part IV to assess 
fiscal sustainability provide a good indication of 
the ability of governments to service the 
outstanding liabilities without triggering explosive 
debt dynamics, under the assumption that the 
feedback effects between fiscal and economic 
variables, mainly interest rates and output growth, 
are small. However, especially when large 
consolidations are implemented by governments, 
this assumption is not necessarily realistic and it is 
important to have an instrument that allows an 
assessment of fiscal sustainability taking into 
account all feedback effects. 
In particular, it is important to assess, whether the 
policies required to consolidate public finances are 
feasible given their likely effects on the economy. 
The ability to run primary surpluses that are 
sufficiently large so as to ensure debt sustainability 
is constrained by their effects on the economy. A 
negative effect on the economy can require larger 
surpluses, leading to feedback effects which limit 
the capacity of governments to conduct the desired 
fiscal policy. These constraints are defined here as 
fiscal limits. 
The concept of fiscal limits can be applied to both 
the revenue and the expenditure side as it may 
refer either to the ability to generate additional 
revenue, or to the ability to reduce non-interest 
expenditure to ensure sustainable budgets. Even 
"traditional" indicators of fiscal sustainability, 
which abstract from any feedback effects of fiscal 
measures on the economy, do not exclusively 
focus on the primary balance, but also on tax rates, 
such as the debt-stabilising tax rate proposed 
alongside the more common debt-stabilising 
primary surplus.(139) 
This Chapter offers a general equilibrium analysis 
of fiscal limits on the revenue side, which refers to 
the government's capacity to raise sufficient 
revenue to finance expenditures and ensure the 
long-run sustainability of public debt. The fiscal 
                                                          
(139) Blanchard, O.J. (1990), Blanchard, O.J., J.C. Chouraqui, 
R.P. Hagemann and N. Sartor, (1990) propose the "tax 
gap" indicator as being analogous to the "primary balance 
gap" indicator. The "tax gap" is the difference between the 
debt-stabilising (or "sustainable") tax rate and the current 
tax rate, measuring the required tax adjustment to stabilise 
the debt-to-GDP ratio under the assumption that taxation 
can be more readily adjusted than public expenditure.  
limit denotes the maximum (tax) revenue the 
government can collect. 
Fiscal limits may in principle depend on economic 
and political factors alike, as reflected in the two 
main strands of the literature on the determinants 
of fiscal limits:(140) 
The economic approach focuses on the economic 
limits to tax collection and builds on the concept of 
Laffer curves. These curves relate the tax rate to 
the revenue collected and have an inverted U-
shape, because distortionary taxation reduces the 
tax base on which tax revenue is collected. The 
fiscal limit is the point at which the decline of the 
tax base offsets the impact of an increase in the tax 
rate on revenue collection. Beyond that limit, 
further tax rate increases will actually reduce total 
tax revenue. For example, increasing labour 
taxation widens the wedge between net wages and 
labour costs and reduces taxable official 
employment; capital income taxation introduces a 
wedge between investment costs and the net 
returns to capital, which tends to reduce the 
equilibrium stock of productive capital; 
consumption taxes decrease the purchasing power 
of market income and makes non-taxed shadow 
activity or home production more attractive. 
The political approach relates fiscal limits to the 
political economy of taxation and government 
spending. It is based on the observation that 
electorates usually show limited support for tax 
increases (and expenditure cuts) whereas tax cuts 
are popular well below the Laffer peaks. Recent 
experiences in some euro area countries illustrate 
that even countries in severe fiscal stress might be 
unwilling to raise taxes to increase government 
revenue.(141) 
The model-based sustainability analysis in this 
chapter follows the first approach and focuses on 
the economic feasibility to generate the tax 
revenues needed to stabilise the public finances in 
the long-run. Political determinants are certainly 
important, but difficult to model. However, any 
                                                          
(140) For this taxonomy see Leeper, E. and T. Walker (2011). 
(141) The political limits to fiscal sustainability may be inferred 
from past policy responses, as it was argued in Chapter 
IV.3 on fiscal reaction functions. Legislated deficit or debt 
rules could be seen as another type of political limit or 
additional category of political self-restraint. 
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assessment of the economic dimension of fiscal 
limits should acknowledge that political 
constraints are likely to be tighter than economic 
ones. 
This approach contributes to the general 
sustainability analysis in that it provides i) an order 
of magnitude for the space that member states still 
have to increase distortionary taxes before 
reaching the Laffer curve maximum; and ii) the 
general equilibrium effects of a tax-based fiscal 
consolidation path.  
The advantage of integrating the model-based 
approach into a sustainability analysis is that it 
allows the general-equilibrium effects of different 
types of consolidation – gradual versus sudden 
consolidations and consolidations based on 
different tax instruments – to be distinguished. 
This advantage comes at a potential cost stemming 
from the fact that the results are potentially 
strongly model-specific. The precise transmission 
channels must be modelled and may all relevant 
mechanisms (especially the political ones) may not 
be captured to the full extent. Policy analysis 
should therefore build on empirically validated 
models and provide robustness checks to assess the 
sensitivity of results with respect to (uncertain or 
case-dependent) key parameters of the model. 
In terms of the use of different tax instruments, the 
forthcoming 2011 issue of the Commission report 
on "Tax reforms in EU Member States" identifies 
various challenges faced by euro area Member 
Sates in the area of tax policy in the wake of the 
crisis. In particular, the report considers the 
potential need to introduce fiscal consolidation 
measures on the revenue side – as a complement to 
expenditure control – to ensure fiscal 
sustainability. The report also addresses the 
possibilities for making the tax structure more 
growth friendly and improving the design of 
individual taxes. 
5.1. ANALYSING FISCAL LIMITS WITH THE 
QUEST MODEL 
This Chapter uses Commission's QUEST model 
(see Box IV.5.1) to derive fiscal limits for 
distortionary taxes. Fiscal limits are understood as 
the peaks of the Laffer curve for labour, capital 
and consumption taxes. Beyond these peaks, 
further tax increases lead to reductions in tax 
revenues because the contraction of tax bases 
outweighs the effect of higher tax rates on 
government revenue. There are direct and indirect 
crowding-out effect on tax bases. For example, 
income taxation that dampens private-sector 
income and activity reduces the tax base of both 
income and indirect taxes. The analysis of fiscal 
limits should include such indirect effects and 
focus on the impact of tax policies on total tax 
revenue. 
Tax avoidance and tax competition are crucial in 
shaping the Laffer curve. The version of the 
QUEST model used for this chapter includes home 
production and an open-economy setting to 
address domestic tax avoidance and some aspects 
of cross-border tax competition. 
First, home production is a way of modelling a 
shadow sector of the economy. The work and 
output of the informal sector are untaxed. Home 
production captures the responsiveness of official 
and informal activity to changes in labour and 
consumption taxes. In the model, households 
decide about the allocation of work effort to 
official and shadow activities based on the real net 
wage from official employment and the alternative 
return from home production. Income and sales 
taxes affect this trade-off and the households’ 
decisions. Growing substitutability between the 
two sectors amplifies the negative impact of tax 
increases on tax bases and tightens the fiscal 
limit.(142) 
Second, the open-economy structure partly 
captures the effect of international tax competition. 
Rising rates of capital income taxation in one 
country affect the relative prices of domestic and 
internationally traded assets and trigger capital 
outflows from the respective economy.(143) 
                                                          
(142) Labour tax is assumed to be liner, so that progressivity is 
not accounted for.  
(143) The model assumes that income taxation follows the 
residence principle and allows for cross-border arbitraging 
as the optimal portfolio allocation requires net returns to 
capital to be equalised across assets and countries. It does 
not address the viability of residence-based taxation when 
households or integrated firms can shift tax bases across 
jurisdictions. The model also excludes other elements of 
tax competition, such as cross-border sales tax arbitrage in 
the internal market. This is in line with Mendoza, E. and L. 
Tesar (1998) and Mendoza, E. and L. Tesar (2005).  
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 Box IV.5.1: The QUEST model
QUEST III is a global macroeconomic model developed by the European Commission for macroeconomic 
policy analysis and research. A member of the class of New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models, QUEST has rigorous microeconomic foundations derived from utility and 
profit optimisation and includes frictions in goods, labour and financial markets. Estimation and calibration 
allows the model to display the main features of the macroeconomic time series. The QUEST III model has 
been estimated on euro area and US data using Bayesian estimation methods. (1) 
The analysis of fiscal limits uses a small open-economy version of QUEST. Parameters such as country size, 
openness, government sector size and effective tax rates are calibrated to average values for EU member 
states. As the analysis focuses on the long-run effect of changes in tax rates on tax revenues, short-term 
dynamics and their determinants (e.g., price and wage stickiness, labour and capital adjustment costs, 
monetary policy) are of secondary importance.  
QUEST distinguishes firm, household and government sectors. Output is produced by profit maximising, 
monopolistically competitive firms, using a Cobb Douglas technology, with capital and labour. Domestic 
goods are imperfect substitutes for goods produced in the rest of the world. Households make savings, 
consumption and labour supply decisions. There is a trade union which sets wages taking into account the 
households' preferences. 
The government is subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. On the expenditure side QUEST 
distinguishes between government consumption, government investment and transfers (further 
disaggregated into unemployment benefits and other transfers). On the revenue side, the model distinguishes 
between taxes from consumption, labour and capital. Tax revenues are linked to their corresponding tax 
bases via linear tax rates. The analysis of fiscal limits keeps government consumption and investment 
constant in real terms. Benefit replacement rates are constant, but benefits payments vary endogenously with 
official unemployment. To isolate the revenue effect of distortionary tax adjustment, it is assumed that 
additional revenues are paid back to households as lump-sum transfers. 
The firms, the households and the government make decisions in line with their intertemporal budget 
constraints. This also ensures that all stock-flow relationships are modelled consistently. 
The analysis of fiscal limits in this section adds an informal sector of home production to the standard 
QUEST model. Households face a choice of working in either the official or informal sector. Neither work 
in home production nor its output is taxed. Households choose between work and leisure and between 
working in the official or the informal sector. (2) 
The choice between market and home work depends on the real net wage in the official market sector 
relative to the productivity of home work, where the former is affected by income and sales taxes. Two 
characteristics of home production restrict the substitutability between market and home work in response to 
changes in taxation: (1) home production is subject to decreasing returns to scale in the benchmark 
calibration; (2) market and home goods are imperfect substitutes in the consumption aggregator. 
The parameters of the home-production model extension are calibrated to match estimates of the size of the 
shadow economy and the elasticity of market employment with respect to tax wedges in Europe. (3) 
                                                          
(1) See Ratto, M., W. Roeger and J. in’t Veld (2009), and In’t Veld, J., R. Raciborski, M. Ratto and W. Roeger (2011). 
For additional information and publications using QUEST see: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/research/macroeconomic_models_en.htm. 
(2) The modelling of home production follows established practice. Examples include Benhabib, J., R. Rogerson and R. 
Wright (1991), Campbell, J. and S. Ludvigson (2001), Gomme, P., F. Kydland and P. Rupert (2001), Greenwood, J. 
and Z. Hercowitz (1991) and McGrattan, E., R. Rogerson and R. Wright (1997). 
(3) Causa, O. (2009) and Tafenau, E., H. Herwartz and F. Schneider (2010).  
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Estimates of fiscal limits 
Graph IV.5.1 displays the Laffer curves for labour, 
capital and consumption taxes in the baseline 
model in which parameters are calibrated to EU 
average values. The panels on the right-hand side 
show the tax revenues from the specific tax 
instrument, the ones on the left-hand side indicate 
the total tax revenue for the given tax rate.(144) 
                                                          
(144) In each scenario only the respective tax rate is changed, 
whereas other tax rates remain at benchmark levels. The 
benchmark corresponds to EU average effective tax rates: 
36.5% for labour tax; 32% for capital tax; 19.5% for 
The benchmark calibration points to substantial 
differences in the fiscal limit across the alternative 
tax instruments: total revenue from labour taxation 
reaches its maximum at the tax rate of 54%; total 
revenue from capital taxes peaks at a 72% tax rate; 
the consumption tax generates additional revenue 
for tax rates well beyond 90%.(145) The revenue-
                                                                                   
consumption tax. Data are from European Commission 
(2010d). In the simulations underlying Graphs IV.5.1- 
IV.5.4, additional tax revenue from tax increases is 
returned to households as lump-sum transfer. 
(145) Laffer curves for labour and capital income taxation must 
peak at tax rates between 0% and 100%. No tax revenue is 
collected at tax rates of 0%; the tax base is also zero at tax 
Graph IV.5.1: Laffer curves for the benchmark calibration 
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Note: Tax revenues are expressed as percent of baseline GDP, i.e. the GDP given actual average income and consumption tax rates. The model is 
calibrated at the average effective EU tax rates (see European Commission (2010d).) The  average effective EU tax rates are represented by the vertical 
lines 
Source: Commission services. 
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maximising labour tax rate is at the lower end of 
the estimates in related model-based analyses that 
– depending on the exact specification used – find 
revenue maxima for labour tax rates ranging from 
51 to 71%. Meanwhile, the revenue-maximising 
capital tax rate lies above range (48 to 65%) 
reported in other studies.(146) (147) 
The simulations in Graph IV.5.1 use values for the 
elasticity of substitution between market and home 
production that reproduce empirical estimates for 
EU countries. According to these estimates, 
increasing the labour tax wedge by one percentage 
point raises the share of the shadow economy by ¼ 
percentage points of total (i.e. official and 
unofficial) GDP and reduces official employment 
                                                                                   
rates of 100% as every incentive to work and invest in the 
official sector disappears. This does not hold for sales taxes 
that can generate (additional) tax revenue for rates beyond 
100%. 
(146) See Trabandt, M. and H. Uhlig (2010) and Busato, F. and 
B. Chiarini (2009). Trabandt and Uhlig (2010) use a 
closed-economy setup and do not include an informal 
sector, but provide robustness checks for alternative values 
of the elasticity of labour supply. Contrary to the QUEST 
specification, perfect competition in goods and labour 
markets is assumed. Country-specific estimates in Trabandt 
and Uhlig (2010) suggest fairly uniform Laffer curves for 
labour taxation in Western European countries, but larger 
diversity for capital taxation. Busato and Chiarini (2009) 
use a model with informal sector and calibrated to the 
Italian economy, which assumes very high substitutability 
between official and informal production. 
(147) The relatively high peak level of the Laffer curve of 
taxation on capital income in QUEST derives from the 
calibration of the model parameters, namely from the 
elasticity of labour supply and the weight of leisure in 
utility. The QUEST model is calibrated at a relatively high 
value. The parameter values suggested by the data 
underlying the model structure imply a rather limited 
response of labour supply to changes in the real wage. 
Consequently, taxation that reduces the equilibrium capital 
stock, marginal labour productivity and the real wage has 
limited impact on labour supply, employment and labour 
tax revenue. Trabandt, M. and H. Uhlig (2010) illustrate 
that the peak of the Laffer curve for capital taxation at 
relatively low tax rates results precisely from the fact, that 
the impact of lower investment and capital on wages has 
strong repercussions for labour supply and the labour tax 
base in their model. Higher values for the elasticity of 
labour supply and the utility weight of leisure do also shift 
the Laffer curve of labour taxation to the left. Furthermore, 
the fact that QUEST does not include the possibility to 
invest or shift profits abroad in order to avoid taxation at 
higher domestic rates diminishes the impact of capital 
taxation on the tax basis. 
by around ½ percent.(148) Intuitively, the higher the 
substitutability, the tighter the fiscal limits. 
Some sensitivity analysis is reported here, given 
the large impact of the degree of substitutability 
between market and home production on the shape 
of the Laffer curve. Moreover, substitutability is 
likely to vary across countries and time as it 
depends on the production structure in the official 
sector and on administrative and legal conditions 
that affect how easily activities can be shifted 
between market and home production. 
Graph IV.5.2 illustrates the sensitivity of fiscal 
limits to supply-side behaviour. The charts show 
the potential tax revenues for the standard 
calibration (Graph IV.5.1) and a higher elasticity 
value that doubles the increase in the relative size 
of the informal sector in response to a one 
percentage-point increase in the labour tax wedge 
from ¼ to ½ percentage points. 
Higher substitutability reduces the revenue-
maximising tax rates and the corresponding 
maximum tax revenue. The curve for labour 
income taxation peaks at 45% (instead of 54%) 
and the maximum revenue falls by 7%; the capital 
tax curve peaks at 67% (instead of 72%) and the 
maximum tax revenue falls by 2%; the revenue 
curve for the consumption tax remains upward 
sloping, but flattens visibly. 
The effects become even stronger when the 
benchmark assumption of decreasing returns to 
scale in home production is relaxed. Going from 
the standard setting of decreasing returns to scale 
to an alternative calibration with constant returns 
to scale in home production Graph removes a 
supply-side constraint to the sectoral reallocation 
of activity and increases the willingness of 
households to substitute official employment for 
home work.(149) 
                                                          
(148) See Causa (2009) and Tafenau, Herwartz and Schneider 
(2010). 
(149) The production technology in the official sector is 
modelled by a Cobb-Douglass production function with 
capital and labour. The Cobb-Douglas function implies 
constant returns to scale, e.g. doubling all inputs doubles 
production output, but decreasing marginal returns to 
labour and capital when the other factor is held constant. 
The Cobb-Douglass specification is in line with standard 
modelling practice and the QUEST model estimation. 
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Graph IV.5.2: Laffer curves for higher substitutability between 
market and home production 
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Note: Tax revenues are expressed as percent of baseline GDP, i.e. the 
GDP given actual average income and consumption tax rates.  The 
model is calibrated at the average effective EU tax rates (see European 
Commission (2010d).)  The average effective EU tax rates are 
represented by the vertical lines. 
Source: Commission services. 
The results are shown in Graph IV.5.3. The 
income from labour and capital taxes peaks at tax 
rates of 39% and 63%, respectively, and reaches a 
maximum of only ½% and 8% above current rates. 
Taxing consumption now also faces a revenue 
maximum at a 68% tax rate.  
The maximum tax revenue from consumption 
taxation exceeds the current revenue by 26%, but 
the revenue curve already flattens at a tax rate of 
40%. 
Graph IV.5.3: Laffer curves for higher substitutability and 
constant returns to scale in home production 
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Note: Tax revenues are expressed as percent of baseline GDP, i.e. the 
GDP given actual average income and consumption tax rates. The  
vertical lines represent the average effective EU tax rates used as a 
benchmark 
Source: Commission services. 
Taken together, robust model-based evidence for 
fiscal limits estimates derived from Laffer curves 
exists for labour income and capital taxation. The 
fiscal limits are high in the setting in which the 
substitutability between production in the official 
sector versus home production is limited. These 
limits tighten in the case of increased tax 
avoidance through home or shadow production. 
The higher the degree of substitutability between 
official and informal production, the tighter the 
fiscal limits. High substitutability also introduces a 
meaningful revenue limit for consumption taxes. 
The fact that the limits of capital taxation in the 
open-economy setting of QUEST are not tighter 
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than those found in closed-economy models 
suggests that the elements of cross-border spillover 
from taxation captured in the model, namely after-
tax return equalisation across countries that affects 
savings rates and demand for domestic and foreign 
assets, do not play a major role. However, the 
model excludes important aspects of potential tax 
competition, such as cross-border profit shifting by 
households and integrated corporations, which 
would increase cross-border tax base mobility in 
response to tax-rate differentials and reduce the 
potential of capital taxation to generate additional 
tax revenue. 
The output costs of higher taxation 
Higher taxation has economic costs even where it 
succeeds in raising additional revenue. The tax 
distortions reduce employment, investment and 
production.(150) Raising additional revenue through 
higher taxes is therefore associated with significant 
output decline. This is illustrated in Graph IV.5.4. 
Moving the labour tax from the current rate of 
36.5% to the revenue peak (54%) shown in Graph 
IV.5.1 would reduce output by circa 10% 
compared to current tax rates in the benchmark 
calibration Graph. Given the limited degree of 
substitutability between official and shadow 
activities in the benchmark calibration of the 
model, growing home production mitigates the 
decline of official output only slightly and total 
output declines as well. Raising the capital tax 
from the current rate of 32% to the peak of the 
revenue curve (72%) reduces output by more than 
10%.(151) Output losses are smaller for the 
consumption tax, which illustrates that shifting 
revenue collection from income to consumption 
taxes is beneficial in employment and output 
terms. However, the higher the substitutability 
between market and home production, the stronger 
are the reductions in official output and tax bases 
for income, profit and consumption taxes and the 
                                                          
(150) Certain taxes, of course, also correct market distortions and 
make agents pay for negative externalities and the 
consumption of public goods. 
(151) In view of the fact that it is normally considered that capital 
taxation is more distortionary, it may look surprising that 
the output costs of increasing capital taxation are lower 
than the output cost for raising the labour tax. Again, one 
has to recall that the model does not account for tax base 
mobility in the form of foreign investment or profit shifting 
between jurisdictions. 
growth of shadow activities in response to rising 
tax rates. 
Graph IV.5.4: The output costs of higher taxation 
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5.2. FISCAL LIMITS IN SUSTAINABILITY 
ANALYSIS 
The main results of the model-based analysis of 
the economic limits to distortionary taxation can 
be summarised in three points: 
(1) The maximum revenue collectable by the 
government depends on the tax instrument used. 
The results of the model point towards higher 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2011 
 
184 
distortions from labour taxation than currently 
assumed, and indicate that labour income taxation 
face the tightest limit. It has to be stressed that the 
latter point is only valid under the relevant caveat 
that the model does not (fully) address 
international tax competition on capital in that the 
approach used does not adequately take into 
account the key issue of tax base mobility. 
Conversely, the potential of consumption taxes to 
generate revenue is relatively large as the adverse 
tax base effects are smaller. 
(2) The fiscal limits depend on the structure of the 
economy, especially on the elasticity of tax bases 
with respect to tax rates. One particular aspect is 
tax avoidance through the migration of production 
towards the shadow economy or home production. 
The room for shadow activities depends on the 
structure of production and the enforcement of the 
tax code. Substitutability between market 
production and shadow activities might be higher 
in economies with a larger incidence of labour-
intensive services, as it is plausible to assume that 
the latter can more easily migrate from market to 
home production than classical manufacturing. 
 (3) Highly elastic tax bases also amplify the 
output costs of higher taxation. The stronger the 
adverse tax base effect, the higher the output loss 
from rising tax rates. 
Keeping these points in mind, model simulations 
can inform the sustainability analysis in two ways. 
First, they provide a rough benchmark against 
which it is possible to compare existing effective 
tax rates. In the case of the EU aggregate, the 2008 
EU averages of the effective tax rates (36.5% for 
labour tax; 32% for capital tax; 19.5% for 
consumption tax) are well below the model's 
thresholds, which provides for some fiscal space, 
especially with reference to the consumption tax. It 
should be recalled, however, that raising 
distortionary taxes comes at a cost in terms of 
output losses. 
Second, model simulations can illustrate the 
evolution of government budget balances and 
government debt dynamics under alternative 
policy settings and economic conditions. 
Simulations can help in assessing the feasibility of 
specific consolidation strategies, taking into 
account the impact of revenue and expenditure 
based measures on the tax bases and potential 
output. Graph IV.5.5 gives a hypothetical example 
for an average EU Member State, which considers 
a with a starting government debt of 80% and a 
primary deficit of 4% of GDP in 2011; potential 
output grows at 1.7% p.a. in the baseline and the 
annual real interest rate is 3%.(152) 
The panels in Graph IV.5.5 display three different 
scenarios: (a) non-consolidation,(153) which 
extrapolates the 4% primary deficit into the future 
and with no fiscal tightening; (b) "timely 
consolidation," which is a tax-based consolidation 
starting in 2012 and bringing government debt 
down from 80 to 60% of GDP by 2020; (c) 
"delayed consolidation", which is a tax-based 
consolidation starting only in 2016 and bringing 
government debt down to 60% of GDP by 2020. 
For simplicity, the revenue-based consolidations 
(b) and (c) are assumed to increase labour income, 
capital and consumption taxation by the same 
number of percentage points. 
Comparing the no-consolidation and consolidation 
scenarios provides several interesting observations: 
First, a continuation of the current primary deficit 
together with underlying potential growth and 
interest rates leads to a debt explosion; government 
debt to GDP increases from 80 to 126% in under 
ten years. 
Second, the tax increases that are required to bring 
government debt to 60% of GDP (in the absence of 
non-interest expenditure cuts) are large, especially 
if consolidation is delayed to the second half of the 
decade. Timely consolidation requires 5 
percentage point labour, capital and consumption 
tax rate increases, so that consolidation appears 
                                                          
(152) The model assumes debt to be held domestically, so that 
higher taxation to reduce debt does not imply a transfer of 
purchasing power from domestic to foreign households. 
Foreign-held debt makes consolidations more painful. 
Taxation reduces the disposable income of domestic 
households, without being offset by interest income and as 
debt payments flow abroad. While the general mechanics 
of consolidation remain unchanged, foreign indebtedness 
leads to a stronger contraction of domestic consumption, 
which also reduces the base of the consumption tax. The 
negative wealth effect from capital outflow does, on the 
other hand, also reduce the decline in labour supply that is 
associated with a given tax wedge. 
(153) Technically, the tax-based fiscal closure rule in QUEST is 
switched off until 2025 and the intertemporal government 
budget constraint respected via the emission of new debt 
during this period of time. In 2025 the standard closure 
rule, in which the labour tax rate reacts to deviations of 
government debt from target, is phased in again. 
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politically costly even if implemented in a timely 
fashion; a delayed consolidation, on the other 
hand, would require tax rate increases of more than 
10 percentage points for all three tax instruments. 
Third, a sudden consolidation in only one year, as 
opposed to the gradual strategies (b) and (c), 
requires severe tax hikes if the consolidation 
comes in the early 2010s. In the late 2010s, one-off 
consolidation might even become economically 
unfeasible. A large consolidation at the end of the 
decade to bring government debt down from 126 
to 60% of GDP during one year in 2019 would 
require a primary surplus of 66% of GDP in 2019, 
which is far above the potential revenue from even 
extreme labour or profit tax increases and very 
likely beyond any politically viable VAT-based 
consolidation. 
Fourth, a fiscal consolidation through distortionary 
taxation comes with sizable cumulative output 
losses due to the negative supply-side effects of 
increasing tax rates. The output costs provide a 
strong case for more balanced consolidation 
packages that also include measures on the 
expenditure side. 
The cumulative output losses from timely (b) and 
delayed (c) consolidations in Graph IV.5.5 are 
similar, owing to the fact that the impact of tax 
rates on tax revenues is fairly linear for given tax 
levels. This linearity holds of increases of about 5 
to 10 percentage points above the status quo. Non-
linearity of the link between tax rates and revenues 
becomes important when tax rates approach the 
Laffer curve peaks and in economic environments 
in which tax bases react more strongly to tax rates, 
such as in Graphs IV.5.2 and IV.5.3, where the 
substitutability between market and home 
production is significantly higher than in the 
benchmark calibration of Graphs IV.5.1 and 
IV.5.5. 
5.3. CONCLUSION 
The main policy conclusion from the model-based 
comparison of alternative (non-)consolidation 
scenarios is that fiscal consolidation should be 
implemented in a timely manner, as this contains 
the accumulated debt stock and allows the 
consolidation to be smoothes over a longer period 
of time. Delaying a consolidation to the medium or 
Graph IV.5.5: Dynamic sustainability analysis 
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long term may lead to debt levels that cannot be 
serviced anymore through tax revenues, i.e. where 
tax collection hits the Laffer peaks imposed by the 
elasticity of tax bases. Furthermore, the cumulative 
output loss from distortionary taxation increases as 
economies approach the fiscal limit defined by the 
Laffer curves, which is more likely to happen the 
larger the required consolidation. 
A final comment is warranted. Taken at face value, 
the capacity to create tax revenues would not 
appear to be the first binding constraint on using 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 tax increases as a consolidation instrument 
because not many countries are likely to be on the 
downward path of the Laffer curve. This is 
particularly the case with regard to consumption 
taxes. On the other hand, the model may miss 
some important tax competition aspects, which 
explains why taking the results should be 
interpreted with caution. Furthermore the 
estimated impact of taxes on growth is a sufficient 
economic reason to avoid excessive tax increases. 
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Member States 
BE Belgium 
BG Bulgaria 
CZ Czech Republic 
DK  Denmark 
DE Germany 
EE Estonia  
EI  Ireland 
EL  Greece 
ES  Spain 
FR  France 
IT  Italy 
CY Cyprus 
LV Latvia 
LT Lithuania 
LU  Luxembourg 
HU Hungary 
MT Malta 
NL  The Netherlands 
AT  Austria 
PL Poland 
PT  Portugal 
RO Romania 
SI Slovenia 
SK Slovakia 
FI  Finland 
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SE  Sweden 
UK  United Kingdom 
 
EA Euro area 
EU European Union 
EU-25 European Union, 25 Member States (excl. BG and RO) 
EU-27 European Union, 27 Member States 
EU-15  European Union, 15 Member States before 1 May 2004  
EU-10 European Union, 10 Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004  
(CZ, EE, CY, LV, LH, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK) 
Non-EU countries 
AU  Australia 
CA  Canada 
CH  Switzerland 
JP   Japan 
KO South Korea 
NO Norway 
NZ  New Zeeland  
US(A)  United States  
Currencies 
EUR  euro 
ECU  European currency unit 
BGL Bulgarian lev 
CZK  Czech koruna 
DKK  Danish krone 
EEK  Estonian kroon 
GBP  Pound sterling 
LTL Lithuanian litas 
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LVL Latvian lats 
HUF Hungarian forint 
RON New Rumanian leu 
SEK  Swedish krona 
SKK Slovak koruna 
CAD  Canadian dollar 
CHF  Swiss franc 
JPY  Japanese yen 
SUR  Russian rouble 
USD  US dollar 
Other  
AMC      Asset management company 
AMECO Macro-economic database of the European Commission 
CAPB Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
CMFB    Committee on monetary, financial and balance-of-payment statistics 
COFOG Classification of the functions of government 
DEA  Data envelope approach 
DG ECFIN Directorate-General Economic and Financial Affairs 
DGS      Deposit Guarantee Scheme  
DR Debt requirement 
DSGE Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
DWF      Discount window facility 
EAMS    Euro Area Member States 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Council 
EDP Excessive deficit procedure 
EERP European Economic Recovery Plan 
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EFC Economic and Financial Committee 
EFSF     European Financial Stability Facility   
ELA      Emergency Liquidity Assistance  
EMU   Economic and Monetary Union 
EPC Economic Policy Committee 
ESA(95) European System of National and Regional Accounts 
ESM       European Stability mechanism 
ESSPROS European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics 
EU KLEMS European database on capital, labour, energy, material and services 
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
FIRB     Foundation Internal Ratings Based  
GDP Gross domestic product 
GLS  Generalised least squares 
IBP Initial budgetary position 
ICT  Information and communication technologies 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INSEE   Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques 
ISCED   International Standard Classification of Education 
LGD       Loss Given Default  
LIME     Working group on methodology to assess Lisbon-related Structural Reforms 
LTC Long-term budgetary cost of ageing 
MTBF  Medium-term budgetary framework 
MTO Medium-term budgetary objective 
NAIRU  Non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary least squares 
PBB  Performance-based budgeting 
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PISA  Programme for International Student Assessment 
pp Percentage points 
PPS Purchasing power standard 
R&D Research and development 
RAMS  Recently acceded Member States 
RF          Resolution Funds 
RoEA Rest of euro area 
ROW Rest of the world 
SCPs Stability and convergence programmes 
SGP  Stability and Growth Pact 
SLS       Special liquidity scheme 
SSC Social security contributions 
TFP  Total factor productivity 
VAT Value added tax 
WGHQPF Working Group on the quality of public finance 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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Asset management company  Public or private 
body aiming at restructuring, recovering or 
disposing of nonperforming assets.  
Automatic stabilisers  Features of the tax and 
spending regime which react automatically to the 
economic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a 
result, the budget balance in percent of GDP tends 
to improve in years of high growth, and deteriorate 
during economic slowdowns. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a 
forum for regular cooperation on banking 
supervisory matters aiming at enhancing the 
understanding of key supervisory issues and 
improving the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide. It also develops guidelines and 
supervisory standards in areas where they are 
considered desirable. In this regard, the Committee 
is best known for its international standards on 
capital adequacy; the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision; and the Concordat on cross-
border banking supervision.  
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)  
Annual guidelines for the economic and budgetary 
policies of the Member States. They are prepared 
by the Commission and adopted by the Council of 
Ministers responsible for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (ECOFIN). 
Budget balance  The balance between total public 
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a 
positive balance indicating a surplus and a 
negative balance indicating a deficit. For the 
monitoring of Member State budgetary positions, 
the EU uses general government aggregates. See 
also structural budget balance, primary budget 
balance, and primary structural balance. 
Budgetary rules  Rules and procedures through 
which policy-makers decide on the size and the 
allocation of public expenditure as well as on its 
financing through taxation and borrowing. 
Budgetary sensitivity  The variation in the budget 
balance in percentage of GDP brought about by a 
change in the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated 
to be 0.5 on average. 
Candidate countries  Countries that wish to 
accede to the EU. Besides the accession countries, 
they include Croatia and Turkey. 
Close-to-balance requirement  A requirement 
contained in the 'old' Stability and Growth Pact, 
according to which Member States should, over 
the medium term, achieve an overall budget 
balance close to balance or in surplus; was 
replaced by country-specific medium-term 
budgetary objectives in the reformed Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Code of Conduct  Policy document endorsed by 
the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005 setting 
down the specifications on the implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the format and 
content of the stability and convergence 
programmes. 
COFOG  (Classification of the Functions of 
Government) A statistical nomenclature used to 
break down general government expenditure into 
its different functions  including general public 
services, defence, public order and safety, 
economic affairs, environmental protection, 
housing and community amenities, health, 
recreation, culture and religion, education and 
social protection. 
Composite indicator: a compilation of several 
indicators into a single index reflecting the 
different dimensions of a measured concept. 
Convergence programmes  Medium-term 
budgetary and monetary strategies presented by 
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. 
They are updated annually, according to the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Prior 
to the third phase of EMU, convergence 
programmes were issued on a voluntary basis and 
used by the Commission in its assessment of the 
progress made in preparing for the euro. See also 
stability programmes. 
Crowding-out effects  Offsetting effects on output 
due to changes in interest rates and exchange rates 
triggered by a loosening or tightening of fiscal 
policy. 
Cyclical component of budget balance  That part 
of the change in the budget balance that follows 
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automatically from the cyclical conditions of the 
economy, due to the reaction of public revenue and 
expenditure to changes in the output gap. See 
automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing and structural 
budget balance. 
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance  See 
structural budget balance. 
Defined-benefit pension scheme  A traditional 
pension scheme that defines a benefit, i.e. a 
pension, for an employee upon that employee's 
retirement is a defined benefit plan. 
Defined-contribution pension scheme  A scheme 
providing for an individual account for each 
participant, and for benefits based solely on the 
amount contributed to the account, plus or minus 
income, gains, expenses and losses allocated to the 
account. 
Demand and supply shocks  Disturbances that 
affect the economy on the demand side (e.g. 
changes in private consumption or exports) or on 
the supply side (e.g. changes in commodity prices 
or technological innovations). They can impact on 
the economy either on a temporary or permanent 
basis. 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes reimburse a limited 
amount of deposits to depositors whose bank has 
failed. From the depositors' point of view, this 
protects a part of their wealth from bank failures. 
From a financial stability perspective, this promise 
prevents depositors from making panic 
withdrawals from their bank, thereby preventing 
severe economic consequences. 
Dependency ratio A measure of the ratio of 
people who receive government transfers, 
especially pensions, relative to those who are 
available to provide the revenue to pay for those 
transfers. 
Direct fiscal costs (gross, net) of a financial 
crisis The direct gross costs are the fiscal outlays 
in support of the financial sector that increase the 
level of public debt. They encompass, for example, 
recapitalisation, purchase of troubled bank assets, 
pay-out to depositors, liquidity support, payment 
when guarantees are called and subsidies. The 
direct net costs are the direct gross cost net of 
recovery payments, such as through the sale of 
acquired assets or returns on assets. Thus, the net 
direct fiscal costs reflect the permanent increase in 
public debt. 
Direct taxes Taxes that are levied directly on 
personal or corporate incomes and property. 
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget 
balance and in its components under the control of 
government. It is usually measured as the residual 
of the change in the balance after the exclusion of 
the budgetary impact of automatic stabilisers. See 
also fiscal stance. 
Early-warning mechanism  Part of the preventive 
elements of the Stability and Growth Pact. It is 
activated when there is significant divergence from 
the budgetary targets set down in a stability or 
convergence programme. 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)  
Formerly the Monetary Committee, the EFC is a 
Committee of the Council of the European Union 
set up by Article 114 of the. Its main task is to 
prepare and discuss (ECOFIN) Council decisions 
with regard to economic and financial matters. 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC)  Group of 
senior government officials whose main task is to 
prepare discussions of the (ECOFIN) Council on 
structural policies. It plays an important role in the 
preparation of the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, and it is active on policies related to 
labour markets, methods to calculate cyclically-
adjusted budget balances and ageing populations. 
Effective tax rate The ratio of broad categories of 
tax revenue (labour income, capital income, 
consumption) to their respective tax bases. 
Effectiveness The same concept as efficiency 
except that it links input to outcomes rather than 
outputs. 
Efficiency  Can be defined in several ways, either 
as the ratio of outputs to inputs or as the distance 
to a production possibility frontier (see also Free 
Disposable Hull analysis, Data Envelope analysis, 
stochastic frontier analysis). Cost efficiency 
measures the link between monetary inputs (funds) 
and outputs; technical efficiency measures the link 
between technical inputs and outputs. Output 
efficiency indicates by how much the output can be 
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increased for a given input; input efficiency 
indicates by how much the input can be reduced 
for a given input. 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (equivalent to 
lender-of-last- resort), the most traditional tool 
available to a central bank for dealing with 
financial instability. It includes both the provision 
of liquidity to the financial system as a whole 
through market operations, as well as emergency 
lending to individual banks. Not all liquidity 
injections aimed at preventing the spread of a 
liquidity problem relate to a crisis, as central banks 
routinely offer liquidity against specified collateral 
requirements in order to support the orderly 
functioning of markets. 
ESA95 / ESA79  European accounting standards 
for the reporting of economic data by the Member 
States to the EU. As of 2000, ESA95 has replaced 
the earlier ESA79 standard with regard to the 
comparison and analysis of national public finance 
data. 
European Financial Stability Facility is a 
company owned by Euro Area Member States 
created following the decisions taken in May 2010 
by the Council. EFSF is able to issue bonds 
guaranteed by EAMS for up to € 440 billion for 
on-lending to EAMS in difficulty, subject to 
conditions negotiated with the European 
Commission in liaison with the European Central 
Bank and International Monetary Fund and to be 
approved by the Eurogroup. EFSF has been 
assigned the best possible credit rating; AAA by 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, Aaa by 
Moody’s. 
European semester European semester New 
governance architecture approved by the Member 
States in September 2010. It means that the EU 
and the euro zone will coordinate ex ante their 
budgetary and economic policies, in line with both 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the Europe 2020 
strategy. Based on previous discussions on 
Commission's Annual Growth Survey, each 
summer, the European Council and the Council of 
ministers will provide policy advice before 
Member States finalise their draft budgets.   
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)  A procedure 
according to which the Commission and the 
Council monitor the development of national 
budget balances and public debt in order to assess 
and/or correct the risk of an excessive deficit in 
each Member State. Its application has been 
further clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
See also stability programmes and Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Expenditure rules A subset of fiscal rules that 
target (a subset of) public expenditure. 
Foundation Internal Ratings Based framework 
used to set minimum regulatory capital for 
internationally active banks. The Basel II FIRB 
framework sets minimum regulatory capital 
requirements using a modified version of an 
industry model, the so-called Gaussian asymptotic 
single risk factor model of credit risk developed 
chiefly by Vasicek. 
Fiscal consolidation An improvement in the 
budget balance through measures of discretionary 
fiscal policy, either specified by the amount of the 
improvement or the period over which the 
improvement continues. 
Fiscal decentralisation  The transfer of authority 
and responsibility for public functions from the 
central government to intermediate and local 
governments or to the market. 
Fiscal federalism  A subfield of public finance 
that investigates the fiscal relations across levels of 
government. 
Fiscal governance Comprises all rules, regulations 
and procedures that impact on how the budget and 
its components are being prepared. The terms 
fiscal governance and fiscal frameworks are used 
interchangeably in the report. 
Fiscal impulse  The estimated effect of fiscal 
policy on GDP. It is not a model-free measure and 
it is usually calculated by simulating an 
econometric model. The estimates presented in the 
present report are obtained by using the 
Commission services’ QUEST model. 
Fiscal institutions Independent public bodies, 
other than the central bank, which prepare 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, monitor 
the fiscal performance and/or advice the 
government on fiscal policy issues. 
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Fiscal rule A permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator 
of fiscal performance, such as the government 
budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major 
component thereof. See also budgetary rule, 
expenditure rules. 
Fiscal stance A measure of the effect of 
discretionary fiscal policy. In this report, it is 
defined as the change in the primary structural 
budget balance relative to the preceding period. 
When the change is positive (negative) the fiscal 
stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive). 
General government  As used by the EU in its 
process of budgetary surveillance under the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the excessive deficit 
procedure, the general government sector covers 
national government, regional and local 
government, as well as social security funds. 
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to 
and from the EU Budget. 
Government budget constraint  A basic 
condition applying to the public finances, 
according to which total public expenditure in any 
one year must be financed by taxation, government 
borrowing, or changes in the monetary base. In the 
context of EMU, the ability of governments to 
finance spending through money issuance is 
prohibited. See also stock-flow adjustment, 
sustainability. 
Government contingent liabilities Obligations 
for the government that are subject to the 
realization of specific uncertain and discrete future 
events. For instance, the guarantees granted by 
governments to the debt of private corporations 
bonds issued by enterprise are contingent 
liabilities, since the government obligation to pay 
depend on the non-ability of the original debtor to 
honour its own obligations. 
Government implicit liabilities  Government 
obligations that are very likely to arise in the future 
in spite of the absence of backing contracts or law. 
The government may have a potential future 
obligation as a result of legitimate expectations 
generated by past practice or as a result of the 
pressure by interest groups. Most implicit 
liabilities are contingent, i.e., depend upon the 
occurrence of uncertain future events. 
Growth accounting  A technique based on a 
production function approach where total GDP (or 
national income) growth is decomposed into the 
various production factors and a non-explained 
part which is the total factor productivity change, 
also often termed the Solow residual. 
Indirect taxation  Taxes that are levied during the 
production stage, and not on the income and 
property arising from economic production 
processes. Prominent examples of indirect taxation 
are the value added tax (VAT), excise duties, 
import levies, energy and other environmental 
taxes. 
Integrated guidelines  A general policy 
instrument for coordinating EU-wide and Member 
States economic structural reforms embedded in 
the Lisbon strategy and which main aim is to boost 
economic growth and job creation in the EU. 
Interest burden General government interest 
payments on public debt as a share of GDP. 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
Partnership between the EU and Member States 
for growth and more and better jobs. Originally 
approved in 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was 
revamped in 2005. Based on the Integrated 
Guidelines (merger of the broad economic policy 
guidelines and the employment guidelines, dealing 
with macro-economic, micro-economic and 
employment issues) for the period 2005-2008, 
Member States drew up three-year national reform 
programmes at the end of 2005. They reported on 
the implementation of the national reform 
programmes for the first time in autumn 2006. The 
Commission analyses and summarises these 
reports in an EU Annual Progress Report each 
year, in time for the Spring European Council. 
Loss Given Default The loss incurred if an obligor 
defaults. 
Maastricht reference values for public debt and 
deficits  Respectively, a 60 % general government 
debt-to-GDP ratio and a 3 % general government 
deficit-to-GDP ratio. These thresholds are defined 
in a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union. See also Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Maturity structure of public debt The profile of 
total debt in terms of when it is due to be paid 
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back. Interest rate changes affect the budget 
balance directly to the extent that the general 
government sector has debt with a relatively short 
maturity structure. Long maturities reduce the 
sensitivity of the budget balance to changes in the 
prevailing interest rate. See also public debt. 
Medium-term budgetary framework  An 
institutional fiscal device that lets policy-makers 
extend the horizon for fiscal policy making beyond 
the annual budgetary calendar (typically 3-5 
years). Targets can be adjusted under medium-
term budgetary frameworks (MTBF) either on an 
annul basis (flexible frameworks) or only at the 
end of the MTBF horizon (fixed frameworks).  
Medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) 
According to the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact, stability programmes and convergence 
programmes present a medium-term objective for 
the budgetary position. It is country-specific to 
take into account the diversity of economic and 
budgetary positions and developments as well as 
of fiscal risks to the sustainability of public 
finances, and is defined in structural terms (see 
structural balance). 
Minimum benchmarks  The lowest value of the 
structural budget balance that provides a safety 
margin against the risk of breaching the Maastricht 
reference value for the deficit during normal 
cyclical fluctuations. The minimum benchmarks 
are estimated by the European Commission. They 
do not cater for other risks such as unexpected 
budgetary developments and interest rate shocks. 
They are a lower bound for the 'medium-term 
budgetary objectives (MTO). 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)  An indicator 
combining the change in real short-term interest 
rate and in the real effective exchange rate to 
gauge the degree of easing or tightening of 
monetary policy. 
Mundell-Fleming model  Macroeconomic model 
of an open economy which embodies the main 
Keynesian hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity 
preference). In spite of its shortcomings, it remains 
useful in short-term economic policy analysis. 
NAIRU  Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment. 
Non-Keynesian effects  Supply-side and 
expectations effects which reverse the sign of 
traditional Keynesian multipliers. Hence, if non-
Keynesian effects dominate, fiscal consolidation 
would be expansionary. 
Old age dependency ratio  Population aged over 
65 as a percentage of working age population 
(usually defined as persons aged between 15 and 
64). 
One-off and temporary measures Government 
transactions having a transitory budgetary effect 
that does not lead to a sustained change in the 
budgetary position. See also structural balance. 
Outcome indicator Measures the ultimate results 
(outcomes) of policy choices (e.g. education 
attainment, healthy life years, economic growth).  
Output costs from a financial crisis This is the 
gap between the hypothetical output development 
without a crisis and the actual output realised 
against the back of the crisis. Various methods are 
available to calculate output losses, in particular 
either using the trend GDP growth or the level of 
GDP as a benchmark.  
Output gap  The difference between actual output 
and estimated potential output at any particular 
point in time. See also cyclical component of 
budget balance. 
Output indicator  Measures the technical results 
(outputs) of policy choices (e.g. number of 
university graduates, number of patents, life 
expectancy). 
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG)  Pension 
system in which current pension expenditures are 
financed by the contributions of current 
employees. 
Pension fund A legal entity set up to accumulate, 
manage and administer pension assets. See also 
private pension scheme. 
Performance-based budgeting A budgeting 
technique that links budget appropriations to 
performance (outcomes, results) rather than 
focusing on input controls. In practice, 
performance-informed budgeting is more common 
which basis decisions on budgetary allocation on 
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performance information without establishing a 
formal link. 
Policy-mix  The overall stance of fiscal and 
monetary policy. The policy-mix may consist of 
various combinations of expansionary and 
restrictive policies, with a given fiscal stance being 
either supported or offset by monetary policy. 
Potential GDP The level of real GDP in a given 
year that is consistent with a stable rate of 
inflation. If actual output rises above its potential 
level, then constraints on capacity begin to bind 
and inflationary pressures build; if output falls 
below potential, then resources are lying idle and 
inflationary pressures abate. See also production 
function method and output gap. 
Pre-accession Economic Programmes (PEPs)  
Annual programmes submitted by candidate 
countries which set the framework for economic 
policies The PEPs consist of a review of recent 
economic developments, a detailed 
macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public 
finance issues and an outline of the structural 
reform agenda. 
Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Framework 
(PFSF)  Framework for budgetary surveillance of 
candidate countries in the run up to accession. It 
closely approximates the policy co-ordination and 
surveillance mechanisms at EU level. 
Primary budget balance  The budget balance net 
of interest payments on general government debt. 
Primary structural budget balance  The 
structural budget balance net of interest payments. 
Principal components  A statistical technique 
used to reduce multidimensional data sets to lower 
dimensions for analysis. This technique provides a 
compression of a set of high dimensional vectors 
(or variables) into a set of lower dimensional 
vectors (or variables) and then reconstructing the 
original set summarizing the information into a 
limited number of values. 
Private pension schemes   The insurance contract 
specifies a schedule of contribution in exchange of 
which benefits will be paid when the members 
reach a specific retirement age. The transactions 
are between the individual and the insurance 
provider and they are not recorded as government 
revenues or government expenditure and, 
therefore, do not have an impact on government 
surplus or deficit. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy  A fiscal stance which 
amplifies the economic cycle by increasing the 
structural primary deficit during an economic 
upturn, or by decreasing it in a downturn. A 
neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance unchanged over the economic 
cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See 
also tax-smoothing. 
Production function approach  A method to 
estimate the level of potential output of an 
economy based on available labour inputs, the 
capital stock and their level of efficiency. Potential 
output is used to estimate the output gap, a key 
input in the estimation of cyclical component of the 
budget. 
Public debt Consolidated gross debt for the 
general government sector. It includes the total 
nominal value of all debt owed by public 
institutions in the Member State, except that part 
of the debt which is owed to other public 
institutions in the same Member State. 
Public goods Goods and services that are 
consumed jointly by several economic agents and 
for which there is no effective pricing mechanism 
that would allow private provision through the 
market. 
Public investment  The component of total public 
expenditure through which governments increase 
and improve the stock of capital employed in the 
production of the goods and services they provide. 
Public-private partnerships (PPP)  Agreements 
that transfer investment projects to the private 
sector that traditionally have been executed or 
financed by the public sector. To qualify as a PPP, 
the project should concern a public function, 
involve the general government as the principal 
purchaser, be financed from non-public sources 
and engage a corporation outside the general 
government as the principal operator that provides 
significant inputs in the design and conception of 
the project and bears a relevant amount of the risk. 
Part V 
Resources 
 
199 
Quality of public finances  Comprises all 
arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that 
support the macroeconomic goals of fiscal policy, 
in particular economic growth. 
Quasi-fiscal activities  Activities promoting 
public policy goals carried out by non-government 
units. 
QUEST  The macroeconomic model of the EU 
Member States plus the US and Japan developed 
by the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission. 
Recently acceded Member States  Countries that 
became members of the EU in May 2004 and 
include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Two additional countries, 
Romania and Bulgaria joined in January 2007. 
Resolution Funds Privately financed funds whose 
function is to support crisis management 
authorities in their effort to avoid contagion 
between banks and limiting systemic risk. 
Ricardian equivalence Under fairly restrictive 
theoretical assumptions on the consumer’s 
behaviour (inter alia infinite horizon for decision 
making), the impact of fiscal policy does not 
depend on whether it is financed by tax increases 
or by a widening deficit. The basic reasoning 
behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and 
was revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s. 
Securitisation  Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with 
the intention of paying interest and capital out of 
the proceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or 
from future revenue flows. 
Sensitivity analysis  An econometric or statistical 
simulation designed to test the robustness of an 
estimated economic relationship or projection, 
given various changes in the underlying 
assumptions. 
Significant divergence  A sizeable excess of the 
budget balance over the targets laid out in the 
stability or convergence programmes, that triggers 
the Early warning procedure of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Size of the public sector  Typically measured as 
the ratio of public expenditure to nominal GDP. 
‘Snow-ball’ effect  The self-reinforcing effect of 
public debt accumulation or decumulation arising 
from a positive or negative differential between the 
interest rate paid on public debt and the growth 
rate of the national economy. See also government 
budget constraint. 
Social security contributions (SSC)  Mandatory 
contributions paid by employers and employees to 
a social insurance scheme to cover for pension, 
health care and other welfare provisions. 
Sovereign bond spread  The difference between 
risk premiums imposed by financial markets on 
sovereign bonds for different states. Higher risk 
premiums can largely stem from (i) the debt 
service ratio, also reflecting the countries' ability to 
raise their taxes for a given level of GDP, (ii) the 
fiscal track record, (iii) expected future deficits, 
and (iv) the degree of risk aversion. 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)  Approved in 
1997 and reformed in 2005, the SGP clarifies the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the 
surveillance of Member State budgetary policies 
and the monitoring of budget deficits during the 
third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two 
Council Regulations setting out legally binding 
provisions to be followed by the European 
Institutions and the Member States and two 
Resolutions of the European Council in 
Amsterdam (June 1997). See also Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. 
Stability programmes  Medium-term budgetary 
strategies presented by those Member States that 
have already adopted the euro. They are updated 
annually, according to the provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. See also Convergence 
programmes. 
Stock-flow adjustment The stock-flow 
adjustment (also known as the debt-deficit 
adjustment) ensures consistency between the net 
borrowing (flow) and the variation in the stock of 
gross debt. It includes the accumulation of 
financial assets, changes in the value of debt 
denominated in foreign currency, and remaining 
statistical adjustments. 
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Structural budget balance The actual budget 
balance net of the cyclical component and one-off 
and other temporary measures. The structural 
balance gives a measure of the underlying trend in 
the budget balance. See also primary structural 
budget balance. 
Sustainability  A combination of budget deficits 
and debt that ensure that the latter does not grow 
without bound. While conceptually intuitive, an 
agreed operational definition of sustainability has 
proven difficult to achieve. 
SYMBOL SYstemic Model of Banking 
Originated Losses developed by a joint team of 
Commission services (Joint Research Centre and 
the Directorate-General for Internal Market and 
services of the European Commission) together 
with academic experts on banking regulation 
aiming at estimating the losses originated in the 
banking system. 
Tax elasticity A parameter measuring the relative 
change in tax revenues with respect to a relative 
change in GDP. The tax elasticity is an input to the 
budgetary sensitivity. 
Tax gaps  Measure used in the assessment of the 
sustainability of public finances. They measure the 
difference between the current tax ratio and the 
constant tax ratio over a given projection period to 
achieve a predetermined level of debt at the end of 
that projection period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax smoothing  The idea that tax rates should be 
kept stable in order to minimise the distortionary 
effects of taxation, while leaving it for the 
automatic stabilisers to smooth the economic 
cycle. It is also referred to as neutral discretionary 
fiscal policy. See also cyclical component of fiscal 
policy. 
Tax wedge  The deviation from equilibrium 
price/quantity as a result of a taxation, which 
results in consumers paying more, and suppliers 
receiving less. When referring to labour tax wedge 
more specifically, the tax wedge is usually 
regarded as the difference between the difference 
between the salary costs of an average worker to 
their employer and the amount of net income that 
the worker receives in return, the difference being 
represented by taxes including personal income 
taxes and compulsory social security contributions. 
Total factor productivity  Represents the share of 
total output not explained by the level of inputs 
(labour, capital or primary product). It is generally 
considered as a measure of overall productive 
efficiency. 
UMTS Third generation of technical support for 
mobile phone communications. Sale of UMTS 
licences gave rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 
2001. 
Welfare state Range of policies designed to 
provide insurance against unemployment, sickness 
and risks associated with old age. 
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European Union 
European Commission ec.europa.eu 
Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/index_en.htm 
Eurostat  epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
European Council consilium.europa.eu 
European Parliament www.europarl.europa.eu 
 
Economics and Finance Ministries 
Belgium  www.treasury.fgov.be/interthes Ministère des Finances - 
Ministerie van Financen 
Bulgaria www.minfin.bg Ministry of Finance 
Czech Republic www.mfcr.cz Ministry of Finance 
Denmark www.fm.dk Ministry of Finance 
Germany www.bundesfinanzministerium.de Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
Estonia www.fin.ee Ministry of Finance 
Ireland www.irlgov.ie/finance Department of Finance 
Greece www.mnec.gr/en/  Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Spain www.mineco.es/ Ministerio de Economía y 
Hacienda 
France www.finances.gouv.fr Ministère Économie, Finances et 
l'Industrie 
Italy www.tesoro.it Ministero dell’Economia e delle 
Finanze 
Cyprus www.mof.gov.cy Ministry of Finance 
Latvia www.fm.gov.lv Ministry of Finance 
Lithuania www.finmin.lt Ministry of Finance 
Luxembourg www.etat.lu/FI Ministère des Finances 
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Hungary www.p-m.hu Ministry of Finance 
Malta finance.gov.mt Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs 
Netherlands www.minfin.nl Ministerie van Financien 
Austria www.bmf.gv.at Bundesministerium für Finanzen 
Poland www.mofnet.gov.pl Ministry of Finance 
Portugal www.min-financas.pt Ministério das Finanças 
Romania www.mfinante.ro Ministry of Finance 
Slovenia  www.gov.si/mf Ministry of Finance 
Slovak Republic www.finance.gov.sk Ministry of Finance 
Finland www.vn.fi/vm Ministry of Finance 
Sweden finans.regeringen.se Finansdepartementet 
United Kingdom  www.hm-treasury.gov.uk Her Majesty's Treasury 
 
Central Banks 
European Union www.ecb.int European Central Bank 
Belgium  www.nbb.be Banque Nationale de Belgique / 
Nationale Bank van België 
Bulgaria www.bnb.bg Bulgarian National Bank 
Czech Republic www.cnb.cz Czech National Bank 
Denmark www.nationalbanken.dk Danmarks Nationalbank 
Germany www.bundesbank.de Deutsche Bundesbank 
Estonia www.eestipank.info Eesti Pank 
Ireland www.centralbank.ie Central Bank of Ireland 
Greece www.bankofgreece.gr Bank of Greece 
Spain www.bde.es Banco de España 
France  www.banque-france.fr Banque de France 
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Italy www.bancaditalia.it Banca d'Italia 
Cyprus www.centralbank.gov.cy  Central Bank of Cyprus 
Latvia www.bank.lv Bank of Latvia 
Lithuania www.lb.lt Lietuvos Bankas 
Luxembourg www.bcl.lu Banque Centrale du Luxembourg 
Hungary www.mnb.hu National Bank of Hungary 
Malta www.centralbankmalta.com Central Bank of Malta 
Netherlands www.dnb.nl De Nederlandsche Bank 
Austria www.oenb.at Oestereichische  Nationalbank 
Poland www.nbp.pl Narodowy Bank Polski 
Portugal www.bportugal.pt Banco de Portugal 
Romania www.bnro.ro National Bank of Romania 
Slovenia  www.bsi.si Bank of Slovenia 
Slovak Republic www.nbs.sk National Bank of Slovakia 
Finland www.bof.fi Suomen Pankki 
Sweden www.riksbank.com Sveriges Riksbank 
United Kingdom www.bankofengland.co.uk Bank of England 
 
 
EU fiscal surveillance framework 
Stability and Growth Pact: 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/index_en.htm?cs_mid=570 
Excessive deficit procedure: 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy554_en.htm 
Early warning mechanism: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy1075_en.htm 
Stability and convergence programmes: 
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ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy528_en.htm 
Sustainability of public finances: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy546_en.htm  
Quality of public finances 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12186_en.htm  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/epc_publications_en.htm#Quality%20of%20public%20finances 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/index_en.htm 
 
